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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to consider the relationship between philosophy and 
biography, and the bearing that this relationship has on debates concerning the 
nature and function of philosophy. There exists a certain tradition that 
conceives philosophy exclusively in terms of rational discourse and as such 
explicitly rejects the idea of any substantial relationship between philosophy 
and the way in which one lives. I shall argue that the claim that philosophy 
cannot have any impact upon biography is often based upon an implicit 
conception of philosophy as primarily rational discourse. 
In contrast to this I shall draw upon Socratic and Stoic philosophical 
resources in order to reconstruct an alternative conception of philosophy as an 
art concerned with one's way of life. Central to this conception will be the 
relationship between philosophical discourse or argument and philosophical 
training or exercise. I shall argue that the ancient claim that philosophy is 
primarily expressed in one's behaviour presupposes a conception of 
philosophy as an art that involves both rational discourse and training or 
exercise as two equally important components. I shall argue that by adopting 
this alternative conception of philosophy as a techne it will be possible to 
understand properly the relationship between philosophy and biography. 
In Part One I shall outline the ancient idea that philosophy is something 
expressed in one's life, the Socratic conception of philosophy as an art, the 
Stoic development of this conception into an art of living, and some ancient 
objections to this Stoic conception. In Part Two I shall examine the 
relationship between philosophical discourse and exercises in Stoic 
philosophy, focusing upon the neglected concept of philosophical askesis. 
Central to this will be the literary form of such exercises and so I shall focu~ 
upon two texts (by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius) concerned witt 
philosophical exercises. 
IX 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Topic 
In his senes of lectures on the history of philosophy Hegel found himself 
confronted with a peculiar difficulty when he came to discuss Socrates. l His 
problem was that, in the case of Socrates, Hegel found it difficult to 
disentangle what he considered to be the merely biographical from what he 
held to be truly philosophical. He noted, quite rightly, that with Socrates 
philosophy and biography are intimately interrelated.2 For Hegel this devalued 
Socrates' philosophy insofar as he thought that philosophy proper must be 
removed from the here and now of an individual's life and developed into an 
1 Hegel, Vorlesungen fiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, reconstructed by Michelet from 
lecture notes and first published 1833-36. Michelet also produced a shortened second edition 
in 1840-44 upon which Haldane & Simson's English translation is based. However the edition 
of the German text that I have consulted (in Hegel, Werke, vols 18-20) reproduces Michelet's 
first edition. For discussion of Hegel's portrait of Socrates see Montuori, De Socrate Iuste 
Damnato, pp. 11-15; Socrates: PhYSiology of a Afyth, p. 32; Kierkegaard, The Concept of 
Irony, pp. 219-37; Kofinan, Socrates: Fictions ofa Philosopher, pp. 39-124. 
~ See Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 389: "Socrates' life [ ... ] is. 
however, closely intertwined with his interest in Philosophy, and the events of his life are 
bOlmd up with his principles". 
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abstract system. 3 In the case of the Cynics, whose philosophy is preserved 
almost exclusively in biographical anecdotes and aphorisms, Hegel was even 
more dismissive. 4 These judgements reflect Hegel's own conception of the 
nature and function of philosophy as it is outlined in the Introduction to the 
lectures~ namely as a matter of universal thought directed towards truth. 5 
Hegel's difficulties with Socrates and the Cynics derive from the inability of 
this conception of philosophy to consider the philosophical significance of 
biographical material. 6 Philosophy, as conceived by Hegel, cannot deal 
adequately with the idea that an individual's philosophy may be expressed in 
his or her way of life. 
This difficulty is by no means confined to Hegel. Around a century later C. 
D. Broad could not conceive of the possibility that the study of philosophy 
could impact upon an individual's way of life. In particular he claimed that the 
study of ethical theory would make as little impact upon someone's conduct as 
3 See Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 396: "Because the philosophy of 
Socrates is no withdrawal from existence now and here into the free, pure regions of thought, 
but is in a piece with his life, it does not proceed to a system". For Hegel's conception of 
Fhilosophy underpinning this judgement see the Introduction to the Lectures, vol. L pp. 1-116. 
See Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 479: "There is nothing particular 
to say of the Cynics, for they possess but little Philosophy, and they did not bring what they 
had into a scientific system"~ vol. 1, p. 484: "Diogenes is only famed for his manner of life; 
",ith him, as with the modems, Cynicism CaIne to signify more a mode of living than a 
philosophy". For discussion see Niehues-Probsting, 'The Modem Reception of Cynicism', pp. 
330-31. 
5 See e.g. Hegel, Lectures on the History ofPhilosop/~y, vol. 1, pp. 7-8, 11, 27, 90. 
6 By 'biography' here and throughout this study I do not mean just the literary genre of written 
biography but rather the course and manner of an individual's life (i.e. what is recorded in a 
written biography). This reflects the range of the Greek word l3io~ which primarily means 
'manner of life' but which also CaIne to be used to signify the literary genre of biography. 
\Vhile my remarks will hopefully apply to the relationship between philosophy and written 
biography, their primary concern is with the relationship between an individual's philosophy 
and the way in which he or she lives. 
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the study of dynamics would upon someone's golf performance. 7 He went on 
to conclude his own study of ethics with the dismissive remark that ethical 
theory is "quite good fun for those people who like that sort of thing". 8 More 
recently, Bernard Williams has dismissed the claim that the study of 
philosophical accounts of the emotions could have any therapeutic value for 
the individual concerned. 9 In particular he has doubted that philosophy, 
conceived as rigorous argument and intellectual analysis, could impact upon 
how someone leads their life. He says that he cannot himself conceive how the 
study of the logical theory of the Stoic Chrysippus, for instance, could make 
any difference to an individual's behaviour. 10 
At first glance this might suggest some form of ancient -modern dichotomy 
in which ancients such as Socrates and Chrysippus thought philosophy was in 
some way connected to one's way of life, while modems such as Hegel and 
Williams do not. However, an attitude similar to that of Hegel and Williams 
can already be found in Aristotle. In a series of remarks concerning the 
philosophy of Socrates, Aristotle doubted the Socratic claim that the 
possession of knowledge (E1tlO''tllllll) - a definition (6P10'Jl6~) or rational 
account (A6'Yo~) - concerning some particular thing could have any direct 
7 See Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 285 (and cited by Sandbach, The Stoics. p. 11): 
"We can no more learn to act rightly by appealing to the ethical theory of right action than we 
can play golf well by appealing to the mathematical theory of the flight of the golf-ball. The 
interest of ethics is thus almost wholly theoretical, as is the interest of the mathematical theory 
of golf or of billiards". 
8 Broad, Five T..--ypes of Ethical Theory, p. 285. 
9 See Williams. 'Do Not Disturb' (a review of Nussbaum's The Therapy of Desire) and 'Stoic 
Philosophy and the Emotions'. Williams' position has been challenged by Richard Sorabji in 
'Is Stoic Philosophy Helpful as Psychotherapy?' and Emotion and Peace of ~\find, esp. pp. 
159-68. 
10 See Williams, "Do Not Disturb', p. 26. 
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impact upon one's behaviour (~lo<;) in relation to that thing. 11 Insofar as 
Aristotle defines philosophy as a matter of ')..,6YO<;,12 this criticism of Socrates' 
thesis may be seen as the foundation for a more general claim that philosophy 
- conceived as a matter of /....6YO<;,13 an activity primarily concerned with 
giving a rational account of the world - will not have any direct impact upon 
an individual's actions (epya). Williams, in his remarks concerning 
Chrysippus, can also be seen to define philosophy in terms of ')..,6yo<; when he 
characterises it as a subject primarily understood as "rigorous argument". 14 
Moreover, the idea of an ancient-modern dichotomy is further challenged 
by the fact that there have been a number of modem philosophers who have 
affirmed the idea that philosophy might be primarily expressed in an 
11 The key passages are Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1144b28-30 (= SSR I B 30), Ethica 
Eudemia 1216b2-10 (= SSR I B 28), 1246b32-35 (= SSR I B 29), Alagna Aforalia 1198alO-13 
(= SSR I B 33). These will be discussed in Chapter Two § 6. 
12 Aristotle defines philosophy in terms of 1..0"(0'; in lvfetaphysica 981b5-6. He refines his 
understanding of 1..0"(0'; in De Interpretatione 16b26-17a7 to 1..0"(0'; anocpaV't1.leo,;c 'a 
statement that shows or proves something'. The highest form of philosophy for Aristotle will 
be a matter of such statements 0.0,,(01.) concerning first principles and causes (apX<l'; leal 
ahia,;; see }.Jetaphysica 982al-3, with Alexander of Aphrodisias In lv[etaphysica 6.1-5). 
These statements are clearly separable from the behaviour of the individuals who make them. 
Indeed, Aristotle explicitly characterises such knowledge as unconcerned '''ith action (see 
A1etaphysica 982b20-21, witll Alexander of Aphrodisias Inllifetaphysica 5.16-20. 15.22-30). 
This summary account of Aristotle's conception of philosophy would of course be 
complicated considerably if one attempted to take into account some of his remarks in the 
Ethica Nicomachea (esp. 1l03b26-30, 1l05bI2-18). 
13 By 1..0"(0'; in this contex1 I mean a rational account, ex-planation, or definition ex-pressed in 
discourse (see the substantial entry in LSJ). By using tlris word I want to capture the twin 
ideas of rational explanation and verbal expression (AO"(O'; is a ·verbal noun of ')"E,,(O) and 
literally means 'something said'). I shall use 'philosophy conceived as ').,,6"(0';' as shorthand for 
philosophy conceived as an activity concerned with developing a rational understanding of the 
world that is expressed in discourse or argmnent (as opposed to a plrilosophy expressed in 
actions (ep"(a) or way oflife «(3io,;)). 
14 Williams. 'Do Not Disturb', p. 26. 
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individual's behaviour. 15 This is a recurrent theme in the works of Nietzsche 
and is particularly prominent in his essay Schopenhauer as Educator: 
I attach importance to a philosopher only to the extent that he is 
capable of setting an example. [ ... ] the philosopher must supply this 
example in his visible life, and not merely in his books; that is, it must 
be presented in the way the philosophers of Greece taught, through 
facial expressions, demeanor, clothing, food, and custom more than 
through what they said, let alone what they wrote. 16 
For Nietzsche, the true philosopher must offer an image of a complete way of 
life rather than focus upon the abstract notion of attaining 'pure knowledge' 
(reine Wissenschaft).17 The philosopher is an artist and his life is his work of 
art. 18 As is well known, Nietzsche was intimately familiar with ancient 
philosophy and in particular with the anecdotal history of the lives of the 
15 For a preliminary discussion of the significance of the idea of the philosophical life in 
modem philosophy see Miller, 'From Socrates to Foucault: The Problem of the Philosophical 
Life'. 
16 Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as Educator § 3 (KGW III 1, 346; Complete Works, vol. 2. pp. 
183-84). Note also § 8 (KGWIII 1, 413~ Complete Work~, vol. 2, p. 246): "The only possible 
criticism of any philosophy, and the only one that proves anything, is trying to see if one can 
live by this philosophy" . 
17 See Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as Educator § 3 (KGW III 1, 347; Complete Works, yol. 2, p. 
184). 
18 See in particular the following from Nietzsche's NachlaB: "The philosopher's product is his 
l~fe (first, before Iris worb). It is his work of art [Kunstwerk]" (KGW III 4, 29 [205]: Complete 
~Vork~, vol. 11, pp. 274-75)~ "One should have a philosophy only to the e>..1ent that one is 
capable of living according to this plrilosophy" (KGW III 4, 30 [17]; Complete Worb, vol. 11, 
p. 299); "As long as philosophers do not muster the courage to advocate a lifestyle 
[Lebensordnung] structured in an entirely different way and demonstrate it by their own 
example, they will come to nothing" (KGWIll 4,31 [10]; Complete Works. vol. 11. p. 311). 
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losophers by Diogenes Laertius. 19 More recently, two philosophers greatly 
uenced by Nietzsche, and also each drawn to the ancient image of the 
losopher, have considered the relationship between philosophy and 
graphy. The first of these, Michel Foucault, has suggested that philosophy 
~ht be conceived as an activity directed towards turning one's life into a 
rk of art: 
What strikes me is the fact that, in our society, art has become 
something which is related only to objects and not to individuals or to 
life. [ ... J But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why 
should the lamp or the house be an art object but not our life?20 
e second, Gilles Deleuze, in a reading of Spinoza influenced by his own 
Irk on Nietzsche, has developed the concept of 'practical philosophy' 
l1ceived as a mode of living or way of life in which philosophy and life are 
ited.21 Elsewhere, in a discussion concerning the image of the philosopher 
lwing upon Diogenes Laertius, Deleuze has suggested that, 
Nietzsche's early philological work focused on Diogenes Laertius: 'De Laertii Diogenis 
ltibus' (1868-69), 'Allalecta Laertiana' (1870), and Beitrage zur Quellenkunde und Kritik 
• Laertius Diogenes (1870), all in KGW II L For a detailed analysis of their philological 
rit see Barnes, 'Nietzsche and Diogenes Laertius'. 
:<'oucault, 'On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress', in Dits et ecrits, 
I. 4. pp. 392, 617: Essential Works, vol. L p. 261 (for tlus and other references to shorter 
,rks by Foucault I supply references to these two collections rather than tlleir original places 
publication; note that some of these shorter works were first published in English). When in 
s interview Foucault was questioned about this idea, he eA'Plicitly acknowledged 
~tzsche's influence. Foucault's account will be discussed further in Chapter FiYe § 2. 
See Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, esp. pp. 3, 122, 130 (Spinoza: Philosophie 
"ltique, pp. 9-10, 164-65, 175). 
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we should not be satisfied with either biography or bibliography; we 
must reach a secret point where the anecdote of life and the aphorism 
of thought amount to one and the same thing. 22 
lere IS, then, an ongomg debate concermng the relationship between 
lilosophy and biography. In this study my concern is to consider the nature 
~ this relationship and to examine the conceptions of philosophy involved in 
.e various assessments of this relationship. Hegel, for example, is quite open 
mcerning the nature of his own conception of philosophy and it is relatively 
raightforward to see how this has shaped his assessment of Socrates. In other 
lses, the presuppositions concerning the nature and function of philosophy 
:main implicit. The aim of this study is to construct a conception of 
lilosophy that is able to deal adequately with the idea that philosophy is 
)mething that is primarily expressed in one's way of life. Of course one may 
ly that none of the major figures in the history of philosophy - Aristotle and 
:egel included - would deny that the study of philosophy would have some 
npact upon the behaviour of the individual concerned. However in many 
ises this is merely an incidental consequence of what is conceived to be 
rimaril y a matter of developing theoretical understanding. The aim here, 
len, is to explore the possibility of a conception of philosophy in which 
hilosophical ideas are primarily expressed in behaviour, a conception in 
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 128 (Logique du sens, p. 153). This may be seen to form 
ift of Deleuze's r~jection of Platonic transcendence and his affirmation of (in part) Stoic 
lspired immanence. For Deleuze, this move involves replacing the concept of philosophy as 
lIfe thought (philosophy as a reflection upon life) with one in which philosophy and life are 
nited (Philosophy as a way oflife). 
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. 
which understanding is developed not for its own sake but rather'''order to 
1\ 
transform one's way of life, a conception of philosophy that would make 
biography not merely incidentally relevant but rather of central importance to 
philosophy. 23 
Those modern philosophers who have been sympathetic to this idea have 
often turned to antiquity for inspiration. It is of course a commonplace to 
proclaim that in antiquity philosophy was conceived as a way of life. To be a 
philosopher in antiquity - a Platonist, a Stoic, an Epicurean, a Cynic, a 
Neoplatonist, even an Aristotelian - meant that one would live in a 
specifically philosophical manner.24 However, on its own, this claim tells us 
little concerning how one might understand the relationship between an 
individual's philosophy and his way of life. Of those who have attempted to 
explore this question, Foucault has been most explicit, suggesting that in 
antiquity philosophy was often conceived as an art of living, a "techne tou 
biou" . 25 As a matter of fact this phrase does not appear in this precise form in 
the ancient literature.26 However there are references to a "C£XVll nept "Cov ~iov, 
an art concerned with one's way of life. Almost all of the ancient occurrences 
of this phrase derive from sources with Stoic connections and it is with the 
23 Thus my concern here is with the idea that biography may be of philosophical relevance 
insofar as it e~'Presses philosophical ideas (i.e. the impact of philosophy on one's biography): I 
am not concerned with the idea that certain biographical information may contribute to 
understanding the formation of a philosophical position (Le. not the impact of biography on 
one's philosophy), 
24 For general studies of different conceptions of philosophy in antiquity see Hadot, Qu 'est-ce 
que la philosophie antique?; Jordan, Ancient Concepts of Philosophy; Domanski, La 
philosophie, theorie ou maniere de vivre?; Gauss, Plato's Conception of Philosophy; Chroust, 
'Late Hellenistic 'Te~1book Definitions' of Philosophy'. 
25 See e.g. Foucault, The Care of the Self, pp. 43-45 (Le souci de soi, pp. 60-63). Note also 
Nehamas, The Art of Living, p. 96, who also uses this phrase. 
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Stoics that this conception of philosophy as the art of living came to be 
developed. 27 Insofar as they appear to have been the only ancient 
philosophical school to explore the nature of this relationship between 
philosophy and biography in any detail, it is with them that this study ~ be 
" "I " " Jt&':, ~LS pnman y concerned. The StOIC Eplctetus d@tiftcs philosophy thus: 
Philosophy does not promise to secure anything external for man, 
otherwise it would be admitting something that lies beyond its proper 
subject-matter. For just as wood is the material of the carpenter, 
bronze that of the statuary, so each individual's own life (6 ~ioC; au'tou 
E1cUcr't01.)) is the material (UA:Tl) of the art of living ('tfjc; 1U:pt ~iov 
't£XVllC;)?8 
Here Epictetus presents his philosophy conceived as an art of living as an 
activity directed towards the transformation of one's way of life (~ioC;). In 
26 This and all of the following data concerning the frequency of phrases derive from the 
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae database and the Packard Humanities Institute Latin database. 
27 The formulation 'tEXV'l11tEPt 'to" l3iov occurs 4 times, all in Se:~1:us Empiricus (Pyrrhoniae 
Hypotyposes 3.272, 273, Advers'Us Mathematicos 11.1S0, 209). Variations on this formulation 
occur a total of 41 times, of which 34 occur in Se:\1us (many in his preferred form 1) 1tEpt 'tOv 
l3iov 't£XV'l1) during his series of arguments against the idea of an art of living (which will be 
discussed in Chapter Four § 2). The remaining 7 occurrences are: Epictetus Dissertationes 
1.15.2, Chrysippus apud Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 3.S.16 (5.352 Kiihn = 
226.25-29 De Lacy = Sf/F 2.909, 911), Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.5blO (2.66.14-67.4 
WH = SVF 3.560), Strabo 1.1.1 (= Posidonius test. 75 EK), Philo Legum Allegoria 1.57 (= 
SVF 3.202), Plutarch Quaestiones Convivales 613b, and Clement of Alexandria Paedagogus 
2.2 (PG S.420a), the most important of which will be discussed in Chapter Three § 1. Latin 
equivalents would be ars vitae and ars vivendi; these occur in Cicero De Finibus 1.42, 1.72, 
3.4,4.19,5.16, 5.1S, Tusculanae Disputationes 2.12, Academica 2.23, Seneca, Epistulae 95.7, 
95.S, 95.9. Note also Seneca fro 17 Haase apud Lactantius Divinae Institutiones 3.15.1 (PL 
6.390-91). 
28 Epictetlls Dissertationes 1.15.2: q>tAo<Joq>i<x 'tOO" EK't~ 'tt 1tEpt1tOl.lt<JEtV 'tiP Cx.v8po)1tQ>" Ei. Of 
Jilt, El;ro 'tt 'tfl~ ioi<x~ UAll~ tiV<xOtl;E't<Xt. ~ "{ap1:tK'tOvO~ UAll 'ta l;uAa, Cx.VOPl<XV't01tOl.OU 6 
X<XAK6~, o'h~ 'tfl~ 1tEpi l3iov 'tEXV'Il~ UA1l613io~ <xu'tOu EKa<J'to'O. 
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contrast to the conception of philosophy as A6'Yo~, this conception is explicitly 
concerned with the way in which one lives. The function of philosophy, for 
Epictetus, is to transform one's behaviour, and any development in genuine 
philosophical understanding will, for him, always be expressed in one's 
actions (epya). This idea of an art ('t£XV''l) concerned with transforming one's 
behaviour clearly shares something with the Socrates of the Apology and the 
early Platonic dialogues where knowledge of human excellence (ap£'tl1) is 
repeatedly compared to knowledge of an art or craft ('t£XV''l).29 
A provisional generalisation would be to say that for philosophers such as 
Aristotle, Hegel, and Williams, philosophy is conceived as primarily a matter 
of A6'Yo~; for Socrates, the Stoics, Nietzsche, and Foucault, philosophy is 
conceived as a 't£XV''l, and in particular a 't£XV''l primarily concerned with 
transforming one's J)iO~.30 Insofar as philosophers who conceive philosophy in 
terms of A6'Yo~ appear to be unable to deal adequately with the philosophical 
significance of biography and the more general relationship between 
philosophy and biography, the aim of this study is to draw upon primarily 
Stoic ancient philosophical resources in order to construct a conception of 
philosophy that can deal with this relationship. 
A common objection to the characterisation of philosophy as an art of 
living is the claim that, insofar as it downplays the role of A6'Yo~, it makes a 
29 ill general I translate 'tEXVll as 'art' but occasionally use 'craft', 'skill', or all three together. 
Another alternative sometimes used is 'e:\.rpertise' (e.g. Annas & Barnes, Sextus Empiricus, 
Outlines of Scepticism). I often use 'expert' for 'tEXV1'tllC; rather than 'artist' or 'craftsman'. 
Socrates' apparent use of an analogy between 'tEXVll and <XpE'tTt will be discussed (and 
qualified) in Chapter Two § 4. 
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philosophical way of life indistinguishable from other, say, religious ways of 
life also common in antiquity. 31 Yet what distinguishes a philosophical way of 
life from these religious ways of life is the fact that it is grounded upon, and 
expresses a desire for, rational understanding as opposed to, say, mystical 
insight or unquestioned faith in a system of beliefs. What makes the concept of 
an art of living specifically philosophical is the essential role that rational 
understanding, analysis, or argument (AOYO~) plays within it. What 
distinguishes this conception of philosophy from that held by Aristotle, Hegel, 
or Williams is that this rational understanding is not constitutive but rather 
simply a necessary condition. It is the philosopher's distinctively rational way 
of life (f.\io~) that is constitutive, his actions and behaviour, which are of 
course an expression of his rational understanding. 
The central task of this study will be to construct a conception of 
philosophy in which AOYOC; is a necessary component but is not the only 
constitutive element. In order to accomplish this task I shall draw upon those 
ancient philosophers who explicitly conceived philosophy in these terms, 
namely the Stoics, but also Socrates insofar as he can be seen to lay the 
foundations for their conception of an art of living, a 'tEXV'l 1tEpt 'tOY ~iov. 
Central to this conception of philosophy will be the significance of 
philosophical exercise or training (licrKll<nc;) and the role that this plays 
30 Of course this is merely a generalisation in order to contrast two general conceptions of 
philosophy. I do not mean to make any substantive claims concerning any of these 
philosophers at this stage. 
31 See e.g. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, pp. 353-54, who criticises Foucault and 
"affiliated '\-vriters" (by which she appears to mean Pierre Radot) on this point. She suggests 
that their accounts place too much emphasis upon "habits and techniques du soi" (i.e. 
INTRODUCTION 12 
alongside rational discourse (AOYO<;) in the concept of an art (t£XV'l)?2 The 
reconstruction of this conception of philosophy will allow two things. Firstly, 
it will make it possible to approach those ancient philosophers who conceived 
philosophy in these terms with a proper understanding of their implicit 
presuppositions concerning what it was that they thought they were engaged 
in. This is essential in order to avoid anachronistic judgements?3 Closely 
related to this is the re-assessment of certain authors who have often been 
dismissed as non-philosophical without pausing to consider the assumptions 
implicit within such a judgement. Secondly, reconstructing this conception of 
philosophy will, it is hoped, form a contribution to the more general debate 
concerning the nature of the relationship between philosophy and biography 
and the nature and function of philosophy as such. 
2. The Structure 
The ftrst chapter of this study is devoted to developing an understanding of the 
relationship between philosophy and biography as conceived in antiquity. 
Beginning with a series of anecdotal stories concerning the status of 'the 
(i(Jl(TJ<nc;) and do not acknowledge the importance of rational argument (i.e. /"'0"(0C;). I shall 
discuss this further in Chapter Five § 2 (b). 
32 It should be noted that this concern with the constitutive elements of'ttXVll is quite different 
to the debate between the rationalist and empiricist medical schools concerning the foundation 
of the art of medicine. 111at debate - concerning the relationship between reason and 
e:\.'Perience - was primarily concerned 'with the acquisition of technical expertise in medicine 
and, in particular, how one might come to know the AOYOl underpinning a 'ttXVTJ· For further 
discussion see Frede's Introduction to Walzer & Frede, Galen, Three Treatises 011 the Xature 
a/Science, pp. ix-xx:\.iv. 
33 See in particular the excellent discussion of this risk in Frede, 'The Philosopher', in 
Brunschwig & Lloyd, eds, Greek Thought, pp. 3-19, esp. p. 4. 
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lilosopher's beard' in the Graeco-Roman world, it will move on to consider 
le way in which philosophy was often presented as a matter of actions rather 
tan words (epya ou AOYOt). Central here will be the philosophical 
gnificance attached to biographical and anecdotal literature concerning the 
yes of ancient philosophers. This first chapter will set the scene for the 
lbsequent discussion. 
In the second chapter I shall begin to develop an understanding of the 
oncept of an art of living by turning to Socrates as he is portrayed by Plato in 
le Apology. In this text Socrates can be seen to outline an embryonic 
onception of an art (tEXVll) concerned with one's way of life (~io~). I shall 
Iso consider a number of the early Platonic dialogues in which this idea is 
eveloped, in particular Alcibiades I and the Gorgias. However my focus will 
e upon the historical Socrates rather than the character in Plato's dialogues. 34 
:onsequently I am less concerned with what these dialogues may tell us about 
-lato's own philosophical position and I shall also draw upon other Socratic 
ources, in particular Xenophon.35 I shall also consider what I take to be a 
,roblem with one aspect of Aristotle's portrait of Socrates insofar as this will 
lelp to bring into focus the issues at hand. 36 The main reason for this focus 
4 For my approach to the 'problem of Socrates' see Additional Note 1. 
5 As ,vith the Platonic dialogues, I shall make use of Xenophon's works (primarily the 
Iemorabilia) only to the extent that they present or elaborate ideas that can be found in 
'lato's Apology (see Additional Note 1). For further discussion of Xenophon as a source for 
;ocrates see in particular Chroust, Socrates Afan and Alyth and Cooper, 'Notes on 
Cenophon's Socrates'. 
6 Beyond Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, there is the portrayal of Socrates by Aristophanes 
II the Clouds (for which see Dover, 'Socrates in the Clouds'; Vander Waerdt 'Socrates in the 
:louds'; Montuori. 'Socrates Between the First and Second Clouds', in Socrates: An 
lpproach, pp. 85-145) and numerous later testimonia now collected in Giannantoni's Socratis 
,t Socraticorum Religuiae (many of which are translated in Ferguson, Socrates: A Source 
~ook). I have already discussed these and their potential yalue yery briefly in my "The 
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upon the historical rather than the Platonic Socrates is the fact that the Stoics 
(and before them the Cynics) claimed to be followers of Socrates,37 yet, at the 
same time, clearly distanced themselves from Plato?8 The Socrates with which 
I am concerned, then, is the Socrates who inspired Zeno to study philosophy 
and eventually to begin his teaching in the Painted Stoa (Lton nOtK1All),39 and 
the Socrates who appears throughout the works of later Stoics such as 
Epictetus as the ultimate role model for the Stoic sage. 40 It is clearly beyond 
Problem of Socrates' (an exemplary example of what needs to be done can be found in 
Glucker, 'Socrates in the Academic Books and Other Ciceronian Works'). For further 
discussion of what has come to be known as 'the problem of Socrates' see the works referred 
to in Additional Note 1. 
37 See for example the judgement of Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, vol. 
3, p. 505: "Antisthenes, and his disciple Diogenes, were in many respects closer 
approximations to Sokrates than either Plato or any other of the Sokratic companions"; also 
Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 4. For the Cynic appropriation of Socrates see Long, 'The 
Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics', pp. 28-46. For the Stoic 
appropriation see Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy'; Striker, 'Plato' s Socrates and the 
Stoics'. This Cynic-Stoic appropriation of Socrates is particularly clear in the Arabic tradition 
where he becomes 'Socrates of the Barrer~ see Alon, Socrates in c\fediaeval Arabic 
Literature, pp. 30-31, 49. 
38 On a range of philosophical topics the Stoics can be seen to respond to Platonic positions 
and to oppose them. For ancient awareness of this opposition see Numenius apud Eusebius 
14.6.11 (732d = SVF 1.12). For their disagreement in ontology see Brunschwig. 'The Stoic 
Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic Ontology', p. 125. For politics see Plutarch De 
Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1034e (= SVF 1.260). For ethics see Striker, 'Plato's Socrates and the 
Stoics', p. 242. For psychology see Sedley, 'Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality', p. 313. 
In the last two cases these responses have been characterised as ex.-plicit attempts to rescue 
Socratic positions from Platonic criticisms. 
39 See Diogenes Laertius 7.2 (= SVF 1.1) who reports that Zeno was inspired to study 
philosophy after reading Book 2 of Xenophon's A!emorabilia. For discussion of the 
Xenophonic character of the Stoic image of Socrates see Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic 
Philosophy', pp. 152-54, 160-64. 
40 The sources for Socrates used by Epictetus are difficult to determine. He clearly knew the 
works of Plato and often cites him (for which see Jagu, Epictefe et Platon). A passage at 
Dissertationes 2.17.35-36 implies that Epictetus also knew the works of Xenophon and 
Antisthenes, and at Dissertationes 4.6.20 he quotes from Antisthenes (although probably from 
his Cvrus rather than one of his Socratic works; see fro 20a DC = SSR V A 86). However 
Antisthenes' Socratic dialogues appear to have been readily available to Dio Chrysostom -
Epictetus's fellow pupil under Musonius Rufus - and thus were still in circulation in the late 
first century AD (on which see Brancacci, 'Dio, Socrates, and Cynicism', esp. pp. 241-5~). In 
the light of this. it would perhaps be hasty to reject certain features of Epictetus' s portrait of 
Socrates as 'idealisations' or 'distortions' simply because they do not agree "ith the other 
sources that survive. Antisthenes was older than both Plato and Xenophon and may \vell haYe 
been considerably closer to Socrates than either of them. If Epictetus drew upon Antisthenes' 
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the scope of this study (or perhaps any) to reconstruct fully either the Stoic 
image of Socrates or the historical Socrates. My remarks concerning the 
Socratic conception of an art ('tEXVll) concerned with one's way of life (~io<;) 
are thus to a certain extent provisional and are intended simply to function as a 
foundation for an understanding of the Stoic conception of an art of living. 
In the third chapter I shall tum to the Stoics themselves and examine how 
they took up Socrates' scattered remarks concerning the nature of philosophy 
and used them to construct a fully-fledged concept of an art of living. Of 
particular importance will be the way in which the Stoics developed the 
Socratic idea of an art ('tEXV11) concerned with the health of the soul (",'Ox'll), 
their more formal attempts to define an art ('tEXVll), and their discussion of the 
relationship between philosophical theory (AOYO<;) and exercise (aaKllat<;). In 
order to do this I shall draw upon a wide range of Stoic sources and shall use 
the term 'Stoic' in a fairly broad way.41 However throughout this study I shall 
often return to the works of Epictetus. There are a number of reasons for this. 
The first is that the texts that have come down to us under the name of 
Epictetus constitute the largest collection of documents relating to Stoicism 
written in Greek. 42 Secondly, these texts derive from a Stoic philosopher 
rather than an intellectual with an interest in Stoicism (such as Cicero) or a 
hostile member of a different philosophical tradition (such as Plutarch or 
Philodemus). Thirdly, in antiquity Epictetus gained a considerable reputation 
now lost portraits of Socrates then his presentation of Socrates may well be based. in part on 
one of the most important ancient sources for Socrates. 
41 See Additional Note 2. 
42 For the authorship and transmission of these texis see Additional Note 3. 
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as an important Stoic philosopher and as a faithful follower of the early Stoa.43 
Fourthly, the material in Epictetus is directly relevant to my concerns here, 
namely the relationship between philosophical discourse and one's way of life. 
Another important source, especially for the Stoic concept of an art of living, 
is Sextus Empiricus, to whom Chapter Four is devoted. While Epictetus (c. 
55-135) was probably at his most active c. 100 (his Discourses have been 
dated to c. 108),44 Sextus has been given afloruit of c. 150-170.45 It is likely 
that the 'Stoics' to whom his polemic is addressed would have been those 
influenced by Epictetus and active during a period in which Epictetus's fame 
was at its greatest. 46 Thus, if any qualification should be placed on my use of 
the term 'Stoic' it should perhaps be to note this focus upon the Stoicism of 
the second century AD. Indeed, a number of the other authors that I shall draw 
43 For ancient testimonies see Aulus Gellius 1.2.6 (= test. 8 Schenkl), who calls Epictetus the 
greatest of the Stoics (Stoicorum maximus), Celsus apud Origen Contra Celsum 6.2 (PG 
11.1289 = test. 26 Schenkl) who comments upon his popularity, Fronto Epistulae (2.52 
Haines) who calls him a sage (sapiens), Galen De Libris Propriis 11 (19.44 KUhn = test. 20 
Schenkl) who devoted a work to him, and Augustine De Civitate Dei 9.4.2 (PL 41.259, 
following Aulus Gellius 19.1.14 = fro 9 Schenkl), who says that the doctrines of Epictetus 
were in harmony \\!J..th those of Zeno and Cluysippus. For modern assessments of his 
orthodoxy see Bonhoffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epfctet, pp. iii-iv (= The Ethics of the Stoic 
Epictetus, pp. 3-4); Brehier, The History C?f Philosophy: The Hellenistic and Roman Age, p. 
154; Hadot, The Inner Citadel, p. 82. 
44 See Millar, 'Epictetus and the Imperial Court', p. 142, and Additional Note 3. 
45 See Bett, !)'extus Ernpiricus, Against the Ethicists, p. ix n. 3. 
46 Bett, Sextus Empiricus, Against the EthiCists, p. ix, suggests that Sextus's polemic was 
directed towards philosophers who "lived centuries before his own time". However it has been 
argued (with regard to Plotinus's polemic against the Gnostics in Enneades 2.9 and 
Simplicius's polemic against the Manichaeans in In Epicteti Enchiridton 35) that such 
polemics were usually a response to direct contact ,,!J..th adherents of the philosophical position 
under attack (see Tardieu, 'Sabiens coraniques et 'Sabiens' de Harran', pp. 24-25 n. 105; 
Hadot, 'The Life and Work of Simplicius', p. 287). It makes more sense to suppose that 
Se~1us's polemic was inspired by direct contact with contemporary followers of Epictetus 
(who no doubt would have laid great stress on the idea of an art of living) than with written 
texts that would have been centuries old. As Hadot notes (Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 
191), it is likely that in the second century Epictetus would have been the greatest authority 
for questions concerning Stoic philosophy. Thus, pace Betl I suggest that Se~1us's target was 
probably Epictetus. 
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upon - Marcus Aurelius (121-180), Plutarch (c. 50-120), Galen (c. 129-210), 
and Aulus Gellius (c. 130-180) - all belong to this period. 
As I have mentioned, in Chapter Four I shall consider a senes of 
objections to the idea of an art of living raised by Sextus Empiricus. By 
considering each of these objections in tum I shall attempt to clarify and 
perhaps refine the Stoic concept. I shall also consider to what extent Sextus's 
scepticism, despite these objections, nevertheless still maintains the idea that 
philosophy is something primarily expressed in one's way of life (~ioC;). 
These four chapters constitute Part One, all focusing on the relationship 
between ~ioC; and 'rEXV'll, and the concept of a 'rEXV'll concerned with one's 
~ioC;. In these chapters I shall suggest that philosophy conceived as 'rEXV'll is 
able to impact upon one' s ~ioC; because it involves not just 'AoyoC; but also 
aO"lC'llO"tC; . 
In Part Two I shall move on to explore the relationship between these two 
components of 'rEXV'll further. Chapter Five will focus upon the notion of a 
philosophical or spiritual exercise (aO"K'llO"tC;), considering its function and its 
form. Particular attention will be paid to the way in which in antiquity 
philosophical exercises were often expressed in very specific forms of 
literature. Just as philosophical theory may be seen to have its own literary 
genre in the form of the treatise, so philosophical exercises may be seen to 
have their own genre; a form of writing that, to a modem audience, may often 
appear to be of little philosophical interest. 
Chapters Six and Seven will explore the relationship between A6yoC; and 
aO"lCl10"tC; further by examining two examples of literary genres specific to 
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philosophical aO'KllO'le;. These are the Handbook of Epictetus and the 
Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Central here will be the way in which such 
philosophical exercises are closely connected to certain literary forms and the 
significance this may have for an assessment of a text as 'philosophical'. In 
particular I shall attempt to show in these chapters that, when placed within 
the context of philosophy conceived as a 't£XVll involving both 'Aoyoe; and 
aOKllO'le;, texts such as the Handbook and the Meditations can be seen to be 
profoundly philosophical. 
In the Conclusion I shall draw upon the ancient philosophical positions I 
have discussed in order to sketch the outline of a conception of philosophy 
that can deal adequately with the idea that philosophy might be primarily 
expressed in an individual's way of life Cl3ioe;). In particular I shall draw 
attention to a number of later thinkers who can be seen to develop the idea that 
philosophy is a 't£xvll concerned with one's l3ioe; in order to emphasise again 
that the two competing conceptions of philosophy that I have outlined so far 
do not form an ancient-modem dichotomy_ This is important in order to show 
that the Socratic and Stoic conception of philosophy is not merely an 
interesting episode in the history of ideas but rather the foundation of a 
tradition concerning how one might conceive the nature and function of 
philosophy which has existed throughout the history of Western philosophy_ 
What I am about to present, then, is not merely an historical excursion but 
hopefully a contribution to the contemporary debate concerning the nature and 
function of philosophy as such. 
PART ONE 
~ioC; and 'tEX,VT} 
CHAPTER ONE 
PHILOSOPHY AND BIOGRAPHY 
1. The Philosopher's Beard 
In AD 176 the Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius 
created four chairs of philosophy in Athens, one for each of the major 
schools. 1 When, a few years later, the holder of the Peripatetic Chair died, two 
equally well qualified candidates applied for the post.2 One of the candidates, 
Diodes, was already very old so it seemed that his rival, Bagoas, would be 
sure to get the job. However, one of the selection committee objected to 
Bagoas on the grounds that he did not have beard saying that, above all else, a 
philosopher should always have a long beard in order to inspire confidence in 
his students.3 Bagoas responded by saying that if philosophers are to be judged 
1 See Dio Cassius 72.31.3, Philostratus Vitae Sophistarum 2.2 (566), Lucian Eunuchus 3, "ith 
Birley, Alarcus Aurelius, p. 195. 
2 The following story derives from Lucian's Eunuchus and is generally agreed to be fictional. 
3 See Lucian Eunuchus 8: "One [of the judges] said that presence and a fine physical 
endowment should be among the attributes of a philosopher, and that above all else he should 
have a long beard that would inspire confidence in those who visited him and sought to 
become Iris pupils" (trans. Harmon). 
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only by the length of their beards then perhaps the chair of Peripatetic 
philosophy should be given to a billy-goat.4 The matter was considered to be 
of such grave importance that it was referred to the highest authorities m 
Rome, presumably to the Emperor himself 5 
From this no doubt apocryphal story one can see that in antiquity, and in 
particular in Graeco-Roman antiquity, the beard came to be seen as the 
defining characteristic of the philosopher; philosophers had to have beards, 
and anyone with a beard was assumed to be a philosopher.6 Why was it that 
the beard became so closely associated in the popular imagination with the 
figure of the philosopher? What does it say about the nature of philosophy as it 
was conceived in antiquity? Before answering these questions, it might be 
helpful to consider in a little detail the origin and status of the phenomenon 
that came to be know as 'the philosopher's beard'. 
The cultural phenomenon of 'the philosopher's beard' has a somewhat 
complex history. Although when thinking of bearded ancient philosophers one 
might first turn to the examples of Socrates and Plato, their beards were not 
'philosophers' beards'. In fifth and fourth century Athens shaving was not a 
widespread practice and, as a rule, every adult Greek male wore a beard. The 
introduction of shaving is generally credited to Alexander the Great towards 
the end of the fourth century Be and it seems to have become very popular. 
Yet in the period immediately after Alexander philosophers tended to continue 
to sport beards in contrast to the newly emerging fashion. Yet these beards -
4 See Lucian Eunuchus 9. 
5 See Lucian Eunuchus 12. 
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the beards of Zeno and Epicurus - were still not fully fledged 'philosophers' 
beards'. 
In the third century BC the focus of philosophical activity began to shift 
from Athens to Rome. According to tradition, the earliest Romans grew their 
beards long. 7 However, barbers were first introduced to Rome from Sicily 
around 300 BC, bringing with them the custom of shaving. 8 One of the first to 
take up the practice of daily shaving was Scipio Africanus towards the end of 
the third century BC.9 If shaving was common in Hellenistic Greece, it 
became almost compulsory in Rome. All respectable Roman citizens were, 
from that point on, clean-shaven. 
Having set the scene it is now possible to tum to the question concerning 
the origin of 'the philosopher's beard'. In 155 BC an embassy of three Greek 
philosophers visited Rome on a diplomatic mission. The three philosophers 
were representatives from the three most important philosophical schools of 
the day: Carneades, the current head of Plato's Academy; Critolaus, from 
Aristotle's Lyceum; and Diogenes of Babylon, the current head of the Stoics. IO 
In contrast to their beautifully clean-shaven Italian audience, these three 
intellectuals all sported magnificent beards. In the mind of the Romans, there 
seemed to be some form of inherent connection between the fact that 
Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes were philosophers and the fact that they 
6 See e.g. Lucian Demonax 13; note also Lucian Cynicus l. 
7 See Cicero Pro Caelio 33. 
8 See Varro De Re Rustica 2.11.10. 
9 See Pliny Naturalis Historia 7.21l. 
10 For ancient reports of the trip see Aulus Gellius 6.14.8-10 (= Sf'F 3 Diog. 8). Cicero 
Tusculanae Disputationes 4.5 (= SVF 3. Diog. 10), and others collected in SVF 3 Diog. 6-10. 
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all had beards. At this moment, then, the specifically Roman concept of -the 
philosopher's beard' was formed. After the Roman conquest of Athens in 87 
BC, Rome usurped Athens as the centre of philosophical activity in the ancient 
world. 11 It was within the urbs of clean-shaven Rome, then, that the beard first 
became connected with the figure of the philosopher. 
In order to examine the philosophical significance of this cultural 
phenomenon, it will be necessary to consider two very different attitudes 
towards beards. Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century 
BC, was also a keen philosopher and produced a number of philosophical 
works. As a respectable Roman citizen, Cicero was clean-shaven. It appears 
that he deliberately chose not to sport a 'philosopher's beard' and it is not too 
difficult to understand why. If Cicero had grown a beard, he would have 
appeared to his contemporaries as a typical Greek philosopher and would have 
looked just like the three philosophers who visited Rome a century before. Yet 
the only Greek philosophers present in Rome at that time would have been 
either slaves and servants working in the household staff of the aristocracy as 
librarians and tutors, or unwashed Cynics begging on the street corner and 
shouting abuse at passers by.I2 Either way, the figure of the bearded 
philosopher was not one to which the politically ambitious Cicero would want 
to aspire. This suggests that Cicero was more concerned with his social 
standing and his political career than he was with his pursuit of philosophy. 
His concern was more with what he could learn from the philosophers and put 
For this embassy and the introduction of Greek philosophy into Rome see Griffin. 
'Philosophy, Politics. and Politicians at Rome'. esp. pp. 2-5. 
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to work in his oratory and his political career than with devoting his entire life 
to philosophy itself.13 Consequently Cicero never adopted the philosopher's 
beard. 
In sharp contrast to Cicero, the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who lived in 
the first and second centuries AD, affirmed the philosopher's beard as 
something almost sacred. This may be seen to express the idea that philosophy 
is no mere intellectual hobby but rather a way of life that, by definition, 
transforms every aspect of one's behaviour, including one's shaving habits. If 
someone continues to shave in order to look the part of a respectable Roman 
citizen, it is clear that they have not yet embraced philosophy conceived as a 
way of life and have not yet escaped the social customs of the majority. In the 
language of the Sophists, to shave is KU"CU V0J.10V while to sport a beard is 
KU"CU cpUO'tV. 14 For Epictetus, the true philosopher will only act according to 
reason or according to nature, rejecting the arbitrary conventions that guide the 
behaviour of everyone else. Cicero - despite the value and importance of his 
11 See Frede in CHHP, p. 790. 
12 See Zanker, The lv1ask o/Socrates, pp. 198-200. 
13 See for example the assessment of Clarke, The Roman A1ind, p. 54: "For most of his life 
philosophy was not in the forefront of Cicero's interests. He believed in a union of rhetoric 
with philosophy and of statesmanship with philosophy, and liked to think of himself as a 
philosophic orator and philosophic statesman, but oratory and statesmanship came first". See 
also Zanker, The A1ask o/Socrates, p. 199. 
14 The distinction between what is according to custom or convention (KU'tU V0J.lOv) and what 
is according to nature (KU'tU q)'U()tv) originated in the Sophistic enlightenment of the 5th 
century Be and was taken up later by both Cynics and Stoics. For a Sophist such as Antiphon, 
the distinction is between what is arbitrarily agreed and what is necessary (see Antiphon De 
Veritate (POxy 1364 = fro 44 DK) 11. 23-34). For the Cynics, to live according to nature meant 
to remove everything unnecessary and was thus, to a certain extent, understood negatively 
(see Dudley, A History o/Cynicism, pp. 31-32; Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 10), although as 
with Antiphon q)"b()~ was in effect understood in terms of what is necessary. For the Stoics, 
q),U()l<; is given a more positive content and living in accordance with nature becomes 
identified with living in accordance with reason (see e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 3.1.25). For 
further discussion see Kerferd, The Sophistic A1ovement, pp. 111-30; Guthrie, History, Y01. 3, 
pp.55-134. 
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written philosophical works - was not a philosopher according to this very 
specific definition of the term. 
In the light of this, Epictetus was intensely proud of his own beard, 
describing it as noble, dignified, and "more majestic than a lion's mane".15 
Indeed, the following hypothetical discussion indicates the value he placed 
upon it: 
'Come now, Epictetus, shave off your beard'. 
If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not shave it off 
'Then I will have you beheaded'. 
If it will do you any good, behead me. 16 
For Epictetus, to shave would be to compromise his philosophical ideal of 
living in accordance with nature and it would be to submit to the unjustified 
authority of another. Faced with that prospect he would - like Socrates -
rather die. If this sounds extreme we should bear in mind that this was a real 
political issue at that time: Philostratus reports that the Emperor Domitian 
ordered that the philosopher Apollonius have his hair and beard forcibly 
removed as punishment for anti-State activities. 17 Short of killing him - which 
would have made him a martyr like Socrates - this was the most severe 
punishment the Emperor could inflict upon the philosopher. This terrible 
possibility must have been constantly on Epictetus's mind, for he was in Rome 
15 Epictetus Dissertationes 1.16.13. 
16 Epictetus Dissertationes 1.2.29 (trans. Hard). 
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at the time that Domitian banished all philosophers from Italy, and Epictetus 
literally fled for his life. 18 
One can now begin to see how the beard came to be associated with 
philosophy, or to be more precise, how it came to represent a certain 
conception of philosophy. According to a number of ancient sources, the 
philosopher's beard came in a variety of shapes and sizes. Writing in the 
second century AD, Alciphron describes a group of philosophers from 
different schools attending a birthday party: 
There was present, among the foremost, our friend Eteocles the Stoic, 
the oldster, with a beard that needed trimming, the dirty fellow, with 
head unkempt, the aged sire, his brow more wrinkled than his leather 
purse. Present also was Themistagoras of the Peripatetic school, a man 
whose appearance did not lack charm and who prided himself upon his 
curly whiskers. 19 
What this passage suggests is that philosophers from different schools each 
wore their beards in different ways. Moreover, these different beards were 
thought to reflect the different philosophical doctrines of the various schools.20 
For example, the Cynics, who preached strict indifference to all external goods 
and social customs, sported the longest and dirtiest beards. The Stoics, who 
17 See Philostratus IataApollonii 7.34; Zanker, The A,lask of Socrates, p. 260. 
18 For Domitian's banishment of the philosophers including Epictetus (c. AD 88-89) see Aulus 
Gellius 15.11.3-5 with Starr, 'Epictetus and the Tyrant'. 
19 Alciphron Epistulae 3.19.2-3 (trans. Benner & Fobes) with comment in Anderson, 
'Alciphron's Miniatures', esp. p. 2194; Zanker, The A1ask of Socrates. p. 1l0. 
CHAPTER ONE 27 
argued that it is acceptable to prefer certain external goods so long as they are 
never valued above virtue, also sported long beards, but engaged in occasional 
washing and trimming for purely practical considerations. 21 The Peripatetics, 
who following Aristotle believed that external goods and social status were 
necessary for the good life together with virtue,22 took great care of their 
beards, carefully trimming them as was appropriate for a member of the 
traditional Greek aristocracy. 
From these few examples one can begin to see how different types of 
beard might not merely indicate visually to which school an individual 
belonged, but actually express the philosophical positions held by that 
school. 23 It is not that one needs a beard in order to be a philosopher; nor is it 
that a beard in itself is of any philosophical importance. Rather, what is of 
philosophical importance is what a beard can express, whether it be a certain 
conception of philosophy as such (as in the different attitudes of Cicero and 
20 See Zanker, The lv/ask o/Socrates, p. 111. 
21 See Musonius Rufus fro 21 (115.4-8 Hense = 128.10-13 Lutz = SVF 1.243): "The remark of 
Zeno was well made that it is quite as natural to cut the hair as it is to let it grow long, in order 
not to be burdened by too much of it nor hampered for any activity" (trans. Lutz). See also 
Frede, 'Euphrates of T)Te', p. 10: "There was the Stoic insistence of the naturalness of hair, 
yet also the need to maintain it in a functional state. And it would be in the spirit of Stoicism 
to discuss such seemingly banal details of ordinary life". Lucian refers to the close cropped 
functional hair cuts of many Stoics and names Chrysippus in particular (see Lucian 
Hermonmus 18, Vitarium Aucno 20-21: note also Juvenal Saturae 2.15). This may well go 
back to Diogenes the Cynic (see Diogenes Laertius 6.31). For further discussion see 
Geytenbeek, A"fusonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe, pp. 119-23. 
22 Aulus Gellius 18.1.1-14 (part in SVF 3.56) records a typical debate between a Peripatetic 
and Stoic on this issue. 
23 The idea that an individual's philosophical position or character can be discerned from 
external attributes such as a beard might appear to share something in common ''lith 
physiognomy (q)'UCHOYVO>j.lOVta.). Ancient physiognomy has been defined as the attempt to 
uncover an individual's character by means of bodily movements or physical characteristics 
(see esp. Ps-AristotIe Physiognomol1ica 806a22-b3). HO'wever it tends to focus upon physical 
attributes out of tIle control of the individual concerned (e.g. ibid. 811a28: "a nose tllick at the 
tip means laziness") whereas the primary concern here is with behaviour. For ancient sources 
for physiognomy see R Forster Scriptores Physiognomici, 2 \'ols (BT) and for modem 
discussion see Barton, Power and Knowledge, pp. 95-131. 
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Epictetus), or a specific philosophical doctrine (as in AI ciphron , s account of 
the birthday party). If, like Epictetus, one conceives philosophy as not merely 
an intellectual hobby but rather a way of life, then one's philosophy will be 
expressed in the way one acts, and not simply in what one might say. As such, 
the act of shaving or the act of growing a beard can be as philosophical as any 
other act. As Michael Frede has noted, "Human life is a matter of banal things 
[ ... ]. If there is something non-banal about it, it is the wisdom with which 
these banal things are done, the understanding and the spirit from which they 
are done,,?4 What makes a beard a 'philosopher's beard', then, will be the 
philosophical way of life that it expresses. Of course, there will be plenty of 
non-philosophical beards, and plenty of beardless philosophers. Yet, in 
Graeco-Roman antiquity at least, the serious philosopher always had a beard 
and he appears to have valued it more highly than his life. 
Perhaps one can now begin to understand why in Lucian's tale the 
Athenians refused to appoint the beardless Bagoas to the chair of Peripatetic 
philosophy. For them, a philosopher's beard was no mere ornament or 
accessory. Rather it was an expression of a truly philosophical way of life and, 
as such, essential. 
24 Frede, 'Euphrates of Tyre', p. 6. 
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2. EPYU and AoYOt 
What this entertaining yet seemingly trivial discussion concerning beards 
illustrates is that, for certain philosophers in antiquity, philosophy was 
conceived as something much more than merely the development of a 
theoretical understanding of the world. Instead philosophy appears to have 
been conceived as something that would impact upon every aspect of one's 
life, right down to something as apparently banal as one's shaving habits. 
Moreover, it suggests that philosophy was conceived as primarily a matter of 
actions rather than words and that a philosopher's actions might well be a 
more accurate indication of his philosophical position than anything he might 
say. This idea of an individual's beliefs being a matter of 'deeds not words' 
(ep)'cx 01> /,,0),01) became prominent in fifth and fourth century Athens and, in 
particular, came to be associated with Socrates, forming part of his rejection of 
Sophistry as mere amusement with words?5 What became especially 
important was the idea of harmony between deeds and words (ep)'a Kat 
)..,0)'01) in one's way of life. 26 These ideas persisted in a number of later 
25 See in particular a number of fragments attributed to Democritus, including fro 55 DK apud 
Stobaeus 2.15.36 (2.191.9 WH): "One should emulate the deeds and actions of virtue, not the 
"vords" (£pya "Ka.1. 1tp1}~ta<; ap£'tfj<;, ou Myo'O<;, ST\AoUV XP£tIDV); note also fro 82 DK & fro 
145 DK. Further examples in Sophocles, Euripides, llmcydides, and Plato are mentioned in 
O'Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes, esp. p. 114. 
26 See e.g. Plato Laches 188c-d & 193d-e, ,"vith discussion in O'Brien, The Socratic 
Paradoxes, pp. 114-17. In Xenophon, Socrates affmns actions over words as the tme 
indicators of an individual's beliefs (e.g. Xenophon.A1emorabilia 4A.1O, Apologia 3): in the 
Laches the interlocutor Laches proposes what he calls a 'Dorian harmony' between actions 
and words. Socrates responds by saying that although both of them might be judged 
courageous by their actions, their inability to give a definition or account O.oyo<;) of courage 
means that they would be judged failures according to this test (1 93d-e ). Note also Socrates 
apud Stobaeus 2.15.37 (2.191.11-12 WH = SSR I C 187). 
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philosophical schools and became particularly common with the Stoics. In his 
epitome of Stoic ethics the doxographer Arius Didymus writes: 
It is not the person who eagerly listens to and makes notes of what is 
spoken by the philosophers who is ready for philosophizing, but the 
person who is ready to transfer the prescriptions of philosophy to his 
deeds (epya) and to live in accord with them. 27 
Of particular relevance here is a passage in the Discourses of Epictetus where 
he suggests that his students engaged in their Stoic studies should observe 
themselves in their daily actions in order to find out to which school of 
philosophy they really belong.28 He predicts that most will find themselves to 
be Epicureans while a few will be Peripatetics, but pretty feeble ones at that. 
However, Epictetus is doubtful that he will find any real Stoics among his 
students. To be sure, there will be many that will recite the arguments of the 
Stoics, but for Epictetus a real Stoic is one "who is sick, and yet happy 
(£U'n)xouv'ta); in danger, and yet happy; dying, and yet happy; exiled, and yet 
happy; disgraced, and yet happy.,,29 Such individuals are not surprisingly few 
and far between. His students may be able to recite Stoic AOYOt but they will 
not be genuine Stoics until they can produce Stoic epya.30 
27 Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.l1k (2.104.17-22 WH = SVF 3.682; trans. Pomeroy). 
28 See Epictetus Dissertationes 2.19.20-25; note also 3.2.10-12. A similar idea is ex'})ressed in 
Bion fro 49 Kindstrand apudDiogenes Laertius 4.5l. 
29 Epictetus Dissertationes 2.19.24 (trans. Hard). 
30 Note also Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.11k (2.105.4-6 WH = SVF 3.682) where he 
says that the foolish do not support the rational account (A6'Y~) of "irtue (apEL1l) with 
corresponding deeds (EP'Ya). 
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On the basis of this, Epictetus warns his students against trying too hard to 
explain the complex writings of a Stoic such as Chrysippus to others. He 
suggests that, insofar as these writings are primarily concerned with offering 
advice on how to live, his students may find themselves humiliated if they 
make public displays of their mastery of these doctrines but are unable to act 
in accordance with them?1 They will, he suggests become philosophers of the 
kind that are 'without deeds, limited to words' (aVE'\) 1:01> n:pU1:1:Etv, ~EXPt 1:01> 
AEYEtV)?2 Of course, this is by no means a rejection of philosophical theory as 
such.33 Instead it is the claim that a genuine philosopher will display his 
beliefs in both his actions and his words (epya Kat AoYOt), both being 
essential components of philosophy as conceived by Epictetus. His warning is 
that a verbal display of the manipulation of complex philosophical doctrines 
will be worthless unless those doctrines are also expressed in every aspect of 
one's life. As we have seen, one very visible expression of a philosopher's 
doctrines would have been the presence or the absence of a beard. 34 
31 See in particular Epictetus Enchiridion 49 where he eX'PlicitIy refers to the need for 
harmony between epya. and AOYOt: note also Dissertati ones 1.17.13 -19. 
32 Epictetus fro 10 Schenk! apud Aulus Gellius 17.19.1. . . 
33 It has been suggested that Epictetus' s warning was necessary only because Ius teaching 
would have concentrated upon the exposition of passages from earlier Stoics such as 
Chrysippus (see e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 2.21.11). In this sense, Epictetus is not rej.ecting 
scholarship as such but rather emphasising its position within a broader conceptIon of 
£hilosophy as a way of life. See Long, 'Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius', p. 993.. . 
4 Of course, Epictetus often repeats that a beard alone does not make a philosopher. It IS 
interesting to note that the fact that he felt tins warning to be necessary indicates how strongly 
the connection was held to be in the popular imagination. 
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3. The Philosopher's (3i~ 
If in antiquity philosophy was conceived as something primarily expressed in 
actions rather than words, then the assessment of what does and does not count 
tfD\M 
as 'philosophical' would have been very different)6' certain contemporary 
attitudes. One very noticeable feature of ancient philosophical traditions is the 
significance that was often assigned to biographical and anecdotal literature. 35 
In antiquity the word ~ioC; or 'life' referred to an individual's way of life or 
manner of living and was distinct from the merely biological connotations of 
being a 'living being', for which the Greeks used S<!,>OV.36 It also came to be 
used as a literary title for what may loosely be called a 'biography'. 37 However 
ancient biographies (~iot) were quite different from modern biographies, 
being concerned less with dates of birth, death, and memorable events, and 
more with uncovering an individual's character and - as the very title suggests 
- presenting the way in which an individual lived. In the opening remarks to 
35 For a survey of the use of biographical material in ancient philosophy (focusing on 
Hellenistic philosophy) see Mansfeld in CHHP, pp. 16-26. 
36 In general ~cpov was used to refer to animal life or, more generally, any living being. This, 
along with the distinction between (3io~ and ~cpol' is nicely illustrated by a line in Aristotle 
Politica 1256a20-21: (3iot TtOAA01 KO.1 'trol' ~<p(J)v Ka1 'trov av6pooTt(J)v daiv, "there are many 
ways of life both of animals and of humans". It is WOrtIl noting that here (and elsewhere; see 
the examples listed in LSJ) (3io~ is used to refer to an animal's way ofl{{e. Note also that ~cpov 
was sometimes used to refer to humans. The distinction. then, is not between human and 
animal life but rather between manner of living and biological life (however ~(J)lt was 
occasionally used to refer to a way oflife; see e.g. Simplicius In Epicteti Enchiridion 7l.34-35 
Hadot). 
37 The word (3tO'Ypacpia is not recorded until the ninth century AD when it was used twice by 
Photius in his discussion of Damascius's Life of Isidore the Philosopher (see Damascius 
Historia Philosophica test. 3 & fro 6a apud Photius Bibliotheca cod. 181 (l26a5) & cod. 242 
(335bI4) respectively). Photius's use may date back to Damascius himself (late frftlt earl~ 
sixth centuries AD). Either way, the word is both late and rare. Moreover. although (3wypacpia 
is used to describe Damascius's account of Isidore, the title of his ,vork (as recorded) remains 
Tov 'fatoropo'\) w'\) cptAOaocpo'\) (3iov. 
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his biography of Alexander, for example, Plutarch states that he will not list all 
of his subject's memorable actions, the reason being that his intention is not to 
write histories but rather to write biographies or 'lives' (01)'tE yap i<J'topia~ 
ypacpOJlEV, &"').}."a PiOU~).38 As such, his primary objective is to reveal the 
character (1ieo~) of his subject, to paint a likeness of him in which his 
character can be seen, rather than merely to recount the dates of important 
events in his life. His intention, he says, is to focus upon the signs of the soul 
('to. 't1l~ "'UXll~ <JllJlEta) in order to reveal the soul of his subject and, in 
particular whether it is good or bad (&..PE'tll~ 11 KaKia~). With this aim in mind 
Plutarch affirms the importance of anecdotal material: 
A slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of 
character than battles where thousands fell. 39 
Although Plutarch was not primarily concerned with writing biographies of 
philosophers,40 his general account of the nature of ancient biography and its 
use of anecdotal material sets the scene for an understanding of ancient 
philosophical biographies. Insofar as philosophy was conceived as something 
expressed in actions rather than words (epya OU AOY01), biographical and 
anecdotal material was held to be of philosophical importance in a way in 
38 See Plutarch Alexander 1.1-3. On the difference between history and biography in antiquity 
see Cox, Biography in Late Antiquity, esp. pp. 4-5. 
39 Plutarch Alexander 1.2 (trans. Perrin): npa:YJl.a !3paxu nOAA<l~ Kat {riiJl.a Kat nalOl<l uc; 
£Jl.<paow Tl60t>C; Enoill<YE Jl.a.AAoV 11 Jl.<lxal Jl.t>PlOVEKPOl. 
40 A number of Plutarch's surviving biographies deal with primarily historical figures who 
also had philosophical interests (e.g. Cato, Cicero). However Plutarch did write biographies of 
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which it is not today.41 Indeed, the development of biography as a literary 
genre appears to have been closely connected with philosophy throughout 
antiquity.42 In the light of Plutarch's comments it is not difficult to see why: 
biography was conceived as an account of the character and the state of the 
soul of an individual, precisely the objects of a philosopher's concern. 43 In 
antiquity the focus was more upon the 'philosopher' as an individual who 
expressed his character in his behaviour rather than upon 'philosophy' 
conceived as an abstract discipline or activity that could be separated from the 
lives of the individuals who practised it. To become a student of philosophy in 
antiquity did not mean merely to learn a series of complex arguments or 
engage in intellectual debate. Rather, it involved engaging in a process of 
transforming one's character (1iao~) and soul (\jfUX11), a transformation that 
would itself transform one's way of life (~io~). Lucian, in his biography of the 
philosopher Demonax, makes it clear that his reason for writing this account is 
to provide such students with an example of a philosopher's life that they can 
philosophers and in particular we can note his lost biography of the Cynic Crates (Larnprias 
cat. 37; see Plutarch fro 10 Sandbach apud Julian Orationes 6.200b = SSR V H 84). 
41 Unlike Momigliano, I do not intend to draw any distinction between anecdote and 
biography (see his The Developrnent ~f Greek Biography, e.g. p. 76). On the contrary, I ,,'ant 
to emphasise the anecdotal element within ancient philosophical biography. His aim in 
distinguishing between the two is in order to help him chart the development towards modem 
biography, whereas mine is to make clear the contrast between ancient and modem biography. 
The difference, then, does not so much reflect any dispute but simply a difference in 
objectives. 
42 The first great flourishing of biography in antiquity appears to haye been, in part, inspired 
by Socrates. The Cynics had a particular taste for collections of anecdotes. Later, Aristotle 
became an important influence, collecting accounts of different ways of life alongside his 
collections of scientific and political material (tins Peripatetic interest is reflected in the 
Characteres of Theoplrrastus). The Neoplatonists also produced a number of biographies. This 
relationship between philosophy and tile literary genre of biography is discussed throughout 
Momigliano's The Development of Greek Biography. 
43 These were also o~jects of religious concern and tile resemblance between biographies of 
philosophical sages and religious holy men has often been commented upon; see e.g. Cox, 
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use as a pattern or model (1tUpab£tYJlu) for their own lives. 44 In the light of 
this, ancient philosophy should perhaps be approached as a series of 
biographies of philosophers or examples of ideal philosophical lives rather 
than as a collection of theoretical systems or philosophies. 45 Although this 
may sound strange to a modem philosophical audience, it nevertheless 
explains the importance attached to anecdotal and biographical material in 
ancient philosophy. In order to consider this ancient philosophical interest in 
biography further it may be helpful to consider some examples. 
(a) Xenophon's Memorabilia 
It has been suggested that the origins of biography in general can be traced 
back to the impact made by Socrates.46 His life and death, it is claimed, were 
considered so extraordinary that the desire to record them in effect created 
biography as a literary genre. Whether this is true or not, it is probably less 
contentious to suggest that the various accounts of the life and death of 
Socrates at least formed the foundation for ancient philosophical interest in 
Biography in Late Antiquity, pp. 17--1-4: Anderson, Sage, Saint, and Sophist, esp. pp. 5-6. The 
distinction became increasingly blurred in Neoplatonism. 
44 See Lucian Demon(L'( 2. Demonax was a pupil of Epictetus with Cynic tendencies. For 
Demonax see Goulet-Caze, 'Cat:llogue of KnO'Wll Cynic Philosophers', pp. 393-94. For 
further discussion see Clay, 'Lucian of Samosata: Four Philosophical Lives', pp. 3412-13 & 
3425-29. 
45 This is precisely the approach employed by Diogenes Laertius. Less well known is 
Porphyry's Historia Philosophiae (C1>lAOO"Oq>ot; iO"wpia) in four books (of which only the Vita 
Pythagorae survives in extenso); see Porphyrii Philosophi Fragmenta, ed A Smith (BT), fro 
193-224, and the CUF edition of the Vita Pythagorae by E. des Places which includes an 
appendix on the Historia Philosophiae by A-P. Segonds, pp. 163-97. Some of the fragments 
derive from Arabic and Syriac sources, on which see Gutas, 'Pre-Plotinian Philosophy in 
Arabic', p. 4956. 
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biography.47 Beyond Plato, a considerable number of people are said to have 
written Socratic dialogues, including Antisthenes, Euc1ides, Phaedo, Crito, 
Aeschines, and Aristippus,48 while the creation of this genre is credited to an 
otherwise unknown associate of Socrates called Simon the Shoemaker. 49 
Unfortunately none of the works of these authors survive in extenso. 50 
One source for Socrates beyond Plato that does survive is Xenophon's 
Memorabilia (A1tOJlVllJlOVeUJ.l<I'ta).51 This text is a fairly unstructured 
collection of anecdotes, reported conversations, and apologetics which has 
often been judged second-rate on historical, literary, and philosophical 
46 This was the suggestion of Dihle in his Studien zur Griechischen Biographie, pp. 13-34, and 
d}scussed in Momigliano, The Development o/Greek Biography, p. 17. 
41 For Momigliano none of these constitute a proper biography of Socrates (ibid.). They 
certainly do not conform to a biography in the modem sense of the word. Yet they are clearly 
concerned with providing an account of the character of their su~iect. For further discussion of 
the Socratic biographical genre (and its tendency to idealise its subject) see Momigliano, 171e 
Development o/Greek Biography, pp. 46-49. 
48 For accounts of this genre (famously mentioned by Aristotle in De Arte Poetica 1~47b9-13 
= SSR I B 2) see Clay, 'The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue', pp. 23-47: Kahn, Plato and the 
Socratic Dialogue, pp. 1-35. Momigliano also draws attention to the later attempts to write 
'biographies' of Socrates by Aristoxenus and Demetrius (The Development of Greek 
Biography, pp. 75, 77). The fragments ofthese are in SSR I B 41-51 & 52-56 respectively. 
49 See Diogenes Laertius 2.123 (= SSR VI B 87). For further information see Hock, 'Simon the 
Shoemaker as an Ideal Cynic', pp. 41-53, and my 'Socraticorum Afaximus: Simon the 
Shoemaker and the Problem of Socrates'. Kahn doubts the historical reality of Simon (Plato 
and the Socratic Dialogue, p. 10) and suggests an othenvise unknown Alexamenos of Teos as 
the creator of the Socratic dialogue (p. 1), citing a fragment from Aristotle's De Poetis (fr. 72 
Rose3 apud Athenaeus 505c = SSR I B 1; note also Diogenes Laertius 3.48). However this 
passage does not say that Alexamenos invented the Socratic dialogue but simply that he wrote 
imitative dialogues before the Socratic dialogues and before Plato. Evidence in favour of 
Simon's historical reality may be found in the recent discovery of a shop on the edge of the 
Athenian Agora, the flo~r s~ttered with hobnails, containing the base of a pot with 'Simon's' 
inscribed upon it (see my 'SocraticorumAfa.,umus', p. 254 n. 8). 
50 The most notable fragments to survive come from the dialogues of Aeschines, of \vhich 
some were only discovered in tlle 20th century in tlle papyri from O~Trhynchus and published 
as recently as 1972 (see POxy 1608, 2889, 2890). These can be found in SSR VI A ~1-100 
(also (]JF I 1, 8) and a selection are translated in Field Plato and his Contemporaries. pp. 
146-52. 
51 The Latin title Afemorabilia was first supplied by Johannes Leonclavius in his 1569 edition 
of Xenophon. A better Latin equivalent might be Commentarii; indeed, tIus is how Aulus 
Gellius refers to it (14.3.5). See Momigliano, The Development o/Greek Biography, p. 52. 
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grounds. 52 Nevertheless it deserves our attention because it helps to explain 
the philosophical significance of the anecdote. A cursory reading soon shows 
that Xenophon is just as concerned with recording Socrates' habits and 
personality as he is with any particular thing he may have said or any 
philosophical argulnent he may have made. The reason for this is simple: 
Xenophon repeatedly says that Socrates taught those whom he met not merely 
with his words but also with his actions: 
In my opinion he [Socrates] actually benefited his associates, partly by 
the example of his actions (epYQl O£ll(VUWV eau'tov) and partly by his 
conversation (OUXA,£yOjl£vo<;). I shall record as many instances [of 
both] as I can recall. 53 
As such, one might say that an account of Socrates' actions - his habits and 
his way of life (~io<;) preserved in anecdotes - will be of just as much 
philosophical importance as a record of his verbal arguments. Indeed, in the 
Memorabilia Socrates himself is reported to have argued that acts (epya) are 
always more important than words (AOY01) when it comes to debates 
. .. . 54 
concernmg JustIce or VIrtue. 
52 See e.g. the surveys of such judgements in Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, pp. 
82-86, and Cooper, 'Notes on Xenophon's Socrates', esp. pp. 3-4. In the eighteenth century 
Xenophon enjoyed a higher reputation and Iris devaluation appears to have begun "1th 
SchIeiermacher. (see e.g. 'On the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher', p. 138). 
53 Xenophon A1emorabilia 1.3.1 (trans. Tredennick modified). See also -1-.3.18: '"By 
enunciating such principles as these and by putting them into practice himself. he made his 
associates more devout and responsible"; 4.4.1: "As for his views about what is right so far 
from concealing them, he demonstrated them by his actions (~PYQ))". 
54 See Xenophon Alemorabilia 4.4.10; note also Xenophon Apologia 3, Plato Apologia 32d. 
However in Plato Laches 193d-e Socrates suggests that deeds (tpya) "ithout words (AOYOt) 
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Although it has been common to dismiss Xenophon as philosophically 
na'ive compared to Plato and consequently to devalue his account of 
Socrates,55 such a judgement presupposes a certain conception of philosophy 
which Xenophon - and more importantly, Socrates - may well have rejected. 
If Xenophon' s primary concern is with Socrates as a philosopher who 
followed a certain way of life then it should not be surprising to find him 
focusing upon the anecdotal and the biographical. He offers a justification for 
doing so by saying that he thinks that nothing could be more profitable than 
spending time in the company of Socrates and learning from his example; now 
that Socrates is dead, Xenophon suggests that the next most profitable thing 
one could do is spend time in his company indirectly by reading accounts of 
his life. 56 Despite his more recent detractors, Xenophon clearly sees the 
Memorabilia as in some sense a profoundly philosophical text. 
Indeed, one could perhaps go further and suggest that, insofar as Socrates 
is reported to have defined philosophy as a matter of actions rather than words 
(epya 0'0 AOY01),57 then only a text like the Memorabilia will be adequate to 
capture his philosophy as it is expressed in his actions. However, such a claim 
would be an oversimplification for, as we have already seen, Socrates 
demands that one's philosophy must be expressed in both actions and words 
(epya Kat AOYOt). This may help to explain Plato's decision to use the 
dialogue form for his Socratic works, a form that lends itself to the inclusion 
will not do either. One must not simply act courageously but also be able to offer an account 
(AOYOC;) of courage in order to be tmly courageous. This will be discussed further in Chapter 
Two § 3. . . 
55 See e.g. Schleiennacher, 'On the Worth of Socrates as a Pllliosopher. p. 138. 
56 XenophonlHemorabilia 4.1.1. 
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of anecdotal material alongside theoretical argument, thereby offering the 
perfect medium in which to record both Socrates' actions and his words.58 
(b) Diogenes Laertius's Life of Diogenes the Cynic 
The recorded title of Xenophon' s account of Socrates is ' A1toJl VllJlOvEUJla'ta, 
'memoirs'. Closely related to this type of biographical account are XPEtal, 
'anecdotes'. Quintilian describes a XpEia. as a biographical anecdote used in 
order to illustrate some moral or philosophical point. 59 The origin of the idea 
of a X pEt a in this specific sense seems to have been the product of the Socratic 
schools and, in particular, the Cynics.60 This probably reflected the fact that 
many of these philosophers, following the example set by Socrates himself, 
chose not to write themselves in the belief that philosophy was a matter of 
deeds rather than words (epra ou /"'OrOl). As these Socratic schools 
developed, later members were forced to rely upon anecdotal accounts of the 
lives of their philosophical predecessors as a source of material for their 
57 XenophonAfemorabilia 4.4.10. 
58 Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom, p. 106, suggests that Plato chose to write dialogues because 
they are "a logos inseparable from deeds". However, I would not want to follow him in 
characterising this as "nonteclmical knowledge"; for more on this see Chapter Two § 7. 
59 See Quintilian institutio aratoria 1.9.3-5. For the relationship benveen a1to~vTJ~6v£'\)~u'w. 
and XPEtUt see Kindstrand, 'Diogenes Laertius and the Chreia Tradition', pp. 221-24. Note 
that Diogenes Laertius uses these tenus apparently interchangeably to refer to Zeno' s 
collection of anecdotes about his teacher Crates (6.9l = ST''F l.272, 7.-1- = SVF 1.·H). of which 
only one fragment survives, preserved in Stobaeus 4.32.21 (5.786.1-10 WH = SVF 1.273 = 
SSR V H 42) and discussed in my 'Socraticorum Alaximus: Simon the Shoemaker and the 
Problem of Socrates', pp. 258-60. 
60 See Kindstrand, 'Diogenes Laertius and the Chreia Tradition', pp. 223-24. Collections of 
XPEtat are credited to a number of Socratics by Diogenes Laertius, including Aristippus (2.84 
= SSR IV A 144). Diogenes (5.18 =SSRVB 68), Metrocles (6.33 =SSR VB 412), Zeno (6,91 
= Sr/F 1.272), and Antisthenes (7.19 = SSR V A 137; not in DC). 
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philosophies. For these schools, the anecdote became an important form of 
philosophical text. 
In his account of the life of Diogenes the Cynic, Diogenes Laertius 
preserves a number of XPEtUl of which at least one dates back to a collection 
made in the third century BC by the Cynic philosopher Metrocles. 61 In these 
anecdotes one can see Cynic philosophy 'in action'. Two examples will 
suffice to illustrate this. First, there is the account of Diogenes hugging statues 
in the middle ofwinter.62 This act expresses the Cynic philosophical doctrine 
that all external circumstances are irrelevant to the good life and that one 
should engage in practical training in order to make oneself indifferent to such 
circumstances. The extreme nature of the act also serves to highlight exactly 
what is involved if one were to take the Cynic ethical ideal literally. Second, 
there are the accounts of Diogenes' indecent acts in the marketplace which 
graphically illustrate his rejection of social customs and his adherence to a 
strict analysis of what is and is not appropriate behaviour in terms of what is 
and is not in accordance with nature (KU'tU cpU<JW).63 In both of these cases 
Cynic philosophy is communicated in a dramatic and powerful way. One can 
immediately see exactly what following the Cynic way of life (KUVlKO<; ~io<;) 
might entail. Of course, one should remember that Diogenes is reported to 
61 See Diogenes Laertius 6.33 (= SSR V B .ti2). For Metroc1es see SSR V L 1-6 and Goulet-
Caze, 'Catalogue of Known Cynic Philosophers', p. 398. 
62 Diogenes Laertius 6.23 (= SSR VB 174). -y.. 
63 Diogenes Laertius 6.69 (= SSR VB 147), pace Mansfeid. Classlcal ReVleu' 38 (1988), p. 
163 who dismisses tlns as mere exhibitionism. , 
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have said that, like a chorus trainer, he deliberately 'set his note a little high' 
in order to ensure that everyone else should 'hit the right note'. 64 
By recording these anecdotes Diogenes Laertius preserves something of 
great importance, namely Cynic philosophy as it was expressed in actions 
rather than words (epya OU J.~6yo,,).65 Of all the ancient schools of philosophy, 
this is especially vital for an understanding of the Cynics insofar as they held 
that philosophy was primarily a matter of deeds.66 This is nicely illustrated in 
the following anecdote: 
Hegesias having asked him to lend him one of his writings, he 
[Diogenes] said, "You are a simpleton, Hegesias; you do not choose 
painted figs, but real ones; and yet you pass over the true training 
(acrK11<H v "C1)v aA 119" v1)v) and would apply yourself to written rules. 67 
For Diogenes, philosophy is something that is primarily expressed in one's 
actions (epya). Any written philosophical doctrines will function merely as 
tools to be used in the transformation of one's way of life (~io~). If 
philosophical theories are studied for their own sake and not put into practice 
then their primary function has not been understood. 
64 Diogenes Laertius 6.35 (= SSR VB 266). For discussion of Cynic training (acr1C11<nc;) see 
Goulet-Caze, L 'ascese cynique, esp. pp. 204-27. 
65 See Mejer, Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background, pp. 2-·l who notes that 
Diogenes conceived Iris lristory very much in tenns of actual 'philosophers' rather than 
abstract 'philosophies'. 
66 See e.g. Antisthenes fro 70 DC apud Diogenes Laertius 6.11 (= SSR V A l3-l) 
67 Diogenes Laertius 6.48 (= SSR VB 118; trans. Hicks). 
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As with Xenophon, it has been common to dismiss Diogenes Laertius as a 
superficial and unphilosophical author.68 Likewise, the Cynics themselves 
have often been dismissed as proponents of a lifestyle rather than a philosophy 
@Y h . proper. et suc responses presuppose a conceptIOn of philosophy that the 
Cynics would have completely rejected. In the case of Diogenes the Cynic, 
one might even say that it is only in an anecdotal history such as that of 
Diogenes Laertius that one can begin to approach his philosophy conceived as 
a way of life. 70 Within this context, Diogenes Laertius's compendium of 
amusing XPEtut far from being philosophically trivial is, with regard to the 
Cynics at least, the most philosophical form of writing there can be. 71 
68 See e.g. the recent judgement in Hankinson, The Sceptics, p. 4. 
69 Varro apud Augustine De Civitate Dei 19.1.3 (PL 41.62-l) describes Cynicism as a 
collection of manners and customs (habitu et consuetudine) that mayor may not be combined 
with a 'proper' philosophy. More recently, similar judgements have been made by Hegel 
(Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 479; cited in the Introduction) and 
Schleiermacher, who characterised Cynicism as "a peculiar mode of life, not a doctrine, much 
less a science" ('On the \Vorth of Socrates as a Philosopher', p. 132). For further discussion 
on the status of Cynicism as a 'proper philosophy' see Goulet-Caze, L 'ascese cynique, pp. 28-
31. 
70 See Long, 'The Socratic Tradition', p. 31: "Diogenes Laertius' s anecdotal style is generally 
an impediment to philosophical infonnativeness. In the case of the Cynic Diogenes, however, 
anecdote and aphorism should be construed as the essential vehicles of his thought". 
Similarly, Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, p. XAYii: "There is no doubt that the Lives and 
Views of the Philosophers of a Diogenes Laertius are bad history of philosophy, but perhaps 
they do capture an aspect of ancient philosophy that the scholarly history of philosophy, given 
its aims, passes over, but that, nonetheless, is real and of interest". Also Nietzsche, 
Schopenhauer as Educator § 8 (KGW III 1, 413: Complete Works, vol. 2, p. 246): "I for one 
would rather read Diogenes Laertius than Zeller, because at least the spirit of ancient 
philosophy is alive in the fonner, whereas in the latter neither this spirit nor any other spirit is 
alive" . 
71 If this sOlmds like a rather ex1reme claim then I might say that, like Diogenes, I am 'setting 
mv note a little too high' in order to counterbalance the all too common dismissal of 
biographical and anecdotal material as 'completely unphilosophical'. For an appraisal of the 
philosophical significance of Xp£la.l see Kindstrand, 'Diogenes Laertius and the Chreia 
Tradition', esp. pp. 232-33, 242-43. 
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(c) Porphyry's Life of Plot in us 
Although one might concede the importance of the anecdote for an 
understanding of someone like Diogenes the Cynic it does not, at first glance, 
appear to be particularly important for ancient philosophy as such, especially 
as it developed in later antiquity. During a substantial portion of its history, 
ancient philosophy functioned as something much closer to the modem 
academic discipline. Philosophical study tended to focus upon the close study 
of the texts, particularly those of Plato and Aristotle, and the commentary 
became a standard form of philosophical text. 72 Yet even in this period, it 
seems to have been standard practice to preface the study of any philosophical 
text with a biographical account of its author. 73 
One example of this practice that survives is Porphyry's Life of Plotinus. 74 
This text, containing a biography and an account of the ordering of Plotinus' s 
texts, was written by Porphyry as an introduction to his edition of the 
Plotinus's Enneads. As such it belonged to a whole genre of ancient texts 
which often had titles of the form 'What Comes Before the Study of . .. (llpo 
'tfi~ ava'YvrocrEc.o~)' .75 One of the things that was considered to be essential 
72 For a general introduction to philosophical practice in later antiquity (c. AD 200-600) see 
Sorabji, Aristotle Transformed, pp. 1-30. 
73 See Mansfeld, Prolegomena, esp. pp. 30, 97-98, 108-10. One such example of this approach 
can be found in the anonymous Prolegomena Phi!osophiae Platonicae l.1O-11 ,,,hich opens 
\"ith the line, "Our admiration for his [Plato's] philosophy will become even greater ,,,"hen we 
follow up his life-history (iO''topiav) and the character of his philosophy" (trans. Westerink). 
74 The full title is On the L{fe of Plotinus and the Order of his Books (ilEpi. 'tou m~o)'ti vou 
(3io'O Kat 'til~ 't<i~E~ 'trov (3t(3Airov aU'toi». For a general discussion see Cox, Biography in 
Late Antiquity, pp. 102-33. 
75 See Mansfeld, Prolegomena, p. 109. Mansfeld also discusses two examples of this genre by 
Thrasyllus dealing \vith 'what comes before the study of Plato' and 'what comes before the 
study of Democritus' (see pp. 58-107). This use of biography as part of a general 
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'before the study of a philosophical text was an account of its author's life. 
Porphyry's text opens with an appropriate anecdote in which he recounts how 
Plotinus often appeared to be ashamed of being in his body and consistently 
refused to sit for a painter or a sculptor, exclaiming that it was already enough 
that nature had encased him in an image and he did not need an image of that 
image. 76 An anecdote such as this would have illustrated to a prospective 
student of Plotinus the sort of transformation of attitude that might follow 
from a thorough understanding of his philosophy. In effect, it shows 'in 
action' the Plotinian ideal of transcending the body to become like God.77 
Another example of this sort of prefatory biography is mentioned by the 
Neoplatonist Simplicius in the preface to his commentary on Epictetus: 
If the reader be curious to know Epictetus's character, he may find it at 
large in an account of his life and death, from which one can learn 
what sort of man he was in his life, written by Arrian, who also 
compiled the Discourses of Epictetus, and digested them into several 
distinct tracts?8 
The account of the life of Epictetus by Arrian is unfortunately lost. It has been 
noted that Porphyry's account has often been thought to be unique; however 
interpretative strategy dates back at least to Cicero De Inventione 2.117: "one ought to 
estimate what the writer meant from the rest of his writings and from his acts, words, 
character, and life (exfactis, dictis, animo atque vita eiust. 
76 See Porphyry Vita Plotini 1. 
77 This ethical ideal is outlined in Plotinus Enneades 1.2 (il£pi. ap£1:6)v) and Enneades 1.4 
(il£pi. £uocttJ.l0vioo;). . 
78 Simplicius In Epicteti Enchiridiol1 Praef. 1-4 Hadot (trans. Stanhope modified). 
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this lost 'Life' by Arrian suggests that it may have been quite common, a 
development from or sub-group of the 'What Comes Before the Study of '" ' 
genre.
79 
The important point to note here is that in later antiquity students of 
philosophy were taught, or at least expected to know, the philosophy of their 
subject as expressed in his life before they moved on to read his texts. The 
concrete example of the philosopher's life was considered to be essential for 
placing his doctrines m their appropriate context and for offering a 
paradigmatic example of their application. In other words, students of 
philosophy were shown the practical application of the philosophical ideas 
they were about to learn in order to remind them that real philosophical 
progress was a matter of deeds rather than words (epya 0'0 A6yOl) Even in the 
supposedly scholastic atmosphere of late antiquity, philosophy continued to be 
conceived as something directed towards the transformation of one's way of 
life (~iO<;).80 
* * * 
In the light of these examples one can see that biographical information can in 
some sense be just as important as theoretical discourse, offering a concrete 
example of how to put philosophical doctrines into practice. Furthermore, such 
79 See Mansfeld, Prolegomena, p. 110. He also notes that because both Porphyry and Arrian 
knew their biographical subjects personally, their accounts would have commanded 
considerable authority. However note that Souilhe, p. i (following Asmus), has doubted the 
existence of a biography ofEpictetus distinct from the Dissertationes. 
80 This can be seen in the way in which later Neoplatonists (e.g. Iamblichus, Proclus) 
combined the writing of learned commentaries on the works of Plato and Aristotle \,ith 
religious ideas often deriving from Neopythagoreanism. 
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information can illustrate the harmony between a philosopher's doctrines and 
his way of life. For Seneca, this is fundamental: 
Philosophy teaches us to act, not to speak (facere docet philosophia, 
non dicere); it exacts of every man that he should live according to his 
. own standards, that his life should not be out of harmony with his 
words (ne orationi vita dissentiat), and that, further, his inner life 
should be of one hue and not out of harmony with all his activities. 
This, I say, is the highest duty and the highest proof of wisdom - that 
deed and word should be in accord (ut verbis opera concordent), that a 
man should be equal to himself under all conditions, and always the 
same.81 
Moreover, such biographical information will often be able to capture 
something of a philosophical attitude that cannot be transmitted in written 
doctrines alone. However, a collection of anecdotes will always only be 
second best in comparison to actual personal contact. Again, Seneca takes this 
to be vital: 
81 Seneca Epistulae 20.2 (trans. Gummere); note also Epistulae 16.3, 75.4, 108.36. Seneca has 
been criticised himself from antiquity onwards for the apparent discord between his own 
words and actions; see e.g. Suillius apud Tacitus Annales 13.42. For other ancient attacks on 
philosophers for not displaying such a harmony see Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 
1033a-b Lactantius Divinae Institutiones 3.15 & 3.16 (PL 6.390-397). Note also that both 
Zeno and Cato were specifically praised for the harmony between their words and deeds (see 
Diogenes Laertius 7.10-11 (= SVF 1.7-8) & Cicero Pro Jlurena 62 respectively). This appears 
to have been central to their reputations for ·wisdom. 
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Cleanthes could not have been the express image of Zeno if he had 
merely heard his lectures; he shared in his life (vitae eius interfuit), 
saw into his hidden purposes, and watched him to see whether he lived 
according to his own rules (an ex formula sua viveret). Plato, Aristotle, 
and the whole throng of sages who were destined to go each his 
different way, derived more benefit from the character than from the 
words (plus ex moribus quam ex verbis) of Socrates. It was not the 
classroom of Epicurus, but living together under the same roof (sed 
contubernium fecit), that made great men of Metrodorus, Hermarchus, 
and Polyaenus. 82 
-+7 
The philosopher's life, whether experienced first hand or VIa a written 
account, functioned as a concrete example of his written doctrines in action. 83 
Indeed, Seneca himself is reported to have said at his death that the single and 
most noble possession that he could pass on to his friends was the example of 
his own life (imaginem vitae suae).84 Moreover, in many instances where there 
were no written doctrines, the philosopher's life preserved in anecdotes and 
82 Seneca Epistulae 6.6 (trans. Gmmnere)~ note also Epistulae 38.1. See the discussion of 
exempla in Seneca by Newman, 'Theory and Practice of the meditatio', pp. 1491-93, and in 
Epictetus by Hijmans, 'AUK1!O'lS, pp. 72-77. This theme can be found throughout ancient 
philosophy~ see e.g. Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1170a11-13, Galen De AjJectuum 
Dignotione 5 (5.24-25 KUhn = 17.11-22 de Boer), Marcus Aurelius 6.48, Simplicius In 
Epicteti Enchiridion 49.4-6 Hadot. 
83 In between first-hand experience and a written account there would have also existed oral 
traditions concerning the lives of philosophers (and oral traditions conceming their 
conversations or lectures). The relationship between oral and written transmission ("ith regard 
to the te~1s of Aristotle but with wider relevance) is discussed in Sandbach.. Aristotle and the 
Stoics, pp. 1-3. See also Kenyon, Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome, pp. 21-25. 
84 See Tacitus Annales 15.62. 
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records of conversations form the only account of their philosophy.85 What 
some of these accounts suggest is that, rather than being merely an 
entertaining background to the serious written doctrines, an account of a 
philosopher's life may be equally important. If anything, it is the written 
doctrines that are of secondary status, only coming to life when they are put 
into practice. The key to understanding exactly how a philosophical doctrine 
might be put to work in this way may often be an example of it 'in action' 
preserved in an anecdote. 
4. Summary 
In this chapter I have tried to show that in antiquity philosophy was often 
conceived as something primarily expressed in an individual's actions (epya) 
and way of life (~io<;) rather than something restricted to written doctrines and 
arguments (AOYOl). In order to do this I have considered a number of 
anecdotes recording the behaviour of certain philosophers and have considered 
the philosophical significance often attached to the biographies of 
philosophers in antiquity. From a modern perspective much of this material 
may appear to be philosophically irrelevant. Yet that is precisely the point. 
What this anecdotal and biographical material highlights is the fact that, for 
this material to have been considered philosophically important in antiquity, 
the nature and function of philosophy itself must have been understood quite 
85 As we have seen, this was particularly tme for the Cynics; it also applies to Socrates and 
Epictetns. 
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differently to the way in which it is often conceived today. Of course it would 
be a mistake to suggest that all ancient philosophers emphasised the 
philosophical importance of biography and that all modern philosophers 
dismiss such material as irrelevant. Nevertheless, one can see that, in general, 
more significance was attached to such material in antiquity than is today. 
The task for the remainder of this study is to attempt to reconstruct a 
conception of philosophy from ancient philosophical resources that can deal 
adequately with the relationship between philosophy and biography. As we 
have already seen in the Introduction, in antiquity philosophy was conceived 
by some as an art (texvl1) concerned with one's way of life (~tO~), a 
conception whose earliest origins can be traced back to Socrates. Moreover, in 
this chapter we have seen that the idea that philosophy is primarily expressed 
in actions rather than words (epya OU AoYOt) can also be traced back to 
Socrates. As such it may be appropriate to begin with Socrates in order to see 
what he may be able to contribute to the reconstruction of a conception of 
philosophy that can deal with the relationship between an individual's 
philosophical doctrines and their way of life. 
CHAPTER nvo 
THE SOCRATIC ORIGINS OF 
THE ART OF LIVING 
1. Philosophy and J3ioc; 
In the previous chapter I suggested that in antiquity philosophy was often 
conceived as something that would transform an individual's way of life 
(~io<;), such that even one's shaving habits might gain a philosophical 
significance. This conception often characterised philosophy as a matter of 
'deeds not words' (£pya ou AOYOt), a phrase that appears in Xenophon's 
Memorabilia of Socrates. 1 Although Xenophon's account is valuable for an 
understanding of Socrates' philosophy as it was expressed in his way of life, 
unfortunately on its own it gives us little information concerning the 
conception of philosophy held by Socrates. 
Of all the surviving texts that purport to offer evidence for the philosophy 
of Socrates, probably the single most important document is Plato's Apology 
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of Socrates. Unlike Xenophon' s later recollections or Plato's early dialogues 
that supposedly dramatise private conversations, it has been suggested that the 
Apology is the only document that describes a public event. 2 Consequently it 
would have been produced under a number of external constraints if it were to 
appear convincing to a contemporary audience, some of whom may have 
attended Socrates' trial themselves or have heard first hand accounts of it. As 
such it forms the most appropriate place to begin. 3 
Throughout the Apology it is repeatedly made clear that Socrates' principal 
concern is not with argument or definition or rational understanding, but rather 
with life (J31o~).4 Three passages in particular are relevant here. The first of 
these occurs when Socrates introduces his philosophical mission, to which he 
believes he has been appointed by God. He characterises this mission as the 
duty to live as a philosopher (cplAOO'Ocpouv'tu J-lE 8EtV SllV), examining himself 
and others. 5 The second appears when Socrates expands upon what examining 
1 See e.g. XenophonAlemorabilia 4.4.10. 
2 See e.g. Kalm, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 88-95, Burnet, Plato's Euthyphro, 
Apology o/Socrates, and Crito, pp. 63-64, and the discussion in Additional Note 1. Note that, 
in theory, the same argument also applies to Xenophon's Apology. However, whereas Plato is 
generally agreed to have been present at the trial, Xenophon's Apology is based upon a 
second-hand account from Hennogenes (although Hackforth, The Composition 0/ Plato's 
Apology, pp. 8-46, suggests that in fact Xenophon's may have been written first). For further 
references to literature dealing with 'the problem of Socrates' see Additional Note 1. 
3 For some doubts about this approach see Morrison, 'On the Alleged Historical Reliability of 
Plato's Apology'. He argues against treating the Apology as a straightfonvard historical report 
of the trial. Although he is no doubt correct to be cautious, nevertheless the Apology remains 
our best point of departure for a reconstruction of the historical Socrates (see Additional Note 
1). 
4 This point is emphasised by Brickhouse & Smith, Plato's Socrates, pp. 12-1-1-. Other ancient 
sources which make tIns point include Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.8 (not in SSR), 5.10 
(= SSR I C 458), Academica 1.15 (= SSR I C 448), Seneca Epistulae 71.7 (= SSR I C 537). Of 
course, Socrates is interested in argument, definition, and rational understanding. but only 
insofar as they contribute to his understanding of how to live. 
S See Plato Apologia 28e. 
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himself and others might involve. There he is explicit that he wants to examine 
lives rather than, say, beliefs or arguments: 
You have brought about my death in the belief that through it you will 
be delivered from submitting the conduct of your lives ('to'\) ~io'\») to 
criticism. 6 
This notion of a project concerned with examining lives is reiterated in a third 
passage where Socrates suggests that the best thing that anyone can do is to 
examine oneself and others. In contrast to this he adds that a life (~io~) 
without this sort of examination is not w011h living. 7 
In the Apology, then, Socrates' philosophical concerns are clearly directed 
towards Pio~; his concern is to examine his own life, to transform it into a 
philosophical way of life, and to exhort others to examine and transform their 
lives. Despite this, Socrates is often presented as being primarily concerned 
with the search for definitions and preoccupied with questions of the form 
'what is x?'. This portrait owes much to the testimony of Aristotle who, in his 
brief history of philosophy in the Metaphysics, presents Socrates as one of the 
first to turn away from the study of nature towards ethics, and who in his 
ethical studies is primarily concerned with universals and definitions. 8 
Aristotle's testimony is important insofar as it attributes the search for 
definitions to Socrates but goes on to attribute the theory of Forms to Plato, 
6 Plato Apologia 39c (trans. Tredennick). 
7 See Plato Apologia 38a. 
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laying the foundation for the division of the Platonic dialogues into earlier and 
later periods.
9 
However it also forms the basis for the image of what has come 
to be known as 'Socratic intellectualism', namely the idea that Socrates placed 
total emphasis upon intellectual knowledge in his ethics.lO Aristotle tends to 
present Socrates as primarily concerned with definitions (6P10"Jl6~) and 
knowledge (E1tHl''tl1Jlll), both being instances of rational discourse (J."6yo~).1l 
This no doubt reflects Aristotle's own philosophical concerns and in particular 
his interest in logic. Yet it is made explicit throughout the Apology that 
Socrates' search for knowledge (f1tlO"'tl1Jlll) and his cross-examination of those 
who claim to have knowledge remains subordinate to his primary concern, 
namely ~iO~.12 His search for a definition (6P10"Jl6~) or rational account 
(A6yo~) of what is good remains subordinate to the desire to become good, to 
transform his way of life. The philosophical question that drives his search is 
the personal question of how he himself should live and the more general 
question of how one should live. The centrality of this theme is made explicit 
elsewhere: 
8 See AristotleA1etaphysica 987b1-4 (= SSR I B 24). 
9 See Aristotle A1etaphysica 1078b17 (= S,sR I B 26). 1086a37 (= SSR I B 25). Aristotle's 
Socratic testimonia are collected in SSR I B 1-40 and, with commentary, in Deman, Le 
ternoignage d'Aristote sur Socrate. For discussions of Aristotle as a source for Socrates see 
Gulley, The Philosophy o/Socrates, pp. 1-8; Guthrie, History, vol. 3, pp. 355-59; Kahn, Plato 
and the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 79-87; Lacey, 'Our Knowledge of Socrates', pp. -t--t--48; 
Vlastos, Socrates: fronist and 1\10ral Philosopher, pp. 91-98. It has been suggested that when 
Aristotle prefixes the article to the name 'Socrates' (i.e. 6 ~roKpa't1'\~) he refers to Plato's 
literary character but when he does not he is referring to the historical Socrates (see .e.g. ~r~t. 
The Ethics 0/ Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 188; Ross, Aristotle's A1etaphysics, vol. 1, pp. XXXIx-xli, WIth 
some doubts in Taylor, Varia Socratica, pp. 40-90). 
10 For discussion see Nehamas, 'Socratic Intellectualism'. 
11 See e.g. Aristotle A1etaphysica 987b 1-6 (= SSR I B 24), Ethica Nicomachea 114-t-b28-30 (= 
SSR I B 30). 
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For you see the subject of our discussion - and on what subject should 
even a man of slight intelligence be more serious? - is nothing less 
that how a man should live (ov'ttv<x xpl) 'tP01tOV ~ilV).13 
This is clearly very different from Aristotle's presentation of the nature and 
function of philosophy in the Metaphysics where philosophical knowledge is 
contrasted with practical disciplines and presented as the search for knowledge 
of principles and causes. 14 Although Aristotle would no doubt acknowledge 
that the possession of such knowledge would impact upon way the way in 
which the individual concerned lived, there is a clear difference in priorities. 
For Aristotle, philosophers search for this knowledge and this happens to 
impact upon their way of life; for Socrates, philosophers search for knowledge 
in order to transform their way of life. For Socrates the primary function of 
philosophy is this transformation of one's (3ioc;, and the search for knowledge 
(e1tHJ'tllJlll) in the form of definitions (OP10"IlOl) and rational accounts (lvOY01) 
remains subordinate to this practical goal. As such one might hope that a 
Socratic account of the nature of philosophy would offer a framework within 
which it would be possible to deal adequately with questions concerning the 
relationship between philosophy and biography_ Although no explicit account 
survives (if one ever existed), it may be possible to reconstruct an outline of 
such an account from those Socratic sources which have survived. In the next 
12 See e.g. Plato Ap%gia 21c-22e, with Gulley, The Philosophy a/Socrates, pp. 12-13. 
13 Plato Gorgias 500c (trans. Woodhead, in Hamilton & Cairns, modified). 
14 See Aristotle A1etaphysica 1.1, esp. 981a30-981b6 & 982al-3. Note also 993b19-21: 
"philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth, for the end of theoretical knowledge is 
truth (uAit8sta.), and not action (epyov)". 
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three sections I shall attempt to do just this. Then, in the light of this, I shall 
return to Aristotle's presentation of Socrates in order to bring the Socratic 
conception of philosophy into sharper focus. 
2. Care of Oneself in the Apology and Alcibiades I 
Our first step towards understanding the concept of an art of living ('tEXV11 
1t£pt 'tOY ~iov) is to consider how Socrates conceived his philosophical project 
which, as we have just seen, is primarily concerned with life (~ioC;). In the 
Apology Socrates develops what he means by a philosophical project 
concerned with examining his life and the lives of others: 
Are you not ashamed that you give your attention (bn~u:AOUjl£VOC;) to 
acquiring as much money as possible, and similarly with reputation 
and honour, and give no attention (OUK bnjl£AfO or thought to truth 
and understanding and the perfection of your soul (\j1UXilC;)?15 
He continues by saying that he will examine and interrogate everyone he 
meets with these words, reproving anyone who gives all of his attention to 
trivialities and neglects what is of the uppermost importance. He again 
summarises his exhortation to all he meets: 
15 Plato Apologia 29d-e (trans. Tredennick). 
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old, to make your first and chief concern (E1n~EJvEtcreat) not for your 
bodies or for your possessions, but for the highest welfare of your 
souls ("n)xll~).16 
56 
Socrates' project of examining himself and others may be characterised as a 
project that is concerned with taking care of one's soul (f1tt~EAEtcreat 1:11C; 
\I1uxii~). 17 Unfortunately this idea is not developed in any great detail in the 
Apology. However it is developed elsewhere and its presence in the Apology in 
albeit embryonic form gives some ground for approaching these other 
accounts as, broadly speaking, Socratic. 
In Alcibiades I Socrates uses a similar phrase, 'to take care of oneself' 
(f1tt~EAEtcreat eau1:ou),18 and expands upon exactly what this might 
involve. 19 He begins his explanation of what it might mean to take care of 
16 Plato Apologia 30a-b (trans. Tredennick). 
17 In Iris commentary on the Apology, Burnet characterises tlris as tlle fundamental doctrine of 
Socrates (pp. 123, 124, 171). Similarly, Strycker calls it a "quintessentially Socratic 
expression" (Plato's Apology ~rSocrates, p. 333) and Hackforth suggests that it "sums up the 
whole of Socrates' activity" (' Socrates', p. 5). This phrase also appears in Socratic testimonia 
beyond Plato, including XenophonAlemorabilia 1.2.4 and Stobaeus 2.31.79 (2.215.8-10 WH 
= SSR I C 193), and it is also used by Isocrates in Antidosis 304, Ad Demonicum 6, and In 
Sophistas 8. 
18 See Plato Alcibiades 1 127e. In tlle course of the dialogue (l30a-c) Socrates identifies the 
individual (av6pco1tO~) with the soul (V'Ox'it). Thus it seems reasonable, following Burnet (pp. 
123, 154), to equate these two phrases. Despite its presence in the Apology, Kahn (Plato and 
the Socratic Dialogue, p. 90) suggests that £ntJ.L£A£tcr6at 'tfi~ v'OXfi~ is Plato' s preferred 
formulation, citing tlle presence of £ntJ.L£A£w6at ea'Owu in a fragment from Aesclrines' 
Alcibiades (fr. 8 Dittmar apud Aristides De Quattuor 348 (412.17 Lenz & Bebr) = SSR VI A 
50), preslUnably with tlle intention of implying tlmt tlris formulation is more likely to have 
been Socrates' own. A third phrase - £ntJ.L£A£tcr6at Up£'tfi<; - also appears in the Apology 
(31b, 41e) and both Burnet (pp. 127, 17l) and Strycker (pp. 331-32) take it to be synonymous 
with the other two. 
19 See in particular Plato Alcibiades 1 128a-129a. Following Schleiermacher, Introductions to 
the Dialogues of Plato, pp. 328-36, a number of mainly German scholars have disputed the 
autllorship of A lei biades 1. However it does not appear to have been doubted in antiquity (see 
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oneself by drawing a distinction between taking care of oneself and taking 
care of what belongs to oneself. In order to illustrate this distinction he 
contrasts taking care of one's shoes and taking care of one's feet. The art 
('t£XV11) of taking care of one's shoes is clearly shoemaking he suggests.20 
However, no matter how important shoes might be for one's feet, one can 
hardly say that shoemaking is itself the art (t£XVll) of taking care one's feet. 
Socrates and Alcibiades identify gymnastics (YUJlVUcr'tlKlt) as the appropriate 
art for taking care of feet, gymnastics understood in the broadest sense of 
taking care of the body as a whole. Thus, they conclude that the art of taking 
care of those things important for one's feet - one's shoes - is clearly distinct 
from the art of taking care of one's feet themselves. 
Socrates takes this argument and applies to an individual as a whole. Just 
as there are two distinct arts ('t£XVU1) in the cases of taking care of one's feet 
and what is important for one's feet, so there are two distinct arts in the case of 
e.g. Diogenes Laertius 3.51) and recently a number of mainly French scholars have argued for 
its authenticity (see e.g. Croiset (CUF), vol. 1, pp. 49-53). Those who doubt its authenticity 
tend, in general, to attribute it to a member of the Academy and date its composition to c. 340 
BC (see e.g. Bluck, 'The Origin of the Greater Alcibiades'). However, recent statistical 
analysis appears to confinn its authenticity (see Young, 'Plato and Computer Dating', p. 238). 
Its authenticity is not essential to my argument (although a relatively early date of composition 
may be) and I draw upon it as a source for Socrates insofar as it repeats and develops ideas 
present in the Apology_ Indeed, Burnet described it as "a sort of introduction to Socratic 
philosophy for beginners" (cited in Guthrie, History, vol. 3, p. 470). If not by Plato, it may 
conceivably be by one of the other Socratic authors to whom an Alcibiades is credited, 
including Antisthenes, Euclides, and Phaedo (see Diogenes Laertius 6.18 (= fro 1 DC = SSR V 
A 41), Diogenes Laertius 2.108 (= SSR II A 10), and Suidae Lexicon s.v. <l>atorov (<p 154 = 
SSR III A 8) respectively). 
20 Of tlle various examples of 't£xv<Xt used by Socrates, shoemaking is particularly common. 
See e.g. Plato Protagoras 319d, Gorgias 447d, Respublica 333a, 397e, 443c, Theaetetus 146d, 
Xenophon Afemorabilia 4.2.22. That Socrates constantly used tlle example of a shoemaker is 
stated explicitly by Callicles in Gorgias 491a and Alcibiades in Symposium 221e. This may 
owe something to the somewhat shadowJg- figure of Simon the Shoemaker, an associate of 
Socrates with whom Socrates is said to have spent considerable time conversing and who is 
credited with being the first to make ·written records of Socrates' conversations. For references 
to Simon see my 'Socraticorum Alaximus: Simon the Shoemaker and the Problem of 
Socrates'. 
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oneself and what is important for oneself. In other words, the arts that take 
care of the sorts of things usually held to be important for an individual -
possessions, wealth, reputation - are in fact distinct from, and irrelevant to, the 
art of taking care of oneself. Although both Socrates and Alcibiades say that 
they do not know what this art might be, they both agree that before one can 
begin to care for oneself one must first know oneself; for just as the art of 
shoemaking requires knowledge about shoes and the art of moneymaking 
requires knowledge about money, so the art of taking care of oneself requires 
self-knowledge. Socrates concludes by suggesting that the first step towards 
taking care of oneself must be to follow the famous inscription at Delphi that 
proclaims 'know thyself' (yv&6t mlu'tov)?l 
There are two points in this passage from Alcibiades I that deserve further 
comment. The first is the characterisation of taking care of oneself in very 
general terms as an art or craft ('tEXVll).22 Although in the following passage 
from the Apology the word 'tEXV11 is not used, nevertheless one can see the 
same theme being developed: 
Take the case of horses; do you believe that those who improve them 
make up the whole of mankind, and that there is only one person who 
has a bad effect on them? Or is the truth just the opposite, that the 
21 See Plato Alcibiades 1124a, 129a. Note also Aristotle fro 1 Rose3 apud Plutarch Adversus 
Colotem 1118c (= SSR I B 11, I C 502): according to Aristotle tlns Delphic inscription formed 
tlle inspiration for Socrates' philosophising. 
22 See Plato A lcibiades 1128d. 
CHAPTER TWO 
ability to improve them belongs to one person or to very few persons, 
who are horse trainers [ ... ]?23 
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The reason why horse trainers have the ability to improve horses is that they 
possess the art ('t£XVll) of horse training. Just as one would not entrust the 
welfare of one's horse to just anyone, so Socrates suggests that one should not 
entrust the welfare of one's soul (\jfUXTt) to just anyone. 24 Yet it is of course far 
from clear who in fact possesses the art ('t£XVl1) of caring for souls. This 
general characterisation of caring for oneself as an art or craft ('tExvl1) 
suggests that - like other arts or crafts - it is an activity guided by knowledge 
(bttO''tTtJlll) of its subject matter, that it is something that can be taught and 
learned, that an expert will be able to give an explanation or rational account 
(AOY0C;) of what he is doing, and that proficiency will require a certain amount 
of training and practice (liO'K110'tC;)?5 However, exactly how Socrates 
understands the relationship between these components is not yet clear and 
something to which we shall return. 
The second point worthy of note in the Alcibiades I passage is that, within 
the context of this general characterisation of taking of oneself as an art 
('t£XVll), Socrates draws a parallel between the art of taking care of oneself -
one's soul (\jIUXTt) - and the art that takes care of one's body which, as we 
23 Plato Apologia 25a-b (trans. Tredennick); see also XenophonApologia 20. . . 
24 See e.g. Plato Crito 47a-d, Laches 184e-185a, XenophonApologia 20, ~\JemorahrllG 3.9.10-
11. 
25 For further discussion see Brickhouse & Smith, Plato's Socrates, pp. 5-7: Reeve. Socrates 
in the Apologv~ pp. 37-45. For a survey of the various meanings of'tExvT\ before Socrates and 
Plato see Rooc1U1i~ Of Art and Wisdom, pp. 17-88. 
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ha ve seen, he call s yu Jl vaO''t:lKll. 26 Socrates suggests that the art of taking care 
of oneself benefits the soul (\jfUXll) in a manner analogous to the way in which 
gymnastics benefits the body. In particular, he wants to suggest that the care of 
the soul is at least as important, if not more so, than care of the body, despite 
the fact that the former is rarely practised.27 
So far we have seen that for Socrates philosophy is something concerned 
with one's way of life (J3io~), that it does this by examining and taking care of 
one's soul (\jfUX11) in a manner analogous to the way in which one might take 
care of one's body, and that this process can be characterised as an art, craft, 
or skill ('t€XV'l). We have also seen that knowledge (E1tlO''tllJlll) of this art or 
craft will involve being able to give an account of the rational principles 
OvOYOl) which underpin it. However it is not yet clear exactly how this notion 
of an art ('t€XVll) concerned with the soul is to be understood. 
26 Elsewhere, Plato's Socrates draws a similar parallel between 'Y'UJlV(l<Y'ttKTJ as that which is 
concerned ~ith the body and JlO'U<YtKTJ as that which concemed with the soul (see Plato 
Respublica 376e). One might understand JlO'U<YtKTJ as a specific type of't£xvTJ, in particular 
one presided over by the Muses, an example of which would be poetry (see ~SJ). In th~ 
Phaedo Socrates is made to say that he had a dream in which he was told to practIse JlO,\XHKTJ 
(see Plato Phaedo 60e) and he' continues by describing philosophy as the greatest of such arts 
(see Plato Phaedo 61a: ro~ q>t}vo<Yocpi(l~ JlEV oU<YTJ~ Jl£'Yi<Y'tTJ~ JlO,\)<YtKi1~). 
27 See e.g. Plato Crito 47c-48a, Protagoras 313a-c, Gorgias 512a. 
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3. The Analysis of -rEXV11 in the Gorgias 
The most detailed analysis of the concept of -reXV1l made by Plato's Socrates 
can be found in a passage from the Gorgias.28 The intention in this passage is 
to show that rhetoric is not a proper art.29 The extent to which this analysis is 
Socratic or Platonic may be open to dispute.30 Nevertheless it deserves our 
attention here insofar as it develops a theme already present in the Apology. 
However it is important to remember that our concern here is not with Plato's 
objectives in the dialogue as a whole but simply with his analysis of this 
Socratic concept. 
In the Gorgias Socrates draws a distinction between the body and the soul 
and suggests that there is a good condition (EuE;ia) for each of them. 31 He 
goes on to suggest that there are two arts ('tExva1) relating to each of these. 
The arts which deal with the soul Socrates calls 'politics' (1tOJ..l't1q).32 
Although he cannot think of an appropriate unifying term, the two arts dealing 
28 For the Gorgias I have used the edition by Dodds alongside Burnet's OCT edition, plus the 
translations by Irwin and by Woodhead (in Hamilion & Cairns), occasionally modified I have 
also used the commentary by Olympiodorus and Galen~s Thrasyb-uJus (5.806-898 KUhn) 
which comments directly on the Gorgias and deals ",ith a number of similar issues. Other 
Platonic dialogues that use what has come to be knol\n as 'the -reXl"" analogy' include the 
Laches, Charmilies, Euthyphro, Euthydemus, and Protagoras. Roochnik supplies a complete 
list of occurrences of 't£XV'I. in the early dialogues and the role it performs in each dialogue 
(OjArt and Wisdom, pp. 253-64). 
29 As Roochnik notes ('SoCIates' Use of the Techne-Analogy', pp. 194-95}, the't£X"'11 analogy 
is primarily used by Plato in the early dialogues as a method of refutation of claims to 
knowledge rather than as the basis for a positive moral theory. 
30 See in particular the discussion in Cooper, 'Socrates and Plato in Plato's Gorgias', esp. pp. 
31-3 2~ who argues that the 'Socrates' of this dialogue cannot straightforwardly be taken as 
merely Plato' s mouthpiece. 
31 See Plato Gorgias 463a-466a, esp. 464a; also Olympiodorus In Platonis Gorgiam 13.1-2; 
Santas, Socrates, pp. 286-303. For an etymological gloss on £i>E~i.a (£1> prefix plus E~~) see 
Galen Thrtmbulus 12 (5.826 Kiibn). 
3~ In their ~lation ofOIYlIlpiodorus In Platonis Gorgiam 13.2, Jackson. Lycos. & Tanant 
suggest 'constitutional'. 
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with the body are gymnastics (yu~vacrttKll) and medicine (iatplKll).33 
Socrates suggests that politics may be divided into two arts corresponding to 
these two physical arts, namely legislation (vO~Oe£ttKll) and justice 
(OlKatocruVll). There are, then, a total of four arts "taking care of either body 
or soul, aiming at the best (<1£t 1tpO~ to f3EJvttcrtoV)".34 
To these four genuine arts, Socrates contrasts four pseudo arts, his 
intention in this instance being to show that rhetoric is not a genuine art but 
merely a knack or routine (E~1t£tp1.a Kat tptf3il).35 Although the credit for this 
detailed and highly structured analysis of the four arts and their spurious 
counterparts should probably go to Plato,36 the basic distinction between arts 
of the soul and arts of the body remains in the spirit of Socrates' definition of 
his philosophical project in the Apology, namely taking care of one's soul 
The distinction that Socrates draws between the four genuine arts and their 
spurious counterparts adds much to his conception of the arts concerned with 
the soul. While the pseudo-arts tend to aim at pleasure, Socrates says that the 
33 Galen offers 'therapeutic arr (6£pa.1tE'O'tt1C"l] 'tfXVrU as a unif)'ing term for these two arts 
concerned 'with the body~ see Galen Thrasybulus 35 (5.873 KUhn). 
34 Plato Gorgias 464c. This may be illustrated by means of a table (with Dodds, p. 226): 
arts ('t£xva.t) 
gymnastics (1'OJ! va.O"'ttlC"i]) 
of the body (6£pa.n:£'O'tt"K-q) 
medicine (ia.'tpt1C"l]) 
legislation (voJ!o6£'tt1C"l]) 
of the soul (n:OAt'tt"K-q) 
justice (Ot"Ka.1OO"\)YT1) 
- preservation 
restoration 
- preservation 
restoration 
35 Plato Gorgias 463b. In his commentary, Dodds suggests "an empirical knack" ~. 225). At 
463d Socrates also characterises rhetoric as an image (dOCOAOV) of the correspondmg part of 
politics. 
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genuine arts aim at what is best (ro ~EAtHJ"COV)?7 This is important insofar as 
the best condition may not always be the most pleasant. Moreover, the pseudo-
arts are presented as the product of 'trial and error' empiricism rather than the 
expression of a real understanding of the task at hand. A genuine art, on the 
other hand, will always involve and proceed according to a rational account 
(A6'Yo~).38 An individual skilled in a particular art will always be able to offer 
an explanation of what it is that they are doing and why it is effective. This is 
what makes an art something that can be taught and learned. 
Within the four genuine arts, Socrates says that as gymnastics 
(Y'UJlVaattlCi'l) is to the body so legislation (VOJl08EttKl)) is to the soul, and as 
medicine (iatp1K1l) is to the body so justice (<>lKatocruvll) is to the souL 
While gymnastics aims at the preservation of the good of the body, medicine 
aims at the restoration of the good of the body_ Likewise, legislation preserves 
the good of the soul, while justice restores the good of the soul. 39 The analogy 
between gymnastics and the art of caring for the soul has already been 
mentioned. This new analogy with medicine helps to develop Socrates' project 
36 See Dodds' commentary, p. 226: This "is an early example of that interest in systematic 
classification which is so prominent in Sophist and Po/iticus [ ... J which is certainly, however, 
a Platonic and not a Socratic invention". 
37 For discussion of the ambiguity of the tenn 'best' ('to f3EA'ttcrwV) see Irwin's commentary, 
p.134. 
38 See Plato Gorgias 465a: "And I say it is not a craft ('tEXVTJV), but a knack (E~1t£tpiav), 
because it has no rational account (AOYOV) by which it applies the things it applies". However. 
as Aristotle notes in Afetapli.vsica 981al-3, a 'tEXVTJ can often be the product of £~1t£tpia, that 
is learned bv trial and error. Thus the key characteristic of a 'ttX\"TI is the presence of a 
rational acc~unt (A6yo~). For further discussion see Dodds, pp. 228-29. See also 
Olympiodoms In Platonis Gorgiam 12.1-2, for the importance of a rational accoun~ and 3.2. 
for the role of e:x~rience in learning a craft. 
39 See OlympiodomsIn Platonis Gorgiam 13.1-2. 
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further.40 It suggests that the art of taking care of the soul will benefit the soul 
in a manner similar to the way in which medicine benefits the body. Both are 
directed towards the cultivation or restoration of healt~ that is, a good state 
(EUE~ia) appropriate to each.41 As examples of 'tExval, both will proceed 
according to a rational account (A6yo~) and will be practised by experts who 
are able to explain and teach their art to others. Just like a doctor someone 
, 
who is skilled in the art of taking care of the soul will focus upon what will 
bring genuine good rather than short-term pleasure. More importantly, both of 
these arts are practical; as with the advice of a doctor, the words of someone 
skilled in the art of taking care of the soul will be of little value unless they are 
put into practice.42 Finally, unlike many of the other examples of 'tEXVU1, 
medicine involves a substantial body of theoretical knowledge and the use of 
this example serves to emphasise the essential role of A6yo~. Although this 
medical analogy is only made ·explicit in the Gorgias, it is already hinted at in 
Alcibiades 1 where Socrates moves between the words btlJlEAE1U and 
9Epa1tEia.43 One might say that just as medicine cures the body, so the art of 
taking care of the soul functions as a form of therapy for the soul and is 
directed towards what one might call mental hea1t~ analogous to physical 
health. 
40 TIlat this analogy may also be attributed to Socrates is given weight by its presence 
throughout Xenophon; see e.g. A1emorabilia 1.2.51, 1.2.54. 2A.3, 2.10.2, 3.1.4. It can also be 
seen in Democritus ft. 31 DK, with comment in Pigeaud, La maladie de I 'arne, pp. 17-19. 
41 Note that Galen suggests that it is necessary to draw a distinction between 'health' (uYlEia) 
and a 'good state' (d)£~ia), defIning 'health· as a certain state and a 'good ~tate' as excellence 
within that state; see Galen Thrasybulus 12 (5.825 Kiilm). However notlung much hangs on 
tillS here. 
42 Aristotle makes a similar point in Ethica Sicomachea l105bI2-18. For discussion see 
Jaeger, 'Aristotle's Use of Medicine as Model of Metllod in his Ethics', pp. 54-61. 
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This analogy with medicine, supplementing the analogy with gymnastics, 
fits into the scheme laid out in the Gorgias only because the art of taking care 
of oneself is divided into two distinct arts under the common heading of 
politics (noAl1:Uc11). Although, as we have seen, both of these analogies can be 
found in Alcibiades /, it seems reasonable to suggest that the systematic 
account in the Gorgias should be credited to Plato rather than Socrates. In both 
the Apology and Alcibiades / the art of taking care of oneself is presented as a 
unified activity that is primarily a personal affair, a task that each individual 
must undertake for themselves. Thus, although the account in the Gorgias is a 
useful supplement to the Apology and Alcibiades /, its use of terminology such 
as legislation (voJl09E'ClKt'1), justice (olK<XlOO"UV'll), and politics (no Al'ClKll) , 
may be seen to suggest the beginning of something quite different from 
Socrates' essentially private and personal philosophical project.44 
4. Different Types of'tExvTl 
So far we have encountered a number of different examples of arts or crafts 
(1:f:XV<Xl) used in connection with the idea of an art (1:f:XV'll) concerned with 
taking care of one's soul (\jIUXll). Before continuing with the Gorgias it may 
43 See Plato Alcibiades 1 13 lb. Note also Laches 185e: "What we have to consider is whether 
one of us is skilled in the therapy of the soul ('tEXVUCOC; 1tEpt 'l'uxfic; eEpC(1t~iC(v)". 
44 In the Apology Socrates is of course concerned ~ith provoking others to take care of 
themselves and thus there is some form of social dimension to Iris project. However, once 
provoked, it is a task that they must tmdertake for themselves. It is unclear how public 
legislation could playa part in what he has in mind (see Reeve, Socrates in the A/J.0l0?y- pp. 
155-60). His repeated use of the 'tEXVll analogy in discussions of politicalleade~ship (m ~th 
Plato and Xenophon) serves primarily to refute the claims of others to expertIse m polItics 
rather than forming the basis for any positive theory of a political 'tEXVll (see the next note). 
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be appropriate to consider the precise nature of these different 'tEXVat and to 
see what, if anything, this may contribute to our understanding of Socrates' 
project. 
As we have see~ in Alcibiades I the analogy was made between the art 
that takes care of one's soul and the art that takes care of one's feet. This latter 
art was specified as gymnastics. In the Gorgias both gymnastics and medicine 
were used. Elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues a whole range of examples of 
'tEXVat are used - building, weaving, shoemaking, flute playing, fishing, 
hunting, mathematics, navigation - although, in general, these are used to test 
claims to expert knowledge made by others rather than as direct analogies with 
the art that takes care of one's soul. 45 Nevertheless it may be instructive to 
consider briefly the nature of these various 'tEXVat and the ways in which they 
can be seen to differ from one another. 
The first and most obvious type of'tEXVll that can be distinguished may be 
called productive (nOtll'ttKll).46 This type of 'tEXVll has a product that can 
clearly be distinguished from its practice. Thus the art of shoemaking has a 
45 Roochnik, 'Socrates' Use of the Techne-Analogy', p. 194, draws attention to the primary 
uses of the U:?(Vl} analogy in the early dialogues, namely for refutation or exhortation, but not 
for the construction of a positive technical conception of apEnl, contra Irwin, Plato '8 A10ral 
Theory, p. 7. Roochnik's argument that Plato r~jected the 't£?(Vl} analogy is developed at 
length in his Of Art and Wisdom. He suggests that the fact that a number of the early dialogues 
fail to produce adequate definitions of the "Virtues that they consider indicates that 't£?(Vl} is not 
a good model for such knowledge (p. 89). But this could simply be due to the fact that none of 
the characters - Socrates included - possess the expertise necessary for one of them to be able 
to supply such a definition. It does not mean that a definition could never be supplied. These 
failures could simply be read as indications of the rarity of such knowledge. However. the 
debate concerning Plato's use of the 't£?(Vl} analogy is not directly relevant here as our primary 
concern is with Socrates and not Plato. This distinction becomes blurred only if one assumes 
that certain Platonic texts can be read as documents of essentially Socratic philosophy (see 
Additional Note 1). 
46 For exanlples of tlris sort of't£?(vl} see e.g. Plato Channides 165d. For the use of the phrase 
TCOll}'tlKll 't£?(vl} see e.g. Galen Thrasybulus 12 (5.826 Kuhn), 27 (5.85~ Kiihn), 30 (5.861 
KUhn), Simpliciusln Physica 303.10-11. 
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product - shoes - distinct from the activity of practising the art itself 
Moreover, success in the art of shoemaking can easily be assessed with 
reference to that product~ the excellent shoemaker is one who makes excellent 
shoes. It has been suggested that this type of 'tEXVll captures the original 
meaning of the word.47 Moreover it has sometimes been assumed that this is in 
some sense the primary or fundamental meaning of'tEXVll and consequently it 
has been argued that any 'tEXVll must ultimately conform to this model and 
thus must have a product distinct from its practice. 48 It is this essentially 
productive conception of'tEXVll that Aristotle holds. 49 
A second type of 'tEXVll can be seen in the case of fishing and this type 
may be called acquisitive (K'tll'tt K11). 50 Although this sort of art does not 
construct anything in the way that a productive art does, nevertheless in some 
sense it has a 'product' distinct from its practice by which mastery of the art 
may be assessed. Thus the excellent fisherman is one who returns home with a 
basket full of fish and consequently his mastery of the art can be seen by all. 
47 See Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom, pp. 18-26, who reports that the original pre-Homeric 
meaning would have been the production of something specifically from wood, but notes that 
already in Homer the range of meanings had expanded to include non-productive activities 
such as singing and medicine. 
48 See e.g. Irwin, Plato's A10ral Theory, pp. 73-74, with criticism in Nussbaum, The Fragility 
of Goodness, p. 97; Rooclll1ik, Of Art and Wisdom, p. 5. TIns leads Irwin into his 
'instrumentalist' interpretation of Plato, in wInch happiness (£1:>ocul1ovia.) is specified as the 
product of the art ('tEXV'll) ofhlunan excellence (ap£'t11) wInch becomes merely a means to this 
end. 
49 See Aristotle Ethica }Ilicomachea 1140al-23 and in particular 1140a17: "art ('tEXV'llV) must 
be a matter of making (not110"Eox;), 110t of acting (01:> npa~£o)(;)". On the basis of this he claims 
at 1140bl-2 that practical wisdom (Q>p6V'llO"t~) cannot be an art. 
50 For examples see e.g. Plato Euthydemus 290b-c. For the phrase K't1')'ttKl] 'tEXV1') see e.g. 
Plato Sophista 223c, Galen Thrasybulus 30 (5.861 KiUll1). 
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A third type of 'tEXVll is exemplified by dancing and may be called 
performative (np<XK'tlK1l).51 For arts such as these there is no material product 
distinct from the practice of the art itself 52 Success in this sort of art must 
therefore be judged with reference to a correct performance. Plato refers to 
this sort of art when he distinguishes between the arts of making harps and 
playing harps, the latter being an art of 'use'. 53 In one ancient source 
, 
examples of arts such as flute playing and harp playing are used to 
characterise what Aristotle calls practical knowledge (ETCtO"'tTtJlll TCpaK'tlK11) 
and which he will say has as its goal action (Ep,,(OV). 54 Note that the way in 
which the word EPYOV can refer to both products and actions may undercut any 
attempt to impose a rigid division between productive and performative arts. 
A fourth type can be seen in the examples of mathematics and geometry. 
These arts may be called theoretical (9£roPll'tlKTt).55 Their precise nature is 
more difficult to discern. They could possibly be classified as productive 
(producing results), acquisitive (uncovering results), 56 or performative 
(primarily characterised by correct application of procedures). However Plato 
51 Alternatively, active. For examples see e.g. Plato lvfeno 9Od-e, Laches 194e. For the phrase 
npalC'ttlClt 'tEXVll see e.g. Ga1en Thrasybulus 27 (5.856 Killin), 30 (5.861 Kiilm), Eustratius In 
Ethica Nicomachea 58.24. 59.2. 
52 Invin, Plato's A10ral Theory. pp. 73-74, insists that even these arts must have a distinct 
'product' (Ep,¥OV)~ dancing produces movements, flute playing produces music. etc. These are 
of course actions rather than distinct material products, highlighting the range of the word 
Ep'¥OV. 
53 See Plato Euthvdemus 289b-c. 
54 See Diogenes' Laertius 3.84 (but note a1so 3.100) and Aristotle A1etaphysica 993b20-21 
respectively. 
55 For examples see e.g. Plato Charmides 165e-166a, Gorgias 450d. For the plu:a~e Eh::roPll'ttlClt 
'tEXVll see e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias In J\1etaphysica 142.7-8, Sexius EmpmcusAdversus 
Alathematicos 2.5.8.291. 
56 See e.g. Plato Euthydemus 290b-c, Sophista 219c. 
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often distinguishes these sorts of arts from all of the others mentioned so far. 57 
An alternative way to characterise them might be as contemplative. Indeed, 
this type of art is often understood as a correlate to Aristotle's conception of 
theoretical knowledge (btlO"'tllJ1ll 8£roPll'tlKl}) which he distinguishes from the 
practical (1tpaK'tlKl}) and the productive (1tOlll'ttKl}).58 However, these 
Aristotle calls types of E1ttO"'tl}Jlll, and not types of'tEXVll, a term which, as we 
have already noted, he limits to the productive 'tExvat. 
A fifth type can be seen in medicine and navigation. These are arts that 
aim (o"'toxa~OJlal) at a distinct goal ('tEAO~) - in the case of medicine, health-
but in which the excellent practitioner does not always achieve that goal. 
These may be called stochastic (O"'tOXaO"'ttKl}) arts. 59 One might say that the 
'product' (epyov) of the art of medicine is health but that - unlike the excellent 
shoemaker - the excellent doctor does not always manage to produce this 
product.60 In other words, excellent practice does not guarantee that one will 
always achieve the goal. This is due to the role played by external factors 
outside of the control of the practitioner. 61 In these sorts of arts a problem can 
5~ See e.g. Plato Charmides 165e, Gorgias 450d-e. 
58 See Aristotle lvfetaphysica 1025b3-1026a32, Rooclmik, Of Art and Wisdom, p. 271. Note 
also Diogenes Laertius 3.84 where Aristotle's threefold di"ision of E1t1(J"'tTtJll} is attributed to 
Plato, but using examples of arts, including shipbuilding for the productive, flute playing for 
the practical, and geometry for the theoretical. 
59 See e.g. Aristotle Topica 101b5-1O, Ars Rhetorica 1355bI2-14. In these passages Aristotle 
does not use the phrase O"WX<l<HtK'Tt 'tEXVl} but his commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias 
does~ see e.g. 111 Topica 32.12-34.5, In Ana~ytica Priora 39.30-40.5, 165.8-15, Quaestiones 
61.1-28. For the phrase see also Ps.-GalenDe Optima Secta 4 (1.112-115 Kiihn). Alexander's 
account of stochastic arts will be discussed in Chapter Three § 4. 
60 In Channides 165c-d Plato characterises health as tlle 'product' (epyo\') of medicine 
alongside houses as the product of building without noting any difference in nature between 
the two arts. The precise relationship between goal ('tfAoC;) and product or function (epyov) in 
stochastic arts will be discussed further in Chapter Three § 4. 
61 See the discussion of such factors in an argument defending medicine's status as a 'tEX\'l} in 
Hippocrates De Arte 8. It is the role that tllese external factors play, and not any lack of 
precision with regard to its subject matter, that defines a stochastic art and leads to the 
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be seen to arise when it comes to assessing an individual's expertise. One 
response to this would be to suggest that if a practitioner of a stochastic art 
"omits none of the available means" (faV trov €VO£XOJlEV<OV Jlllotv 
napaAinu) then one can reasonably claim that he has an adequate grasp of the 
art in question. 62 So, for example, an expert doctor might be defined as one 
who does everything in his power to save his patient. However, this implies 
that only other practitioners of the art in question will be able to make such an 
assessment, for only they will be familiar with all of the means available. 
As we can see, it is possible to distinguish between a number of different 
types of tEXVll and, in order to understand Socrates' concept of an art 
concerned with taking care of one's soul, it will be necessary to consider 
which type of art he may have had in mind. However, we must remember that 
the examples mentioned above derive from the Platonic dialogues where in a 
number of different passages Plato distinguishes between two or three of these 
types of tEXVll for his own philosophical ends.63 It would be rash to assume 
that this analysis can straightforwardly be applied to Socrates' understanding 
of the term tEXVll. 
In the Apology Socrates holds up craftsmen in general as the only 
examples he can find of individuals possessing secure knowledge.64 He does 
not appear to distinguish between different types of craftsmen. Yet as we have 
distinction between goal (-reA-OC;) and function (ep'Yov). Roochnik is occasionally unclear about 
this: compare 0.( Art and Wisdom, pp. 52 & 55. 
62 See Aristotle Topica 101b9-1O. 
63 All of the appropriate passages are outlined in Roochnik, 0.( Art and Wisdon!, pp. 271-82. 
As he notes. Plato's primary division is between the productive and the theoretIcal, but these 
are often sub-divided. 
64 See Plato Apologia 22c-d 
CHAPTER TWO 71 
seen in Alcibiades 1 and the Gorgias, the arts that are explicitly used in 
relation to the idea of an art of taking care of one's soul are gymnastics 
(YU)lVaO''ttKll) and medicine (ia'tptKll). Both of these arts are presented as 
being concerned with the health of the body, with preserving or restoring a 
good state (€u€~la) for the body. As such, they can both be seen as examples 
of stochastic arts; they aim at a goal which mastery of the art in question does 
not necessarily guarantee. To this category one might add the only example of 
a 'tElV'll in the Apology - horse training - which also aims at a good state 
(€u€~la) and in which mastery of the art may not be enough to guarantee 
success; no matter how good the horse trainer, some horses simply cannot be 
trained. Yet another characteristic that these three arts share in common and 
which does not apply to all stochastic arts (e.g. navigation) is that they focus 
upon the transformation of the condition or state of the object with which they 
are concerned. Although one might characterise the health or good state that 
each of these arts aim at as a 'product', a more appropriate way to consider 
them might be as an alteration of the condition of an obj ect. As such we might 
characterise these as not only stochastic but also as transformative arts. 
Should one understand the art of taking care of one's soul as a stochastic-
transformative art? This appears to be what is implied by the examples of 
gymnastics, medicine, and horse training. Yet one will recall that, for Socrates, 
his conception of an art that takes care of one's soul in some sense guarantees 
success and happiness (€u8at)lovla). Just as the master shoemaker knows that 
he is sure to make good shoes, so Socrates conceives of an art the possession 
of which will guarantee success in living well. This is clearly very different 
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from the stochastic art of medicine in which the expert doctor, no matter how 
good he is, will nevertheless occasionally lose a patient due to external factors 
outside of his control. Thus it is tempting to suggest that the key characteristic 
of the three examples that Socrates would want to extract is not their 
stochastic nature but rather their transformative function. Indeed, the self-
referential nature of the art with which Socrates is concerned appears to rule 
'.c'. fr 65 . 
out mterlerence om external factors. The art of taking care of one's soul is 
an art directed towards the transformation of the state of the soul into a good 
state (EuE~ia), developing its excellence (apE1:1'1), just as medicine transforms 
the state of the body into one of health. 66 This, broadly speaking, may be 
called its 'product' . Yet it is important to note here that this art is not itself 
human excellence (apE1:ll) but rather an art that cultivates and takes care of 
such excellence,67 just as medicine and gymnastics are not themselves health 
but rather the arts that cultivate and preserve health. Thus apE1:11 is the product 
of the art for which Socrates searches and not the art itself 68 For Socrates, 
65 This will become a key characteristic later in the bands of Epictetus who will suggest that 
the only thing with which we should be concerned is that which is totally "ithin our own 
power and independent of external factors (see e.g. Enchiridion 1.1-3). 
66 By aps'tTt should be understood not merely moral virtue but "irtue in the sense of 'that by 
virtue of which' a tiring is good, and thus excellence or goodness in general. An athlete who 
wins at tile Olympics, for instance, is aps'tTt yet this clearly does not mean ·virtuous'. For 
further comment see Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, pp. 30-31: also Nehamas, 
The Art o/Living, p. 77, who suggests 'success'. 
67 Note again the use of £nlJ.lSAsI0'6at aps'tfj<; in the Apology (31b, 41e) as a synonym for 
£mJ.lsA£10'6cxl £cx'O'tou and £mJ.lSAsw6cxl 'til<; 'l''OXl1<; (see Burnet, pp. 127, 171; StIycker. pp. 
331-32). The 'tEXVll for which Socrates searches will take care of his excellence; it is not itself 
that excellence. In Euthydemus 275a it is philosophy (q)t/~oO'o<picx) that is identified as that 
which takes care of excellence (aps'tl1<; £ntJ.lsJ..sI0'6at). Socrates' 'tEXVll analogy, ilien. is with 
philosophy, not WitIl excellence (aps'tTt). . 
68 This is based upon my earlier reading of the Apology and, in particular, Alcibiades 1. which 
develops material in the Apology. It is not a claim about the early Platonic dialogues in 
general. But it is interesting to note tImt this answers one of the objections made by Vlastos 
and others to Irwin's instrumentalist reading of Plato (see the summary in Vlastos, Socrates: 
lronist and lv!oral Philosopher, pp. 6-10). RatIler than aps'tTt being reduced to a means for 
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then, it appears that human excellence (ap£'t1]) is not a technique ('t£XVll) but 
rather a certain excellent state (£u£~iu) of the soul (\IIUx1]). 
As I have already noted, this brief detour from the Gorgias has focused 
upon the different types of't£xvll that appear in Plato's dialogues. It is difficult 
to know how much, if any, of this can be attributed to Socrates. The analyses 
of different types of 't£XVll that appear in a number of the early dialogues is 
probably the work of Plato himself and may not owe much at all to Socrates.69 
The central theme that one finds in the Apology and elsewhere is Socrates' 
search for a secure form of knowledge concerned with how one should live. 
The only examples of any form of secure knowledge that he could find were 
with the artisans and craftsmen, and consequently Socrates appears to have 
taken their model of knowledge as the paradigm in his search without 
necessarily considering the subtle but important differences between the 
various examples of such knowledge. This is a topic to which we shall return 
when we discuss the Stoics in the next chapter. Our primary concern here is to 
consider the way in which Socrates understood the nature of such 't£XVUl in 
general and the way in which he thought such knowledge could be developed. 
attaining the 'product' EooatJlovia. apE'tTt itself becomes the 'prod~ct'., identified with 
EuoatJlovia (as Vlastos suggests it must be), retaining its status as an end lllitseif. . 
69 TIus is the line taken by Roochnik in Of Art and Wisdom. although he does not dIrectly 
address questions concerning the hlstorical Socrates. 
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5. The Role of a.O"1Cllo"t~ 
As we saw earlier in the Gorgias, central to Socrates' distinction between an 
art or craft ('t£XV'll) and a mere knack or routine (f~1t£lpia Kat 'tPl~fJ) is the 
claim that one who is an expert in an art will be able to give a rational account 
(AOYO~) of what he is doing. 70 It is this ability that makes an art something that 
can be taught and learned. Yet what exactly is involved in learning an art? Is it 
merely a question of gaining a theoretical understanding of the rational 
principles (AOY01) behind the art? In a number of passages in the Gorgias 
Socrates suggests that he thinks that, alongside an understanding of the 
relevant rational principles, something else will also be required if someone is 
to become proficient in an art. Before considering these passages it might be 
helpful to consider further the nature of a 't£XV'll. 
For any art or craft ('t£XV'll) it is possible to draw a threefold distinction 
between someone who has no knowledge of the craft in question, an 
apprentice in that craft, and an expert ('tExvi'tl1~). It is the status of the 
apprentice that is relevant here. An apprentice might be described as someone 
who has studied the basic principles of the craft but has not yet mastered the 
practice of that craft. Although he might understand the rational principles 
(AOY01) underpinning the craft ('t£XVl1), nevertheless he is not yet a craftsman 
('tEXvi'tl1~). The student of medicine, for example, will require considerable 
practical experience after his education in medical theory before he can claim 
70 It is Socrates' own inability to give such an account (A6yoc;) that forms the basis for his 
profession of ignorance despite his reputation for wisdom in his actions (Epya). 
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to be a fully qualified doctor. In other words, an understanding of the I"OYOl 
relevant to a 'tEXV11 is not on its own sufficient for mastery of that 'tEXVT). 
In the light of this, let us now return to the Gorgias. In three separate 
passages Socrates hints at the role that training or exercise (aOKT)<H<;) might 
p lay in the acquisition of an art or craft ( 'tEXVT)). 71 After a discussion 
concerning the beneficial qualities of self-discipline or temperance 
(O<.O<PPOO'UVT)), Socrates sums up by saying that anyone who wants to be happy 
must attain this: 
If it is true then the man who wishes to be happy (£uOaljlOVla) must 
pursue and practice (Ol<.OK'tEOV Kat aOK11'tEov) temperance. 72 
Self-discipline or temperance (o<.O<PPOOUV11) is of course one of the traditional 
human excellences or virtues (ap£'tai). Here Socrates hints at the idea that the 
acquisition of this excellence will require one not merely to be able to say 
what it is (i.e. supply its 1.,010<;) but also to engage in some form of practice 
(ao"K11O'l<;) if one wants to acquire it fully. Later in the dialogue, where 
Socrates returns explicitly to the question of 'tEXV11, he suggests to his 
interlocutor Callicles that it would be foolish for either of them to stand up in 
public and profess themselves to be an expert ('t£xvi't11<;) in an art or craft 
71 As well as aO'KTJO't<; other words used include J.1£A£'tTJ and 'Y'UJlUSEH'. These terms are often 
used interchangeably and in the present context I take them to be broadly S}TIonymous. These 
terms will reappear in Chapter Five. For philosophical references to aO'"KTJO't<; before Socrates 
see e.g. Protagoras fro 3 DK and Democritus ft. 242 DK, ,vith comment in Hijmans, 
''AC7Kllmq, pp. 55-57; for references to JlEj"E'tTJ see e.g. Protagoras ft. 10 DK apud Stobaeus 
3.29.80 (3.652.22-23 WH): "art without practice, and practice "ithout art:, are nothing" (EAEYE 
JlTJOEV £ivat Jlll'tE 'tEXVTJV aVE'\) JlEAE'tTJ<; Jlll'tE JlEAE'tTJV aVEt> 'tEXVTJ<;). 
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before they had first served a long apprentice of trial and error, followed by a 
period of successful practice in private.73 Only then would either of them be 
ready to proclaim their ability. Here the idea that an apprentice in a craft must 
undergo some form of training after his initial education in the principles of 
that craft is made more explicit (although the word UOK1101<; is not used). 
Later, at the very end of the dialogue, Socrates again says to Callicles that 
neither of them should engage in the art of politics until they have gained 
sufficient expertise in it: 
After such training in common (K01 vfi aOK1loav'tE<;) together, then at 
last, if we think fit, we may enter public life?4 
Here Socrates is explicit: before one can become an expert in an art or craft (in 
this case, politics) one must first engage in training or exercise (&OK1101<;). 
What these passages hint at is the idea that, alongside an understanding of the 
principles (AOY01) involved in an art ('tEXV11), one must also engage in a period 
of practical training or exercise (UO"KllO"l<;) in order to master that art. This is 
what the apprentice must undergo in the period between leaving the classroom 
and publicly proclaiming his expertise in his chosen profession. 
Xenophon, in a passage defending the reputation and activities of Socrates, 
also draws attention to the importance of UO"KllO"l<; and, in particular &oK1101<; 
concerned with the soul (",UXll): 
72 Plato Gorgias 507c. 
73 See Plato Gorgias 514e. 
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I notice that as those who do not train the body (-cn crm)lcx-ccx 
aaKouv-ccx~) cannot perform the functions proper to the body (-c<X -cou 
crm)lcx-co~ epycx), so those who do not train the soul (-Cl]V 'I1UXl)V 
acrKouv'tCX~) cannot perform the functions of the soul (-C<X 'tfl~ 'I1uxfl~ 
epycx)?5 
77 
Although Xenophon does not explicitly attribute this remark to Socrates 
himself, it is clear that Xenophon takes this notion of training the soul ('I1Uxi}) 
to be implicit in Socrates' philosophy and considers it necessary to make it 
explicit as part of his defence of Socrates. 
From these remarks one can see that for Socrates learning an art or craft 
('tEXV'll) will involve two components, ~,,6yo~ and licrKllcrt~. 76 In order to 
become a master of any given 'tEXV'll, both components will be necessary.77 It 
is not enough merely to understand the principles behind an art, one must also 
undertake a series of exercises in order to translate those principles into one's 
behaviour. It is this training (liaKl1crt~) that transforms the apprentice into an 
expert whose mastery of the art in question is displayed in his actions (epycx). 
74 Plato Gorgias 527d. 
75 Xenophon Alemorabilia 1.2.19 (trans. Marchant). 
76 A third contributory factor (but perhaps not a necessary component) would be natural 
ability. These three - learning, practice, natural ability - are often listed together in 
discussions of't£XVl1 and ap£TTt (e.g. Plato Aleno 70£1, Protagoras 323d-e, Phaedrus 269d, 
XenophonAlemorabilia 3.9.1-3~ note that in the last two of these J.l£A£'tl1 is used in place of 
aO'K:l1(J1.~;). For further discussion see O'Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes, esp. pp. 144-46 n. 27, 
and, for further ancient examples, see Shorey, '<I>')(H~, J.l£A£1:11. E1ttO''t1}J.lll'· 
77 This is rarely acknowledged in discussions of either Socrates or the early Platonic 
dialogues. However note Guthrie, History, vol. 3, p. 456: "It must also be remembered that 
Socrates's constant analogy for virtue was not theoretical science but art or craft (techne). 
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Unfortunately the role of training in the concept of'tEXVll is rarely brought out 
in this context because Socrates has often been presented as being primarily 
concerned with the search for definitions, that is, for an account of the rational 
principles (AOY01) which stand behind knowledge of an art or craft. As I have 
already suggested, this may well be due to the influence of Aristotle's 
testimony. 78 However, although such definitions may be a necessary condition 
for knowledge of an art or craft, the passages that we have just considered 
suggest that Socrates did not consider them to be, by themselves, a sufficient 
condition. 79 
6. Aristotle's Interpretation of Socrates 
It is clear, then, that Socrates outlines the idea of an art ('tEXVll) concerned 
with taking care of one's soul ('l'UX11) or one's excellence (ap£'til), analogous 
to gymnastics and medicine, and requiring two components, a rational 
principle (AOYO~) and practical training (ao"Kl)(n~). 
mastery of which calls for both knowledge and practice"; and also more recently Nehamas, 
'Socratic Intellectualism', p. 46. 
78 See § 1 above. 
79 I say 'may be a necessary condition' rather than 'are a necessary condition' because of the 
following: in both Plato Laches 193d-e and Xenophon A1emorabilia 4.4.10 Socrates is 
presented as possessing the art of luunan excellence (apeTIt) even though it is e:x.'Plicitly 
acknowledged in both passages that he catmot give a rational account of it. One might say that 
in some sense Socrates possesses ape'Ll] itself, but does not possess knowledge (E1tt<J'tl]lLrU of 
apE'Ll]. He is, for instance, courageous but has no knowledge of courage (and therefore can 
neither define it nor teach it to others). Tins is obviously closely related to the status of 
Socrates' profession of ignorance, an issue which goes beyond our concerns here. Tile 
important point in the present conte:x.i is not lvhetller defmition (/,,6yoC;) is a necessary 
condition or not (at present I remain undecided) but rather the claim tlmt it is not a sufficient 
condition. 
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In addition to this there is another important point that needs to be noted. 
Socrates suggests that possession of a 'tEXVll will necessarily impact upon the 
behaviour of its possessor. 80 So, when making shoes, the skilled shoemaker 
cannot help but make good shoes (excepting any deliberate intention or 
external interference). Similarly the musician, by virtue of the fact that he has 
mastered the art concerned with his instrument,. always plays well. In short, 
Socrates suggests that the art ('tEXVll) that takes care of one's soul (WUXl]) _ 
also characterised as the art that takes care of one's apE'tl] - will automatically 
impact upon one's behaviour. To be more precise, he claims that knowledge 
(bttO''tllJlll) of this art ('tEXVll) will necessarily impact upon an individual's 
actions (epya). 81 Just as the skilled shoemaker will, by definition, always 
make good shoes, so he who knows the art of taking care of one's excellence 
(apE'tll) will necessarily act excellently. 
This idea that philosophical knowledge (brtO''tl]Jlll) will automatically 
impact upon one's behaviour (~io~) has often been criticised, probably most 
famously by Aristotle. This criticism is of course based upon Aristotle's own 
understanding of what he takes to be Socrates' position. The Aristotelian 
claims concerning Socrates relevant here are the following: 
80 See e.g. Plato Gorgias 460b-c: "Now is not the man who has learned (J.1£J.1a8T\KOx;) the art 
of carpentry a carpenter? [ ... ] And he who has learned the art of mu~ic ~ musician? [ ... ] And 
he who has learned medicine a physician? And so too on the same pnnClple, the man who has 
learned (J.1£J.1a8T\KOx;) anything becomes in each case such as his knowledge (E1ttcr~Jl~) 
makes himT'o This is based upon Iris more general claim that people only do what they think IS 
best; see e.g. Plato Protagoras 352c, Xenophon Afemorabilia 3.9.5, 4.6.6,. Ari.stotle E~hica 
Eudemia 1216b6-9 (= S')R I B 28). Iftlley do not know what is best tllen theIr nnstake mIl be 
a product of ignorance: but if tlley do know what is best they will necessarily do it. 
81 See e.g. XenophonA1emorabilia 3.9.5. 
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He [Socrates] thought all the excellences (ap£'tcXC;) to be kinds of 
knowledge (f:1Uo"'tllJ1UC;), so that to know justice (£ib£VUl 't£ 't11V 
blKUlOO"UVllv) and to be just (£lvul blKutov) came simultaneously 
(&JlU O"UJlf3ulV£tv); for the moment that we have learned geometry or 
building we are builders and geometers. 82 
Socrates thought the excellences (ap£'tuc;) were rational principles 
(AOYOUC;) (for he thought they were all forms of knowledge 
(£1tto"'ttlJlUC;)). 83 
80 
These two passages form the core of Aristotle's presentation of what has come 
to be known as Socrates' 'virtue is knowledge' thesis - the theory that to know 
what is good will necessarily make one good.84 The first of these passages is, 
in the light of what we have already seen, fairly uncontroversial. For Socrates, 
ap£'ttl is the knowledge (£1ttO"'ttlJlll) developed by the art ('t£XVll) that takes 
care of one's soul, and to possess that knowledge will automatically impact 
upon one's behaviour. 85 Just as knowing the art of shoemaking makes one a 
good shoemaker, so knowing the art that cultivates human excellence (ap£'ttl) 
will make one an excellent individual. However, the second of these passages 
is somewhat problematic. Here, human excellence (ap£'ttl) is identified with 
82 Aristotle Ethica Eudemia 1216b6-9 (= SSR I B 28). 
83 Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1144h28-30 (= SSR I B 30). 
84 For further discussion of this thesis see Guthrie, History, vol. 3, pp. 450-59. For Aristotle's 
presentation of this thesis see Deman. Le ternoignage d'Aristote sur Socrate, pp. 82-98. 
85 For ap£'tlt as a form of £1t1O"'tltJ.lll see Plato Alena 87c, Protagoras 34ge-350a, 360d. 
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rational principles (AOyot).86 Aristotle in effect suggests that Socrates held that 
posseSSIOn of these principles (AOyot) would on its own be sufficient to 
guarantee knowledge (bnO''tlUl'T}); 'to know the principles (AOYOt) 
underpinning human excellence (ap£'t1'l) is enough to possess that excellence' 
says Socrates according to Aristotle. 
Aristotle's implicit identification of bnO''tl}~'T} with ')"oyo~ in his 
presentation of Socrates' position leads Aristotle to attribute to Socrates the 
claim that an understanding of philosophical principles or theory (AOYO~) will 
on its own automatically impact upon one's behaviour (Pio~). It is this thesis 
that Aristotle then criticises for being too simplistic. Indeed, the passage in 
question continues with the clause i}~£t~ oE jl£'tCx AOyOU. Thus the full passage 
reads: 
Socrates thought the excellences (ap£'tCx~) were rational principles 
(AOyOU~) (for he thought they were all forms of knowledge 
(bnO''tlljla~)), while we think they involve a rational principle (jl£'tCx 
'1 ' ) 87 /\,°YOU . 
Yet as we have already seen, Socrates does not identify bnO''tlljl 11 with AOyO~ 
and does not think that such principles will be enough on their own to 
86 See also Aristotle ]\lfagna A10ralia 1198alO-13 (= SSR I B 33) where the identification 
between <Xp£'t1] and ')J)'yoc;, is made explicit (with comment in Deman, Le tefJ~oi~age 
d:4ristote sur Socrate, p. 92). For discussion oftlle authenticity of this work - often dislll1ssed 
as spurious - see Cooper, 'The Afagna Aforalia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy'. 
87 Aristotle Ethica Nicornachea 1 1 44b28-30 (= SSR I B 30). 
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transfonn one's behaviour. Instead, he identifies £1n<Jt1Ul ll with tExvll,88 
arguing that it is this that will automatically impact upon one's behaviour, and 
not merely the possession of the '),,0Y01 underpinning that tEXVll. 89 As Aristotle 
confirms in the first passage above, Socrates held ap£tl} to be a form of 
knowledge (£1n<Jt11Jlll). However, in contrast to Aristotle's claim in the second 
passage, Socrates identifies knowledge (f1ClO"tl}Jlll) not with an understanding 
of the principles (AOY01) underpinning an art but rather with the possession of 
the art (tEXVll) itself As we have already seen. Socrates does not think that an 
understanding of the theory or principles (AOY01) behind an art (tEXVll) is on 
its own enough to make one an expert in that art. Rather he suggests that one 
will also require training, exercise, or practice (ao"Kl10"1~). 
By identifying £1n<Jt11Jlll with AOYO~ Aristotle, in effect, makes Socrates 
say that the apprentice craftsman who has finished his course of lectures on 
theory Ovoyo~) but has not yet undergone any practical training (ao"KllO"t~) will 
immediately be able to translate what he has learned in the classroom into 
practical ability. Yet what Socrates actually says is that in order for the 
apprentice to become a master craftsman (t£xvitll~) he must engage in 
practical training (a<JKllo"l~) in order to learn how to translate what he has 
88 See e.g. Plato Protagoras 357b. 
89 This distinction may be used to fonn the basis for a Socratic response to Aristotle's 
criticism of Socrates' rejection of 'weakness of will' in Ethica Nicomachea (see e.g. 11-l-5b21-
27 = SSR I B 39). The individual who appears to know x but does not do x has an 
understanding of the principles concerning x but does not possess the art concerning x. On his 
reading of Socrates, Aristotle's identification of knowledge (E1t1O"'ttlJlrU with an u~derstan~g 
tlle principles (AOyot) leads to the paradox of possessing knowledge but not actIng upon It. 
However Socrates' identification of knowledge with possession of an art ('tEXVll) - as opposed 
to the principles lmderpinning that art - enables him to say tlmt the 'weak-willed" indi,idual 
does not have E1CtO"'tltJLTI even though he might possess the relevant A6y01. The exira element 
required will of course be ao"KllO"t<;. 
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learned in the classroom (AOyO<;) into actions (£pya). However, once the 
apprentice has finished his practical training, then his skill or expertise ('tEXVTJ) 
will automatically impact upon the way in which he practises his craft. In 
other words, by identifying £1ttO"'t'llJl TJ with 'Aoyo<; rather than 'tEXVTJ in his 
account of Socrates' position, Aristotle fails to take into account the 
importance that Socrates places upon ao"KTJO"t<; for the acquisition of 
knowledge of an art or craft, including the art that cultivates human excellence 
7. Summary 
The aIm of this chapter has been to consider the Socratic ongms of the 
conception of philosophy as an art ('tEXVTJ) concerned with one's way of life 
(~io<;). I have tried to offer an outline of Socrates' account of a 'tEXVTJ directed 
towards taking care of one's soul ('!lUx'll), a 'tEXVTJ directed at the cultivation of 
apE't'll that will be expressed in an individual's actions (£pya).91 I have also 
90 However, in his own ethics Aristotle does take into account the role of amcll<nc; in the 
acquisition of ap£'tlt (see e.g. Ethica Nicomachea 1099b9-18; also 1l05bI2-18). The major 
difference between Aristotle's own position and that of Socrates (and later the Stoics) is his 
distinction between O"o<pia and CPPOVllO"lC;. This introduces into his philosophy the possibility 
of a dichotomy between kno\ying goodness and being good (see e.g. Ethica Nicomachea 
l103b26-28) that is impossible for Socrates. This, in tum. leads to his confusion concerning 
Socrates' position. As we have seen, in fact Aristotle and Socrates would agree with regard to 
the point that ap£'tlt is not merely a matter of 'Ao,,{oC; but nevertheless involves 'A6yoC;. TIle 
difference between their positions lies in Socrates' emphasis upon 'tEXVll as a model for 
£1tlO"'tltJIll and O"ocpia (see esp. Plato Apologia 21c-22e) in contrast to Aristotle's more 
theoretical mode1. For Aristotle 'tEXVll is strictly productive and not concerned \\'ith action 
(e.g. Ethica Nicomachea 1140aI6-17), 
91 By way of further elaboration: this art ('tEXV'l) is concerned with cultivating a good state 
(£i)£"~ia) "in tlle soul (\lfUXlt) and this good state (£i>£~ia) may be identified "ith excellence 
(apult). This transfonnation of the soul is automatically e~q)ressed in actions (epya). these 
actions (epya) being the tangible 'product' (epyo\') of the art ('tEXVll) and the means by which 
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attempted to show that knowledge (£1ttO"'t11J.l.TJ) of this 'tEXVTJ cannot be 
identified simply with the principles (AoYOt) underpinning that 'tEXVTJ but will 
instead involve both AOyoC; and aO"KTJO"tC;.92 I have suggested that this is 
something often obscured by an 'intellectualist' image of Socrates, an image 
that owes much to Aristotle's testimony. 
We can now begin to see how this Socratic conception of philosophy 
might enable us to understand better the relationship between philosophy and 
biography. By identifying £1[tO"'t1111TJ with 'tEXVTJ rather than Iv6yoC;, Socrates 
implicitly presents philosophy as something that will necessarily be expressed 
in an individual's actions (epya), just as the craftsman's expertise will be 
expressed in his actions and the works (epya) that he produces.93 Yet there 
will be plenty of philosophical apprentices who, although they may have 
mastered philosophical AoYOt, are not yet philosophers in the Socratic sense 
insofar as their epya are not yet in harmony with their AOYOl. The 
philosophical expert, on the other hand, will express his mastery in his actions 
and not just in his words. Moreover, the analogy with the craftsman suggests 
that what we have here is a form of knowledge that is primarily expressed in 
an individual's actions. Although an expert in a 'tEXVTJ will be able to give a 
rational account of what he is doing, this remains secondary to the practice of 
tins change in the soul is assessed. Thus tins art ('t£XVT) - identified with philosophy -
transforms both soul (V1>x-ft) and way of life ((3io<;) simultaneously. As we shall see in Chapter 
Three § 7, a similar schema can be seen WitIl the Stoics. 
92 As Foucault puts it, ,\'itIl Socrates we have a conception of philosophy that cannot be 
reduced to the mere awareness of a principle (see The Use of Pleasure. p. 72~ L 'usage des 
plaisirs, pp. 97-98). 
93 Note the way in which the range of meanings of €pya contributes to the analogy. The 
'works' of the philosopher are his 'actions'. his philosophical ,yay of life. TIris "ill be seen 
again in the discussion of different types of t£XVTJ in Chapter Three. 
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the 'tEXVll itself94 As Epictetus reminds his students, a builder does not offer 
to discourse on the art of building; rather he builds, thereby showing his 
mastery of his art.95 Socrates' conception of philosophy as a 'tEXVll rather than 
simply a matter ofA6yo~ means that an individual's actions (epya) and way of 
life (f3io~) may often be a better indication of an individual's philosophy than 
any written or spoken account (A6yo~). As such, this conception of philosophy 
gives a philosophical significance to biography that philosophy conceived as 
simply a matter of A6yo~ cannot. Indeed, Xenophon reports that before his 
trial Socrates said to his companions that there was no need for him to prepare 
a lengthy written defence, for his behaviour throughout his life constituted the 
best defence he could possibly have. 96 
It is important to stress, however, that with Socrates this image of 
philosophy as an art concerned with one's way of life is only hinted at and is 
by no means developed into a full y-fledged concept. Socrates' comments 
serve merely as suggestive ways in which to think about the issues involved. It 
was only later, in the hands of the Stoics, that the concept of an art of living 
94 In his Of Art and Wisdom Roochnik argues that Plato (not Socrates) rejects the 'tEXVll 
analogy because it is unable to offer an adequate model for knowledge of apE'tll. In its place 
Roochnik suggests that Plato held on to a non-technical conception of knowledge and one of 
the few characteristics that he assigns to tins is a harmony between deeds and words (see e.g. 
pp. 97, 105, 107, 125, 176). Yet tllls is precisely one of the key characteristics of a technical 
conception of knowledge and the teclmica1 model offers an ideal framework witl® which to 
understand such a hannony. It offers a model of knowledge tlmt is primari(v expressed in 
actions but also necessarily involves the ability to explain tile skill in words. Of course there is 
a sense in which such knowledge is not necessari(v eA1>ressed in actions: the builder must 
choose to build before anyone can see that he possesses the art of building. However once he 
has chosen to build (excepting deliberate intent or external interference) he ""ill necessarizy 
build good houses if he possesses the art. Compared to Aristotle's reading of Socrates' 
position, the 'tEXV11 model offers an excellent framework for understanding a fornl of 
knowledge in which there is no gap between 'Aoyoc;, and epyov, pace Roochnik. 
95 See EpictetusDissertationes 3.21.4. 
96 See XenophonApologia 3. 
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('rEXV'll 1tEPl 'tOY J3iov) was developed. Nevertheless Socrates can be credited 
with being probably the first to examine in any detail the various components 
from which that concept was formed. In the next chapter I shall examine how 
the Stoics did just this, creating a conception of philosophy able to deal 
adequately with the idea that philosophy is something primarily expressed in 
one's way of life. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE STOIC CONCEPTION OF 
THE ART OF LIVING 
1. The Phrase 'Art of Living' 
With Socrates, one can see all of the components necessary for the 
construction of a concept of an art of living. Although it is clear that he 
conceived of an art ('CEXVT}) concerned with one's way of life (J3ioC;) involving 
both rational principles (AOYOt) and training (CicrKl1<nc;), Socrates does not 
appear to have constructed a fully-fledged concept of an art of living ('tEXVT} 
1rEpl 'tOY J3iov). 
In ancient philosophical sources the idea of an 'art of living' is primarily 
associated with the Stoics. In Greek sources the phrase 'tEXVT} 1rEpl 'tOY J3iov 
(or variations upon it) occurs most often in the works of Se:x.1:us Empiricus 
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who, as we shall see in the next chapter, discussed this concept in some detail 
and made a number of objections to it. I As he reports, 
the Stoics say straight out that practical wisdom (CPPOVllO't v), which is 
knowledge of things which are good and bad and neither, is an art 
relating to life ('t£XVllV umxPXEtv 1tEpt 'tOY f3iov), and that those who 
have gained this are the only ones who are beautiful, the only ones 
who are rich, the only ones who are sages.2 
Beyond the works of Sextus Empiricus there are seven other occurrences in 
the Greek sources, four of which have explicit Stoic provenance, of which 
three are relevant here. 3 The first of these, by Epictetus, has already been 
quoted in the Introduction but it may be helpful to repeat it again here: 
1 As I have already noted in the Introduction, versions of tins phrase appear in ancient Greek 
literature a total of 41 times. Of these, 34 derive from the works of SexhIs Empiricus. The 
Latin equivalents ars vitae and ars vivendi are less frequent. The former appears in Cicero De 
Finihus 3.4,4.19,5.18, Tusculanae Disputationes 2.12, Seneca Epistulae 95.7, 95.8. The latter 
appears in Cicero De Finihus 1.42, 1.72, 5.16, Academica 2.23, Seneca Epistulae 95.9. Note 
also Seneca fro 17 Haase apud Lactantius Divinae lnstitutiones 3.15.1 (PL 6.390-91). The 
occurrences in Cicero attest tIlat tins concept became something of a commonplace but tIley 
do not add much to our understanding of its precise nature. The occurrences in Seneca's 
Epistulae appear in a passage that will be discussed in § 4 below. 
2 Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 11.170 (= Sf/F 3.598: trans. Bett modified). 
3 The fourth ex-plicitIy Stoic instance wInch I shall not discuss is Chrysippus apud Galen De 
Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 3.8.16 (5.352 Kiihn = 226.25-29 De Lacy = ST'F 2.909, 911). 
The words 1tEPi. 'trov K<X'ta 'tOy ~iov 'tEXVT\ occur "",1.thin the context of an allegorical 
interpretation of the gods and consequently tlns example does not bear on tile subject tmder 
discussion here. However it is the only one e:x.rplicitIy credited to the early Stoa. The tlrree not 
explicitly Stoic occurrences are Phllo Legum Allegoria 1.57 (although still excerpted by yon 
Arnim as SVF 3,202), Plutarch Quaestiones Convivales 613b, Clement of Alexandria 
Paedagogus 2.2 (PG 8.420a). None ofthese merit any further comment. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Philosophy does not promise to secure anything external for man, 
otherwise it would be admitting something that lies beyond its proper 
subject-matter. For just as wood is the material of the carpenter, 
bronze that of the statuary, so each individual's own life (6 ~lo<; au'tou 
tKUcr't01)) is the material (uA TI) of the art of living ('t1l<; 1tEPl ~lov 
'tEXVTI<;).4 
89 
The important point here is not merely the idea that the subject-matter (DATI) 
of the art of living ('t1l<; 1tEPl ~lov 'tEXVTI<;) is each individual's own life (6 ~lo<; 
uU'tou tKUcr't01)) but also that this is conceived as something that is not 
external to the individuaL In other words, an individual's way of life (~io~) is 
what Epictetus will characterise elsewhere as something within our power or 
'up to us' (eq> llJltv) and as such one of the few things that should be the 
proper object of our concern. 5 This focus upon what is internal to the 
individual or a proper concern for the individual can also be seen in the second 
passage. In his epitome of Stoic ethics preserved by Stobaeus, the doxographer 
Arius Didymus reports that the Stoics conceived human excellence or apE'tl1 
as the art concerned with the whole of life (1tEpt oAov oucruv 'tOY ~iov 
4 Epictetus Dissertationes l.15.2, with commentary in Dobbin, pp. 156-57. At Dissertationes 
4.8.12 the material (uJ.:'l) of philosophy is said to be an individual's reason (A6yo~). Note also 
Dissertationes l.26.7 where Epictetus uses 'ta I3tOYCtKa in analogy with 'La J.loool1(a (Wolf 
and Upton translate 'ta I3tronKa as art em vivendi, Carter and Oldfather as 'the art of living') 
and Dissertationes 4.l.63 where he refers to il Ent()'tllJ.l1'J wi) I3toi)v. perhaps follo"ing 
Musonius RufilS fro 3 (10.6-7 Hense = 40.13-1..J. Lutz). 
5 See e.g. Epictetus Enchiridion 1.1 which is discussed further in Chapter Si.x § 2 (a). TIris 
concern with l3io~ in Stoicism can also be seen in the fragmentary remains of Chrysippus' s 
II£pi l3im\' (see SVF, vol. 3, p. 194). Note also POxy 3657 (= CPF I L 100.5). esp. 2.13-15, 
which appears to propose l3io~ as a Stoic 't61to~ (see the commentary by Sedley in The 
Oxyrhynchus Pap."vri, vol. 52, p. 54: also CPF I 1 ***, p. 802). 
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t£XVT)V).6 For the Stoics, ap£tf} was conceived as an internal mental state a , 
disposition of the soul ('I'Uxf})? The third passage derives from the geographer 
Strabo, himself a Stoic and an associate of Posidonius, who characterises both 
geography and philosophy as the art of living and happiness (tfi~ 1t£pt tov 
f3iov t£XVT)~ Kat £uoatJlovia~). 8 
Drawing these remarks together we can see that the art of living is on the 
one hand identified with the internal mental state of ap£tl1 and, on the other 
hand, concerned with one' s f3io~ which is also characterised as something in 
some sense internal or properly belonging to the individual. It is also in some 
way concerned with one's well-being or happiness (EuoatJlovia). There is a 
sense, then, in which the art of living may be seen to be self-reflexive, echoing 
Socrates' idea of taking care of oneself (E1ttjlE/v£to9at EaUtOU ).9 
These explicit references are to a certain extent helpful but alone they do 
not give us enough information to understand fully the precise nature of this 
concept. In order to do that it will be necessary to draw upon a number of 
6 Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.5blO (2.66.14-67.4 WH = SVF 3.560). Arius Didymus 
has been identified with the Alexandrian philosopher Arius of the first century BC (see 
Pomeroy, Arius Didymus, pp. 1-3). Note also the passage at 2.7.5b4 (2.62.15-17 WH = SVF 
3.278) which, if Hirzel's emendation of't£A£ia<; to 'tExva<; is adopted (contra Wachsmutll 
von Amim. and Pomeroy), reads 'tau't<X<; JI£V ouv 'tCx.<; P'Tl6£icra<; O:PE'tCx.<; 'tExva<; EiVat 
AE'YOOOl 1t£pt 'tOY l3iov Kat cruvEcr'tl1KEVat £K 6£ropl1~a'tro\', "so they say that the above-
mentioned virtues are arts concerning life and are comprised from rules of behaviour" (trans. 
Pomeroy modified). Hirzel's suggestion is recorded in the 'Corrigenda et Addenda' to 
\Vachsmuth & Hense, vol. 1, p. x...xxix. 
7 See e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.89 (= SVF 3.39). Sextus Empiricus Adversus Afathematicos 
11.23 (= SVF 3.75), Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.5b1 (2.60.7-8 WH = SVF 3.262). "ith 
Inwood & Donini in CHHP, pp. 714-24. 
8 Strabo 1.1.1 (= Posidonius test. 75 EK), 'with Kidd, Posidonius, The Commentary, pp. 60-62. 
For Strabo's Stoic credentials see e.g. 1.2.3-1- where he '''Tites 'our Zeno'. 
9 This is a characteristic noted by Foucault: "No technique, no professional skill can be 
acquired 'without exercise; nor can'one learn the art of living, the techne tou biou, "ithout an 
askesis that must be understood as a training ofthe self by the self (un entrainement de soi par 
soi)" CL'ecriture de soi', in Dits et ecrits, vol. 4, p. -1-17; Essential Works. vol. 1. p. 208). I 
shall return to this passage in Chapter Five § 2 (b). 
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related discussions. In the next section I shall consider the way in which the 
Stoics presented their philosophy as primarily concerned with transforming 
one's life (J)to~) and, in particular, modelling one's life upon the example set 
by Socrates. Then I shall consider the way in which the Stoics adopted and 
developed Socrates' medical analogy between arts of the body and arts of the 
soul. In the light of this analogy with the art of medicine I shall then examine 
Stoic definitions and discussions Of'tEXV11 to see how well this analogy works. 
Then I shall tum to an important discussion by Seneca that deals with the 
relationship between philosophical doctrines (decreta) and precepts 
(praecepta), a discussion that can be seen to develop Socrates' remarks 
concerning the relationship between A6yo~ and acrK11(n~. Finally, I shall 
attempt to reconcile this image of Stoic philosophy with some of the more 
traditional portraits in which it is presented as a systematic and highly 
structured body of knowledge comprised of the three components of logic, 
physics, and ethics. Once all of these tasks have been done I shall attempt to 
offer a definition of the Stoic conception of philosophy. 
2. The Ideal of the Sage 
As with Socrates, for Stoics such as Epictetus the subject-matter (1)1,,11) of 
philosophy is one's own life (J)to~). In this, as in many other things, the Stoics 
may well have consciously followed the example set by Socrates. According 
to the Epicurean Philodemus, some Stoics actually wanted to be called 
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'Socratics' . 10 Embarrassed by the behaviour of some of the Cynics to whom 
their school's founder Zeno was so closely linked - and for that matter by 
some of the Cynic-inspired attitudes of Zeno and Chrysippus themselves _ 
these later Stoics, it is claimed, hoped to redeem the Cynic dimension within 
Stoicism by transforming it into a stepping stone in a genealogy extending 
back to Socrates. l1 Faced with the succession Diogenes-Crates-Zeno, these 
later Stoics expanded it into Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes-Crates-Zeno, in 
effect proposing Socrates' companion Antisthenes as a key link between the 
disreputable Diogenes and the respectable Socrates. 12 Whether one decides to 
choose Diogenes or Socrates as the point of departure for such a Stoic 
genealogy, either way it seems likely that the early Stoics would have 
considered themselves to be continuing a Socratic tradition which conceived 
of philosophy as a matter of 'deeds not words' (epya ou AOYOl).13 One need 
only note that Zeno was first inspired to study philosophy after reading an 
account of Socrates in Xenophon's Memorabilia and chose to study with the 
Cynic Crates as he was the closest approximation to the Socrates he had read 
.1-4-
10 Philodemus De Stoicis (PHerc 155 & 339) col. 13.",Dorandi (not in STy): LW1CPCX'ttlW1. 
KcxJ..sicr6CXt aE[A,]OOOtv. For the relationship between the Stoics and Socrates see in particular 
Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy'; Striker, 'Plato's Socrates and the Stoics'. 
11 Some of the 'Cynic inspired' ideas of Zeno and Chrysippus will be discussed in Chapter 
Four § 2 (e). A variety of ancient sources attest to a perceived closeness between Stoicism and 
Cynicism; see e.g. Cicero De OffiCiiS 1.128, Juvenal Saturae 13 .122, Diogenes Laertius 7.121 
(= SVF 3 ApoUod. 17), Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.11s (2.11-L2-t.-25 WH = SVF 
3.638). 
12 For criticism of the subsequent 'Cynicised' portrait of Antisthenes see Dudley. A History of 
CyniCism, pp. 1-16, plus the more recent discussion in Goulet-Caze, 'Who was the First Dog'. 
in Branham & Goulet-Caze, eds., The Cynics, pp. 414-15. 
13 Note that even if one were to place Diogenes at the beginning of the Stoic genealogy. he 
himself was reportedly described by Plato as a 'Socrates gone mad' (LOlKpa'tll<; J1atv6~\'O<;): 
see Diogenes Laertius ,6.5~, Aelian Var~q ~istorj~ 1-\..33 (both SSR VB 59). This may perhaps 
be glossed as Socrates' plulosophy pus~o Its lOgIcal e:\.1reme. 
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about that he could find. 14 It was probably within this context, then, that the 
early Stoics constructed their philosophy. Remaining faithful to Cynic and 
Socratic philosophy, Stoicism was constructed around a practical goal, 
namely, not merely to know the nature of excellence (apE'tl1) or wisdom 
(O'oq>ta), but rather to live a life shaped by excellence or wisdom - to become 
a sage (O'Oq>OC;).15 
The Stoic conception of the sage was nothing less than the ideal of a 
perfect individual, an individual described in terms that were usually reserved 
only for the godS. 16 The sage is described in a variety of sources as one who 
does everything that he undertakes well, one who is never impeded in what he 
does, one who is infallible~ he is more powerful than all others, richer, 
stronger, freer, happier; he alone is the only individual worthy of the title 
'king' .17 The doxographer Arius Didymus adds the following: 
The virtuous man (0'1tou8atov) is great, powerful, eminent, and strong. 
[ ... ] Consequently he is neither compelled by anyone nor does he 
compel another, neither prevented by nor preventing anyone else, 
neither forced by another nor forcing anyone else, neither dominating 
14 See Diogenes Laertius 7.2 (= SVF 1.1). also Eusebius 15.13.8 (816c = STF 3 Z.T. 1). 
15 Terms used for the sage, seemingly interchangeably. include (J(><po<; and cnto-uoaio<; (and in 
Latin, sapiens). See Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology ofEar~v Stoic EthiCS, pp. 124-38. 
16 See Jagu, Zenon de Citlium, p. 30; Long, 'Dialectic and the Stoic Sage'. p. 103. 
17 For accounts of the sage see e.g. Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.5-12 (2.57.13-ll6.18 
WH) passim (including S~F 3.548, 55·t 563, 564,567,578, 581, 587,589, 593,601-02.605). 
Cicero Tusculanae Dispulationes 3.10-21 (= SVF 3.570), Paradoxa Stoicorum 33-52. De 
Finibus 3.26 (= SVF 3.582),3.75 (= SVF 3.591), De Republica 1,28 (= SVF 3.600), Diogenes 
Laertius 7.121-25 (including SVF 3.549, 556, 641-42). Plutarch Compendium Argumenti 
Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere 1057d-e. 1058b-c, De Communibus Notitiis 1063d (= STF 
3.759). For discussion see Edelstein, The Jleaning of Stoicism. pp. 1-18: Kerferd. 'What Does 
the Wise Man Know?'. 
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nor dominated, neither doing harm to another nor suffering harm from 
anyone else [ ... ]. He is particularly happy, prosperous, blessed, 
fortunate, pious, dear to the gods, meritorious, a king, a general, a 
politician, good at managing the household and at making money. 18 
9~ 
Not surprisingly, there was considerable doubt as to whether any examples of 
such an individual existed, ever existed, or could ever exist. Neither Zeno nor 
Chrysippus ever appear to have described themselves as sages. 19 Chrysippus 
went further, stating that he had never even known one. 20 Alexander of 
Aphrodisias described the Stoic sage as rarer than an Ethiopian phoenix. 21 
However, the ever practical Seneca seems to have been a little more 
optimistic, proposing Cato as a concrete example of such an individual. 22 
18 Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.11g (2.99.12-100.6 WH = SVF 3.567; trans. Pomeroy 
modified). 
19 For Zeno see Dec1eva Caizzi, "The Porch and the Garden: Early Hellenistic hnages of the 
Philosophical Life', pp. 317, 320; for Chrysippus see Diogenianus apudEusebius 6.8.16 (264c 
== SVF 3.668) and the next note. Sex1us Empiricus, Adversus A1athematicos 11.181, objected 
that if the Stoics did not claim to be sages themselves, then they admitted that they did not 
possess wisdom and thus that they did not possess precisely what they claimed to teach. This 
objection will be discussed further in Chapter Four § 2 (b). 
20 See Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1048e (== SVF 3.662,668). 
21 Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato 199.16-20 (= ST'F 3.658 == LS 61 N): "Of men, the 
greatest number are bad, or rather there are one or two whom they [the Stoics] speak of as 
having become good men as in a fable, a sort of incredible creature as it were and contrary to 
nature and rarer than the Ethiopian phoenix; and the others are all wicked and are so to an 
equal extent, so that there is no difference between one and another, and all who are not wise 
are alike mad" (trans. Sharples). See also Seneca Epistulae 42.1: "For one [man] of the first 
class perhaps springs into existence, like the phoenix, only once in five hundred years" (trans. 
Gununere). Other ancient sources tend to refer to one or two examples of the sage only: see 
e.g. Diogenianus apudEusebius 6.8.13 (264b = ST-'F 3.668). 
22 See Seneca De Constantia Sapientis 7.1~ also Rist, 'Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy', p. 2012. 
Seneca's optimism was criticised by his otherwise devoted fan Justus Lipsius in Jfanuduclio 
2.8 (1604 edn, pp. 82-84; trans. in Kraye, Renaissance Philosophical Texts 1, pp. 200-02). 
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In contrast to this image of a perfect individual, the Stoics characterised 
everyone else as 'fools' (q>auAOt).23 The foolish are, in the words of a 
summary by Plutarch, "madmen and fools, impious and lawless, at the 
extremity of misfortune and utter unhappiness". 24 They are slaves and 
children, and are often dismissed as sub-human, with only the wise deserving 
of the title 'men' (liv9pO>1tot).25 Yet, if the sage is as rare as he is said to be 
, 
then the implication is that almost everybody falls into this somewhat 
unflattering category. 26 
This conception of the sage and the distinction between the wise and the 
foolish had already been made by the Cynics. 27 Diogenes described the 
majority of humankind as mad and slaves, sub-human even. 28 In contrast he 
described good men as godlike. 29 The Cynic conception of the wise person is, 
like that of the Stoic sage, of someone who is free and happy regardless of the 
circumstances in which they might find themselves. Indeed, Diogenes is often 
23 See Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.11g (2.99.3-5 WH = SVF 1.216 = LS 59 N): "It is 
the view of Zeno and his Stoic followers that there are two races of men, that of the 
worthwhile (crno'O()<X.irov), and that of the worthless (q><X.UAroV)" (trans. Pomeroy). As well as 
'wise' and 'foolish', and 'worthwhile' and 'worthless', Long & Sedley propose 'excellent' 
and 'inferior'. Beyond q><x'UA~, the word aq>prov is also often used (and in Latin, insipiens and 
stultus). 
24 Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1048e (= SVF 3.662, 668). See also Arius Didymus 
apud Stobaeus esp. 2.7.l1k (2.103.24-106.20 WH = SVF 3.677), Cicero Paradoxa Stoicorum 
27-32, with further references in Sr'F 3.657-84. 
25 Cicero uses the term 'man' in this restricted sense in De Republica 1.28: "while others are 
called men (homines), only those who are skilled in the specifically human arts are worthy of 
the name" (trans. Rudd). See also Epictetus Dissertationes 2.24.19-20, Marcus Aurelius 
11.18.10. 
26 TIns distinction between the wise and the foolish seems to me to be more important to the 
Stoa than the universal respect for human rationality often attributed to it (e.g. Nussbaum, The 
Therapy of Desire. pp. 325. 331, 343). Although comments to that effect can be found. it is 
not clear to me that they say what some commentators ivant them to say. 
27 See Jagu, Zenon de Cittium, p. 31. For a Cynic example of the restricted use of 'man' 
(avepro1t~) see Diogenes apud Diogenes Laertius 6.41 (= SSR VB 272). 
28 See e.g. Diogenes Laertius 6.33 (= SSR VB 76).6.71 (= SSR VB 291). 
29 See Diogenes Laertius 6.51 (= SSRVB 354). 
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cited by later Stoics as an example of such an individual himself, 30 and it is 
reported that the Stoic sage will himself follow the Cynic way of life (J(UVIKO~ 
J3io~), a way of life characterised as a short cut to virtue (auvtoJlov fn' <XP£'t11V 
686v)?1 
This conception of the sage shared by the Stoics and Cynics derives 
ultimately from Socrates. As we have already seen, it is reported that Zeno 
turned to philosophy after reading about Socrates in Xenophon's Memorabilia, 
and became a student of the Cynic Crates because Crates was the closest thing 
he could find to the example of Socrates.32 The image of the Stoic sage was 
thus not a hypothetical ideal,33 but rather based upon an idealised image of 
actual individuals, an image that functioned as an exemplar or role model. 34 
Names often cited include Antisthenes and Diogenes, but ultimately the Stoic 
sage is based upon the figure of Socrates.35 
30 See the idealised portrait in Epictetus Dissertationes 3.22; note also Marcus Aurelius 8.3. 
31 See Diogenes Laertius 6.104 (not in SVF). 7.121 (= SVF 3 Apollod. 17), Arius Didymus 
apud Stobaeus 2.7.11s (2.1 H.24-25 WH = SVF 3.638). 
32 See Diogenes Laertius 7.2 (= SVF 1.1): also Eusebius 15.13.8 (816c = SJ,F 3 Z.T. 1). 
33 The sage is often presented as just this, especially by philosophers since the Renaissance. 
Justus Lipsius does this in his.J4anuductio 2.8 (1604 edn, p. 84), despite the contrary claims of 
his beloved Seneca in De Constantia Sapientis 7.1. More famous is Kant's judgement. in 
which the sage is characterised as an ideal, an archetype existing in thought only. Indeed, Kant 
goes so far as to say that even to attempt to depict this ideal in a romance is impracticable, let 
alone in reality (Critique of Pure Reason A569-70, B597-98). One notable, if early, exception 
to this modem tendency is Angelo Politian who, in his Epistola ad Bartolomeo &ala, argued 
that if just one example could be found, that would be enough to affirm the reality of the sage. 
Then, following Cicero and Seneca, he cites Cato as his example. For translations of Politian 
and Lipsius see Kraye. Renaissance Philosophical Texts 1, pp. 192-99 & 200-09 respectively. 
34 Hadot, 'La figure du sage dans l' Antiquite greco-latine', pp. 15-18, argues that the image of 
the sage is not a theoretical construction but rather a reflection upon an outstanding individual. 
whether it be Plato reflecting upon Socrates or Seneca reflecting upon Cato. See also Ius 
Philosop/~y as a Tray of Life, p. 147 (but apparently contradicted at p. 57). Note also Hicks, 
Stoic and Epicurean, p. 88, and the discussion of exempla in Seneca by Newman. 'Theory and 
Practice of the meditatio', pp. 1491-93. 
35 In an interesting paper entitled 'Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World', 
David Sedley has drawn attention to what he calls "a virtually religious commitment to the 
authority of a founder figure" in the Hellenistic philosophical schools (see also Brunsclmig, 
'La philosophie a l'epoque hellenistique', p. 512). He goes on to note that "lule none of the 
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Socrates himself was often described by his contemporaries in terms 
similar to those later reserved for the Stoic sage. For example, in the 
Symposium Plato makes Alcibiades describe Socrates as a "godlike and 
extraordinary man", 36 while in the Memorabilia Xenophon describes him as 
"the perfect example of goodness and happiness". 37 The name of Socrates 
appears throughout later Stoic authors as the finest example of wisdom. 38 If 
only one or two sages ever existed, then Socrates is almost always cited as one 
of them. The status of Socrates as the fundamental Stoic role model is 
captured by Epictetus when he says: 
Even if you are not yet a Socrates, you must live as if you wish to 
become a Socrates?9 
There is a very real sense, then, in which one might define the goal of Stoic 
philosophy - the attainment of wisdom (ao<piu), the aspiration to become as 
sage (ao<poc;) - as the task of becoming like Socrates.40 
later Stoics can be seen to criticise their fOlmder Zeno, in Zeno' s o-wn day it would have been 
Socrates who stood as the great authority figure for the Stoa (pp. 97-99). Although I am also 
not aware of any criticism of Zeno, I have not noticed much eulogy either. In fact, for a later 
Stoic like Epictetus it is Socrates who stands out as the great role model, followed by 
Diogenes the Cynic. In the light of Philodemus's ~~m that some Stoics wanted to be called 
Socratics (De Stoicis (PHerc 155 & 339) col. 13~orandi) and my suggestion here that the 
sage is an idealised unage of Socrates, it is tempting to suggest that throughout the history of 
Stoicism Socrates may well have been seen as the ulti1nate founder of the Stoic tradition. with 
Zeno occupying a slightly lesser position. 
36 Plato Symposium 219c. 
37 Xenophon},1emorabilia ~.8.11. 
38 See the discussion in Doring, Exemplum Socratis, esp. pp. 18-~2 on Seneca, and pp. ~3-79 
on Epictetus. , 
39 Epictetus Enchiridiol1 51.3 (trans. Boter), "ith conunent in Jagu. Epictete et Plaron, pp. n-
62; Hijmans, "'A(TI(71O"l~. pp. 72-77: Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy'. pp. 150-51. 
See also the list of references to Socrates as a Stoic role model in Epictetus gathered together 
in SSR I C 530. 
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In between these two classes of the foolish majority (<pa:uJ."ol) and the rare 
sage ( O'o<pOC;), there is a third group, those who are 'making progress' 
(npoKOnll).41 Individuals in this intermediate group may be described as lovers 
of wisdom, as philosophical 'apprentices', as those who admire the figure of 
the sage and aspire to become like him, but nevertheless are strictly speaking 
still classed as foolish. This is illustrated by the image of man drowning just 
below the surface: 
Just as in the sea the man a cubit from the surface is drowning no less 
than the one who has sunk 500 fathoms, so neither are they any the 
less in vice who are approaching virtue (apE'tl1) than they who are a 
long way from it [ ... ] so those who are making progress (01. 
npoKon'tov'tEC;) continue to be stupid and depraved until they have 
attained virtue (apE'tl1).42 
This third group may be seen to correspond to Socrates' description of himself 
as one who has become aware of his own ignorance but does not yet possess 
wisdom. 43 Yet for a number of the Stoics, Socrates is himself said to be one of 
the wise, perhaps the only obvious and uncontroversial example. This paradox 
40 See Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy', pp. 160-64. 
41 This notion is particularly prominent in Epictetus, e.g. Enchiridiol1 12, 13, 48. See also the 
discussion in Seneca Epistulae 75.8-18 ","here this intennediate category is itself divided into 
three sub-categories. However note Diogenes Laertius 7.127 (= Sf;F 3.536) where this 
intennediate category is characterised as Peripatetic and eA'Plicitly said not ~o be Stoic. ". 
41 Plutarch De Communibus Notitiis 1063a (= ST/F 3.539; trans. Chenuss); see also ibid. 
1062e, Cicero De Finibus 3.48 (= SVF 3.530), Diogenes Laertius 7.120 (= STF 3.527). 
43 See e.g. Plato Apologia 21c-d. 
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might be explained by suggesting that their judgement was based upon what 
he did rather than what he said, that is, on his [pya. rather than his AOY01. 44 
Members of this third group are philosophers in the etymological sense of 
the word.
45 
They are lovers of wisdom or, to be more precise, they aspire to 
become like the image of the sage. In this sense they are primarily lovers of 
the idealised oo<po<; rather than abstract oO<pia. For the Stoics, philosophy is 
that which transforms <p1AOOO<pOt into 00<p0l. As such, the subject matter 
(bAll) of philosophy is one's way of life (6 J3io<; a.u'Cou EKUOtOU);46 its task is 
to transform one's way of life into the life of a sage, to become like Socrates. 
Just as we have already seen with Socrates, then, the primary concern of Stoic 
philosophy is J3iO<;.47 
3. An Art Concerned with the Soul 
With Socrates we saw that the idea of an art (tEXVll) concerned with one's life 
(1310<;) was closely connected to the idea of an art concerned with taking care 
of one's soul (\lfUxn), although the precise relationship between these two 
ideas was not made explicit. This idea of an art concerned with the soul 
44 Of COlUse, the ideal for Socrates is harmony between ep"{a. and ).,o"{Ot. to be able to act well 
and give a rational account of that behaviour. Given the Stoic claim that only the sage can 
possess knowledge (E1ttO"'ttlJ.ll1), one would assume that their ideal would also involve such a 
harmony. In that case, Socrates would fail the test. 
45 Seneca offers an account of Stoic philosophy beginning with this etymological distinction in 
Epistulae 89.-1-. See also Gourinat, Premieres ler;ons sur Ie j\1anuel d'Epicfefe, pp. 19-20. 
46 See Epictetus Disserfafiones 1.15.2-3. quoted above. § 1. 
47 A notable exception to this generalisation is Posidonius who. displaying the influence of 
Aristotle, defines the goal as 'lo live contemplating (6EropO\>\''ta.) the truth and order of all 
things" (posidonius fro 186 EK apud Clement of Alexandria Stromata 2.21 (PG 8.1076a) = LS 
63 1). As with Aristotle. this 'theoretical life' is still a mode of life. However, as Edelstein 
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analogous to medicine as the art concerned with the body was developed by a 
number of Stoics,48 but in particular by Chrysippus. Two extended reports 
drawing upon Chrysippus's use of this analogy survive, the first by Cicero, the 
second by Galen. By examining each of these accounts in tum hopefully it will 
be possible to reconstruct a basic understanding of how the Stoics used and 
developed this Socratic analogy. 
(a) The Medical Analogy in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations 
The first of these accounts can be found in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations. 49 
Scholars have suggested a number of works by Chrysippus as the source for 
this account, including his ITEpt nu9&v and eEpunE'l),tl1(6~. 50 Cicero opens his 
account, just as Socrates did in the Gorgias, by drawing a distinction between 
the soul and the body, and proposing that just as there is health and sickness of 
notes, 'The Philosophical System of Posidonius', pp. 31~-15, this is a considerable shift: from 
the more orthodox Stoic position. 
48 See the extended discussion in Pigeaud, Le maladie de I 'time. pp. 2~5-371, and note in 
particular the account in Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.5b4 (2.62.15-20 WH = SVF 
3.278): "For just as the health of the body is a correct mixture of the hot, cold, dry, and wet 
elements in the body, so too the health of the soul ('tit" 'tile; \If'oxile; UyiEtaV) is a correct 
mix1ure of the beliefs in the soul. And likewise, just as bodily strength is an adequate tension 
in the sinews, so mental strength is adequate tension when deciding and acting or not" (trans. 
Pomeroy). The idea of tension in the soul 'will be discussed further in Chapter Five § ~. 
49 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes, in particular 3.1-21 and -t..9-33. I have used the 
editions by King (LCL) and Dougan & Henry. The conte)\..i is a discussion concerning whether 
the sage can be totally free from emotions (the Stoic position) or subject to some moderate 
emotions (the Peripatetic position). For an outline of the argument in these sections see 
Dougan & Henry, vol. 2, pp. ix-xxi; MacKendrick, The Philosophical Books of Cicero. pp. 
149-63. For further discussion of Cicero's treatment of this material see Pigeaud, La maladie 
de I 'time, pp. 2~5-315; Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, pp. 316-58; Sorabji, Emotion and 
Peace oIA-1ind, pp. 29-54. 
50 For a survey of opinions concerning Cicero's sources see Dougan & Henry. vol. 2, pp. xx:\.-
xlvii. For Chrysippus's ilEplna.8&v (of which the 8Epa.rrE'O'tl"KOe; may have been one book) 
see SVF 3.456-90. Von Amim includes a number of passages from the Tusculanae 
Disputationes as testimonia for ilEPi. rra.8wv; see SVF 3.483-88. 
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the body, so there is health and sickness of the soul. 51 Again, just like 
Socrates, Cicero suggests that the diseases of the soul are in many ways more 
dangerous than those of the body. 52 Yet despite this he notes that, in general, 
little attention has been paid to the idea of a medicine for the soul (animi 
medicina) analogous to medicine for the body. 53 Nevertheless Cicero does 
think that such an art exists and that that art is philosophy. 54 The primary task 
for the philosopher, then, is to treat the diseases of the soul (animi morbum). 
However, unlike the physician, he will not attempt to treat other people but 
rather he will focus his attention upon himself 55 The philosopher is thus one 
who concerns himself with the diseases of his own soul. 
After this general introduction to what he takes to be the nature and 
function of philosophy, Cicero turns to the details of the Stoic analogy 
between diseases (morbi) of the body and the soul. 56 He begins by drawing 
attention to the claim that no foolish individual is free from such diseases. 57 
Only the sage is free from the diseases of the soul as only he has mastered 
philosophy conceived as the art that treats these diseases. Wisdom (sapientia, 
51 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.1. 
52 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.5. 
53 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.1. 
54 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.6: est profecto animi medicina, philosophia. 
55 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.6. This reflects the nature of Socrates' OW11 project 
to take care of himself (£1tt~£A£icrea.l Ea.'O'tOU) and is developed later by Epictetus, for whom 
the philosopher can treat only himself (see e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 1.15.1-2). 
56 At Tusculanae Disputationes 3.7 Cicero proposes morbus as a translation for 1ta.80e:; (note 
also Tusculanae Disputationes 3.23, 4.10). However it might be more accurate to translate 
1ta.80e:; as perturbatio (as Cicero himself does in De Finibus 3.35), saving morbus for \'00"0e:;. 
See Dougan & Henry, vol. 2, p. 9, and Adler in SVF·t pp. 172-73. 
5~ See Cicero Tusculanae Disputafiones 3.9: omnium insipientium animi in 11I0rbo SlIn!. At 
Tusculanae Disputationes 3.10 Cicero eA'Plicitly says that in tins tile Stoics followed Socrates. 
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(Jo<pia.) is thus defined simply as a healthy soul (animi sanitas).58 Only by 
submitting oneself to the therapy of philosophy can this state of health be 
reached. 59 
Cicero notes that the Stoics, and Chrysippus in particular, devoted much 
space to the analysis and definition of the various disturbances of the soul. 60 
These disturbances are emotions (perturbationes, morbi), in particular the 
emotions of anger, covetousness, distress, compassion, and envy, all of which 
"d " I 61 are sal to Imp y or presuppose one another. The Stoic analysis of these 
emotions focused upon four principal types produced by beliefs in something 
either good or evil, either currently present or due to happen in the future. 62 
The task of philosophy, then, is to enable one to overcome these unwelcome 
mental states. Only by doing this will one be able to approach the ideal of the 
sage. The key to this, Cicero suggests, is to trace the origins of these mental 
58 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.10: iia fit ut sapientia sanitas sit animi. The Stoic 
characterisation of the foolish as 'insane' is thus not mere rhetoric but in fact quite literal for 
they were thought to have unhealthy (insanitas) minds. 
59 Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.13. 
60 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 4.9 (= SVF 3.483): "Cbrysippus and the Stoics in 
discussing disorders of the soul have devoted considerable space to subdividing and defining 
them" (trans. King). 
61 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.19-21, note also '+.16-22. The emotions listed here 
are anger (ira), covetousness (concupisco), distress (aegritudo). compassion (miseratio), and 
envy (invidia). 
62 See Cicero Tusculanae Dispufationes 3.24-25 (= STiF 3.385).4-.11-14-. These four types are 
delight (laetitia), lust (libido), distress (aegritudo), and fear (metus). Note the summary at 
Tusculanae Disputationes 4.14 (= Sf-'F 3.393): aegriiudo opinio recens mali praesentis ... 
faetitia opinio recens boni praesentis ... metus opinio impendentis mali ... libido opinio 
venturi boni. The relationship between these four is best illustrated by means of a table 
(following Dougan & Henry, vol. 2, pp. xi & xxxi): 
praesentis faetitia (itoovit) belief in present good 
boni 
absentis libido (£nt9'O~ia) belief in future good 
perfurbationes (1ta911) 
belief in present evil praesentis aegritudo (AU1tll) 
mali 
absentis metus (<j)6f30~) belief in future evil 
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disturbances just as a doctor might diagnose sicknesses affecting the body.63 
Only then will it become possible to overcome these diseases of the soul. 
Again, Cicero notes that Chrysippus in particular devoted considerable 
attention to the development of this analogy. 64 As Cicero develops his Stoic 
inspired diagnosis he suggests that the origins of these disturbances are to be 
found in an individual's beliefs or opinions (in opinione).65 The emotions are 
thus merely the symptoms of mental disturbance. The underlying causes are 
these beliefs (opiniones). 66 The task of philosophy - directed at the cultivation 
of wisdom (sapientia) understood as the health of the soul (animi sanitas) - is 
to treat these beliefs or opinions which cause the disturbances of the sou1. 67 
(b) The Medical Analogy in Galen's 
On tlte Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 
Cicero's account may be supplemented by turning to Galen who, in Book 5 of 
his On the Doctrines ~f Hippocrates and Plato, discusses an argument 
between Chrysippus and Posidonius concerning certain details of this analogy 
63 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.23. 
64 See Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 4.23 (= SVF 3.424): "far too much attention is 
devoted by the Stoics, principally by Chrysippus, to dra"ving an analogy between diseases of 
the soul and diseases of the body" (trans. King). 
65 Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 3.24. 
66 These beliefs are, in tum, the product of judgements. There appears to have been a dispute 
in the early Stoa concerning whether emotions should be characterised as judgements or the 
product of judgements. The fonner position is attributed to Chrysippus, the latter to Zeno. I 
shall return to this in Chapter Seven § 2 where I shall discuss the Stoic theory of judgement in 
some detail. 
67 As Epictetus "ill later say, "'it is not the things themselves (,t<x. 1tpuYIl<xt<x) that ~sturb ~en. 
but their judgements (OOYIl<X't<X) about these things" (Epictetus Enchiridion 5). Thi~ defimtIon 
of philosophy as the treatment of opinions or judgements "'ill become central m Chapter 
Seven. 
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between diseases of the mind and diseases of the body.68 According to Galen, 
both men agreed that such disturbances (miS'll) do not occur in the soul of "the 
better sort of men" (,trov aO'tEt(J)v),69 clearly a reference to the sage. However, 
Galen reports disagreement between Chrysippus and Posidonius with regard to 
what goes on in the souls of the foolish majority ('trov cpa:oA(J)v \lfUxl)). 
According to Chrysippus, their souls are best described as analogous to a body 
which is prone to become ill due to a small and chance cause (tnt JlIKp(i Kctt 
'tuxOUOn 1tpocpaon)?O Posidonius questioned this analogy, arguing that it 
would be wrong to compare a diseased soul with a healthy body which was 
not at present ill but merely prone to illness. 71 Galen agrees with Posidonius 
and goes on to offer his own account of the analogy: 
The souls of virtuous men ('ta~ 'trov onouoat(J)v \lfuxa~) ought to be 
compared to bodies immune from disease, [ ... ] the souls of those 
making progress (1tPOK01t'tOV't(J)v) should be compared to bodies of 
robust constitution, souls of intermediate persons to bodies that are 
healthy without being robust, souls of the multitude of ordinary men 
(cpaUA(J)V) to bodies that become ill at a slight cause, and souls of men 
68 The relevant passage is Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5.1-2 (5.428-445 Killm = 
292.-l-304.32 De Lacy). I have relied upon the edition (with translation) by De Lacy, 
69 Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5.2.2 (5.-l32 Killm = 294.31 De Lacy~ trans. De 
Lacv). 
70 S'ee Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5.2.3 (5,432 KUhn = 294.33-36 De Lacy = 
SVF3A65). 
71 See Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5.2,4-12 (5,432--l35 KUhn = 294.36-296.36 
De Lacy = Posidonius fro 163 EK). 
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who are angry or enraged or in any affected state whatever to bodies 
that are actually diseased. 72 
Galen is keen to emphasise that this analogy between the health of the body ('tl 
'tou crWJ..lCl'tO<; UyiEtCl) and the health of the soul ('tl 't11<; 'l'UX11<; uyina) was of 
particular importance for the Stoics, hence their concern with and occasional 
disputes over precisely how it should be conceived. The reason for this 
attention is not too difficult to discern for, as we have already seen in Cicero's 
account, the Stoic definition of philosophy as that which cultivates the health 
of the soul depends upon it. Galen is well aware of this and quotes the 
following from Chrysippus: 
It is not true that whereas there is an art ('tEXVll), called medicine, 
concerned with the diseased body (1tEpt 'to voaouv amJ..la), there is no 
art ('tEXVll) concerned with the diseased soul (1tEpt n)v voaouaav 
'l'Uxi]v), or that the latter should be inferior to the former in the theory 
and treatment of individual cases.73 
For Chrysippus, this art is philosophy and the philosopher is "the physician of 
the soul" ({) 't11<; 'l'UX11<; ia'tpo<;).74 
72 Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5.2.9 (5.434 Kuhn = 296.21-27 De Lacy trans. 
De Lacy modified). _ _ .. 
73 Chrysippus apud Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis ).2.22 (::)..+37 Kuhn = 298.28-31 
De Lacy = ST-'F 3.471; trans. De Lacy). 
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* * * 
In the light of these two accounts concerning the nature and function of 
philosophy, both of which claim the authority of Chrysippus, we can see that 
the Stoics held the task of the philosopher to be the cultivation of the health of 
the soul (it 'ti1~ "'1)xi1~ UytE1U, animi sanitas), 'to take care of one's soul' 
(bnJlEAEt0'9ul 'ti1~ "'1)xi1~) as Socrates would have put it. Two points deserve 
noting here. The first is the claim that the philosopher cannot treat others but 
rather must focus upon himself, that is, upon the diseases (na911, 
perturbationes) within his own soul. The second is that the underlying cause 
of these diseases (na911, perturbationes) are one's beliefs or opinions «)6~ut, 
opiniones).75 However, our present concern is with the analogy between the 
art that takes care of the soul and the art that takes care of the body, namely 
medicine. These passages show that the Stoics placed particular emphasis 
upon this medical analogy; philosophy is the art that takes care of the soul 
analogous to the way in which medicine is the art that takes care of the body, 
an art that Cicero aptly calls 'Socratic medicine' (Socratica medicina).76 In 
many ways this analogy appears to work well. Medicine is an art that involves 
complex theoretical knowledge yet is clearly orientated towards a practical 
goal. It appears to offer an excellent model for a conception of philosophy 
74 Chrysippus apud Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5.2.23 (5.437 Killm = 298.33 De 
Lacy = SVF 3.471). 
75 I note again the dispute between early Stoics concerning the precise nature of the 
relationship between opinions or judgements (M~at, Kpicrn~) and emotions (nuS'll). such as 
that between Zeno and Cbrysippus reported in Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5.1.4 
(5.429 KUhn = 292.17-20 De Lacy = SVF 1.209, 3.461). I shall return to this in Chapter Seyen 
§ 2 where I shall discuss the Stoic theory of judgement in some detail. 
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involving both complex theory (AoyOC;) and practical exerCIse (acrKTtcrtC;) 
directed towards the transformation of one's life, for this is precisely what 
medicine attempts to achieve with respect to the body. However, in order to 
test this model and to see just how well it works in the specific context of the 
Stoics' philosophy, we must return to the question concerning the nature of 
4. Stoic Definitions of'tEXVTl 
In order to understand the analogy between philosophy and medicine better it 
will be necessary to consider the precise nature of the art of medicine and the 
way in which it might differ from other arts, something that we have already 
discussed in the previous chapter. However, before doing this it might be 
helpful to begin with some more general attempts by the Stoics to define 
According to Olympiodorus, Zeno defined an art ('t€XVTt) as "a system of 
apprehensions unified by practice for some goal useful in life". 77 By 'system 
of apprehensions' (()U()'tllJl<X E K K<X't<X/" 11\lf£<.OV) we can understand a 
systematic body of knowledge made up of apprehensions, these being assents 
76 Cicero Tusculanae Dispufationes -+.24 (= srr 3.424). 
n Olympiodorus In p,latonis G~rgiam 12.1 (= STir 1.73 = LS, .Q A~: ZTtV~V O€ q>T)<Jl~' 0:': 
't€XVll £O''t1. O'uO''tllJ1<X £lC lC<X't<XAll\jf£WV O'u'Y''{£YUJ1V<XO'J1£vcov 1tpo<; 'tl 't£Ao<; £uXPllO'~v 't.wv £\ 
'to f3iQ>. See the detailed analysis in Sparshott, 'Zeno on Art: Anatomy of a Defininon., esp. 
pp. 284-90. Other ancient sources that report this definition, although .. often '\lthout 
attribution, include Lucian De Parasito 4 (= STir 1.73), Se:\1us Empmcus Adverslis 
Alathematicos 2.10 (= SVF 1.73), Ps.-Galen De/initiones Jfedicae 7 (19.350 Kiihn = STF 
2.93). 
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to 'adequate impressions' (<pav'taO"ta Ka'taAl17t'ttKll).78 These apprehensions 
should be understood as secure instances of empirical knowledge. This system 
is 'unified by practice' (crUYYEYU)lVaO")lEvc.ov), that is, brought together into a 
system through training or exercise, as in the case of an apprentice who brings 
together all of the principles that he has learned into a real body of knowledge 
only when he engages in practical training. This systematic body of 
knowledge is 'directed towards a useful goal or a good purpose' (7tp6~ n 
'tEAOC; EUXPllO"'tov),79 a formulation which recalls Socrates' distinction in the 
Gorgias between arts which aim at something good and mere empirical 
knacks which aim at short-term pleasure. 80 Finally, the useful goal to which an 
art is directed is 'within life' ('t&v tv 'tep J3icp), a point which serves simply to 
underscore the practical nature of an art. 
There is nothing in this definition that is immediately controversial. 81 An 
art ('tEXVll) is a systematic body of knowledge, based upon empirically derived 
principles but also requiring practice or training, with some specific practical 
goal. Any Stoic conception of an art concerned with the health of the soul will 
presumably conform to this definition. As we have already noted, this art is 
78 Alternatively, an objective, cognitive, recognisable, or convmcmg impression (or 
presentation). For notes on the translation of this term see Sandbach, 'Phantasia Kataleptike', 
p. 10: Hadot, The Inner Citadel, p. 104. For discussion ofthis concept and Stoic epistemology 
in general see Sandbach, ibid.; Frede, 'Stoics and Skeptics on Cle.ar and Distinct Impressions', 
esp. pp. 157-70; Frede in CHHP, esp. pp. 300-16: Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 133-51; Striker, 
'KP1'tTtPlOV 'tfic; UJ:118£lac;', esp. pp. 51-68, 73-76: Hankinson, 'Natural Criteria and the 
Transparency of Judgement', esp. pp. 168-70: Watson, The Stoic Theory of Knmrledge, pp. 
34-36. This concept will be discussed further in Chapter Four § 2 (c) and Chapter Seycn § 2 
(c). 
79 Sparshott, 'Zeno on Art: Anatomy of a Definition', p. 289, notes that the precise meaning of 
£UXPll(J'tOC; is difficult to determine and suggests that 'useful' or 'serviceable' (LSJ) does not 
do justice to the presence of the £1)- prefix. He proposes' of good use'. 
80 See Plato Gorgias 464b-465a. 
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identified with human excellence (apE'tl1) and with wisdom (O"ocpia, 
cpp6Vl10t~).82 Human excellence or wisdom, then, is an art, a systematic body 
of knowledge directed towards the cultivation of the health of the soul. 
However, one important question that this definition does not address is the 
relationship between the practice of this art and the goal to which it is directed. 
This is, in effect, the same as the question whether the possession of expertise 
in an art is, on its own, a sufficient condition for securing that towards which 
the art is directed. If the goal ('t£AO~) of the art of living is the cultivation of 
well-being (Eu(5ulJ.lOvia), then will expertise in that art guarantee well-being? 
In order to consider this question it might be helpful to begin by returning to 
some of the distinctions made in the previous chapter between different types 
of't£xvat. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, it is possible to outline a number 
of different types of art or craft ('t£xvll). Here I shall focus upon just three 
types; the productive (1tolll'ttKll), the pelformative (1tpcxK'tu:ll), and the 
stochastic (o'toxuo'tl1cll). 83 As we have already seen, a productive art is one 
that produces a product (epyov). An example of this sort of art would be 
shoemaking. In this case the product is clearly distinct from the process that 
produces it. The goal of shoemaking is to make shoes and so the goal ('t£AO~) 
81 However, as we shall see in Chapter Four § 2 (c), Sextus Empiricus will object to its 
reliance upon the idea of an 'adequate impression'. 
82 See Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.5blO (2.66.1~-67"+ WH = SVF 3.560; noted at the 
beginning of this chapter); also Alexander of Apbrodisias De Anima Libri Mantissa 159.33-3~ 
(= Sf'F 3.66), Sextus Empiricus Adversus Alathematicos 1l.170 (= STF 3.598), Cicero 
Academica 2.23 (= Sv'F 2.117). It is important to note that, unlike Aristotle, the Stoics tend to 
use the terms O'o<pia, and CPPOVT}O't<; S)TIonymous]y, See Tsekourakis, Studies in (he 
Terminology of Earl;y Stoic Ethics, pp. 128-31. 
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of this type of art may be identified with the product (epyov) produced. The 
expert shoemaker can easily be identified by his ability to make good shoes. A 
performative art is one in which the goal of the art is identical with the 
performance of the art itself. An example of this sort of art would be dancing. 
In this case, the art aims at nothing beyond its own activity, and the actions 
(epya) that constitute this activity are its 'product' (epyov). A possessor of this 
type of art can be identified simply by their ability to practise the art well. A 
stochastic art is one that does not produce a distinct physical product but 
instead aims at a goal clearly distinguishable from the practice of the art 
itself. 84 Examples of this sort of art would include medicine and navigation. In 
this case, the goal ('tEA-OC;) of the art - in the example of medicine, health - is 
not a separate physical product. It is also important to note that the possession 
of this sort of art is not enough to guarantee the desired result. If a so-called 
shoemaker failed to make a good pair of shoes then it would be reasonable to 
conclude that, in fact, the individual in question did not possess the art of 
shoemaking. Yet if a doctor failed to save a patient one would not necessarily 
assume that the doctor had not performed well. In other words, although a 
practitioner of a stochastic art may be an expert in their art, that expertise will 
not on its own always guarantee achievement of the goal of the art (in this 
example, the health of the patient). This is due to the role played by external 
83 The other types of 1:£XV1ll11entioned in the last chapter - the acquisitive (K1:111:tKl]) and the 
theoretical (6£roPll1:tld]) - although important for Plato are not relevant here. 
84 From <HOXa.Cf'ttKO<;, 'skilful in aiming at', 'able to hit' (LSI): deriying from CJ'toxa~oJla.t, 
'to aim'. Sometimes 1:£xva.t CJ1:oxa.CJnKa.i is translated as 'conjectural arts' (e.g. Barnes, et 
al., Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Prior Ana~ytics 1.1-7). 
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factors out of the practitioner's control. 85 Instead, the expert in a stochastic art 
will only be successful 'for the most part' (btl 1:0 1[01.,'0).86 
Of these three types of 1:£XVT} it would be reasonable to suppose that the art 
that is concerned with the health of the soul is a stochastic art. This appears to 
be implicit in the analogy with medicine which, as we have seen, was taken 
quite seriously. Unfortunately this is the most complex of the three types. It is 
clear that the goal of a productive art is the physical product that is produced, 
while the goal of a performative art is the activity or practice of the art itself. 
A good shoemaker is one who makes good shoes~ a good dancer is one who 
gives a good performance. In each case, successful achievement of the goal 
(1:£ AO\;) can be evaluated with reference to the epyov, the product or 
performance. With a stochastic art, however, this is not the case. As we have 
already seen, an excellent doctor may consistently practice the art of medicine 
without error and yet in some instances he will not be able to cure all of his 
patients due to external factors beyond his control. One is faced with the 
paradox of an expert who does not always achieve the goal of the art that he is 
practising, in this case health. If we accept the medical analogy, then, insofar 
as it is like medicine, the art concerned with the health of the soul - the art of 
living - will also face this problem. 
85 See Striker, 'Following Nature', esp. p. 244. 
86 See Alexander of Apbrodisias In Ana~ytica Priora 165.8-15 (trans. Mueller & Gould). Here 
Alexander follows Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 11l2a30-1112bIL esp. ll12b8-9. Aristotle 
puts this down to the indeterminate subject matter of the arts in question ratller than to the role 
of e~1emal factors. Alexander lists both of these as deflning characteristics of a stochastic art 
(see e.g. Ouaestiones 61.1-28). However the fIrst of these cannot be right (pace Roochnik Of 
Art and TVisdom, p. 52) and may be seen to reflect Aristotle's somewhat rigid distinction 
between arts and sciences, and the inferior status that he assigns to the former. 
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In order to overcome this problem, the Stoic Antipater - who explicitly 
characterised the art of living as stochastic - suggested that in the case of such 
arts the goal ('tEAO<;) should be understood not as a specific desired outcome 
but rather as a correct performance of the art itself, defining the goal ('tEAO<;) 
as doing everything within one's power (nav 'to Ka9' au'tov 1tOtElv) to attain 
the desired outcome. 87 The advantage of this formulation is that, as in the case 
of productive and performative arts, the goal becomes that by which one can 
assess the ability of a practitioner. Thus, a good doctor is not one that produces 
health in his patients but rather one that does all that he can within his power 
to produce health in his patients. Similarly, a good archer is not necessarily 
one that always hits his target but rather one that does all that is in his power 
to hit the target. 88 The archer's goal ('tEAO<;), on this account, is to shoot well; 
whether he hits the target or not will depend upon a number of external factors 
out of his control. Similarly, whether a doctor saves his patient or not will 
depend not merely upon his own expertise but also upon a number of external 
factors. 89 
8'7 See Arius Didy'IUUS apud Stobaeus 2.7.6a (2.76.11-15 WH = Sf'F 3 Ant. 57) with discussion 
in Long, 'Carneades and the Stoic telos', esp. p. 81; Inwood, 'Goal and Target in Stoicism', 
esp. pp. 550-52; Striker, 'Antipater, or The Art of Living', esp. pp. 306-11~ 'Following 
Nature', esp. pp. 243-44. Antipater's formulation appears to have been in response to criticism 
from the Academic Carneades who o~jected to Antipater's revised formulation of the Stoic 
t£AO~ as selecting certain primary natural things and rejecting other non-natural things (also 
reported in Arius Didymus). For ancient criticism of Antipater's t£Ao<; formulation see 
Alexander of Aphrodisias De Anima Libri Afantissa 164.3-9 (part in SVF 3.193 = LS 64 B), 
who also reports Antipater's formulation at 161.5-6 (not in Sf/F). 
88 This exanlple comes fTom Cicero De Finibus 3.22 (= SVF 3.18). 
89 It is the role of these external factors that leads to the distinction between goal (t£Ao<;) and 
function or product (€p,,(ov) in stochastic arts and not any indeternunacy with regard to the 
subject matter or the expert's actions. See Ierodiakonou, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias on 
Medicine as a Stochastic Art', pp. 481-82, contra Inwood, 'Goal and Target in Stoicism'. pp. 
549-50, and Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom, p. 52. 
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We now have two distinct conceptions of a stochastic art In the first of 
these it was admitted that occasionally an expert will not always reach the goal 
('tEAO<;) of the art. The doctor, for example, will not always save his patients. 
In the second conception - attributed to Antipater - the goal ('tEAO<;) is 
paradoxically redefined as 'making every effort' or 'doing everything within 
one's power' (nav 'to 1<:0.9' o.u'tov 1Wl€lV) to achieve the goal ('tE/vO<;).90 The 
goal of medicine would thus become not cultivating health but 'making every 
effort' to cultivate health. In a passage by Alexander of Aphrodisias both of 
these conceptions of a stochastic art are discussed and both are rejected.91 We 
have already noted the problems with the first conception, namely that it 
becomes difficult to assess whether someone has expertise in their art or not 
The problem with the second conception is that, although an expert will 
always be said to have reached the goal by 'making every effort', the idea that 
the goal of medicine is not cultivating health and the goal of archery is not 
hitting targets fails to do justice to the nature of these arts. Although achieving 
these goals is, to a certain extent, independent of mastery of the art in question 
due to the role that external factors will play in determining the outcome, 
nevertheless these goals remain the reason why one would choose to learn one 
of these arts in the first place.92 To say that the goal of medicine - the goal 
90 See Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.6a (2.76.11-15 WH = SVF 3 Ant. 57). 
91 See Alexander of Aphrodisias Quaestiones 61.1-28 (11. 4-23 = SVF 3.19, although there is 
no ex-plicit reference to the Stoa), translated in Sharples. Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
Ouaestiones 2.16-3.15. Note also Alexander of Aphrodisias In Topica 32.12-34.5, In 
.;inalvtica Priora 39.30-40.5. 165.8-15. For discussion see Ierodiakonou, 'Alexander of 
Aphiodisias on Medicine as a'Stochastic Art', esp. p. 475; Roochnik Of Art and Wisdom, pp. 
54-55; Inwood, 'Goal and Target in Stoicism', pp. 549-50; Striker, 'Following Nature', esp. p. 
244. 
92 See e.g. Plutarch's criticisms of Antipater's position in De Communibus Xotitiis lO71b-c: 
--If someone should say that an archer in shooting does all that in him lies not for the purpose 
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being that to which all actions can be referred - was a correct performance of 
medical technique, rather than the restoration of the health of the patient, 
would fail to explain a number of things typically done when practising the art 
of medicine. 
In order to overcome these problems Alexander offers a third option. 93 He 
suggests that in a stochastic art it is necessary to make a clear distinction 
between the goal ('t£AO<;) of the art and its function, action, or product (EpyOV). 
Thus, in the case of medicine, the goal ('t£AO<;) - that for the sake of which 
every effort is made - would remain health, but the proper task or function 
(epyov) would become to make every effort towards achieving that goal 
('t£AO<;).94 This is clearly better than Antipater's paradoxical formulation. 
Alexander suggests that emphasising this distinction between goal ('t£AO<;) and 
function (epyov) is necessary due to the role played by external factors in 
stochastic arts. According to this third formulation, an expert in a stochastic art 
will always achieve the EPYOV of his art, as in the other arts, and this may form 
a basis for judging his expertise. 95 However, due to the role of external factors 
of hitting the mark but for the purpose of doing all that in him lies, it would be thought that he 
was spinning some monstrous and enigmatic yams" (trans. Cherniss). Note also Cicero De 
Finibus 3.22 (= SVF 3.18). 
93 This appears at Quaestiones 6l.23-28, Olnitted in SJ-F 3.19. 
94 To a certain e:\.1ent Alexander follows Aristotle here, as one might e:\.'}lect. See esp. Aristotle 
Topica 101b5-1O and Ars Rhetorica 1355b12-14. In the former Aristotle suggests that 
expertise in medicine should be evaluated with reference to a practitioner using all of the 
available means. In the latter he suggests that the function (ep'Yov) of medicine is not simply to 
create health but to move the patient as far towards health as is possible in the circumstances. 
95 It is important to note the various ways in which the notion of ep'Yov functions in the three 
types of'tfxvll. In a productive art the ep'Yov is the physical product, the pair of shoes made by 
the shoemaker. In a performative art the £P'Yov is the action 'produced' by the artist. the 
performance itself (tbis was the sense in which the term was understood in Chapter One). In a 
stochastic art the ep'Yov becomes the task or function of the art, that "'hich the doctor does 
Witll reference to the 'tfAO<;. Thus the 'product' (ep'Yov) of medicine is not health (which is in 
fact the 'tfAo<;) but rather those actions which are directed towards cultivating health. See 
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he will not always achieve the 'tEAO~ of his art.96 The expert doctor, for 
example, will not always manage to cultivate health (the 'tEAO~), but - if he is 
an expert - he will always make every effort towards cultivating health (the 
epyov). 
As one can see, the question concerning the nature of stochastic arts in 
general, and medicine in particular, is very complex. However, our primary 
concern here is not with the nature of the art of medicine itself but rather with 
the status of the analogy between the art of medicine and the art of living. This 
analogy appears to imply that one should conceive the art of living as a 
stochastic art. However, if one conceives the Stoic art of living as a stochastic 
art one immediately faces a problem. It is reported that the goal ('tEAO~) of the 
Stoic art of living is the cultivation of well-being or happiness (eUoatjlovla).97 
If one conceives the art of living as a stochastic art then this goal of 
eUoatjlovl.a - like health in the case of medicine - will not necessarily follow 
from a correct performance of that art. Instead it will be dependent upon other 
Alexander of Aphrodisias In Topica 32.27-33.4, translated and discussed in Roochnik, Of Art 
and Wisdom, p. 54. 
96 In productive and perfonnative arts the ep'Yov and 'tEAoC; always coincide. 
97 See e.g. Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.6e (2.77.16 WH = SVF 3.16). This is, in turn, 
identified with living in accordance with excellence (apE'tTt) and with nature (<I)'OO1.C;). Thus 
the Stoic 'tEAo<; cannot be the selection of primary natural things (the formulation attributed to 
Antipater; see Clement of Alexandria Stromata 2.21 (PG 8.1076a) = SI/F 3 Ant 58) which 
remain strictly speaking indifferent Instead, its focus must be what is in our own power, 
namely the excellent mental state that constitutes apE'tTt (otllen"ise it would, as some ancient 
critics claimed, be no different to the Peripatetic position). Antipater' s formulation of the 
'tEAOC; is thus in certain important respects heterodox. The orthodox Stoic position is re-
affirmed by Posidonius (e.g. Posidonius fro 187 EK apud Galen De PlaGitis Hippocratis et 
Platonis 5.6.9-12 = 5.470-71 Kuhn = 328.6-18 De Lacy) and Epictetus (e.g. Disserrationes 
2.5.1-5). Note also Plutarch's criticisms of those Stoics who attempt to hold botll goals at once 
in De Communibus Notitiis 1070f-1071b; see also Cicero De Finibus 3.22 (= SVF 3.18). For 
further discussion see Bonhoffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, pp. 163-188 (= The Ethics of 
the Stoic Epictetus, pp. 209-238); Long, 'Cameades and the Stoic telos', passim: Inwood. 
'Goal and Target in Stoicism', esp. p. 551: Reesor, The Nature of jlan in Ear~v .\roic 
Philosophy. pp. 103-17. 
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external factors. This must be wrong insofar as the Stoic art of living 
(identified with apE1:ll) is repeatedly said to be a sufficient condition for 
happiness (Euoat}lovia) by itself (this is precisely what distinguishes it from 
the Peripatetic position).98 If it were a stochastic art, expertise would not be 
sufficient to guarantee the goal, Euoat}lovia. We are left, then, with two other 
alternatives. The first would be to characterise the art of living as a productive 
art, in which case one would have to say that it is an art that produces 
happiness (Euoat}lovia), this being its 'product' ,99 The second would be to 
characterise it as a performative art, in which case well-being or happiness 
(Euoat}lovia) would have to be identified with the performance of the art 
itself In either of these cases Euoat}lovia would be both the 1:£AO~ and the 
epyov of the art, and in either case expertise in the art would guarantee 
attainment of the 1:£AO~. The question, then, becomes whether the Stoics 
conceived Euoat}lovia as a product or as an activity. 100 According to Cicero, 
at least some Stoics adopted the second of these options: 
98 Pace Dobbin, Epictetus, Discourses Book 1, p. 156, who, on the basis of the reports 
concerning Antipater, suggests that all Stoics held the art of li\'ing to be stochastic. This is 
clearly not the case for someone like Epictetus (Dobbin's primary subject) for whom the art of 
living is concerned only with what is within one's own power (eq>' itJltv) and for whom 
success in that art is in no way dependent upon ex1emal factors. For the distinction between 
the Stoic and Peripatetic positions see e.g. Cicero Tusculanae Disputationes 5.40--H (= LS 63 
L), Aulus Gellius 18.1.1-14 (part in SVF 3.56). 
99 TIns is suggested in Alexander of Apbrodisias De Anima Libri lHantissa 159.33-34 (= SVF 
3.66): "excellence is an art that produces happiness" (it De apE'tlt 't€XVTI lCU't' umoi><; 
EooutJ1oviu~ notll'ttlClt), an account that may implicitly assume Aristotle's restricted 
conception of't€XVll as essentially notll'ttlClt 't€XVll (see Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1140al-
23). As I have noted in tlle previous chapter, this is also the way in which my-in attempts to 
ex-plain the relationship between 't€XVll and EOOatJloviu in the early Platonic dialogues (see 
Ins Plato's Aforal Theorv). However he has been criticised because tllis reduces apE'tlt to 
something purely ins~ental rather than an end in itself (see Vlastos, Socrares: Ironist and 
lvforal Philosopher, pp. 6-10). 
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We do not consider that wisdom resembles navigation or medicine, but 
it is more like the gestures just mentioned, and like dancing, in that the 
actual exercise (effectio) of the skill is in itself, and does not aim at an 
external obj ecl. 10 1 
II7 
In other words, the art of living is a performative art like dancing, acting, or 
music, and not like the stochastic arts of medicine and archery.102 It is 
primarily an activity that is not directed towards any further goal beyond the 
activity itself. It is the very performance of the art of living that constitutes 
£i>oat~ovia, itself conceived as an activity,I03 just as the satisfaction gained 
from the performing arts is to be found in the very act of the performance 
itself 
What does this account of the different 'tEXVat contribute to our 
understanding of the concept of an art of living? We are now in a position to 
say that this art ('tEXV11) is a systematic body of knowledge based upon 
empirically derived principles and brought together through practice. It is 
directed towards a goal ('tEJvO~) which we have seen described as the health of 
100 Alternatively one might ask how the Stoics understood epyov in this particular contex.1:, 
epyov covering both product and action. 
101 Cicero De Finibus 3.24 (= SVF 3.11; trans. Wright): Nec enim gubemationi aut medicinae 
similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actionii illi potlus quam modo dixi et saltationi, ut in 
ipsa insit, non/oris petatur extremum, id est artis effictio. See also De Finibus 3.32. The word 
effoctio should be understood similarly to epyov, that is as referring to the 'product' of an art. 
In a perfonnative art the performance itself is the 'product' (EPYo\" ejJectio). TItis is distinct 
from the attempt in De Finibus 3.22 to characterise the art of living as a stochastic art using 
the analogy with an archer. That analogy only works with reference to the desire to secure 
'primary natural objects' ('t<l np6Yta Ka't<l q>ool\', princpia naturae), wltich is Antipater's 
heterodox fonnulation of the U:j,,~. 
102 See Long, 'Carneades and the Stoic telos'. pp. 83-84, for the same conclusion. 
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the soul ('ti}v 'tfl~ \jI'\)xfl~ u')'l£tav) and as £uoatj.LOvla, which may be 
understood to be synonymous. 104 Finally, this goal is identical to the activity 
of practising the art of living itself (rather than a distinct product produced by 
it or something contingent upon other external factors). As a performative art, 
then, one can see the limits of the analogy between the Stoic art of living and 
medicine. Yet nevertheless one can also understand why this analogy came to 
be so common in ancient discussions concerning the nature and function of 
philosophy. Philosophy treats the soul analogously to the way in which 
medicine treats the body; however the way in which it achieves this is, for the 
Stoics at least, subtly different. 105 
5. The Relationship Between a(j1(l1(jt~ and AOY<><; 
An important element in Zeno's definition of'tEXVll is the reference it makes 
to the role of practice. As we have seen, an art, according to Zeno, is a 
systematic body of knowledge that is brought into its systematic unity by way 
of practice (Ju')'')'£')'Ujl VaOll.Ev(ov ). One can immediately see how this echoes 
Socrates' claim in the Gorgias that the development of expertise in an art will 
103 Aristotle famously characterised £UoatJ.1Ovia as an activity (see e.g. Ethica Nicomachea 
1176a30-1176b9), with which the Stoics would agree. For further discussion see Long, 'Stoic 
Eudaimonism', esp. p. 82. 
104 Note the etymology of £uoa1.).1Ovia as having a good daimon or spirit and the resonance 
between this and the idea of a healthy soul. 
105 The prevalence of this analogy even among Stoics presumably reflects the influence of 
Socrates who hints at tlle analogy but who would not have engaged in the careful analysis of 
different types of'tEXV11 begun by Plato (in Iris evaluation of the status of rhetoric) and taken 
to its heights in later authors such as Galen and Alexander of Apbrodisias (in their evaluations 
of the status of medicine). Of course, for a Peripatetic the medical analogy does work in all of 
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require not just an understanding of the relevant principles (AOYOl) but also 
training (aO'lCl10"lr;). For Zeno, then, as well as Socrates, 'tEXVll involves both 
Aoyor; and aO"lCllO'tr;. A number of other early Stoic sources also make 
reference to the importance of aO"lCllO'tr;.106 But what exactly is the role of 
aO'lCllO"lr; in the Stoic concept of an art of living? It should be clear from what 
has already been said that this question will be of central importance for the 
creation of a conception of philosophy that can adequately deal with the idea 
that philosophy is primarily expressed in one's way of life (~ior;). 
No extended early Stoic source dealing with this topic survives. However 
it is addressed in a pair of letters by Seneca which include a number of 
references to the idea of an ars vitae. 107 The first of these letters deals with the 
question of whether philosophical doctrines (decreta) are sufficient on their 
own without precepts (praecepta) for the art of living. The second deals with 
the question of whether precepts (praecepta) are sufficient without doctrines 
(decreta). By decreta we can understand doctrines, principles, or opinions; by 
praecepta we can understand precepts, teachings, instructions, written rules, 
exercises, or maxims directed towards the transformation of an individual's 
behaviour. 108 Although the notion of praecepta may be slightly broader than 
its details for they would be happy to acknowledge the role played by e~1ernal factors in the 
cultivation of Ei>oaLJ.LOvia (see e.g. Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1178b33-1179a9). 
106 See e.g. Aristo apud Clement of Alexandria Stromata 2.20 (PG 8.1052b = SVF 1.370). 
Note also the references in Diogenes Laertius to two works entitled IIEpi Cx,<JKlt<JEW<; by the 
Stoics Herillus (7.166 = SvF 1.409) and Dionysius (7.167 = SVF 1.422). Further references 
can be found in Chapter Five § 1. 
1(l7 These letters are Seneca Epistulae 94 and 95. I have used the editions by Reynolds (OCT) 
and Gummere (LCL). As ,ve shall see, these letters include a number of Latin translations 
from earlier Stoics including Aristo (ST-"F 1.358-359) and Cleanthes (SfF 1.582). 
108 See the respective entries in OLD. 'Vitll regard to praecepta, Newman has argued that it is 
artificial to try to distinguish between, on the one hand, the notion of a philosophical exercise 
and, on the ~ther, its written or rhetorical expression. Instead he suggests that for the later 
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that of aO'Kll(HC;, Seneca's discussion bears directly upon the relationship 
between AOYOC; and aO'Kll(HC; insofar as it deals with the question of whether 
either philosophical theory or practical advice are, on their own, sufficient for 
transforming one's behaviour. 109 
Seneca opens the first of these two letters by noting that, on the one hand, 
there are those who have claimed that precepts are the only significant 
component within philosophy, abstract theory being unnecessary insofar as it 
is of no practical import, while, on the other hand, there are those who think 
that precepts are of little use and that doctrines are by themselves sufficient for 
living well. 110 The second of these positions was held by the Stoic Aristo and 
Seneca begins by considering Aristo's arguments. Aristo argues that precepts 
will be of no use to someone who lacks the appropriate understanding for that 
ignorance will cloud whatever they do. Only those free from such ignorance 
can benefit from precepts (praecepta). However precepts are totally 
superfluous to such individuals who, being free from error, do not need any 
instruction; "to one who knows, it is superfluous to give precepts; to one who 
does not know, it is insufficient". 111 According to Aristo, only the doctrines 
(decreta) of philosophy can make any difference to someone's way of life; 
Stoics at least, philosophical texts were themselves seen to be central to such exercises, 
whether thev be in the fonn of instructions directed towards students or texis produced by 
students the~selves ('Theory and Practice of the meditatio', pp. 1478-82). I shall return to this 
point in Chapter Five § 5. 
109 For a brief discussion of these letters in relation to the role of techniques (exercises) and 
analysis (theory) in Stoic cognitive therapy, see Sorabji, Emotion and Peace oJAfind, pp. 161-
63. 
11 0 See Seneca Epistu Zae 94.1-3. 
III Aristo apud Seneca Epistulae 94.11 (= SVF 1.359): praecepta dare scienti supervacuum 
est, nescienti parum. 
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precepts (praecepta) are pointless. Il2 There are two points that need to be 
noted here. The first is that Aristo holds a position similar to the intellectualist 
reading of Socrates in which theoretical understanding alone is thought to 
guarantee excellence ( ap£'tl1). The second is that Aristo holds on to the 
orthodox Stoic distinction between the wise (O'o<p01) and the non-wise 
(<paUAOt), characterising the non-wise as mad or insane (insania).l13 However, 
he does not appear to consider the possibility of a third intermediate category, 
namely those who are 'making progress' (1tPOK01tl1), philosophers in the 
etymological sense of the word. 
In his response to Aristo, Seneca is happy to acknowledge the central 
importance of philosophical doctrines (decreta) but questions Aristo's outright 
rejection of the role that precepts (praecepta) might play. For Seneca, precepts 
do not teach but they do reinforce teaching already received: "advice is not 
teaching; it merely engages the attention and rouses us, and concentrates the 
memory, and keeps it from losing grip". 114 Thus precepts (praecepta) are not 
for the sage who already enjoys secure knowledge, but rather for those who 
are 'making progress' (1tPOK01tl1, projicientes), those who in one sense already 
know but who have not yet fully assimilated that knowledge and have not yet 
translated that knowledge into actions. Seneca responds to the claim that 
precepts only work with reference to the theoretical arguments that underpin 
them by saying that precepts act to remind one of those arguments and to 
112 See Seneca Epistulae 94.13. 
113 See Seneca Epistulae 94.17. 
114 Seneca Epistulae 94.25 (trans. Gummere): non docet odmonitio sed advertit, sed excitot, 
sed memoriam continet nec patitur elabi. 
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assist in their digestion. 115 Just like the training undertaken by the apprentice 
craftsman, Seneca suggests that precepts (praecepta) serve as a form of 
training for one who has already studied philosophical doctrines (decreta).1l6 
Precepts are thus an often useful complement to doctrines, at least for those 
who are 'making progress' (npoKOnTt, projicientes).117 
The question that follows naturally, and which is dealt with in the second 
of these letters, is whether such precepts are sufficient on their own to 
transform an individual's way of life. Following Aristo, Seneca acknowledges 
that precepts can be of little help to a disturbed mind. 118 Moreover, although 
precepts can indeed bring about a change in behaviour, they cannot do so 
alone. For Seneca, philosophy is both theoretical and practical (contemplativa 
et activa); it involves both doctrines and precepts (decreta et praecepta).119 In 
order to illustrate this inter-dependency Seneca draws a number of analogies: 
doctrines (decreta) are like the branches of a tree while precepts (praecepta) 
are like the leaves, the latter depending upon the former for their existence, the 
strength of the former only being seen in the display of the latter. 
Alternatively, doctrines are like the roots of a tree and precepts are like the 
leaves, the former being the hidden foundation for the latter, the latter being 
the outward expression of the strength of the former. Again, doctrines are like 
115 I shall develop this idea of 'digestion' of philosophical doctrines further in Chapter FiYe § 
3 (b). 
116 See Seneca Epistulae 94.32. Recalling points that I have already discussed in Chapter One 
§ 3, Seneca goes on here (Epistulae 94.40--1-2) to suggest that the best form of praeceptum is 
association with a living role model and suggests that praecepta are in effect substitutes for 
direct contact with a philosophical mentor. 
117 Seneca is explicit on this point at Epistulae 94.50. For Seneca's own understanding of the 
intermediate category of those 'making progress' (proficientes) see Epistulae 75.8-18. 
118 See Seneca Epistulae 95.4~ also 95.38. 
119 See Seneca Epistulae 95.10. 
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the heart of a living being while precepts are like the actions of the limbs the , 
former being hidden and only known to the world via the movements of the 
latter, which depend upon the former for their power of movement. 120 
In each of these analogies the doctrines (decreta) are the necessary but 
concealed foundation of the precepts (praecepta). The precepts form the 
outward and visible expression of the doctrines, without which the doctrines 
would remain hidden. Seneca's conclusion, then, is that both doctrines and 
precepts are necessary for the acquisition of wisdom (sapientia, oo<pia).121 
The praecepta of Seneca, although perhaps broader in scope than the notion of 
aOKTlcrtC;, are similar to the training undertaken by an apprentice implicit in 
Socrates' discussion of'tExvTI. While both Socrates and Seneca clearly affirm 
that an understanding of the relevant doctrines or principles (decreta, I"OrOl) 
are a necessary condition for the acquisition of expertise, both also 
acknowledge the role that some form of exercise or exhortation (praecepta, 
aOKTIO"tC;) might play in that acquisition. Although neither would want to say 
that such exercise or training could ever be a sufficient condition on its own, 
both appear to lean towards the claim that it may be a necessary condition 
alongside a grasp of the relevant principles. 
120 See Seneca Epistulae 95.59, 95.64. 
121 Doctrines (decreta) are clearly a necessary condition. They may in certain circumstances 
be a sufficient condition but in general, Seneca tends to doubt this. Precepts (praecepta) may 
in certain circumstances be a sufficient condition but again in general Seneca tends to doubt 
this. However, whether precepts are a necessary condition is not so clear. Seneca appears to be 
inclined to say yes. Nevertheless, for Seneca decreta retain a certain priority over praecepta. 
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6. The Stoic Division of Philosophy 
The account so far of a conception of philosophy as an art ('tEXVll) concerned 
with one's way of life (~io~) and involving two components, philosophical 
theory (AOYO~) and philosophical exercise (acrKllcrt~), is relatively 
straightforward. However, what is not so immediately clear is how this might 
be reconciled with the common image of Stoic philosophy as a highly 
structured system divided into the three components of logic, physics, and 
ethics. According to the summary of Stoic philosophy by Diogenes Laertius, 
they [the Stoics] say that philosophical discourse ('tov KU'tCt 
q>tAocro<pia.v AOYOV) has three parts, one of these being physical 
(<p1)crtKOV), another ethical (1)8tKOV), and another logical (AOY1KOV).122 
It is interesting to note that it is not philosophy that is divided into these three 
parts but rather philosophical discourse ('tov Ka.'tU qnAocro<piuv 'Aoyov). 
Elsewhere, in Plutarch, we are told that it is philosopher's theorems ('tIDV 'tou 
qnAocrO<p01) 8€WPllJ.Hl'tWV) that are divided. 123 It is also interesting to note that 
according to Diogenes Laertius this division was first made by Zeno, and then 
restated by Chrysippus, in works both called On Discourse (II€pl/.,0Y01) ).124 It 
122 Diogenes Laertius 7.39 (= SVF 2.37 = Posidonius fro 87 EK = LS 26 B: trans. LS) .. For 
commentary see Kidd. Posidonius, The Commentary, pp. 350-52. A full survey of the "anous 
ancient divisions can be found in Sex1us EmpiricusAdversus ~A1athematicos 7.2-23. 
123 See Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1035a (= SlF 2.42). 
124 See Diogenes Laertius 7.39 (= SVF 2.37). For ancient references to these works see the lists 
in Sf/F. vol. 1, p. 71, and vol. 3, p. 201. All but one derive from Diogenes Laertius. 
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seems, then, that this division was primarily conceived as a division of 
philosophical discourse, not of philosophy itself. 125 As for philosophy proper, 
Diogenes Laertius reports the following: 
They compare philosophy to a living being (£h:asouO't Of scPcp "C1]v 
qnAoO'o<ptav), likening logic ("Co Jvoyucov) to bones and sinews, ethics 
("CO ilOu.;:ov) to the fleshier parts, and physics ("Co <pUO'tKOV) to the soul. 
They make a further comparison to an egg: logic is the outside, ethics 
is what comes next, and physics the innermost part; or to a fertile field: 
the surrounding wall corresponds to logic, its fruit to ethics, and its 
land or trees to physics; or to a city which is well fortified and 
governed according to reason. 126 
Elsewhere, in Sextus Empiricus, the first of these similes is credited to 
Posidonius and his preference for this one in particular is explained: 
Posidonius differed: since the parts of philosophy are inseparable from 
each other, yet plants are thought of as distinct from fruit and walls are 
separate from plants, he claimed that the simile for philosophy should 
125 For further discussion see Hadot, 'Philosophie, Discours Philosophique, et Dhisions de 1a 
Philosophie chez les Storciens', passim; Gourinat, La dialectique des Stoi'ciens, pp. 19-3-1-: 
Ildefonse, Les Stoi'ciens 1, pp. 23-29. That the Stoics drew a sharp distinction behveen 
philosophy and philosophical discourse is made clear in Epictetus' s analogy with the art of 
building: just as the builder does not discourse about building but builds, so the philosopher 
does not engage only in discourse about wisdom but also endeavours to become wise (see 
Dissertationes 3.21.4). 
126 Diogenes Laertius 7.40 (= SVF 2.38 = LS 26 B; trans. LS). Note that in each case physics 
is in some sense fOlmdational, logic gives strength or protection, while ethics is the largest or 
most visible part. 
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rather be with a living being, where physics is the blood and flesh 
, 
logic the bones and sinews, and ethics the soul. 127 
These passages suggest that, for the Stoics, philosophy itself was conceived as 
a unified entity with three parts that could only be divided from one another in 
discourse. 128 Just as a living animal is composed of flesh, bones, and soul that 
can only be distinguished from one another as component parts in abstraction, 
so philosophy can only be divided into the component parts of logic, physics, 
and ethics in abstraction. Philosophy proper has no parts. 
Philosophy itself, an activity directed towards the cultivation of wisdom 
(O'ocpta), involves all three of these elements. It is not that practical ethics 
utilises the theoretical arguments of physics and logic. 129 Rather one might say 
that each of these three parts is both theoretical and practical, and that they are 
interdependent with one another. Moreover, this interrelation means that 
expertise in one will always involve expertise in the others. For example, 
someone who understands the organisation and structure of the cosmos will at 
the same time know how to act within the cosmos.130 The sage will thus 
simultaneously practise all three aspects of philosophy in his life. He will 
practise logic by analysing his judgements, practise physics by locating 
1~7 Posidonius fro 88 EK apud Sextus Empiricus Adversus l\1athematicos 7.19 (= LS 26 D; 
trans. Kidd, modified). Note that physics and ethics have changed places compared to the 
version in Diogenes Laertius. 
128 See Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 54-55; Hadot, 'Les divisions des parties de 1a 
Wtilosophie dans l' Antiquite', pp. 208-11. .. . 
29 For the Stoics, logic is no mere organon or tool as it was for Aristotle: ratller It IS an 
essential part of phllosophy itself (see Christensell An Essay 0/1 rhe Unity o/Stoic Philosop/~v. 
p. 39). This seems to have been emphasised in particular by Posidonius (see Kidd. Posidonius, 
The Commentary, pp. 352-55). 
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himself as but one part of the larger cosmic system, and practise ethics in his 
actions. Thus Cicero notes that for the Stoics there are not only ethical virtues 
(virtutes) but also physical and logical virtues. 131 As one might expect, 
following the Socratic doctrine of the unity of virtue or human excellence 
(ap£'tTt), the Stoics held these three types of virtues to be one. 132 This might be 
glossed by saying that there is a single corporeal state or disposition of the 
soul (\jfUXTt) that, when possessed, is expressed in a variety of different ways, 
which may be classified according to the tripartite division of philosophical 
discourse. 
The Stoic position is thus very different from Aristotle's account of the 
different parts of philosophy. Rather than three mutually dependent 
components, Aristotle divides the theoretical from the practical and proposes a 
hierarchy of sub-parts within each. I33 Theoretical philosophy, for example, is 
divided into three parts arranged in a specific order depending upon their 
relation with impermanent matter, the highest of the theoretical sciences being 
theology (e£O)"oytKTt), also called first philosophy (npw'tll cptAocrocpia). Logic 
is rejected as a science in its own right and is relegated to the status of a tool or 
instrument (opyavov).134 In contrast, for the Stoics philosophy is a unified 
whole without any internal hierarchy and Posidonius' s comparison with a 
130 See Brehier, The History of Philosophy: The Hellenistic and Roman Age, p. 37; Hadot. The 
Inner Citadel, pp. 77-82; 'La philosophie antique: une ethique ou une pratique?', pp. 25-26. 
131 See Cicero De Finibus 3.72 (= SVF 3.281). 
132 See Schofield 'Ariston of Chois and the Unity of Virtue': for Socrates see Penner 'The 
Unity of Virtue'. 
133 See Aristotle Aletaphvsica 1025b3-1026a32, with Guthrie, History, vol. 6, pp. 130-34: 
Hadot, 'Les divisions des'parties de la philo sophie dans l"Antiquite', pp. 202-08: 'Philosophie. 
Discours Philosophique, et Divisions de la Philo sophie chez les Stolciens', pp. 207-08. 
134 This ternl was fIrst applied to Aristotle's logic by Alexander of Aphrodisias In Aristotelis 
Topica 74.29-30: see Guthrie, HL'I'fory, vol. 6, p. 135. 
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living being is in many ways the most appropriate of those proposed. Their 
organic conception of philosophy as three interdependent components of equal 
status might be said to reflect the Stoic theory of a single immanent rational 
principle (J"oyO\;) underpinning each part of their system, 135 while Aristotle's 
hierarchy of parts is clearly a reflection of the priority that he gives to that 
which is unchanging, with the most important part of philosophy being that 
which comprehends substance understood as the unchanging substrate of all 
existing things. Moreover, in contrast to Aristotle's division between the 
theoretical sciences of physics and theology on the one hand, and the practical 
sciences of ethics and politics on the other, for the Stoics all three aspects of 
philosophy are at once both theoretical and practical. 136 For them, if a division 
is to be made between theory and practice it must be made within each part of 
philosophy and not between them. 
Returning to Diogenes Laertius' s account of the vanous similes for 
philosophy, he continues his report by adding: 
On the statements of some of them [Stoics], no part is given preference 
over another but they are mixed together. 137 
135 Here, ')j)'y~ should be understood differently to how it has been used thus far. In tllis 
conte"-.i it refers to a single rational principle witlrin nature responsible for the order of tlle 
cosmos, often referred to as the <Y1t€PJ.lU"tl.1(O; AOYO; (see e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.136 = S~F 
1.102). This conception clearly owes much to Heraclitus (see e.g. fro 1 DK). I shall touch upon 
this again in Chapter Seven § 2 (a). 
136 See Hadot, 'La philosophie antique: une etlrique ou une pratique?', p. 25. However. as 
Hadot himself notes, pp. 31-32. witll Aristotle the matter is, as always. significantly more 
complex (see e.g. Aristotle Politica 1325b16-21). 
137 Diogenes Laertius 7.40 (= SVF 2.41 = LS 26 B: trans. LS). 
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The division into three parts and the various arguments over the relative order 
of those parts seems to have been primarily a debate concerning the teaching 
of philosophy and the order in which students should be introduced to the 
different subjects of philosophical discourse. 138 Thus the Stoic debate 
concerning the relative order of the parts is not a question of a fundamental 
hierarchy, as it would have been for Aristotle, but rather merely a question of 
different teaching methods. For philosophy conceived as the cultivation of 
excellence (ap£'tl}), there is neither a hierarchy nor a division. Indeed, those 
Stoics who affirmed the essentially mixed nature of philosophy are also said to 
have taught philosophy in a mixed form in order to emphasise this. 139 
7. Towards a Definition of Philosophy 
We are now in a position to bring together these vanous Stoic ideas 
concerning the nature and function of philosophy and to offer a preliminary 
definition of philosophy as conceived by the Stoics. But first it is important to 
be clear concerning the distinction between philosophy (cpl/vO(Jocpia.) and 
wisdom (Jo<pia.). With Socrates, as we have already seen, philosophy was 
conceived as an art concerned with the cultivation of wisdom (Jocpia.) or 
human excellence ( ap£'tl}). Socrates was thus a philosopher in the 
etymological sense of the word, he searched for wisdom but he did not possess 
138 For differing orders see Plutarch De Stoicorunl Repugnantiis 1035a-f (part in SI'F 2.-1-2). 
Diogenes Laertius 7.40-41 (part in STl'F 2.38, 43), Se:\.1us Empiricus Adversus Jfathematicos 
7.20-23 (part in Sl''F 2.44). See also Ildefonse, Les Stolciens 1, p. 24. 
139 See Diogenes Laertius 7.40 (= SVF 2.41). 
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it himself. There is for Socrates, then, a clear distinction between philosophy 
(q>tAoO'o<pia.) and wisdom (O"o<pia.); the former is that which searches for the 
latter. 
With the Stoics, the matter is unfortunately not so clear. This is due to the 
tendency in some sources to move between the words philosophy (q>tAoO'O(pia.) 
and wisdom (O'ocpia.) as if they were synonymous. 140 Seneca, for one, holds on 
to the etymological definition of philosophy, describing wisdom (sapientia) as 
the ultimate good and philosophy (philosophia) as the love of that good and 
the attempt to attain it. 141 Yet, as we have seen, insofar as the art of living 
('t£XVll 1tEpt 'tOY ~iov) is an art ('t£XVll), it is, for the Stoics, a form of secure 
knowledge (£1ttO''tltJlll). As such, it is a form of knowledge reserved for the 
sage (O'ocp6~). Thus one might be tempted to identify the possession of the art 
of living with wisdom (O'ocpia.) itself On this account, philosophy would not 
be the art of living but rather that which desires or cultivates the art of living. 
However, as we have also already seen, Epictetus does not understand 
philosophy in this way and he identifies the art of living with philosophy 
( cpt/voO'ocpia.) rather than wisdom (O'ocpia.). 142 
Before attempting to offer a solution to this problem, it may be helpful to 
note two important points which have a direct bearing on this question. The 
first is the characterisation of the art of living as a performative art not directed 
towards any goal beyond the performance itself The second is the emphasis 
140 See Ierodiakonou. 'The Stoic Division of Philosophy'. pp. 60-61. 
141 See Seneca Epistuiae 89.4: Sapientia perfoetum bonum est mentis hl/manae; philosophia 
sapientiae amor est et adfeetatio. 
142 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.15.2. 
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upon philosophy as a unified entity that, strictly speaking, cannot be divided 
into the distinct parts of logic, physics, and ethics. In order for this unified 
entity to exist it must, according to Stoic ontology, exist as a physical body. 143 
Thus philosophy must in some sense be corporeal (O"ffiJla'to~), while 
philosophical discourse, as something 'sayable' (A£K't6~), would be classified 
as incorporeal (aO"wJla'to~).144 The only plausible place where either 
philosophy or wisdom could conceivably have a physical existence is inside 
the material soul ('II '0 X11) of its possessor. 145 For the Stoics, then, for 
philosophy to exist it must do so as a corporeal state or disposition of the soul 
(8t(XeEo"l~ 'tfi~ \jf'OXfi~).146 Yet as we have already seen, philosophy as the art 
of living is also conceived as a performative art and, as such, an activity or 
way of life. How can it be both? 
In order to understand the relationship between these two characteristics 
attributed to philosophy, it may be helpful to tum to Chrysippus's famous 
143 According to Stoic ontology only bodies (crooJia.'ta.) are said to exist. See e.g. Plutarch De 
Communibus Notitiis 1073e (= Sf/F 2.525). 
144 See Ierodiakonou, 'The Stoic Division of Philosophy', p. 6l. For the ontological distinction 
between crOOJia.'to~ and acrooJia.'to~ see e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias In Topica 301.19-25 (= 
SVF 2.329 = LS 27 B), Sextus Empiricus Adversus }.lathematicos 10.218 (= Sf'F 2.331 = LS 
27 D), Seneca Epistulae 58.13-15 (= SVF 2.332 = LS 27 A), with Bnmschwig, 'TIle Stoic 
Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic Ontology'. For the ontological status of },,£lneX. as 
acrooJia.m see e.g. Sextus Empiricus Adversus lvfathematicos 7.38 (= SVF 2.132), \,\1t11 
Brehier, La theorie des incorporels dans I 'ancien Stoicisme, pp. 14-36. According to Stoic 
ontology there are two categories of entity under the common heading of 'something' (n). 
These are corporeals (crOOJia.'ta.) and incorporeals (acrooJia.'ta.). Strictly speaking only the 
former 'exist'; the latter merely 'subsist' (uq>£cr'teX.va.t). For further comment see Goldschmidt. 
Le systeme storcien et l'idee de temps, pp. 13-25; Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 152-59; 
Pasquino, 'Le statut ontologique des incorporels dans l'ancien Stoicisme'; Sedley in CHHP. 
pp. 395-402. 
145 For Stoic materialist psychology. see Long, 'Soul and Body in Stoicism', pp. 34-57; Long 
in CHHP, pp. 560-84: Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy ofjlind, pp. 37-70. 
146 See e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.89 (= SVF 3.39). where ap£'tll is described as a disposition 
(OteX.e£crt~) of the soul ('I''OXll): also Plutarch De Virtute ~Horali 441b-c (= Sf F 3.459). Sextus 
EmpiricusAdversus ,Hathematicos 11.23 (= ST/F 3.75 = LS 60 G). 
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cylinder analogy. 147 In this analogy Chrysippus draws attention to the fact that 
when one pushes a cylinder, although the movement is initiated by the push, 
the way in which the cylinder moves is due to its own internal nature or form , 
namely its cylindrical shape. Chrysippus uses this analogy to illustrate a 
distinction between what might be called internal and external causes,148 a 
distinction necessary for his account of freedom and determinism. The initial 
push that starts the cylinder rolling is an external cause but the nature or shape 
of the cylinder that determines the wcry in which it moves is an internal cause. 
In the case of humans, it is the internal disposition of one's soul (8taeE<n~ 'tft~ 
'l'Uxftc;) that determines the way in which one responds to external events. As 
in the case of the cylinder, this internal nature directly impacts upon the way 
in which a thing behaves. Any alteration in this internal cause will have a 
direct and necessary impact upon an individual's behaviour. In other words, 
philosophy, conceived as a disposition of the soul (8tae£(Jt~ 'tft~ 'l'Uxft~), will 
have a direct and necessary impact upon an individual's behaviour. 
Philosophy is thus both this internal corporeal disposition of the soul and an 
activity or way of living, the latter being the necessary expression of the 
former. 
147 See Aulus Gellius 7.2.11 (= SVF 2.1000 = LS 62 D), Cicero De Fato ~2 (= SVF 2.97~ = LS 
62 C), with discussion in Bobzien., Detenllinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, pp. 258-71. 
Note also Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato 18l.26-30 (= SVF 2.979). 
148 The technical terminology for 'internal' and 'e:\.1ernal' is 'perfect and principal' (perfectae 
et principales) and 'auxiliary and proximate (adiwantes et proximae) in Cicero De Fato 41 ~= 
SVF 2.974 = LS 62 C) and 'self-sufficienf (au'to't£JJD and 'initiatory' (1tpo1<a't~p1<'tuc1h:> ~ 
Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1056b (= S'VF 2.997). In the languag~ ofE~lcte~ls, this IS 
the distinction between 'what is and is not 'up to us' (£q>' fl~Y). See the discusslOns III Gould, 
The Philosophy of Chrysippus. pp. 149-5 L Frede, 'The Original Notion of Cause', esp. pp. 
138-50: Bobzien, 'Chrysippus' Theory of Causes'. 
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The Stoic art of living is directed towards transfonning this internal cause, 
namely the physical disposition of one's soul (oui9ECne; 'rile; '1fuxile;). This may 
be identified with the cultivation of wisdom (cro<pia) or human excellence 
(apE'rl1), these also being corporeal dispositions. As such, there appears to be a 
distinction between this art ('rEXV'll) that cultivates wisdom (cro<pia) and 
wisdom itself, just as we have already seen with Socrates. This, in turn, 
implies that philosophy (<ptAocro<pia) conceived as this art ('rEXV'll) should be 
understood in its etymological sense as that which desires wisdom (oo<pia), 
again following Socrates. However, in order to accept this conclusion one 
would have to understand the art of living qua art quite loosely, for strictly 
speaking an art ('rEXV'll) is, for the Stoics, a body of secure knowledge 
(E1tto'rlU..l'll) and as such reserved for the sage (cro<poe;). In order to overcome 
this difficulty one would have to define philosophy as the desire for the art of 
living or that which cultivates the art of living. This is clearly somewhat 
cumbersome and one can understand why this fonnulation was not used. Yet, 
strictly speaking, the art of living should not be identified with philosophy 
(<ptAooo<pia) but rather with what philosophy aims at, namely the ideal mental 
disposition that is wisdom (oo<pia) and human excellence (apE'rl]). Such 
difficulties do not apply to Socrates' position whose art is not itself excellence 
(apE'rl]) but rather the art that cultivates excellence (apE'rl1). In practice, 
however the distance between these two accounts is slight, for if one truly , 
masters philosophy conceived as the art that cultivates wisdom (cro<pia) then 
one will soon possess wisdom itself. According to the Stoic definition of a 
'rEXV'll, philosophy in its etymological sense cannot be the art of living but 
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rather the activity of learning the art of living, a process that culminates in the 
possession of O'o<piu. 
8. Summary 
In this chapter we have seen how the Stoics took up and developed a number 
of themes from Socrates, including the idea of an art ('tEXVll) concerned with 
one's life (J3io<;) and a (slightly problematic) analogy between that art and the 
art of medicine, and how they developed these into a fully fledged concept of 
philosophy as an art of living ('tEXV111C£pt 'tOY J3iov). We have also seen how 
Seneca in particular developed the idea that the acquisition of that art may 
involve not merely an understanding of the relevant principles or theories 
(AOrOt, decreta) but also some form of practical training or teaching 
(aO'KllO't<;, praecepta). It is this philosophical training or exercise - analogous 
to the training that transforms an apprentice into a master craftsman - that 
translates philosophical theories (AOrOt) into philosophical actions (epra ), 
transforming one's way of life (~io<;). Only by supplementing the study of 
philosophical theory with practical philosophical training will it be possible to 
transform the internal disposition of one's soul (oux6£O't<; 'tll<; 'l'UXll<;) and 
attain the philosophical knowledge and understanding (E1CtO''tl1J.l1l, O'o<piu) that 
will necessarily transform one's life into that of the sage. 
In Part Two I shall explore the relationship between philosophical theory 
and training further. However, in order to complete our discussion of the idea 
of an art concerned with one's life, I shall first turn to consider what must be 
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the single most important text dealing with this idea, namely the extended 
polemic against the possibility of the existence of such an art made by the 
Sceptic Sextus Empiricus. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SCEPTICAL OBJECTIONS 
In the last chapter we saw how the Stoics adopted a number of Socratic ideas 
concerning an art ('tEXV'll) directed towards the transformation of one's life 
«(3io<;) and developed these into a fully-fledged concept of an art of living 
('tEXVll 1t£pt 'tov J3iov). For Stoics such as Epictetus, the subject matter (UAll) 
of an individual's philosophy is their own life (<> (3io<; au'tou EKao-ro't). 1 In 
the second century AD Epictetus was particularly well-known and it is from 
this period that a text of particular importance derives. 2 Writing during this 
time when Epictetean Stoicism was immensely popular, Sextus Empiricus 
wrote a detailed discussion of, and series of arguments against, the Stoic 
concept of an art of living. 3 This discussion is important for a number of 
1 See Epictetus Dissertationes l.15.2, already quoted and discussed in Chapter Three § 1. 
2 For Epictetus's fame in this period note Celsus apud Origen Contra Celsum 6.2 (PG 11.1289 
= test. 26 Schenkl), Aulus Gellius 1.2.6 (= test. 8 Schenkl), Fronto Epistulae (2.52 Haines), 
Galen De Libris Propriis 11 (19. ~4 Kiilm = test. 20 Schenld). 
3 As I have already noted in the Introduction., Bett, Sextus Empiricus, Against the EthiCists. p. 
ix, suggests that Sextus's polemic was directed tmvards philosophers who '"lived centuries 
before his own time". However it has been argued (with regard to Plotinus's polemic against 
the Gnostics in Enneades 2.9 and Simplicius's polemic against the Manichaeans in In Epicteti 
Enchiridion 35) that such polemics were usually a response to direct contact with adherents of 
the philosophical position under attack (see Tardieu, 'Sabiens coraniques et 'Sabiens' de 
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reasons. Firstly it contains significantly more instances of the phrase 'the art of 
living' ('t£XVll 1tEpt 'tOV ~tov), or variations upon it, than any other ancient 
text; secondly it contains much doxographical information concerning this 
Stoic concept; thirdly it offers a series of important objections to this concept 
that may help to shed light on the precise way in which it was presented by the 
Stoics. 
In this chapter I shall consider Sextus's arguments against the very idea of 
such a thing called an art of living. 4 The first section offers a brief outline of 
Sextus's sceptical methodology, the second section considers each of Sextus's 
objections in tum, and the third section attempts to bridge the apparent 
distance between Sextus and the Stoics by drawing attention to common 
elements within their philosophical projects. 
Harran', pp. 24-25 n. 105; Hadot, 'TIle Life and Work of Simplicius', p. 287). It makes more 
sense to suppose that Sexius' s polemic was inspired by direct contact \\ ith contemporary 
followers of Epictetus (who no doubt would have laid great stress on the idea of an art of 
living) than with \uitten teA1s that would have been centuries old. 
4 These arguments occur in two works that partially overlap with one another: SeA1us 
Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, esp. 3.239-249, and Adversus A1athematicos, esp. 11.168-
215. I shall focus upon the accOlmt in Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes but shall refer continually to 
the parallel discussion in Adversus A1athematicos 11, also known as Adversus Ethicos. TIle 
Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes survive in three books; Adversus A1athematicos sun'ives in eleven. 
Book 1 of the Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes contains a methodological overview of Pyrrhonian 
Scepticism while Books 2 & 3 argue against the claims of other dogmatic philosophers in the 
fields of logic, physics, and ethics. The material discussed in Books 2 & 3 is also discussed in 
Books 7-11 of Adversus Alathematicos in an eA1ended fonn (Books 1-6 are probably from a 
completely different work). For the Greek texts I have relied upon the LeL edition by Bury 
which is based upon Bekker's 1842 edition. For the p'vrrhoniae Hypotyposes I have also 
consulted the BT edition by Mutschmann & Mau. Note also the translations by Annas & 
Barnes (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism) and Bett (Sextus Empiricus, • .J.gainst the 
Ethicists). For a general introduction see Allen 'The Skepticism of Sextus Empiricus'. 
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1. The Sceptical Method 
Sextus's discussion of the idea of an art of living forms part of his general 
sceptical project of undermining the claims of those he calls the dogmatists (Ot 
80Y}lU'ttKOi).5 Immediately before dealing with the art of living Sextus 
proposes a number of arguments against the claims of dogmatic ethicists and, 
in particular, against the claim that certain things are good or bad by nature 
(q>ucr£t).6 In order to do this he adopts two strategies. His first is to place side 
by side the conflicting opinions of the dogmatists concerning what is and is 
not said to be good? This unresolvable disagreement, he argues, should lead 
any impartial observer to suspend his judgement (bwXll). His second strategy 
is to propose arguments in favour of positions opposed to the specific claims 
of the dogmatists in order to counter-balance the positive arguments made by 
the dogmatists, thereby creating a state of equipollence (icrocr9tv£tu). Faced 
with equally plausible arguments on both sides, Sextus suggests that the 
rational response will again be to suspend judgement (fnOXll) or, to be more 
precise, he suggests that when faced with such balanced arguments one will 
simply find oneself in a state of fnOxll. 8 
As a supplement to these more general arguments against the claims of 
dogmatic ethicists, Sextus then introduces his arguments against the possibility 
5 As Annas & Barnes note (The Alfodes of Scepticism, pp. 1-2), the Greek term does not 
involve the pejorative tone associated ""ith the English equivalent. An ancient dogmatist was 
simply someone who held certain opinions or dogmas. _ 
6 See Sex.ius Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.168-238, esp. 3.179. 3.190, 3.23). 
,-/dversus A1athematicos 11.42-140. 
7 See Sexius Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.180-82. 
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of any such thing called an art of living (it 1tEpt 'tOY ~iov 'tEXV'1l).9 While his 
more general attack is aimed at all dogmatists, it is clear that this second attack 
is directed specifically against the Stoics and their account of the nature and 
function of philosophy. 10 
2. Sextus Empiricus's Objections to an Art of Living 
In Book 3 Chapter 25 of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism Sextus asks the question 
'Is there an art of living?' (El fan 'tEXVll 1tEpt ~iov).ll He opens this chapter 
by saying that it should already be clear from his arguments up to that point 
that such an art cannot exist. 12 Despite this, he proceeds to offer five distinct 
arguments directed against its very possibility.13 In order to consider each of 
these arguments I shall simply quote them in tum as they appear in the 
Outlines f!l Pyrrhonism (occasionally supplementing that version with the 
8 One does not choose E1WXTJ; rather it simply happens as a consequence of iaoa6Ev£l.u. See 
Barnes, 'The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist', pp. 58-59. 
9 As I have already noted, these are in Se>..ius Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.239-249 
and Adversus A1athematicos 11.168-215. Traditionally it has been thought that the Pyrrhoniae 
Hypotyposes is the earlier of these nvo works. However recently it has been argued that this 
may in fact be the later of the two, being an abridged and slightly rewritten version of material 
already discussed in ~Adversus A1athematicos. See Bett, Against the Ethicists, esp. pp. xxiv-
xxviii; Striker, 'Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquillity', p. 191. 
10 Although the attack beginning at Adversus A1athematicos 11.168 is formally directed 
towards the dogmatists (ooYJla'ttKoi) in general (and Epicurus is named in particular at 
Adversus A1athematicos 11.169), the bulk of the texi addresses specifically Stoic doctrines and 
it is clear that the Stoics are Se>..1us's principal target (see esp. Adversus A1athematicos 
1 L 170). See Bett, Against the Ethicists, p. 187. 
11 The parallel section in Adversus A1athematicos (Book 11 Chapter 6) is entitled £\ Ea'tl. 'tl<; 
1t£Pl 'to\! /3iov 'tEXVTt (wv omitted by Bury). Bekker's edition omits the sub-titles. 
12 See Se>..1us Empiricus Pyrrhoniae I!.ltpotyposes 3.239. 
13 In Adversus A1athematicos Book 11 tl1ere are a total of seven arguments; see the list and 
analysis in Bett (Against the Ethicists. p. 182 & pp. 191-224 respectively). The arguments 
omitted in Pyrrhoniae I!.vpotyposes are much weaker tllan those common to botl1 texis. 
Consequently I am inclined to agree ,vitll Bett tlmt tlle Pyrrhoniae I!.vpotyposes is the later of 
the two works, being a re\'ised version in which the less sound arguments have been dropped. 
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slightly longer accounts of the same material in Against the Ethicists) to see if 
they offer any decisive arguments against the Stoic conception of philosophy. 
(a) Competing Arts of Living 
Since the dogmatists do not agree in laying down a single art of living 
( , , , R' ) 14 b 
"CEXVl1V 1tEpt "COV .... toV , ut rather some hypothesize one and some 
another, they land in dispute and in the 'argument from dispute' ("Ct!> 
a1tO "Cfi~ (huq>(Oviu~ AOycp) which we have propounded in what we 
said about the good. 15 
Sextus's first objection is based upon the claim that the various dogmatic 
schools of philosophy - Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetics - are unable to agree 
upon the precise nature of the art of living. Each proposes its own account of 
what this might be. 16 This conflict, Sextus suggests, calls the entire notion into 
question, landing them in the 'argument from dispute' (blUq>(Oviu).17 The 
problem, he argues, is that if the various dogmatic schools propose mutually 
exclusive arts directed towards the cultivation of happiness (EUbU1Jloviu), 
then it will be impossible to follow them all. The only other alternative is to 
14 Bekker, Bury (LCL): 'tEXVT\V 1tEpt 'tOY j3iov, Mutschmann & Mau (En: 'tExvrJV 1tEpt f3iov. 
15 Sex.ius Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.239 (trans. Annas & Barnes modified): see 
also Adversus A1athematicos 11.173-77, with Bett, Against the Ethicists, pp. 191-9-l. 262-63. 
16 It is interesting to note here that Sex.1us implies that each of the dogmatic schools proposed 
its own art of living. As we have seen, ancient uses of this phrase are primarily connected to 
the Stoa, and it seems unlikely that Peripatetics would have conceived philosophy as an art. I 
take it that here Sex.ws is simply referring to the fact that each of the dogmatic schools 
proposed its own ethical philosophy directed towards the cultivation of Ei>Oat~ovia.. each 
based upon a different set of claims to secure knowledge. 
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select just one art and follow that. However, before one can do that one must 
fIrst decide which conception one will follow. Assuming that this will not be 
an arbitrary decision, there must be some grounds upon which one of the 
conflicting conceptions may be chosen. In the discussion of this objection in 
Against the Ethicists Sextus proposes that the only way in which one of these 
conceptions can be selected is by using some other art or expertise. 18 Yet this 
other ali, Sextus argues, will itself need to be justified, and so on, into an 
infInite regress. He concludes that insofar as one cannot follow them all and 
one has no grounds for preferring anyone over any other, the only rational 
course of action is to reject them all. The conflict between the various 
conceptions of an art of living proposed by the dogmatists should lead one to 
suspend judgement (btoXTt). 
Sextus's principal argument here rests upon the assumption that the choice 
of anyone art of living over any other must be made using some other art or 
skill ('t£XVll). That is to say that the process of evaluation of the different 
conceptions proposed by the dogmatists must involve another art that will 
require its own justification. However, there are no obvious grounds for this 
claim. An alternative way in which one might attempt to evaluate the various 
conceptions of an art of living would be with reference to their relative 
success. If each of these arts ('t£xvat) claims to offer the best way in which 
one can cultivate happiness (£u8atl.lOvia), then the most reasonable mode of 
evaluation would be to see which of them does in fact cultivate happiness. 
17 TIlls is the first of the Five Modes of Agrippa: see Diogenes Laertius 9.88, Pyrrhoniae 
H.ypotyposes 1.165, with discussion in Hankinson, The Sceptics. pp. 182-92. 
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Such an assessment could be made either by attempting to put into practice 
each of the competing arts ('tExva1) or by examining the lives of those who 
have been reported to have prospered while following one of these arts 
('tExva1). Either way, it is far from clear that an infinite regress of justification 
is inevitable. If the aim of each of these arts is to cultivate well-being or 
happiness (EuOalJlovia), and this happiness is a state observable by third 
persons, then the process of relative evaluation should be fairly 
straightforward. 
It is of course far from clear that Sextus would accept this as a criterion. 
Bett suggests that "some form of reasoning or experience", including 
presumably the experience of happiness (EuOalJlOvia), could be proposed as a 
criterion of selection. 19 Yet he concludes that even to this Sextus could simply 
raise the question concerning its credentials, preserving his argument from 
dispute (ola<pIDvia). However it is by no means obvious that Sextus would 
necessarily respond in this way. If one turns to other passages where he 
discusses the nature of the sceptical philosophical project one can find two 
important types of claim which are relevant here. 
The first of these relates to the claim that the goal ('tEJvO~) of Sceptical 
philosophy is tranquillity (a'tapa;ia).20 In a number of passages Sextus 
suggests, albeit obliquely, that the tranquillity which accompanies the repeated 
suspension of judgement itself constitutes happiness (EuOalJlOVla): 
18 See Sex1us Empiricus Adversus Alathematicos 11.176-77. 
19 See Bett, Against the EthiCists, pp. 192-93. 
20 See Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes l.12, 1.25-30. TItis will be discussed in 
further detail in § 3 below. 
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If someone should say that a certain thing is not more by nature to be 
chosen than to be avoided, nor more to be avoided than to be chosen , 
[ ... ] he will live happily and without disturbance (~troO"etat )lEV 
eU8al)l6vro~ Kat atapaxro~) [ ... ] freed from the trouble associated 
with the opinion that something bad or good is present.21 
In other words, Sextus himself proposes a philosophical method directed 
towards the cultivation of happiness (eu8al)lOvia). In this, he follows a 
number of earlier Sceptics, and in particular Timon, who affirmed that 
Scepticism was the only sure path to the happy life. 22 In the words of Photius, 
"he who philosophizes after the fashion of Pyrrho (Kat<x nupprova) is happy 
(eu8al)lOVet)"?3 Passages such as these suggest that both Sextus and earlier 
Sceptics acknowledged the existence of happiness (eu8al)lOvia) and that, on 
at least this issue, they did not suspend judgement. If this is the case then the 
presence or absence of happiness could, in principle, form the foundation for a 
Sceptical comparative analysis of the various arts of living proposed by the 
dogmatists. 
The second type of claim made by Sextus that is relevant here - one that 
may also help to clarify the first - relates to physical experiences of sensations 
21 Sextus Empiricus Adversus Afathematicos 11.118 (trans. Bett). See also Adversus 
Afathematicos 7.158. 11.140, 11.141, 11. 147, "1t11 discussion in Striker, 'Ataraxia: Happiness 
as Tranquillity', esp. pp. 188-91. 
22 See e.g. Aristocles apud Eusebius 14.18.1-4 (758c-d = test. 2 PPF = LS 1 F). The 
testimonia and fragmenta for Timon are collected in Diels. Poetarum Philosophorum 
Fragmenta. 
23 Photius Bibliotheca cod. 212 (l69b26-29 = LS 71 C; trans. LS). 
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such as pleasure or pam. Although Sextus claims that the suspension of 
judgement will bring tranquillity, he does not claim that the Sceptic will be 
completely undisturbed. Certain things, Sextus says, will continue to force 
themselves upon the Sceptic, who will feel cold and hunger and pain just like 
anybody else. 24 The suspension of judgement cannot overpower the 
experience (1ta9o<;) of physical pain; what it can do is overcome the belief 
(o6~a) that that pain is something bad. 
The Sceptic will not of course make any substantial claims concerning the 
status of the content of these experiences, but he will nevertheless 
acknowledge them as experiences. As Timon is reported to have said, "I do 
not lay it down that honey is sweet, but I admit that it appears (q>CXiVE'tCXt) to be 
SO".25 In other words, the Sceptic simply acknowledges what happens to him, 
acknowledges the presence of those sensations which are forced upon him.26 
There appears to be no reason why a Sceptic could not acknowledge the 
presence of happiness (EuOatjlOvta) in precisely this way. Clearly the Sceptic 
would not claim that happiness (Euoatjlovia) was an objectively observable 
state but nevertheless he could acknowledge that he himself was experiencing 
something that might best be described as happiness (EUOCXtl . .lOVta), just as he 
could describe or report other experiences that happened to him. Indeed, this 
24 See Se~1us Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.29-30, 1.13, 3.235-36, with Bumy-eat. 
'Can the Sceptic Live his ScepticismT, esp. p. 43. 
25 TimonapudDiogenes Laertius 9.105 (= fro 74 PPF= LS 1 H; trans. Hicks). 
26 TIris issue is closely related to the question concerning the extent of Se~1us' s scepticism. a 
question that has bee~ presented in terms of 'rustic' versus 'UIbane' Scepticism. the former 
involving £nOXTt regarding all beliefs and the latter involving E1tOXTt only regarding 
plrilosophical and scientific theories. In general, I am inclined to interpret Sext~s a.s a 'm~tic' 
Sceptic and my appeal here to e~'Periences does not involve an appeal to non-scIentific belIefs. 
For further discussion see in particular Barnes, 'The Beliefs of a PyrrhoIrist', esp. pp. 61-62. 
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seems to be the only plausible way in which a Sceptic could justify his claim 
that the suspension of judgement (t1tOXll) will bring tranquillity (a"Cupu~lu). 
which as we have seen is itself identified with happiness (£u8utJloviu). There 
is no obvious reason, then, why Sextus could not accept the presence or 
absence of the experience of happiness (£u8utJlovlu) as a criterion for 
evaluating the various arts of living proposed by the dogmatic schools of 
philosophy. His principal argument here fails, even for one who holds onto the 
basic principles of Scepticism. 
(b) The Art of Living Cannot be Taught 
Since wisdom (cpPovllO'iC;) is a virtue (ap£"Cll), and only the sage has 
virtue, the Stoics - not being sages - will not possess the art of living 
("C1)v 1t£pt "Cov J3iov "C£XV11V), and not having this, neither will they 
teach it to others. 27 
Here, Sextus argues that in order for the Stoics to be able to teach their art of 
living they must first possess it. However, insofar as they reserve this virtue or 
excellence (ap£"Cll) for the sage and do not themselves claim to be sages, they 
do not possess it and thus they cannot teach it. Even if the Stoic art of living 
with Bumyeat, 'Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?'; Frede. 'TIle Sceptic's Beliefs'; 
Hankinson, The Sceptics. pp. 273-78. 
27 Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.240 (trans. Annas & Barnes modified), "ith 
the final clause in italics added from Adversus j.fathematicos 11.181 (Jilt EX0V'W; oE 'tau'tll\' 
0'00£ <XAAoUC; oloa~ouO'lv). Note also that in .cldversus .A1athematicos 1l.181 th~ ~elatio~lip 
between "isdom and the art of liying is made more eX1>licit: "For if the art of hymg - bemg 
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did exist in the one or two sages that mayor may not have lived at one time, 
the typical Stoic preacher who claims to be able to teach it cannot. 
This argument draws upon the Stoics' own comments concerning the rarity 
of the sage and a number of passages where leading Stoics denied that they 
themselves had achieved wisdom. 28 The paradox that Sextus seizes upon here 
- that someone without wisdom could nevertheless teach it to others -
captures something of the essentially Socratic flavour of Stoic thought 
concerning human excellence (ap£'tll). Insofar as Sextus's objection 
challenges the essentially Socratic position of the Stoics it also challenges 
Socrates himself, echoing an objection often raised against him, namely that 
he is himself unable to teach goodness or excellence (ap£'tl1) if at the same 
time he declares that he knows nothing. 29 Socrates' identification of such 
excellence (ap£'tl1) with knowledge (bna'tllJlll) implies that he must know 
what is good before he can teach it to others. Indeed, it also implies that he 
must know what is good before he can be good himself. Sextus's objection 
against the Stoics is, in effect, also an objection against this Socratic position. 
In order to clarify Sextus's objection to the Stoics it may be helpful to 
begin by considering the Socratic version of the same problem. Yet, as ever, 
the Socratic position is more complex than it at first appears to be. 
\\'isdom - is a virtue. and only the sage has virtue, the Stoics - not being sages - will not 
possess wisdom nor any art of living'·. 
28 This topic has already been discussed in Chapter Three § 2. . 
29 For Socrates' profession of ignorance see e.g. Plato Apologia 21b,.A1eno 7,1~, Theaetetus 
150c-d, Aristotle Sophistici Elenchi 183b7-8 (= SSR I B 20). Aeschines Alclbwd:,s fr., lIe 
Dittmar apud Aristides De Rhetorica 1.74 (162.2-7 Lenz & Bel~ = SSR VI A ?-,). CICer? 
Academica 1.16 (= SSR I C 448). For further discussion see Bnekhouse & SmltlL Plato s 
Socrates, pp. 30-38: Vlastos, 'Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge'; Guthrie. History. vol. 3. 
pp.442-49. 
CHAPTER FOUR 1~7 
Nevertheless, it is possible to sketch the outline of a solution. The problem 
may be stated thus: on the one hand Socrates sincerely proclaims his 
ignorance; on the other hand he has an unsurpassed reputation for wisdom and 
appears to attempt to teach others. Yet at the same time one of his few positive 
doctrines is the claim that virtue or excellence (apE'tll) is a form of knowledge 
(E1tta'tlU1ll), that all virtuous behaviour is the product of knowledge, and that 
all vice is the product of ignorance.3o If Socrates does not possess this 
knowledge himself, he can neither be virtuous himself nor teach it to others. 
The beginnings of a response to this paradox may be drawn from a passage 
from Xenophon: 
At the same time he [Socrates] never undertook to teach how this 
could be done [to become good]; but by obviously being such a 
person, he made those who spent their time with him hope that, if they 
followed his example (J.HJlOUJlEVOUr;), they would develop the same 
character. 31 
According to Xenophon, Socrates possesses virtue or excellence (apE'tll) and 
this is evident to all insofar as it is expressed in his behaviour (epya). By 
associating with him and watching the way in which he acts others can learn 
from his example. However Socrates is sincere when he says that he does not 
know what human excellence (apE'tl1) is. He cannot claim to know what it is 
30 For discussion see Guthrie. History, vol. 3, pp. 450-59. 
31 Xenophon Afemorabilia l.2.3 (trans. Tredennick). 
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because he is unable to gIve a rational account (A6yo~) of it. Socrates' 
excellence (ap£tll) is thus unarticulated. By observing his behaviour (epya) 
others can see that he possesses such excellence (ap£tll) but that is very 
different from him being able to offer a rational account (A6yo~) of this 
behaviour. 32 Thus Socrates is at once both virtuous but also without 
knowledge (E1nO"tllllll) of what this virtue or excellence (ap£t1'l) is. 33 As such, 
he is unable to teach it in the conventional sense of passing on a systematic 
body of knowledge (€1ttO"tllIl11). The teaching that he is able to undertake 
consists of undermining other people's claims to knowledge (€1tlO"tllllll) and 
provoking them into enquiry themselves. 34 Yet, as Xenophon makes clear, he 
can also teach by example, insofar as excellence (ap£tl1) is for him a matter of 
deed not words (epya 01> AOY01).35 That is, he can show others what it might 
mean to act virtuously but he cannot explain to them precisely what virtue or 
excellence (ap£tl1) is. That is why he continues in his search for such 
knowledge (€1tlO't111l1l) despite his unsurpassed reputation for wisdom 
(O'o<pia). 
This tentative attempt to explain Socrates' paradoxical position may help 
us to understand the Stoic position. As Sextus notes, the Stoics do not claim to 
32 The argument here is similar in certain respects to that at the beginning of Plato's Aleno 
(71d-72c) where although Meno can point to examples of virtue (a.p£'tTt) he is rulable to offer 
an account of what it is that makes them virtuous. Similarly. Socrates can possess virtue 
(ap£'tl]) - can point to himself as an example so to speak - but nevertheless cannot offer a 
rational accOlmt (A6y~) of the nature of that virtue (a.p£'tTt). 
33 On this point my position sImes much in common with Brickhouse & Smith. P{a~o 's 
Socrates, esp. p. 38. Socrates may be convinced of the truth of any number of e~cal 
propositions, yet he cannot claim to know any of them if he is unable to ?iye a ratlonal 
account O..6yo~) of them. Hence his strong conviction yet sincere profession of 19no~ce. 
34 See Vlastos, Socrates: lronist and 1\1oral Philosopher, p. 32. Howe\'er, whether this was an 
example of what Vlastos calls "complex irony" is a question too complex to address here. 
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possess virtue or excellence (ap£'tl}) themselves, yet nevertheless at the same 
time they claim to be able to teach the art of living that cultivates such 
excellence. As in the case of Socrates, a number of the leading Stoics had 
reputations for wisdom (O"ocpia) and in particular wisdom expressed in their 
actions (epya) and way of life «(3iO<;).36 If those same Stoics denied having 
reached the state of perfection reserved for the sage, that may well have been 
due to their inability to offer a full rational account (AOYO<;) of that wisdom. 
Nevertheless, they would still have been able to "teach' by way of practical 
example and by undermining the presuppositions of their students, just as 
Socrates did.37 Thus they could act not so much as teachers, but rather as 
fellow, if more advanced, students. As such advanced students, they would 
inquire with, rather than instruct, more junior students.38 In response to his 
criticisms, one might say that Sextus assume a too narrow conception of what 
could constitute philosophical teaching. 
(c) The Art of Living Presupposes Adequate Impressions 
If, then, for there to be an art of living there must first be art ('tfXVllV), 
and if for art to exist apprehensions (KU'tUAll\j1lV) must first exist, and 
if for apprehensions to exist assent to an adequate impression 
35 As I have already noted in Chapter One § 2, the ideal is of course a harmony between deeds 
and words. 
36 See e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.10-11 (= Sl'F 1.7-8). . ' 
37 In reply to a similar objection conceming his ability to teach rhetonc, Isocrates IS repo~ed 
to have described himself as a whetstone that can sharpen but cannot cut. See Plutarch I'lfae 
Decem Oratorum 838e, Gnomologiwn Vaticanum no. 356~ also Rosenthal, The Classical 
Heritage in Islam, p. 264. 
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(Ka'taA:lln'tt1cfj c:pav'tacrl<;X) must first have been apprehended 
(Ka't€tA:ijc:p9at), and if adequate impressions are undiscoverable then 
, 
the art of living is undiscoverable. 39 
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This argument is directed against the specifically Stoic definition of an art 
('t£XVll). As we have already seen in Chapter Three, according to the Stoics an 
art or skill ('t£XVll) is defined as a 'system of apprehensions' (cruO''tTJJ1a t 1( 
KCl'taA11\jf€<Ov), an apprehension being assent to an adequate impression 
argument here is with the notion of an 'adequate impression' (c:pav'tacria 
Ka'taATJntK11).41 In Stoic epistemology this term is used to refer to the criterion 
of truth.42 It is defined as an impression that is caused by an object and 
stamped upon the mind in accordance with the nature of that object in such a 
way that it could not have been produced by a non-existing object.43 It is an 
impression that is so clear, distinct, vivid, and obvious that it is its own 
guarantee of its accuracy and clarity.44 This guaranteed accuracy may be 
38 See Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 88. 
39 Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.242 (trans. Annas & Bames modified); see 
also Adversus lI,1athematicos 11.182, with Bett, Against the Ethicists, pp. 198-202, 263-64. In 
order to be consistent I have here as elsewhere translated q>UV'tUcrlU lCU'tUJ..ll1t'ttlCll as 
'adequate impression'. However in tillS particular passage this obscures tile connection 
between this concept and lCU'ta.All\jft~ 'apprehension' and lCu'tEtJ"fiq>9ut 'apprehended'. Annas 
& Barnes use 'apprehensive appearance' in order to emphasise tillS connection. 
40 See Se:x1us Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.241, 3.188 (= SVF 2.96), Adversus 
l\1athematicos 11.182 (= SVF 2.97). Note also Olympiodorus In Platonis Gorgiam 12.1 (= 
SVF 1. 73 = LS 42 A) and the discussion in Chapter TIrree § 4. 
41 For a note on the translation of tillS tenn .. along "vith references to further discussions see 
Chapter Tlrree § 4, 
42 See e,g. Se:x1us Empiricus Adversus j\1athematicos 7.227 (= SVF 2.56), Diogenes Laertius 
7.54 (= SVF 2.105 = LS 40 A). 
43 See Se:x1us EmpiricusAdversus A1athematicos 7.248, Cicero Academica 2.18,2.77 (all SfF 
1.59), Diogenes Laertius 7.45-46 (S~'F 2.53), 7.50 (= SVF 2.60). 
44 See in particular Frede in CHHP, pp. 312-13. 
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understood in terms of its causal history; that is, in terms of the physical 
conditions of all of the elements involved in its production. If the sense 
organs, the object in question, and all the other variables are not obstructed or 
in an abnormal state, then the resulting impression will be 'adequate' 
( Ka -caA TInt K11). 45 
Although at first glance this concept appears somewhat obscure, a number 
of ancient examples may help to clarify it Epictetus attempts to do just this by 
proposing that in the middle of the day one should attempt to hold the belief 
that it is in fact the middle of the night. 46 He suggests that one just cannot do 
this. He concludes that during the day the impression 'it is daytime' is so 
powerful that it must be an 'adequate impression' (cpav-cacrta Ka-caAll1tl1dl). 
One might say that impressions of this sort demand assent. 47 If, on the other 
hand, one found that one could hold the opposing impression then this would 
immediately call into question the validity of the initial impression, and this 
might lead one to withhold one's assent For example, the impression that the 
number of stars in the night sky is even is no more self-evident or obviously 
correct than the impression that the number is odd.48 Thus, in a manner similar 
to Sextus's own Scepticism, Epictetus proposes that in such a scenario one 
would be forced to withhold one's assent and to suspend judgement (enoxi]).49 
45 See Sex1us Empiricus Adversus Afathematicos 7.424. with Frede, 'Stoics and Skeptics on 
Clear and Distinct Impressions', pp. 157-58. 
46 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.28.2-3; also Sexius Empiricus Adversus Jfathematicos 
7.242-43 (= SVF 2.65 = LS 39 G). . 
47 See Sexius Empiricus Adversus Afathematicos 7.257, Cicero Academica 2.38, WIth 
Burnyeat, 'Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism'?', pp. 46-47 n. 38. 
48 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.28.3, Sexius Empiricus Adversus Jfathematicos 7.243. 
7.393,8.147,8.317. . . . 
49 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.28.2-3, with Burnyeat. 'Can the ~ceptIc. LIye his 
Scepticism?', p. 44. For other reports of the Stoic attitude towards suspensIOn of Judgement 
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It is not too surprising to find that Sextus has little time for this concept 
which functions for the Stoics as a criterion of trut~ in effect underwriting 
their dogmatism to which he objects. Indeed, it is his principal target in the 
attack he makes upon Stoic epistemology elsewhere. 50 His argument there 
concerns the question of how one is supposed to distinguish between an 
adequate impression and an ordinary unreliable impression. The Stoic claim 
that this is simply self-evident carries little weight with him. Sextus argues 
that as a matter of fact it is impossible to distinguish between these two sorts 
of impressions. Being itself the criterion of truth, the Stoics cannot appeal to 
any further criterion in order to underwrite the reliability of an adequate 
impression. If they attempt to do that, they will simply fall into circularity.51 
As such, Sextus argues that it is impossible to know if one ever has an 
adequate impression. 52 Insofar as the Stoic concept of an art is built upon such 
impressions, any such art will be equally undiscoverable. 
Sextus's criticism here, then, is not so much an independent criticism of 
the concept of an art of living but rather merely a corollary of his more general 
doubts concerning the possibility of secure knowledge and Stoic claims to 
possess such knowledge. Although the concept of self-evident knowledge may 
appear to be problematic, the example of an adequate impression proposed by 
see Sextus Empiricus Adversus lvlathematicos 7.155 (= LS .. n C). C~cero Acad~mica 2.57. (= 
LS 40 I). For further discussion of the relationship between Pyrrhoman and StOIC suspenSIOn 
of judgement see Allen, 'The Skepticism of Sextus Empiricus', pp. 2596-97. 
50 This is in Sexius EmpiricusAdversus lvfathematicos 7.401-35; see esp. 7.427-29. 
51 They will "fall into the circular «)UiAA:ll}yOV) mode of difficulty (a1topia.c;f (Pyrrhoniae 
HypotYposes 3.242). This is a reference to the fifth of ~e F~ve ~ode~ of A~ppa; see 
Diogenes Laertius 9.88, p.,vrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.169, 'nth diSCUSSIOn ill Hankinson.. The 
Sceptics, pp. 182-92. 
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Epictetus - 'it is daytime' - is not particularly controversial. Indeed, it does 
not appear to be the sort of impression with which Sextus would have any 
particular argument. Sextus make this clear himself: 
When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs (jl1) oOyjla'ri~Etv), [ ... J 
they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or 
chilled)'. Rather we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in 
which some say that belief (o6yjla) is assent to some unclear object of 
investigation in the sciences (tJncr'rlljla.~); for Pyrrhonists do not 
assent to anything unclear (aol1A(Ov).53 
The Sceptic, then, should not necessarily have any difficulty with Epictetus's 
adequate impression 'it is daytime'. 54 Moreover, as we have already noted, 
neither would the Stoic have any difficulty with the idea of refusing to assent 
to anything unclear. The distance between Scepticism and Stoicism here is 
perhaps not as great as one might at first suppose. Sextus's argument here fails 
due to his somewhat caricatured account of Stoic claims to knowledge. 
52 It should noted that here (in the Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes) Se~1:us does not argue that there is 
no such thing as an adequate impression (as he does in Adversus J,fathematicos 11.182) but 
rather that such impressions are lmdiscoverable (uv£i>p£'to;). 
53 Se~ius Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.13 (trans. Annas & Barnes). 
54 Of course, Se:\.ius would certainly not call such an experience an 'adequate impression' or 
even a belief. Rather, as we have already seen in § 2 (a) above. he would only be able to 
acknowledge or report such an experience as an experience, "ithout .making any further cl~ 
about it. This issue is closely related to the debate concerning the dIfference between 'rustIC 
and 'urbane' Scepticism, on which see the note in § 2 (a) abm.'e. 
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(d) The Art of Living Produces no Distinctive Actions 
Every art ('tEXV'll) appears to be apprehended from the actions (epy<ov) 
delivered specifically by it. But there is no action specific to the art of 
living. Whatever anyone might say to be its action will be found 
common to ordinary people too (e.g. honouring your parents, returning 
loans, and all the rest). There is therefore no art of living. 55 
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Here Sextus argues that there are no acts peculiar to the sage who possesses 
the art of living that could not be performed by anyone else. In effect, he 
argues against the conception of virtue ( ape'tf}) or wisdom ( O"o<pia) as 
primarily a disposition concerned with how someone acts, as opposed to a 
conception concerned with what an individual does. Sextus implicitly claims 
that if one were to accept this account of what it means to possess the art of 
living then it would become impossible to distinguish between those who do 
and those who do not possess it. 56 In such a situation it would become empty 
to claim that any art of living exists. In short, Sextus argues that for an art of 
living to exist in any meaningful sense it must enable its possessor to do 
certain things that otherwise he would not be able to do. 
The immediate Stoic response to this objection would be to argue that 
wisdom (crocpia) is not to be found in a specific set of actions (epya) 
55 Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.243 (trans. Annas & Barnes modified). ~ee 
also Adversus Afathematicos 11.197-209, with Bett:, Againstthe Ethicists, pp. 210-20 & 265. 
56 A similar objection could be made against Sextus himself if the life of tranquillity that he 
advocates is indistinguishable from the lives of other people: see Annas & Barnes, The .\fodes 
o/Scepticism, pp. 169-71. 
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performed but rather in the motivation for any action performed, the 
disposition standing behind an action. 57 To this Sextus responds that a problem 
with this Stoic argument is that it still makes distinguishing between those 
who do and do not possess the art of living impossible. 58 A Socratic response 
to this would be to say that the key difference between one who does and one 
who does not possess an art ('t£XVll) is the ability of the former to give a 
rational account (A6yo~) of what he or she is doing. 59 While the lucky amateur 
who has a certain empirical knack (Ejl1rttpia, 'tPt~ll) may be able to emulate 
the acts of a professional, he will nevertheless be unable to explain It'hy it is 
that he is able to achieve the results that he does.60 One who possesses the art 
of living, on the other hand, will be able to offer an account of why he does 
what he does, thereby making manifest the internal disposition which 
constitutes his wisdom (O'ocpia). 61 Despite Sextus's objection, this functions as 
a very clear way of distinguishing between those who do and do not possess 
any art, including the art of living. 
A corollary to this is that one who possesses the art of living will not only 
be able to offer an account (A6yo~) of his actions but also will be more 
consistent in his actions and more successful than the lucky amateur. 62 
57 Sexius was well aware of tins Stoic counter argument; see Adversus J1athematicos 11.200. 
58 See Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhol1iae Hypotyposes 3.244, Adversus Alathematicos 11.203. with 
Bett, Against the Ethicists, p. 215. 
59 See esp. Plato Gorgias 465a. with discussion in Chapter Two § 3. .. 
60 Thus Socrates is himself merely a 'lucky amateur' insofar as he cannot gIVe a ratIOnal 
account (A6yo~) of his virtuous behaviour. He has wisdom in 'deeds not words' (€pya ou 
AoYOt) but not ideal harmony of 'deeds and words' (€pya Kat )"oy09. . .. .. 
61 As Bett suggests (Against the EthiCists, p. 215), the appropnate disposl~on. ~ould be 
revealed bv what they [the wise] say about them rather than by any feature mtrulSIC to the 
. . 
actions themselves" . 
62 Sexius touches upon this point at Adversus Alathematicos 11.206-07; see Bett. Against the 
EthiCists, p. 218. 
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Although this will not be a property of any particular action, being something 
only observable over a series of actions, it nevertheless forms another way in 
which the presence or absence of an art may be discerned by an observer. 
A secondary part of Sextus's argument here (although only in Against the 
Ethicists and not the Outlines ~f Pyrrhonism) is the claim that if someone did 
follow such an art and act according to a single rational account (A6yo~) then 
this would surely be noticeable in their behaviour: 
If the wise person (0 <pp6vtJlo~) had a single and determinate order of 
life, he would have been plainly apprehended even from this by those 
who are not wise; but he is not apprehended by these people; therefore 
the wise person is not to be grasped from the order of his actions (tK 
'tfi~ 't6;;Ec.o~ 'trov epyc.ov).63 
Here Sextus concedes a number of points to the Stoics without realising it. The 
rarity of those who have managed to perfect the art of living is precisely the 
basis for the Stoic claim concerning the rarity of the sage. That such 
individuals would be immediately recognisable would be affirmed by the 
Stoics,64 who would no doubt point to specific examples - such as Socrates 
and Diogenes - as instances of individuals who did follow such a way of life 
and were noticed by both their contemporaries and later generations. The fact 
that only these and perhaps one or two others have been noticed is precisely 
63 Se)..ius EmpiricusAdversus A1athematicos 11.209 (trans. Bett). 
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the reason why they should be held up as examples and role models to the rest 
of humankind, the Stoics would argue. The rarity of such figures is no 
argument against the existence of an art of living as such; it merely serves to 
underline its value and importance. 65 
(e) The Art of Living Cannot be Put into Practice 
Most of what the philosophers say is like this - but they would never 
dare to put it into action (ot<xnpa:tn:cr9at) unless they were fellow-
citizens of the Cyclopes of the Laestrygonians. But if they never 
perform these actions [ ... ] then there is no action (epyov) specific to 
those people suspected of possessing the art of living. 66 
Sextus's final argument is based upon the scandalous nature of a number of 
the often Cynic inspired Stoic doctrines. The passage here follows 
immediately after a series of quotations from Zeno and Chrysippus which 
describe a number of these sorts of ideas, including bisexualism, masturbation, 
incest, and cannibalism. 67 Sextus argues that insofar as these doctrines go 
64 See e.g. Chrysippus apud Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1042e-f (= SVF 3.85), 
Cicero De Natura Deorum 2.145. 
65 As has been noted in Chapter Three § 2, Politian (in his Epistola ad Bartolomeo Scala) 
argued that if just one example could be found, that would be enough to affirm the reality of 
the sage; he then cites Cato as his example (see Kraye, Renaissance Philosophical Texts J, pp. 
192-99, esp. p. 196). 
66 Se:x1us Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.249 (trans. Annas & Barnes modified). See 
also Adversus Afathematicos 11.188-96, with Bett Against the Ethicist'}, pp. 205-10 & 26~-65. 
67 See Se:x11ls Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.245-248 (= SVF 1.250, 1.256, 3.745. 
1.254, 3.752). Se:x1us mentions similar Stoic material at 3.199-201 (= SVF 1.585), 3.205-207 
(= ST-F 1.256). Tins sort of material is particularly associated ",ith Zeno's nOAt't£la which is 
reported to have been written when he was still lmder the influence of hls teacher Crates the 
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against the established customs and laws of almost all countries, they can 
never be put into practice. As such, the Stoic art of living is worthless because, 
if it involves such actions, it can never be put into practice. If it is never put 
into practice and it does not produce any actions (epya) then it is, for all 
practical purposes, redundant. 
The argument that Sextus makes here is not that an art of living as such 
does not or cannot exist but rather that the specifically Stoic art of living is 
useless insofar as it can never be practised. 68 The precise relationship between 
these scandalous ideas and the concept of an art of living is not made clear by 
Sextus and it is likely that he uses this material purely to shock. It is far from 
obvious that eating one's dead parents has any bearing upon the existence or 
non-existence of an art of living. It is also far from obvious that any Stoic 
claimed that one who practised the Stoic art of living would, as a matter of 
course, eat their dead parents. 
The shock that Sextus attempts to produce by quoting this material betrays 
a certain respect for traditional custom and law perhaps surprising from a 
Sceptic. It would certainly have carried little weight with the Stoics, to whom 
this objection is addressed. One need only be reminded that, after Socrates, 
Diogenes the Cynic is one of the most cited examples of a Stoic sage.69 His 
Cynic (see Diogenes Laertius 7.4 = SVF 1.2; fragments collected in Baldry, 'Zeno's Ideal 
State'). It reappears in Chrysippus's IIspi. IIOAt'teiru; (this being one of the sources quoted by 
Sextus) which may have been a commentary upon Zeno's text (fragments listed in SVF, vol. 3, 
pp. 202-03). The attempt to discredit Stoicism by dra,ving attention to its affinity with 
Cynicism appears to have been a common tactic used by ancient critics and is particularly 
prominent in Philodemus's De Stoicis (PHerc 155 & 339). For further discussion of the 
relationship between Cynicism and Stoicism see Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 54-80. 
68 See Bett, Against the Ethicists, p. 206. . 
69 See e.g. Seneca De Tranquillitate Animi 8.4-5, De Bene/iciis 5.4.3-4. Marcus Aurelius 8.3, 
and in particular the important passage in Epictetus Dissertationes 3.22. 
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acts of public masturbation and other celebrated indecencies paid little respect 
to the established customs and laws of the Athenians. 70 Acts such as these 
were actually praised by Stoics, including Chrysippus,71 praise which later 
earned harsh criticism from opponents such as the Epicurean Philodemus. 72 
In order to place this material within the appropriate context, it must be 
remembered that Stoic ethics is grounded upon the Sophistic and Cynic 
distinction between what is in accordance with nature (K<X'tft. CPU(HV) and what 
is merely in accordance with custom (K<X'tft. VOJlOV)?3 Implicit within the Stoic 
ideal of living in accordance with nature ('to 0JlOAOYOUJl€VWC; -eft CPUcr£l ~ilv) is 
the rejection of a way of life subordinate to custom (vOJlOC;)?4 It is likely that it 
was within this context that Zeno and Chrysippus discussed acts such as incest 
and cannibalism; they were less positive proposals and more reflections upon 
the distinction between VOjlOC; and cpUo"lC;. Indeed, such acts would have been 
strictly speaking 'indifferent' (aouxcpopov) according to the Stoic 
classification of things good, bad, and indifferent, and thus not positively 
recommended at all. 75 The purpose of a discussion of these topics would not 
70 For Diogenes' indecency see e.g. Diogenes Laertius 6.46,6.69 (both SSR VB 147). 
71 See Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1044b (= SVF 3.706). Chrysippus comments that 
he wished that the desire for food could be relieved so easily by simply rubbing one's 
stomach. 1;r~ 
72 See Philodemus De Stoici.'; (PHerc 155 & 339) passim but e.g. 11.4cj'Dorandi. The Cynic 
tendencies of the early Stoa also appear to been a source of embarrassment for some later 
Stoics such as Panaetius (see e.g. fro 55 van Straaten apud Cicero De Finibus 4.79). 
73 See the note on this distinction in Chapter One § 1. 
74 For the Stoic ideal of living in accordance with nature (,to OJ!OAOY01>J!EVCO<; 'tn q"Ocr£l Sllv) 
see e.g. Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.6a (2.75.11-76.15 WH = LS 63 B). Di~genes 
Laertius 7.87 (= SVF 1.179,3.4). Cicero De Finibus 4.14 (= SVF l.179, 3.13). Eplctetus 
Dissertationes 3.1.25, Marcus Aurelius 3.4.4, with discussion in Bonhoffer, Die Ethik des 
Stoikers Epictet, pp. 163-88 (= The Ethics o/the Stoic Epictetus, pp. 209-38). 
75 See e.g. Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.160 where Sextus re~rts ~t 
Chrysippus held incest to be 'indifferent' (aol<xQ>0pov). For discussion o~ the classIficatIon 
'good, bad, indifferent' see Kidd, 'Stoic Intennediates and the End for Man· . 
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have been to recommend them as regular practices but rather to argue that, 
insofar as they are only prohibited by arbitrary customs (VO}lOl) and are not 
bad in themselves, they may be appropriate in certain exceptional 
circumstances (K<x:ta n€pia'taal v). 76 Such acts play no essential role within 
the Stoic conception of an art of living and were not proposed by the Stoics as 
everyday practices. Although the sage - like Diogenes - may be said to 
engage in such practices in certain circumstances,77 this has little bearing upon 
the possibility of an art of living. 
(f) Summary 
These, then, are Sextus Empiricus' s principal arguments against the Stoic 
conception of an art of living.78 None of them are decisive. In many of them 
Sextus appears to be quite categorical in his claim that an art of living does not 
exist, a categorical claim that appears to go against the Sceptical method of the 
suspension of judgement (enOl'll). To be fair to Sextus, however, his aim here 
may be not to express his own opinion but rather to offer a number of 
arguments against the existence of an art of living in order to counter-balance 
the arguments of the dogmatists for such an art. His intention may have been 
76 See Diogenes Laertius 7.121, 7.109 (= SJ;F 3.496), with Bett Against the EthiCists, p. 209. 
77 As Bett notes (Against the Ethicists, p. 209), many of these scandalous ideas derive from 
Stoic political works which dealt primarily with the conduct of the sage rather than ordinary 
people (e.g. Zeno's I1oAt't£1a. and Chrysippus's I1Ept I1oAt'tEiro;). To propose that a sage in 
some fonn of ideal community might commit such acts in exceptional circumstances is very 
different from proposing such acts as part of everyday behaviour for students of philosophy. 
78 As I have already noted, there are two further arguments in Adverslls Jlathematicos II but 
these are weaker than the five common to Adverslls Afathematicos and p),rrhvniae 
Jfypotyposes. 
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to create the appropriate balance of arguments on both sides (icrocr9tv£lU) that 
would lead a reasonable individual to suspend judgement (tnoX11).79 Although 
Sextus appears to argue forcefully against the existence of an art of living, his 
own attitude may well have been one of agnosticism consistent with the 
general sceptical method.8o However, if we conclude that Sextus's arguments 
against the notion of an art of living do not work, then he will have failed to 
create the balance of arguments required to generate suspension of judgement. 
3. Philosophy and Biography in Scepticism 
Whether Sextus's objections to the notion of an art of living stand or not, what 
they appear to illustrate is a sceptical attack upon a certain conception of 
philosophy, an attack upon a conception of philosophy that claims that 
philosophy is an art that can transform one's way of life (~lo<;). It may appear, 
then, as if Sextus and the sceptical tradition to which he belongs form an 
important exception to the general claim made in Chapter One that in 
Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman antiquity philosophy was primarily concerned 
with the way in which one lived. However, although this may appear to be the 
case, in fact it is not so. 
79 See Hankinson 'Values, Objectivity. and Dialectic', esp. pp. 66-68. As he notes, Sextus's 
negative dogmatic conclusions are "only half the story", 
80 Thus Sextus's arguments must be considered alongside important passages s~ch as 
Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.13-15 and in particular the distinction between AcadeIll1c. and 
Pyrrhonist scepticism at 1.3. However, as Bett notes (Against the Ethicists. ~. 189.), there IS ~o 
indication in Adversus A1athematicos 11 that tIris is the approach Sexius IS taking. Yet thIS 
may simply reflect the fact that the opening sections of that ~york (equivalent to Pyrrhoniae 
Hypotyposes 1), ,vhlch would have placed the later arguments 111 context, have been lost. 
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A number of ancient sources make it quite clear that sceptical philosophers 
thought that philosophy - their philosophy - would transform their way of life 
(f3ioC;) just as much as any Stoic or Epicurean thought that their philosophy 
would transform their lives. 81 In particular they conceived Sceptical 
philosophy as a pursuit directed towards the cultivation of tranquillity 
(<l'tapa~ia) or, to be more precise, a pursuit inspired by "the hope of 
becoming tranquil" ('tilv iA,1ti8a 'tot> <l'tapaK'tl}OEl v). 82 Their argument with 
the dogmatists in general, and the Stoics in particular, was not about whether 
philosophy was concerned with transforming one's way of life but rather was 
simply at the level of how they thought philosophy would transform one's life. 
As we have already seen, the Sceptical philosophical method involved 
responding to dogmatic philosophical claims by propounding equally 
convincing counter claims. Their objective was to cloud the issue in question 
by making both sides of any argument equally compelling. When faced with 
two sets of equally convincing arguments in equipollence (iooo9tvEla), the 
Sceptics claimed that one would soon find oneself in a state of suspended 
judgement (i1t0X11) and one would not be able to hold any positive belief at 
all. 
The Sceptics claimed that the repeated expenence of such suspended 
judgement (i1toXl}) would bring untroubledness or tranquillity (a'tapa~ia). 83 
81 See e.g. Sextus Empiricus Adversus A1athematico~ 11.110-1.8,. "ith Anna~ ~ Barnes. The 
l\1odes o/Scepticism, pp. 166-71; Morrison, 'The AnCIent SceptIC sWay of Life . 
82 Sex'1:us Empiricus Pyrrhoniae H..ypotyposes 1.12 & 1.25. ,~, , 
83 See Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae H..}potypose~ 1.26: The word ~'tapal:;~a. (from :apaXTJ) 
means literally 'tm-disturbed' or 'un-troubled. Striker notes (Ataraxw. Happ~ess ,as 
Tranquillity', pp, 183-84) that the Latin rranquilitate ,vas often used to translate £ue,\)~J.1.a 
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This, the Sceptics suggested, could not be worked towards in any direct sense, 
but rather would be the inevitable consequence of one's consistent suspension 
of judgement. It would be something that would simply happen to the 
Sceptic.
84 
Sextus illustrates the way in which tranquillity comes to the Sceptic 
only when he gives up searching for it with an anecdote about a painter called 
Apelles. It is said that Apelles was trying to paint a picture of a horse and 
wanted to represent the lather on the horse's mouth. He was unable to achieve 
the desired effect, gave up, and threw his sponge at the painting in disgust. 
When the sponge hit the painting it produced a perfect representation of the 
lather of the horse's mouth. 85 In just the same way, Sextus suggests, the 
Sceptic achieves tranquillity as soon as he gives up his search and suspends 
jUdgement (E1t0X'll). Once he does this, it appears of its own accord. 86 
In particular, the Sceptics appear to have believed that this tranquillity 
(a'tcxpcx~icx) was the only true path to well-being or happiness (£U8CXlJ.lOvia).87 
In other words the Sceptics, just as much as the Stoics or Epicureans or any 
other dogmatists, affirmed that philosophy - in this case the Sceptical 
philosophical method of suspending judgement (E1tOXf}) - was the key to 
happiness (£U8CXll . .lOvia), the key to living well. Despite their objections to the 
Stoic concept of an art of living, the Sceptics also held that philosophy was the 
rather than a'ta.pa.~ia. (e.g. Cicero De Finibus 5.23). Nevertheless 'tranquillity' captures the 
meaning of a'ta.pa.~ia. as Sextus uses the word. . ,. 
84 See SeAius Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes l.26 & 1.28. Barnes, The BelIefs of a 
Pyrrhonist', p. 59, emphasises the causal nature of this sequence: investigation l~s to 
opposed argmnents, which leads to equipollence (icrocr8tvna.). which leads to suspensIOn of 
judgement (t1toXTi), which, in turn, leads to tranquillity (na.pa~ia.): 
85 See SeAius Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes l.28. For an anCIent account of ApeUes see 
Pliny Naturalis Historia 35.79-97. 
86 See Bumyeat, 'Can the Sceptic LiYe his Scepticism?', p. 29. 
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key to living well. In particular they characterised philosophy as a therapy for 
the soul, employing a medical analogy not dissimilar to those used by both 
Socrates and the Stoics: 
Sceptics are philanthropic and wish to cure by argument (iticr9al 
'A0Yfi)), as far as they can, the conceit and rashness of the Dogmatists. 
Just as doctors for bodily afflictions have remedies which differ in 
potency [ ... ] so Sceptics propound arguments which differ in 
strength. 88 
Their argument with the Stoics may be seen, then, as an argument between 
two competing schools of philosophy concerning the precise way in which the 
study of philosophy would bring about well-being or happiness (£ubaljlovla), 
and not an argument about whether or not it could. On this latter point, the 
Sceptics are at one with the Stoics and the other dogmatists. 89 Although 
Sceptics such as Sextus may have had doubts about the way in which the 
Stoics claimed that philosophy could transform one's way of life, they did not 
have any doubts that their own philosophical method would transform their 
own lives. Despite his objections, there is a sense in which Sextus's scepticism 
may itself be loosely characterised as an art of living, or at least a 
philosophical method primarily concerned with living well. 
87 See the arguments in Adversus Alathematicos 11.110-67, with Bumyeat, 'Can the Sceptic 
Live Iris Scepticism?', esp. p. 30. 
88 Se:\.1:ns Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.280 (trans. Annas & Barnes). The latter part of 
this passage is Sextus's apology for the varying quality of the arguments that he deploys. 
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4. Summary 
In this chapter I have considered a number of objections against the idea of an 
art ('tEXVll) concerned with one's life (~lo~) made by Sextus Empiricus. I have 
also suggested that, despite making these objections, Sextus's own philosophy 
can be seen to be directed towards the transformation of one's way of life 
(~io~). Sextus's polemic against the Stoic concept of an art of living ('tEXVll 
1tEPl 'tOY ~lov) forms the largest single document concerning this concept and 
that is why it has been considered in some detail. Hopefully this has shed 
further light upon this Stoic conception of philosophy and has developed and 
qualified the discussion in Chapter Three. 
This draws to an end the discussion of the idea of a 'tEXVTJ concerned with 
~lo~. In Part Two we shall move forward to examine the role of the two 
components of such a 'tEXVTJ that we have uncovered in the accounts of both 
Socrates and the Stoics, namely 'A6yo~ and ao"KTJ(H~. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, the role of exercise (ao"KTJo"l~) was held to be of particular importance 
by Socrates in the Gorgias, forming an essential component alongside rational 
discourse (A6yo~) in his conception of an art ('tEXVll). In Socrates' technical 
conception of philosophical knowledge (t1tlO"'t1]JlTJ), such knowledge cannot 
be identified merely with rational understanding Ov6yo~) but will also involve 
exercise or training (ao"KTJo"l~). We have also seen how the Stoics developed 
89 See Annas & Barnes, The 1\1odes 0/ Scepticism, p. 170. In antiquity only the C~Tenaics were 
not eudaimonists; see Annas, The Aforality o/Happiness, p. 322. 
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this technical conception of philosophical knowledge and how Stoics such as 
Seneca placed particular emphasis upon the essential role of both "AOYOC; and 
a<ncll<HC; in philosophy. In Part Two, then, I shall focus upon the relationship 
between these two components of philosophy conceived as a 't£XVll. In 
particular I shall develop the idea of a philosophical a(JKll(JlC; insofar as this is 
the key component distinguishing the technical conception of philosophy from 
those which characterise it simply as a matter of rational discourse (AOyOC;). 
PART TWO 
A6'Yo~ and a(JKll(Jt~ 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXERCISES 
1. The Relationship between a01CllGt<; and AOYO<; 
In Part One I have attempted to outline a certain conception of philosophy as 
an art or craft ('tEXV'T) concerned with one's life (~ioC;). As we have seen, 
central to this conception is the role played by some form of training or 
exercise (aal('T)<nc;).l In the Gorgias, for example, we saw Socrates emphasise 
the need not only for the mastery of the principles (AOYOl) behind an art or 
1 As I have noted in Chapter Two, aO''KT)crtc; (from aO"KEro) may be translated as training, 
exercise, or practice. Also there are JlSAE'tT) (practice, exercise, care (from JlSAS'taro) which 
covers a range of meanings overlapping both aO"KT)crtc; and £1tlJlEAsla.) and YUJlvasro 
(suggesting an athletic metaphor). I shall not attempt to draw any important distinction 
between these terms and I take them to be broadly synonymous (although note the discussion 
and distinctions dra",n in Foucault, L 'hermeneutique du sujet, p. 339). All three of these tenns 
appear in Epictetns (see e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 2.9.13, 3.12.7-8, with discussion in 
Hijmans, vAuK1JO"lt;, esp. pp. 64-77, who also notes the term £'K1tOVStv). The Latin equivalent 
for aO"KT)O'lC; would be exercitatio (as used by Seneca and also by Wolf and SchweigWiuser in 
their Latin translations of Epictetus's Dissertafiones), but note also meditatio (also used by 
Seneca and adopted by Newman in his 'Theory and Practice of the meditatio ') and studium 
(used by Wolf to translate JlSAE'tT). That aO''KllO'tc; was considered to be an important 
philosophical topic is illustrated by the existence of a number of texis entitled ITspl. a<J'1C1lO'sox; 
(De Exercitatione), including works by the Stoics Herillus and Dionysius (Diogenes Laertius 
7.166 & 167 = SVF 1.409 & 422), Musonius Rufus (fr. 6 = pp. 22.27 Hense). Epictetus 
(Dissertationes 3.12; note also 3.2, 3.3), and a texi attributed to Plutarch and preserved only in 
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craft (tEXVll) but also the need for some form of practical training (a(JKT)(n~). 
It is not enough for the apprentice shoemaker to grasp the theoretical 
principles (AOY01) behind his chosen craft; he must also train (U(Jl(Eo)) in order 
to translate that theoretical understanding into practical ability. For in the case 
of a craft (tEXVll) such as shoemaking, one can only claim to have knowledge 
(E1tlO't11Jlll) of that craft if one can produce the appropriate works (EPYCl) 
identified with that craft's goal (tEAO~), in this case a good pair of shoes. 
Philosophy conceived as an art (tEXVll), then, will involve both rational 
principles (AOY01) and practical training (a(Jl(l1(Jl~), and its goal (tEAO~) will 
be to produce the works (EPYCl) appropriate to it. With this conception, 
philosophical knowledge (E1tlO'tllJl11) will directly impact upon one's life 
(~io~) because such knowledge will necessarily lead to philosophical actions 
(EPYU).2 This is the essential difference between philosophy conceived as an 
art (tEXVll) and philosophy conceived simply as a matter of developing a 
rational understanding (AOYO~) in which there is no necessary connection 
between knowledge (E1tlO'tllJlll) and actions (EPYU). The fundamental 
difference between these two conceptions of philosophy is clearly the role 
played by training or exercise (a(Jl(T)(Jl~) in philosophy conceived as an art 
(tEXVll). As in the case of shoemaking, in order for the philosophical 
apprentice to master his art - the art of living (tEXVll1t£pt tOY ~iov) - he will 
Syriac (see the translation into Gennan in Gildemeister & Biicheler, 'Pseudo-Plutarchos 1tEPl. 
acr1dlcrEro~ '). . 
2 In this technical conception of philosophy is it important to stress agam that knowledge 
(t1t1O''tltJ.ll1) is conceived not merely in terms of rational understanding (AOY~) b~t rathe~ a.s a 
technical e:\.]>ertise based upon both rational understanding (f..oy<><;) and practIcal trammg 
(aO"Kl101.~). As we have seen in Chapter Two, this is where Aristotle's criticisms of Socrates 
fall down. 
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have to undergo some form of philosophical training (aO"KllO"lC;) after he has 
learnt the basic principles (AOY01) of his art. Only once such practical training 
has been successfully completed will he be able to claim mastery of that art. 
Thus, in the Stoic art of living, aO"KllO"lC; is the key to transforming a 
q>tAOO"OCPOC; into a O"OcpOC;. 3 
However, it is important to stress that despite the central role of practical 
training (aO"KllO"lC;) in philosophy conceived as an art ('t£XVll) this does not 
imply any rejection or devaluation of philosophical discourse or theory 
(AOyOC;). Rather, philosophical exercise should be understood as a supplement 
to such theory. Philosophy conceived as an art (t£XVll) involves both theory 
(AOYOC;) and practice (ao"Kllo"lC;). 
In order to illustrate the nature of this relationship between AOYOC; and 
aO"KllO"lC; it may be instructive to consider some passages from Epictetus. The 
flrst of these derives from a chapter entitled 'What is the Rule ofLifeT ('tiC; 6 
(3HO'tlKOC; VOJlOC;)' 4 Here Epictetus draws attention to the idea that philosophy 
3 For a general discussion of liCJKllO"lC; in Stoicism see Goulet-Caze, L 'ascese cynique, pp. 
159-91. For references to liO"KllO"lC; in the early Stoa see Aristo apud Clement of Alexandria 
Stromata 2.20 (PG 8.1052b = SVF 1.370), Diogenes Laertius 7.166 (= SVF 1.409), Diogenes 
Laertius 7.167 (= Sf/F 1.422), Aetius De Placitis Re/iquiae I.Prooem.2 (DG 273a13-14 = SVF 
2.35), Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.5b4 (2.62.15-20 WH = SVF 3.278); note also 
Clement of Alexandria Stromata 7.16 (PG 9.536c = SVF 3.490 although no explicit reference 
to the Stoa is made). For Posidonius on liCJKllO"lC; see Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et 
Platonis 5.6.13-14 (5.471 Kiihn = 328.21-7 De Lacy = fro 150 EK), 5.6.19-22 (5A72 KUhn = 
330.6-21 De Lacy = fro 168 EK). Note also his appearance in Seneca's discussion ofpraecepta 
and decreta in Epistulae 94.38 (= fro 178 EK). For Seneca (who uses exercitatio and 
meditatio) see e.g. Epistulae 15.5, 16.1, 70.18, 82.8, 90.46, with further examples in Delatte et 
aI., Seneca Opera Philosophica Index ·Verborum, pp. 222 & 430. The role of liO"K1]O"lC; in 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. The other late 
Stoic texi worthy of note is Musonius Rufus's II£pi. aO"KTto"£coC; (fr. 6 = pp. 22-27 Hense). 
preserved in Stobaeus 3.29.78 (3.648.1-651.21 WH). The text, along ",ith a translation into 
English, can also be found in Lutz, 'Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates'. pp. 52-57. J shall 
discuss this texi in § 2 (a) below. 
4 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.26. 
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is not merely a matter of theory or words (eE<.Opia, "'OYOl) but rather IS 
something primarily expressed in one's way of life (~io~): 
The philosophers first exercise us in theory (eE<.Opia~), where there is 
less difficulty, and then after that lead us to the more difficult matters' 
, 
for in theory there is nothing which holds us back from following what 
we are taught, but in the affairs of life ('tIDV ~t<.O'tlKIDV) there are many 
things which draw us away.5 
It is relatively easy, Epictetus suggests, to master philosophical theorems 
(eE<.OpilJ.l<X'tCt); the difficult task is to translate those philosophical ideas into 
philosophical actions (£pyCt). Yet, as his teacher Musonius Rufus put it, just as 
medical theories (AOYOt) are useless unless they are used to cultivate health in 
the body, so philosophical theories (I.,oYOt) are useless unless they are used to 
cultivate the excellence (apE'tll) of the soul. 6 However this should not lead one 
to devalue such theory. On the contrary, Epictetus makes this point precisely 
to draw attention to the need for such theoretical education before one 
attempts such actions. It is the preparation or necessary condition for the 
philosophical life. 7 Thus training or exercise (a(JKll(Jt~) alone will never be 
enough. As with other arts and crafts ('t£xvCtt), mastery will require both 
practice (&:O'KT)O't~) and a grasp of the relevant theoretical principles (AOYOt). 
5 Epictetus Dissertationes 1.26.3 (trans. Oldfather modified); see also Dissertationes 2.9.13. 
6 See Musonius Rufus fro 3 (12.15-19 Hense = 42.19-22 Lutz). 
7 See e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 4.4.11: "is not the reading of books a kind of preparation 
for the act of living?" (trans. Oldfather). 
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The necessity of philosophical AOYOl is the subject of another passage 
from Epictetus, a chapter concerned with the question of the necessity of the 
art of reasoning (ta AOYU:U).8 While Epictetus stresses the need for the study 
of logic, an interlocutor - one of his students perhaps - interrupts by saying, 
"Yes, but the therapy (of one's jUdgement) is a much more pressing need (than 
the study of logic)". 9 Epictetus responds to this by saying that before one can 
engage in that practical project of therapy (gep<X1tela) one must first be able to 
understand and to define what it is that one hopes to cure. He notes that not 
only do early Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus acknowledge this but also a 
so-called 'Cynic' like Antisthenes. 1o According to Epictetus, for Antisthenes _ 
just as it was for Socrates - philosophical education begins with the 
examination of terms (tIDV 6vo}lutrov E1tlO'1(e'lfl<;).l1 
This discussion between Epictetus and his student illustrates two points. 
The first is the attitude of the student which suggests the existence in certain 
philosophical circles of an emphasis upon exercise in antiquity at the expense 
of theory, an attitude probably connected to the image of the pseudo-
philosopher who sports a philosopher's dirty cloak and beard, but no 
philosophical actions (epya) based upon rational principles (JvOYOl); one who 
plays at being a philosopher but has not yet developed the necessary 
8 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.17, esp. 4-12. 
9 Epictetus Dissertationes 1.17.4 (trans. Oldfather modified). TIle precise meaning of this 
passage is based upon a conjecture fIrst made by Wolf (Cologne edn (1595), .vol.. 3, p. 471, 
and reprinted in both Upton and Schweighauser). The portions of the translatIOn .ill bracket~ 
are based upon Wolfs gloss who understands 'therapy' (6£pan£ia) as 'therapy of Judgement 
(6£pan£ia 'tfj<; \>noA Tt'lf£ro<;). 
10 For Antisthenes' status as a 'Cynic' see Dudley, A History o/Cynicism, pp. 1-16. and more 
recently Goulet-Caze, 'Who was the First Dog', in Branham & Goulet-Caze, eds., The ()nics. 
pp.414-15. _ 
11 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.17.12 (= Antisthenes fro 38 DC = SSR V A 160 & 1 C )30). 
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ierstanding.
12 
The second is Epictetus's clear affirmation of the necessity of 
:h exercise (Uo"1(11O"t<;) and theory (AOYO<;) for philosophy. Philosophical 
~rcises cannot replace theory; rather they supplement theory.13 Theory 
lains a necessary condition and, for Epictetus, the point of departure for 
losophical education. 14 Yet theory alone is not enough for one to make 
Iper philosophical progress. F or that, both AOYO<; and Uo"1(l1O"t<; are 
uired. 15 
2. The Concept of a Spiritual Exercise 
have already seen that some form of Uo"1(11O"l<; will be necessary for 
losophy conceived as an art ('tEXV11). However nothing has been said 
cerning the precise nature of this philosophical exercise. As we have 
:ady seen, for Socrates philosophy is an art that takes care of the soul 
tjl£A£t0"9a1 'ti}<; 'If'Oxi}<;) analogous to gymnastics (yujlvaO"'tlK11), the art 
: takes care of the body.16 These philosophical exercises must thus be 
ceived as in some sense exercises for the soul analogous to exercises for 
)wever, Dobbin. Epictetus, Discourses Book 1, p. 163, takes it to be a s'wipe at Epictetus 
;elf, given Epictetus's own emphasis upon practice over theory elsewhere. 
his is a point upon which Nussbaum (The Therapy of Desire, p. 353) bas criticised 
:ault and "affiliated writers" (by which she seems to mean Pierre Hadot). I shall discuss 
iebate further in § 2 (b) below. 
e e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 3.23.1-3 where he makes clear that before one can engage 
e training necessary to an art or craft one must first understand the precise nature of the 
of that art. 
le necessity of &(}1(T)<nC; for Epictetus is noted by Hijmans.·~(J1(ll(m;, p. 67. 
lictetus also uses this analogy, often employing the verb y'O~ vasw and related terms in his 
lssions of philosophical training. See e.g. Dissertationes 3.3.1·t 3.8.1, 3.20.9. That 
tetus would have been familiar with Socrates' use of this analogy in the Gorgias is 
:nced by his use of the Gorgias in the Dissertationes (see e.g. Dissertationes 2.12.5 "itll 
Epictite et Platon. pp. 136:37, and his list of parallel passages on p. 161). 
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the body. Indeed, we have already come across this idea m a passage by 
Xenophon which is worth repeating: 
I notice that as those who do not train the body (JlTt ta crOlJlUtu 
acrKoUVtue;) cannot perform the functions proper to the body, so those 
who do not train the soul (JlTt tTtV 'lfUXTtv acrKoUVtUe;) cannot perform 
the functions of the soul. 17 
Just as the health of the body requires physical training, so the health of the 
soul (it tile; 'lfuxile; UyiEtU) will require some form of 'mental training', what 
we might call 'exercise for the soul' (acrKl1crte; tile; 'lfuxile;). 
(a) Hadot on Spiritual Exercises 
The concept of an exercise for the soul (acrK11crte; tile; 'If'uxile;) has recently 
been developed by Pierre Hadot who proposes the phrase 'spiritual exercise' 
(exercice spirituel).18 Hadot suggests that one should consider an ancient 
philosophical position not merely in terms of a set of written doctrines but also 
as a series of practices or exercises directed towards the transformation of 
17 Xenophonlvfemorabilia 1.2.19 (trans. Marchant). 
18 See in particular Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique. I have only been able to 
consult the 1st edition. The translation into English under the title Philosop/~y as a Way of Lifo 
is based upon the 2nd edition which includes further material. See also his 'La philosophie 
antique: une etbique ou une pratique?', pp. 7-18~ Qu'est-ce que laphilosophie antique?, pp. 
276-333; Gourinat, 'Vivre la philosophie', pp. 236-39. Hadot cites two works that inspired 
this concept: Rabbow, Seelenfiihrung: Afethodik der Exerzitien in der Antike, and I. Hadot 
Seneca und die griechisch-romische Tradition der Seelenleitung. He also notes the use of this 
phrase by Vernal1t in relation to Pythagoreanism (see A1ythe et pensee chez les Grecs, vol. 1. 
p. 96; Alyth and Thought among the Greeks, p. 87). 
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one's entire way of being (maniere d'etre).19 The phrase 'spiritual exercise' 
used by Hadot derives from Saint Ignatius of Loyola who defines it thus: 20 
The term 'spiritual exercises' (exercitiorum spiritualium) denotes 
every way of examining one's conSCIence, of meditating, 
contemplating, praying vocally and mentally, and other spiritual 
activities, as will be said later. For just as strolling, walking, and 
running are exercises for the body (exercitia quaedam corporalia), so 
'spiritual exercises' (spirituale exercitium) is the name given to every 
way of preparing and disposing one's soul to rid herself of all 
disordered attachments (praeparandi et disponendi animum ad 
expellendos omnes inordinatos affectus), so that once rid of them one 
might seek and find the divine will in regard to the disposition of one's 
life for the good of the souL 21 
19 See Hadot, Exercices spirituels, p. 60; Philosophy as a fVay 0/ Life, p. 127. Jonathan Barnes 
has questioned tile language that Hadot occasionally uses to describe spiritual exercises, such 
as "a practice designed to effect a radical change of being (un changement radical de I 'eire)" 
(Qu 'est-ce que la philosophie antique?, p. 271), and suggests that in fact the notion is very 
straightfonvard: "the notion of intellectual a<JK:ll(n~, of 'mental gymnastics', is at bottom a 
pretty down-to-earth sort of thing; and in most ancient teA'ts a<JK:T}<Jt<; aims at nothing so high-
falutin' as a change of being. After all, the idea of training or practice is hardly esoteric or 
religious (or even remarkable): it is a piece of ordinary, robust, common sense that uyou want 
to ride a bike, then you should get pedalling" (Logic and the Imperial Stoa, p. 47 n. 101). The 
context of Hadot's remark indicates that he is referring to a trans/ormation du moi conceived 
as a change in one's habitus. Nevertheless, I agree "vith Barnes that the idea of intellectual 
a<JK:T}<Jl~ should be understood as a piece of ordinary common sense. 
20 Here Hadot follows Rabbow who appears to have been the first to tum to Ignatius as a 
model for understanding ancient philosophical practices. See Hadot. Exercices spirituels, p. 
59; Philosophy as a Way o/Lifo, p. 126; Rabbow, Seelen/ahrung, pp. 56-80. 
21 Ignatius of Loyola, Exercitia Spiritualia, Annotationes 1. This translation is by Munitiz & 
Endean in Personal rVritings, p. 283, and is based upon the Spanish 'autograph' manuscript, 
two early versions of a Latin translation known as the 'versio prima' (which may be by 
Ignatius himself), and the first printed edition knmvn as the 'versio vulgata' (see Personal 
Writings, pp. 281-82). All four versions are printed in the "Momunenta Historica Societatis 
lesu' edition by Calveras & de Delmases, pp. 140-·B. The Latin excerpts follow the teA1s of 
the two versions of the 'versio prima' which differ little at tIns point in the text. 
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For Ignatius, a spiritual exercise is an exercise for the soul just as a physical 
exercise is an exercise for the body. Although at first glance it might seem 
anachronistic to apply this 16th century Christian concept to an ancient 
philosophical position, Hadot argues that in fact the spiritual exercises of 
Ignatius stand within a Christian tradition that stretches back to antiquity and 
that is indebted to ancient philosophical practice. 22 As one might expect, 
Hadot explicitly identifies 'exercise' (exercice) with &crKl1(n~,23 and Ignatius's 
'spiritual exercise' (exercitium spiritua/is) with &crKl1crl~ 'tfi~ vuxfi~, a phrase 
used by Clement of Alexandria: 
The cure (8EpanEia) of self-conceit (as of every ailment (na8ou~)) is 
threefold: [1] the ascertaining of the cause and [2] the mode of its 
removal, and thirdly, [3] the training of the soul (it &crKl1crt~ 'tfi~ 
vuxf1~) and accustoming it (t8tcrJl6~) to assume a right attitude 
towards the judgements come to?4 
~«. 
In this brief analysis of therapy of mental disturbances or emotions (naSl1) by 
A 
Clement, the first two stages may be characterised as some form of 
22 The Latin phrase exercitium spiritualis is used in Rufinus Historia N/onachorum 7 (PL 
21.41Od) & 29 (PL 21.453d). For discussion of early Christian use of this concept see 
Leclercq, 'Exercices spirituels', in Dictionnaire de spiritualite, vol. 4-, cols 19~2-O8. One 
should also note the medieval use of adapted versions of the Enchiridion of Eplctetus, for 
which see Spanneut, Permanence du Stoicisme, pp. 202-05, "ith te:\.1S in Boter, The 
Encheiridion of Epictetus and its Three C'hristian Adaptations, pp. 351-411. 
23 See Hadot Exercices spirituels, p. 60; Philosopl~y as a iVay of Life, p. 128. He also notes 
J.1EAE1:T) and takes tlus to be synonymous with &o"1CT)(n~. 
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philosophical analysis, namely a theoretical examination of the causes of 
mental disturbances and a proposed cure. Both of these are purely a matter of 
AOyOt. The third stage is the training or exercise (aO"Kll(H<;) of the soul, 
namely the process by which the proposed cure of the passions is put into 
practice. This three stage analysis is in fact very similar to the two stage 
account of philosophical education made by Epictetus in which an initial 
period of studying philosophical principles (AOY01) precedes a period of 
engaging in philosophical exercises (U<JKl}o"£l<;). In both cases the final stage 
is an aO"Kll<Jl<; directed towards the translation of AOYOl into Epya. 
Beyond Clement of Alexandria, two further examples of the phrase 
a<JKll<Jl<; -rfi<; vuxfi<; can be found, one by Musonius Rufus, the other by 
Diogenes the Cynic. In an essay devoted to this topic entitled On Exercise 
(IT£pt Uo"Kl}o"£ID<;),25 Musonius Rufus suggests that, since a human being is 
neither just soul (VUX11) nor just body (O"&jla) but rather some form of 
synthesis of the two, each individual will need to take care (bnjl£Aew9al) of 
both parts.26 Musonius says that there are thus two kinds of exercise or 
training (a<JKll<Jl<;), one which is appropriate for the soul and one which is 
appropriate for the body but also impacts upon the soul at the same time. 27 
According to Musonius, all physical training falls into the second of these 
24 Clement of Alexandria Stromata 7.16 (PG 9.536c = SVF 3.490, although there is no eX'PIicit 
reference to the Stoa). The notion of 'accustoming' or 'habituating' (£etcrJ1oe;) "viII be 
developed further in § 3 (a) below. 
25 This tex1 is Musonius Rufus fro 6 apud Stobaeus 3.29.78 (22.6-27.15 Hense = 52.7-56.11 
Lutz). For comment see Geytenbeek, ltlusonius Rujils and Greek Diatribe, pp. 40-50, who 
describes Musonius's account of acr1<:T\crte; as "truly Stoic" (p. 44), and Hadot, Qu 'est-ce que 
fa philosophie antique?, pp. 289-91. Versions of the phrase acrl<:T\crte; 'rile; \lfuxiic; appear at 
25.4-5 & 25.14-15 Hense (5~.10 & 54.18 Lutz). 
26 See Musonius Rufus fro 6 (24.9-U Hense = 54.2-7 Lutz). 
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groups and in fact always involves an element of spiritual exercise.28 An 
example of this would be training one's body to cope with extremes of heat or 
cold, the famous example being Diogenes' practice of hugging statues in the 
middle of winter, an activity that would also strengthen one's sou1. 29 As for 
purely spiritual exercises, Musonius says the following: 
Training which is peculiar to the soul ('tll<; 'lfUXll<; &O'1(11<Jt<;) consists 
first of all in seeing that the proofs (U1tOO£tl;£t<;) pertaining to apparent 
goods as not being real goods are always ready at hand (1tPOX£tpou<;) 
and likewise those pertaining to apparent evils as not being real evils, 
and in learning to recognise the things which are truly good and in 
becoming accustomed (Eat~£<Jaat) to distinguish them from what are 
not truly good. In the next place it consists of practice (]l£A.£'t<lv) in 
not avoiding any of the things which only seem evil, and in not 
pursuing any of the things which only seem good; in shunning by 
every means those which are truly evil and in pursuing by every means 
those which are truly good?O 
27 See Musonius Rufus fro 6 (25.4-6 Hense = 54.10-11 Lutz). 
28 The same point is made by Epictetus in Dissertationes 3.12.16. Epictetus was of course a 
pupil of Musonius. .. . 
29 See Musonius Rufus ft. 6 (25.6-14 Hense = 54.11-18 Lutz). For DlOgenes' statue huggrng 
see Diogenes Laertius 6.23 (= SSR VB 174). For a further example of this type of exercise see 
Epictetus Enchiridiol1 47. . 
30 Musonius Rufus ft. 6 (25.14-26.5 Hense = 54.18-25 Lutz; trans. Lutz). The nohon of 
'becoming accustomed' (£ais£O'Bat) will be discussed further in § 3 (a) below; the idea of 
keeping proofs 'ready to hand' (npOX£tpoC;) will be developed in Chapter Six § l. 
CHAPTER FIVE 179 
This shares much in common with Clement's account which presented a 
spiritual exercise as that which puts into practice a theoretical analysis of the 
causes and remedies of the emotions (nnell). Here, a spiritual exercise is that 
which translates proofs concerning what is good and bad into behaviour based 
upon those proofs. It is that which translates philosophical "-0Y01 into 
philosophical £pya. 
A second example of the use of the phrase acrKllcrt~ "Ci1~ 'In)xi1~ beyond 
Clement may be attributed to Diogenes the Cynic. According to the report of 
Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes the Cynic distinguished between two types of 
exercise (acrKllat~), that for the soul and that for the body ("C1]V JlEV 'IIUX1KltV, 
"C1]V OE affiJlaK1Kltv), and claimed both of these types of exercise to be 
essential. 31 In particular, Diogenes is reported to have drawn upon the analogy 
with training in an art or craft: 
Take the case of flute players and of athletes: what surpassing skill 
they acquire by their own incessant toil; and, if they had transferred 
their efforts to the training of the soul ("C1)v acrK11crtV Kat tnt "(1)v 
'IIUX11V), how certainly their labours would not have been unprofitable 
• C'C' • 32 
or meuectlve. 
31 See Diogenes Laertius 6.70 (= SSR V B 291) with detailed treatment in Goulet-Caze, 
L 'ascese cynique, esp. pp. 195-222. I say 'may be attributed to Dio~enes the Cynic' bec~u~e 
the text that survives appears to be a paraphrase by Diogenes LaeIims and consequently It IS 
difficult to attribute a specific phrase to his subject. 
32 Diogenes Laertius 6.70 (= S5R VB 291; trans. Hicks modified). 
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Thus, the student of philosophy who wants to master the art of living and to 
cultivate excellence (ape'tll) will need to train in a manner analogous to the 
way in which the athlete or the craftsman must train. 
It is clear, then, that Ignatius's distinction between spiritual exercises and 
physical exercises was already explicit in antiquity.33 Thus, far from being 
anachronistic, Hadot's use of Ignatius's phrase 'spiritual exercise' is useful to 
capture what Clement, Musonius, and Diogenes all call UO"Kll(H<; 't1l<; 'VU Xll<;, 
and to distinguish this from physical exercise. 34 
However, it is important to stress that Hadot's use of the phrase 'spiritual 
exercise' does not imply any substantial claim concerning the nature of the 
soul (\jIUX11) as such.35 The Stoics and the Epicureans, for example, both 
proposed materialist accounts of the soul and yet both schools can be seen to 
engage in spiritual exercises.36 A good example of an Epicurean spiritual 
exercise can be found in Epicurus' s Letter to Menoeceus: 
33 A further ancient example of this distinction between exercises for the body and for the soul 
can be fOlmd in Ps. -Plutarch De Exercitatione preserved only in Syriac. See Gildemeister & 
Bucheler, 'Pseudo-Plutarchos 1tEpt a(jKftcr£~', pp. 524-25, with comment in Geytenbeek, 
.Afusonius Rt!fus and Greek Diatribe, p. 43. 
34 Newman, 'Theory and Practice of the meditatio'~ pp. 1507 n. 66 & 1515, criticises Hadot 
for trying to impose a strict definition to a practice that varied considerably. Although 
Newman may be correct to emphasise the ways in which ancient philosophers engaged in 
different for~ of spiritual exercise, Hadot' s phrase remains a helpful general characterisation. 
Newman himself opts for the Latin meditatio and appears to oscillate between using it in an 
equally broad way and using it in a more limited sense to refer to "reflecting ahead of time 
what evils may come" (ibid., p. 1477). 
35 See Gourinat, 'Vivre la philosophie', p. 237. 
36 For Epicurean and Stoic materialist psychology see Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy ofAlind. 
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Accustom yourself (o"uVE91S£) to the belief that death is nothing to us 
(J.J:l1bev npoc; 1lJlUC;). For all good and evil lie in sensation, whereas 
death is the absence of sensation. 37 
Here Epicurus is not merely making a doctrinal claim that death is 'nothing to 
us' (Jlllbtv npoc; 1lJluC;) but rather is proposing that one accustoms oneself 
(O"uVE91S£) to this thought in a way that will transform one's attitude towards 
death and thus impact upon one's life (~iOC;).38 By engaging in this meditation 
upon the nature of death the hope is that one will be able to overcome both the 
fear of death and the belief that death is something inherently bad. That this 
transformation of one's attitude is Epicurus's aim - not just here but in his 
philosophy as a whole - is made explicit at the beginning of the same letter 
where he identifies the study of philosophy with the cultivation of happiness 
(£UbctlJlOvict) and the health of the soul: 
Let no one either delay philosophising when young, or weary of 
philosophising when old. For no one is too young or too old for health 
f h 1 ( , , ,< ~ ) 39 o t e sou 'to Kct'tct \j!UX11V U'Y1ct1 vov . 
That Epicurus engages in these exercises of the soul directed towards the 
cultivation of mental health, yet at the same affirms the soul to be corporeal, 
37 Epicurus Epistula ad ll.·1enoeceuJn (apud Diogenes Laertius 10) 124 (= LS 24 A: trans. LS). 
38 The notion of accustoming oneself (cru"Mts£) will be developed further in § 3 (a) below. 
39 Epicl.IDIS Epistula ad A1enoeceum (apud Diogenes Laertius 10) 122 (= LS 25 A; trans. LS 
modified). For further discussion see Nussbaum, The Therapy o/Desire, pp. 102-39. 
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indicates that the phrase 'spiritual exercise' does not contain any 
presupposition concerning the nature of the soul (\jfUXll) as such. 40 The phrase 
'mental exercise' might be seen to be more appropriate. The term 'spiritual' 
does indeed have a number of unhelpful connotations but so does the term 
, t l' 41 Alt . hr h' . men a . ematlve p ases suc as mental exercIse' or 'mental training' 
suggest to a modern reader something akin to psychotherapy. Although there 
may be some points of contact between ancient exercises of the soul and 
modern psychotherapy, there are just as many points of departure.42 On 
balance, Hadot's phrase 'spiritual exercise' is well suited, has ancient 
precedent in the aO"Kll(He; 'tile; 'lfuxile; of Clement, Musonius, and Diogenes, 
and can be clearly defined so that the careful reader will not be confused. 
(b) Hadot, Foucault, and Nussbaum on the Nature of Philosophy 
In the light of the extended discussion concerning 'tEXVll in Part One, there are, 
however, certain features of Hadot's use of the phrase 'spiritual exercise' 
about which one should be cautious. According to Hadot, "it is philosophy 
40 See Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, pp. 144-45, on "''\)Xl1. Anything alive 
has a "'UXl1 and thus the Greek word is significantly broader than either 'soul' or 'mind'. A 
more cumbersome alternative occasionally proposed is 'life-force'. Another suggestion has 
been 'animator' (see Barnes, Aristotle, p. 65). However Urmson, The Greek Philosophical 
Vocabulary, pp. 144-45, offers a munber of reasonable arguments in favour of 'soul' rather 
than 'mind'. 
41 This problem of translation is of course merely a corollary to the more general problem of 
finding a suitable English equivalent for "''\)Xl1 (see the previous note). If one follows 
Urmson's argmnents in favour of 'soul' rather than 'mind', then it would follow that in tIlis 
context 'spiritual' would be better than 'mental'. 
42 See in particular the material in Chapter Seven. The relationsllip between the individual and 
the cosmos outlined there would hardly fit under the modem label 'psychotllerapy·. However. 
perhaps one could, following Panizza 'Stoic Psychotherapy in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance', p. 40, use 'psychotllerapy' in its strictIy etymological sense. For furtller 
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itself that the ancients thought of as a spiritual exercise". 43 Yet as we have 
seen, this is not strictly speaking correct. For the Stoics, at least, philosophy is 
an art in which such exercises form but one part.44 If philosophy were simply a 
series of exercises for the soul, then it would be nothing more than a process 
of habituation that would not involve the development of a rational 
understanding of what was being learned. In other words, it would not be 
based upon an understanding of the AOYOt underpinning philosophy conceived 
as a -rexv'll. If, for example, the medical student did not first study the 
principles underpinning the art of medicine and launched straight into simply 
copying the behaviour of others, one would hardly claim that he would be 
likely to master his chosen art. The same applies to philosophy conceived as 
an art. Philosophy for the Stoics is not merely a series of spiritual exercises; 
rather these exercises serve to train the apprentice philosopher in the art of 
living, to translate his doctrines 0"OY01) into actions (epya), to transform his 
life (J3io<;) into that of a sage. But, as Epictetus emphasises, before such 
exercises can begin the apprentice must first learn his doctrines and master 
philosophical theory. Exercises alone are not enough. In his attempt to 
discussion of the relationship between ancient philosophy and modem psychotherapy see Gill, 
'Ancient Psychotherapy', esp. pp. 316·23. 
43 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 126 (emphasis added by translator); Exercices 
spirituels, p. 59: "C'est Ia philosophie elle·meme que les Anciens se sont representes comme 
un exercice spirituel". Note also Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 273. Hadot's claim is based 
upon references to two texts, Aetius De Placitis Reliquiae l.Prooem.2 (DG 273a13·14 = SVF 
2.35 = LS 26 A) and Ps.-Galen De Historia Philosopha 5 (19.231 Kiilm = DG 602.19-603.1). 
However, these texts do not define philosophy as an exercise (&<YK1}0"~), but rather as the 
exercise (a.o"K1}O"t.C;) of an art (texvl}), a phrase one might gloss as an art put into practice. 
Hadot's claim appears, then, to be based upon a misreading of these two relatively 
unimportant texts. 
44 At one point Hadot appears to assume that for the Stoics an exercise and an art amount to 
the same tiring; see Exercices spirituels, pp. 15-16. Philosophy as a fra): of L~re, pp. 82-83, 
"The Stoics, for instance, declared explicitly that philosophy, for tIlem, ,,,as an 'exercise' 
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emphasise the importance of acrKllcrl~ III ancient philosophy Hadot has, it 
seems, forgotten the role of 'Aoyo~. 
It has often been claimed that Michel Foucault's account of what he calls 
techniques or technologies of the self (techniques de soi, technologies de soi) 
- an account that explicitly draws upon the work of Hadot - suffers from the 
same problem, namely an emphasis upon aO'Kllcrl<; at the expense of 'AoYO<;.45 
In particular, Martha Nussbaum has criticised both Hadot and Foucault for 
obscuring what she takes to be the essential role of reason and rational 
argument in ancient philosophy.46 She suggests that if one does not emphasise 
the role of reason in ancient philosophy then an ancient philosophical way of 
life will become indistinguishable from ancient religious ways of life. On her 
account, Hadot and Foucault are unable to account for the difference between 
the sorts of ascetic exercises undertaken by, say, the Desert Fathers, and a 
properly philosophical exercise. As she puts it, 
(exercice). In their view, philosophy did not consist in teaching an abstract theory - much less 
in the exegesis of texts - but rather in the art of living (un art de vivre)". 
45 Foucault introduces this concept in his 1980-81 lecture course entitled Subjectivite et verite 
(not yet published); see Dits et ecrits, voL 4, p. 213~ Essential Works, vol. I, p. 87. His earliest 
discussion in print can be found in his general introduction to the last two volumes of his 
Histoire de la sexualite, first published separately as 'Usage des plaisirs et techniques de soi' 
(1983); see Dits et ecrits, vol. 4, p. 545, and The Use of Pleasure, pp. 10-11 (L 'usage des 
plaisirs, pp. 18-19). TIlls is also where he acknowledges his debt to Hadot; see Dits et ecrits, 
vol. 4, p. 542, and The Use of Pleasure, p. 8 (L 'usage des plaisirs, p. 15). The concept is 
developed further in 'Technologies of the Self', in Ditl} et ecrits, vol. 4, pp. 783-813; Essential 
Works, voL 1, pp. 223-51. For further discussion of Foucault's engagement with ancient 
philosophy see Davidson, 'Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics, and Ancient 
Thought'; Miller, 'From Socrates to Foucault: The Problem of the Philosophical Life'; 
Nehamas, The Art of Living, pp. 157-88; note also Part III of Davidson. ed., Foucault and his 
Interlocutors, entitled 'Foucault and the Ancients', 
46 See Nussbaum, The T71erapy of Desire, esp. pp. 5, 353-54. On p. 5 she claims that Foucault 
characterises ancient philosophy as simply "a set of techniques du sot' and understands these 
techniques as something similar to Hadot's spiritual exercises. However she does not mention 
any particular passage where Foucault says tins (note that Foucault rarely, if eyer, uses 
techniques du soi, preferring techniques de soi). In fact as we shall see, Foucault is careful not 
to identify his techniques with such exercises. 
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Stoicism is indeed, as Michel Foucault and other affiliated writers [i.e. 
Hadot] have recently insisted, a set of techniques for the formation and 
shaping of the self But what their emphasis on habits and techniques 
du soi too often obscures is the dignity of reason. [ ... ] What sets 
philosophy apart from popular religion, dream-interpretation, and 
astrology is its commitment to rational argument. [ ... ] For all these 
habits and routines are useless if not rational. 47 
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Whilst Nussbaum is surely correct to emphasise the role of rational argument 
in ancient philosophy in general, and Stoicism in particular, she is herself far 
from clear concerning how one should understand the relationship between 
such rational arguments and the philosophical techniques which she also 
acknowledges to be vital. She appears to say that Stoicism is indeed a series of 
such habits, routines, or techniques, but then qualifies this by characterising 
these as rational exercises ("Stoicism is indeed [ ... ] a set of techniques [ ... 
which are] useless if not rational"). Yet as we have seen, for the Stoics, 
philosophy is an art ('tEXV'll) comprised of two components, rational argument 
(A6yo~) and practical exercise or training (acrKllcrt~), both being necessary 
components of this art concerned with transforming one's way of life (~io~). 
Indeed, this is in fact precisely how Foucault understands the matter. Despite 
Nussbaum's account of his position, Foucault's characterisation of ancient 
47 Nussbaum, The Therapy o.fDesire, p. 353. 
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philosophy as a technique cannot be identified with Hadot's characterisation 
of philosophy as spiritual exercise. Foucault writes, 
No technique, no professional skill can be acquired without exercise; 
nor can one learn the art of living, the techne tou biou, without an 
askesis that must be understood as a training of the self by the self. 48 
Here Foucault's position is clear; acquisition of a technique requires exercise, 
'tEXVll requires (XO'Kll<ne;. In other words, when Foucault talks about 
techniques or technologies of the self (techniques de soi, technologies de sot) 
he uses these terms in the strictly etymological sense of a 'tEXVll and, despite 
Nussbaum's account, he does not identify these techniques with UO'KllO'le;.49 
Rather, for Foucault, ancient philosophy is a 'tEXVll that involves UO'KllO'te;. His 
'techniques of the self (techniques de sot) should thus be understood as 'arts 
of the self rather than 'exercises of the self. 50 As arts, Foucault's techniques 
do not devalue the role of rational argument as Nussbaum claims but rather 
will involve 'Aoroe; alongside uO'KllO'te; as an essential component. Thus 
Foucault's position is clearly very different from Hadot's, a difference 
overlooked by Nussbaum who appears to assume that Foucault's techniques of 
48 Foucault, 'L'ecriture de soi', in Dits et ecrus, vol. 4, p. 417: "Aucune technique, acune 
habilete professionelle ne peut s' acquerir sans exercice~ on ne peut non plus apprendre l' art de 
vivre, la techne tou biou, sans tIDe askesis qu'il faut comprendre comme lID entrainement de 
soi par soi" (trans. Essential Works, vol. 1, p. 208). 
49 A nunlber of other passages appear to confirm that Foucault understood technique in its 
etymological sense: see e.g. The Use of Pleasure, p. 11 (L 'usage des plaisirs, p. 18)~ Dits et 
ecrits, vol. 4. pp. 545,671: L 'hermeneutique du sujet, p. 428. 
50 See especially 'L'ecriture de soi', in Dits et ecrUs, vol. 4, p. 415: Essential Work~, yo1. 1, p. 
207, where he uses precisely tIris phrase; "les arts de soi-meme". That Foucault understood 
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the self (techniques de soi) can be identified with Hadot's spiritual exercises 
(exercices spirituels).51 
The important point to note here is that one should not identify spiritual 
exercises with philosophy itself As we have already seen, such exercises are 
merely the second, although essential, stage of philosophical education 
coming after an initial stage devoted to philosophical principles (""0,,(01). 
Although Nussbaum is correct to emphasise the essential role of rational 
argument (AO"(O~), her implicit qualification of the idea of philosophy as 
'technique' to 'rational technique' in her discussion of Foucault is far from 
clear. Instead, following the 't€XVll analogy, Stoic philosophy should be 
understood as an art ('t€XVll) grounded upon rational principles (""0,,(01) which 
are only expressed in one's behaviour (epyct, ~tO~) after a period of practical 
training (&crKll(H~). Both AOyO~ and &crKllcrt~ are necessary components of 
philosophy conceived as a 't€XV11 but neither can be identified with philosophy 
itself 
ancient philosophy as an art rather than an exercise or practice is also made clear in The Care 
of the Se({, p. 44 (Le soud de soi, p. 62). 
51 Nussbaum does in fact note that Hadot offers a "different account" to Foucault (The 
Therapy of Desire, p. 353 n. 34). However her eA'Plication of Foucaulfs position fails to make 
this clear. The same mistake is also made by Davidson, 'Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault the 
History of Ethics, and Ancient Thought', p. 123: "For Foucault himself philosophy was a 
spiritual exercise". Hadot himself distinguishes his position from Foucault in Philosophy as a 
Way of Lifo, pp. 206-07, but with regard to a totally different issue, namely Foucault's reliance 
upon what Hadot takes to be an anachronistic conception of 'self. 
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3. The Function of Spiritual Exercises 
This conception of a spiritual exerCIse as one component of philosophy 
conceived as an art ('tEXVll) will be central to distinguishing between this 
technical conception of philosophy and philosophy conceived simply as an 
activity concerned with rational explanation. In order to understand the 
significance of this distinguishing component we must consider exactly how it 
was thought to function. As we have already noted, the purpose of these 
exercises is to enable one to express one's philosophical principles ()."oYOt) in 
one's actions (epya), thereby transforming one's way of life (~io<;). In a text 
that may well have been influenced by Epictetus, Galen writes, 
All we must do is keep the doctrine (8oYJla) regarding insatiability and 
self-sufficiency constantly at hand (npoxetpov), and commit ourselves 
to the daily exercise (aO"Kll(Hv) of the particular actions (epyrov) which 
follow from these doctrines. 52 
In other words, the function of these daily exercises recommended by Galen is 
to translate doctrines (8oYJla'ta, AOYOt) into one's actions and behaviour 
(epya, ~io<;). In a number of the ancient accounts concerning exactly how this 
52 Galen De A/foeluum Dignofione 9 (5.52 Kiihn = 34.24-26 de Boer: trans. Singer modified). 
A number of features of this text suggest the influence of Epictetus, including not only the 
emphasis upon daily exercise and transfonning doctrines into actions but also the use of 
certain terminology such as 'up to us' (£q>' YtJltv) and 'at hand' (1tpOXEtpov). Galen himself 
reports that he \-vrote on Epictetus although the text in question is lost~ see De Libris Propriis 
11 (19.44 Kiilm = test 20 Schenkl). He was also personal physician to Marcus Aurelius who 
was certainly well acquainted "ith Epictetus (see Chapter Seven below). 
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lS to be done there are two themes which emerge: habituation (tetO"Jl6~) and 
digestion (nt"'t~). 
(a) Habituation 
We have already come across the idea of accustoming or habituating oneself 
,n passing in passages from Clement, Musonius, and Epicurus. 53 For Clement, 
ipiritual exercise consists in accustoming (tetO"Jlo~) the soul to make correct 
udgements. 54 For Musonius, spiritual exercise consists in becoming 
lccustomed (teu~£O"eat) to distinguish between real and apparent goods. 55 In 
)oth cases we might say that the function of a spiritual exercise is to accustom 
)r to habituate (tei~ro) the soul according to philosophical doctrines or 
)rinciples (AorOt), to absorb philosophical ideas into one's character (1ieo~) 
;vhich, in tum, will determine one's habitual behaviour. We have also seen 
his idea in action in Epicurus's phrase "accustom yourself (O"UVEet~£) to the 
)elief that death is nothing to us". 56 It can also be seen in a number of Stoic 
3 See Clement of Alexandria Stromata 7.l6 (PG 9.536c = SVF 3.490), Musonius Rufus fro 6 
25.14-26.5 Hense = 54.18-25 Lutz), and Epicurus Epistula ad Afenoeceum (apud Diogenes 
,aertius 10) 124 (= LS 24 A), all cited above. The term translated as 'habituation' or 
accustoming' (tatcrJl~) derives from the verb 'to accustom' (£ai~(j), which in turn derives 
rom 'custom' or 'habit' (£60\;). TIns is itself related to 'character' or 'disposition' (iiao\;), as 
mstotle notes in Ethica Nicomachea 1103aI7-18. It is important to note that in tlns context 
ai~(j) should be understood not as untlnnking habit but rather as a conscious learning process 
iee Unnson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, p. 62). Other ancient references to the 
nportance of habituation (£atcrJl~) include e.g. Plato Phaedo 67c (with further references in 
:randwood, A Word Index to Plato, p. 285), Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1103a14-23 (who 
cknowledges its necessity in the acquisition of both ap£'tft and 't£XVT\ at 1103a31-32 and 
105b9-18, where a medical analogy is used), Plotinus Enneades 1.3.2, 1.6.9 ("ith further 
!ferences in Sleeman & Pollet Lexicon Plotinianum, col. 287). 
I See Clement of Alexandria Stromata 7.16 (PG 9.536c = ST:F 3.490), quoted above. 
; See Musonius Rufus fro 6 (25.14-26.5 Hense = 54.18-25 Lutz), quoted above. 
; See Epicurus Epistula ad .Afenoeceum (apud Diogenes Laertius 10) 12 .. 1.. quoted above. At 
le end of the same letter (135) Epicurus also emphasises the the need for daily exercise. 
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texts such as the following~ the first from Epictetus, the second and third from 
Marcus Aurelius: 
At everything that happens to you remember to turn to yourself and 
find what capacity you have to deal with it. If you see a beautiful boy 
or girl, you will find self-control as the capacity to deal with it~ if hard 
labour is imposed on you, you will find endurance; if abuse, you will 
find patience. And when you make a habit of this (Kat o1hwc; 
Eel~6JlEV6v), the impressions will not carry you away. 57 
Accustom yourself (EelOOV) in the case of whatever is done by 
anyone, so far as possible to inquire within yourself: 'to what end does 
this man do this?' And begin with yourself and first examine 
yourself 58 
Contemplate continually all things coming to pass by change, and 
accustom yourself (Eei~ol)) to think that Universal Nature loves 
nothing so much as to change what is and to create new things in their 
likeness. 59 
This process of accustoming oneself is something that Marcus in particular 
suggests can be achieved only by repeated reflection. In order to illustrate this 
57 Epictetus Enchiridion 10 (trans. Boter). For further references to habituation in Epictetus 
see e.g. Dissertationes 2.9.10,2.9.14..2.18.4,3.8.4,3.12.6,3.25.10. 
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characterises the process in terms of 'dyeing' one's soul just as a piece of 
>th might be dyed a new colour: 
As are your repeated imaginations so will your mind be, for the soul is 
dyed (~a1t1:E1:(n) by its imaginations. Dye it, then, in a succession of 
imaginations like these. 60 
lUS Marcus's Meditations often repeat certain themes agam and agam, 
lecting the repetitive nature of spiritual exercises. This is something also 
lphasised by Marcus's physician, Galen, who characterises the beginning of 
~h exercises (iJ 1:11<; aO'KllO'E<.o<; apXll) as the repetition of propositions to 
eself two or three times. 61 
A spiritual exercise is, then, a form of practical training directed towards 
: incorporation of philosophical doctrines into one's everyday habits. This 
)ituation (i9tO'J.lo<;) involves a transformation of one's character (1190<;) 
ich in tum transforms one's behaviour. 62 As such, this process will enable 
. translation of doctrines (I"oYOt) into actions (epya). It is the second stage 
1arcus Aurelius 10.37 (trans. Farquharson). 
1arcus Aurelius 4.36 (trans. Farquharson). 
r1arcus Aurelius 5.16 (trans. Farquharson)~ see also 3.4: "dyed ""ith justice to the core" 
:cx.wcri>vn l3£13aJ.lJ.l£VOV Ei<; f)a80<;). In his commentary Farquharson claims that this image 
riginal to Marcus (see p. 658). However, as Newman notes ('Theory and Practice of the 
ritatio', p. 1507), it had already been used by Seneca (e.g. Epistulae 71.31). 
ee Galen De Affictuum Dignotione 5 (5.21 KiUm = 15.16-18 de Boer); also ibid. 5 (5.2'+-
(mm = 17.11-22 de Boer), 6 (5.30 Kiibn = 21.3-10 de Boer), 9 (5.52 Kiibn = 3 .. L24-26 de 
r, already quoted above). Note also the following from the first book of Galen's De 
·jbus (fISpt 1)8&v), preserved only in an Arabic epitome: "a character is developed through 
19 constantly accustomed to things that man sets up in his soul and to things that he does 
uarly every day" (p. 241 Mattock; also in Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in islam, p. 
For further discussion of tIlis te:\.1 see Walzer, "New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy 
tn a recently discovered Arabic source)'. 
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)f philosophical education once the study of theory has been completed. It is 
:he means by which the philosophical apprentice completes his education in 
)hilosophy conceived as a 'tExvll. 
(b) Digestion 
o\longside this theme of habituation one also finds the use of an analogy with 
:he digestion of food. Epictetus writes the following: 
Do not, for the most part, talk among laymen about your philosophical 
principles (]reP! 't&V 6£(J)Pl1J.1<X't(J)v), but do what follows from your 
principles. [ ... J For Sheep, do not bring their fodder to the shepherds 
and show how much they have eaten, but they digest (1tE'lfav'ta) their 
food within them, and on the outside produce wool and milk. And so 
do you, therefore, make no display to the laymen of your philosophical 
principles ('ta 6£(J)PltJ.1a'ta), but let them see the results ('ta epya) 
which come from the principles when digested (1t£cp6tv't(J)V). 63 
~ ~ve already seen in Chapter Three, for the Stoics this will be a corporeal transformation 
f th~ dispositiou"s of the soul (ot<xBEaEt~ 'ti1~ 'l''O''ii1~). 
, Epictetus Enchiridion 46 (trans. Oldfather modified). The key term here is the verb 'digest' 
rEaaco) which is used three times (lines 8, 11, & 13 Boter, in the forms e1tE\jf~, TCE\jf<xv'ta. 
ld ltEq>Btv'tcov respectively). Note also the use of epya here and the way in which it 
mctioned in Chapter Three - only once principles have been digested will the appropriate 
$u1ts / products / actions (epya) be produced. 
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For Epictetus, this process of philosophical 'digestion' (7tE'I'lC;) is essentia1. 64 
Too many of his students, he suggests, 'throw up' (t~£jlEro) what they have 
heard before having given themselves an opportunity to digest (7tEooro) it. 
They repeat philosophical ideas before they have assimilated them and thus 
they are unable to act in accordance with them, creating a disharmony between 
their actions and words. Such undigested principles are, for Epictetus, simply 
; vomit , (Ejl£'tOC;).65 
This analogy with digestion also appears in Seneca's advice to Lucilius 
:;oncerning the art of reading: 
Be careful lest this reading of many authors and books of every sort 
may tend to make you discursive and unsteady. You must linger 
among a limited number of master-thinkers and digest their works 
(innutriri oportet) [ ... ] for food does no good and is not assimilated 
into the body if it leaves the stomach as soon as it is eaten, and nothing 
hinders a cure so much as frequent change of medicine. [ ... ] Each day 
4 For further examples of 'philosophical digestion' in Epictetus see Dissertationes 3.21.1-4, 
.9.18. Another image used by Epictetus closely related to digestion is that of a ripening fruit 
see e.g. Dissertationes 1.15.6-8, 4.8.36). A fruit must be given time to ripen - to digest what 
t needs - before it is ready to eat and the same applies to the philosophical development of the 
oui. 
5 TIlls imagery can also be found in an extended passage in Dissertationes 3.21.1-4: "Those 
rho have learned the principles (6£ropTtJ1cx:ra) and nothing else are eager to throw them up 
~~£J1€crat) immediately, just as persons with a weak stomach throw up their food. First digest 
rt€'l1ov) your principles, and then you will surely not throw them up (t~£J1€crl1s) this way. 
)therwise they are mere vomit (EJ1£WS), foul stuff and unfit to eat. But after you have 
igested these principles, show us some change in your governing principle (ltY£J10VlKOU) that 
; due to them; as the athletes show their shoulders as the results of their exercising 
:YUJ1vacr611crav) and eating, and as those who have mastered the arts ('t€xva~) can show 
$ults of their learning. TIle builder does not come forward and say, 'Listen to me deliver a 
iscourse about the art of building'; but he takes a contract for a house, builds it, and thereby 
roves that he possesses the art ('t€XVl1V)" (trans. Oldfather). 
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[ ... ] after you have run over many thoughts, select one to be 
thoroughly digested (collcoquas) that day. 66 
:lhilosophical principles only attain value once they have been digested. Just 
1S food transforms and becomes part of the body only once it has been 
ligested, so philosophical nourishment must be digested before it can become 
)art of the soul,67 transforming one's character (1190C;) and ultimately one's 
>ehaviour (epya, (310C;).68 Spiritual exercises are directed towards this process 
)f philosophical digestion, a process that transforms the soul ('I'UX11, 1190C;) and 
ranslates theoretical principles (9Ecop1lJ.Hx-ca, )"oyO\) into actions (epya). 
* * * 
5 Seneca Epistulae 2.2-4 (trans. Gumrnere modified). As one can see, here Seneca uses both 
oncoquo and innutrio but in general he prefers concoquo which, when used in this context 
Ie OLD glosses as "to absorb into the mind". See also Epistulae 84.5-8, with comment in 
'oucault, 'L'ecriture de soi', in Dits et ecrits, vol. 4, pp. 422-23; Essential Works, vol. L pp. 
13-14. 
i See Simplicius's comment on Enchiridion 46, the chapter quoted above (In Epicteti 
'nchiridion 64.27-30 Radot): "For as meats, when they are duly concocted, distribute 
lemselves into the several parts and mix with the vital juices and blood to nourish and 
:rengthen the body, so do maxims and doctrines, when well digested, convert into 
ourishment and make the soul healthful and vigorous" (trans. Stanhope). 
: This link between character and an individual's habitual actions is noted by Galen in the 
rst book of his De Aforibus (ilEpl.l}a&V), presenTed only in an Arabic epitome. According to 
ralen, an individual's character (1iaOC;) generates actions without further reflection and thus 
tly substantial transfonnation of behaviour will involve transfomling one's character (pp. 
36, 241 Mattock; see also Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, pp. 85 & 91, ,vith 
munent in Walzer, 'New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy (from a recently discovered 
rabic source)', p. 85). Elsewhere Galen suggests that the transformation of one's 1ieoc; ,vill 
lvolve bOtll aO'K:T)cnc; and oOYJ.la'ta (see Galen De Affoctuum Dignotione 7 = 5.37 Kiihn = 
;.21-24 de Boer). The same point is made by Plotinus in Enneades 2.9.15: justice 
iucatOO"uvT)) is developed in one's character (1iaOC;) by reasoning (AOY0C;) and training 
to'K:T)o"tC;). 
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rhese processes of habituation (e610'Jlo<;) and digestion (1tE'Ifl<;) are the 
unctions of spiritual exercises. They aim at the assimilation of philosophical 
)rinciples into one's soul ('IIUXll) that will, in turn, transform one's way of life 
:(3io<;). Like the apprentice craftsman who has learned the principles (""or01) of 
lis art but has not yet mastered the necessary practical technique, so the 
.tudent of this technical conception of philosophy will not be able to claim 
)hilosophical knowledge (e1t10''tllJlll) on the basis of his understanding of 
)hilosophical principles (""OY01) alone. According to this technical conception 
)f philosophy, knowledge (e1ttO''tllJ.lll) conceived as technical expertise will 
llso require this process of assimilation. Like the apprentice craftsman, this 
raining may take some time and will in some sense never be fully completed. 
ust as the master craftsman will continue to improve his techni que as he 
vorks, so the philosopher will continue to improve himself and his life. As 
ialen puts it, in order to become a perfected individual one must engage in 
xercises throughout the whole of one's life.69 
4. The Mechanism of Spiritual Exercises 
Jthough it is relatively clear what a spiritual exercise attempts to achieve, 
amely the digestion of principles and habituation of the soul, it is less clear 
recisely how this might be achieved. So far, the discussion of the idea of a 
See Galen De Affectuum Dignotione 4 (5.14 Killm = 11.15-16 de Boer), ~so. ibid. (5.16 
[ihn = 12.9-10 de Boer), 5 (5.25 Kiilm = 18.4-8 de Boer). A similar pomt IS made by 
ristotle in Ethica Nicomachea 1 147a21-22 where he suggests that the digestion of words and 
eir transfonnation into genuine knowledge takes time. 
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spiritual exercise - an liO'Kll(n~ of the \!lUx'll - has not made reference to any 
specific conception of the soul (\!lUx'll). Although ancient philosohers may, in 
general, agree on the purpose of spiritual exercises, their diverging 
:;onceptions of the soul (\!lUx'll) will clearly lead to quite different accounts of 
the way in which such exercises might work. In the broadest terms, \!IUXll may 
)e understood to refer to the principle of life or animation within a living 
. 70 H . d d )emg. owever, m or er to evelop an account of how a specifically Stoic 
;piritual exercise might function it will be necessary to consider briefly the 
~toic conception of the soul (\!lUx'll). 
(a) The Stoic Conception of\!luXll 
rhe Stoics' materialist conception of the soul (\!lUx'll) can only be understood 
vithin the broader context of their physics. 71 According to Stoic physics, all 
)hysical objects involve two basic principles (apXal), matter (UA,l1) and breath 
1tV£Ujla).72 This breath (1tv£ujla), itself material, pervades all physical 
) In his general discussion in De Anima Aristotle presents the 'l'UXl] as the first principle of 
lVing things (apXlt 'tillv scPcov), as that by virtue of which something is alive, and as that by 
irtue of which a tlring has movement ('KiVl1(n~) and perception (al<J611(Jt~). See Aristotle De 
.nima 402a6-7, 413a20-22, and 403b25-27 respectively. With these general claims the Stoics 
{ouId agree; see e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.156-57 (= SvF 1.135,2.774,3 Ant. 49, Posidonius 
~. 139 EK). 
For general accounts of the Stoic conception of \!fUXl] releyant here see Long, 'Soul and 
lody in Stoicism'; Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Ear{v Stoicisrll, pp. 18-.tL Armas, 
rellenistic Philosophy ofAlind, pp., 37-87; Gourinat, Les stoiciens et /'clme, pp. 17-35; Long 
1 CHHP, pp. 560-84. 
~ The translation of 1tv£uJ1a is a difficult question. It is often rendered as 'breath', 'spirit'. 
rital breath', 'vital spirit', or simply transliterated. I use 'breath' following Long & Sedley 
rJ.d Gourinat's souffle. For general accOlmts of the two apxai, the concept of 1[v£uJ1a, and its 
ltal blending with lnatter, see Sambursky, Physics of the StOiCS, pp. 1-48; Todd, Alexander of 
phrodisias on Stoic Physics, pp. 29-73; Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, pp. 93-102: 
Drabji, Alatter, Space, and Alation, pp. 83-98. For more of the relationship between the two 
Pxat see Chapter Seven § 2 (a) below. 
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)bjects and the qualities of any particular object are due to the tension ("Covo<;) 
)fthe breath (nv£uJ,Hx) within it.73 The solidity of a stone, for example, is due 
o the tension of the breath (6 "Covo<; "Cou nv£u\lu"Co<;) within it, a tension 
:"Covoc;) that generates solidity and stability. 74 
Different degrees of tension ("Covo<;) in the breath (nv£u\lu) pervading an 
)bject will generate different qualities. In the case of the stone, the tension 
:"COVO<;) of the breath (nv£u\la) may be said to give the stone a certain state of 
~ohesion (e~t<;). A higher degree of tension would generate more complex 
lualities such as self-movement. In fact, the Stoics outline four distinct 
~ategories of pneumatic tension: a state of cohesion (e~t<;), nature or growth 
'q>uat<;), soul (WUX1]), and rational soul (AOytl(1] WUX1]).75 The first of these is 
he type of tension found in inanimate physical objects such as stones, the 
~econd is that found in plants, the third that found in animals, and the fourth 
hat found in rational adult humans. 76 There is no substantial difference in kind 
letween these four types of physical entity and the hierarchy is purely one of 
ncreasing degrees of tension ("Covo<;). 77 
3 For wvo~ as the source of qualities see Nemesius De Natura Hominis 2 (18.2-10 Morani = 
,S 47 1). For 't6vo~ as source of cohesion of bodies see Alexander of Aphrodisias De 
lixtione 223.34-36 (= SVF 2.441 = LS 47 L). It has been suggested that 't6~ could be 
nderstood as 'wave-length'; see Long in CHHP, p. 566. For further comment see Voelke, 
,'idee de volonte dans Ie stoidsme, pp. 11-18. 
~ See e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias De }Vlixtione 223.34-36 (= SVF 2.441 = LS 47 L), 
'lutarch De Communibus Notiliis 1085d (= SVF 2.444 = LS 47 G). 
) For this fourfold division see Philo Quod Deus sit Immutabilis 35-36 (= SVF 2.458 = LS 47 
~), Legum Allegoria 2.22-23 (= SVF 2.458 = LS 47 P), Themistius De Anima 1.5 (2.64.25-28 
pengel = SVF 1.158), Ps.-Galen Introductio seu Aledicus 13 (14.726 KiUm = SVF 2.716 = LS 
7 N). In some of the ancient sources the last of these, Aoyt1~Tt 'If'UXTt, is replaced by vo~. 
; The first of these is exemplified by physical coherence and stability. The second 
llpplements this with self-movement. The third adds to these impressions and impulses. 
inally, the fourth adds rational judgements as a mediator behreen those impressions and 
npulses. For further discussion see Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy ofj\1ind, pp. 50-56. 
, Alternatively the distinction is characterised in terms of density and fineness, with 
lanimate objects having the densest rtV£'l>J.lC( and rational souls having the finest. See in 
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The soul ('V"UXll) of an individual human being is thus simply the breath 
: 1tVEUJ,1a.) present in that individual at a certain level of tension ('t6vo~). 78 The 
·ational soul of the sage will be that same breath (1tVEUJ,1a.) in an increased 
itate of tension ('t6vo~). 
(b) Transformation of the 'V"UXll 
:n the light of this one can see that a specifically Stoic spiritual exercise will 
)e directed towards the transformation of the disposition of the soul (oux9Ecrt~ 
:i1~ 'lfUxi1~), a transformation achieved by an alteration in its tension ('t6vo~). 
·ust as a physical exercise will improve the tension in one's muscles, so a 
ipiritual exercise will improve the tension in one's soul. 79 It is reported that a 
,oul in poor condition - that is, one with relatively weak tension - will be one 
ubject to mental disturbances or emotions (mx91l).80 These are the products of 
,articular the account of the transformation of 1tV£UJ.lu in the process of birth in Hierocles 
~lementa Ethica 1.12-28 (= LS 53 B). See also Plutarch De S'toicorum Repugnantiis 1052f (= 
'VF 2.806) who presents the transformation from cpucrtc; to '!fUXl] as one of 'cooling' ('!f~tC;) 
ut apparently contradicted in Galen Quod Animi lv/ores Corporis Temperamenta Sequantur 4 
t 783-84 Killin = SVF 2.787) who suggests that the 1tV£UJ.lU of '!fUXl] is drier and hotter than 
1at of cpucrtC;. As I l1ave already noted, Long suggests tl1at the difference may be understood 
1 terms of 'wave-length'. I am inclined to conceive it in terms of increasing organisational 
lld functional complexity (see Lewis, 'The Stoics on Identity and Individuation', p. 99). 
~ See also the excerpts from Chrysippus preserved (in Latin) in Calcidius In Platonis 
'imaeum 220 (232.16-19 Waszink = SVF 2.879 = LS 53 G). This conception of the '!fU"ll] as 
V£UJ.lU in a certain state owes a debt to Heraclitus who is reported to l1ave characterised the 
"UXl] as an 'exhalation' (avuSuJ.ltucrtC;). See Aristotle De Anima 405a25-26 (= Heraclitus 
:st. 15 DK) and, in particular, Arius Didymus Epitome Physica fro 39 (DG -1-70.25-471.2 = 
VF 1.141. 1.519 = Heraclitus fro 12 DK) where Cleanthes reports tl1at, on this. Zeno followed 
:eraclitus. For further comment see Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, pp. 259-60. 
See Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.5b4 (2.62.24-63.1 WH = SVF 3.278). As I have 
ready noted 'improve' may be characterised as an increase in the tension or the fineness of 
le 1tV£UJ.lu. 
See e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.158 (= SVF 2.766) where emotions are described as a variation 
l1tVEUJ.lU (sleep is also presented as a slackening of tension). 
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)eliefs that, in tum, are the product of judgements. 81 A soul in good condition 
will be free from such emotions and this will reflect a correct use of 
udgements. There is, then, a correlation between weak tension and poor 
udgements on the one hand, and strong tension and sound judgements on the 
)ther. 
What we have in a specifically Stoic context, then, are two parallel 
iescriptions of a single process concerned with the improvement of one's soul 
,\/fuxil). A Stoic spiritual exercise will be concerned with examining one's 
udgements and rejecting those bad judgements that lead to emotions (nu811). 
rhe process of transforming one's judgements and overcoming such emotions 
M8ll) may also be described in purely physical terms as a transformation of 
he tension (t6vo~) of one's soul (\/fUXil).82 Thus, the way in which a Stoic 
piritual exercise will work is by an increase in the tension ('t6vo~) of the 
Ireath (nvEuJla) that constitutes the material soul (\/fuxil). As we have already 
loted in Chapter Three, this transformation of the disposition of the soul 
5tu8EO't~ 'tfj~ \/fUxfj~) will necessarily involve a transformation in one's way 
,f life (~io~). 83 
Note however the dispute between early Stoics on the nature of the relationship between 
~liefs and emotions; see e.g. Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5.1.4 (5..+29 Kiihn = 
)2.17-20 De Lacy = SVF 1.209,3.461). I shall return to this in Chapter Seyen § 2 (b). 
Note also Sene~ Epistulae 16.3 where philosophy is characterised as that "hich moulds 
ld constmcts the soul (animum format et fabricat). 
See Chapter Three § 7. 
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5. The Form of Spiritual Exercises 
~aving considered what a spiritual exercise attempts to achieve and the way in 
Nhich it might achieve this, there remains the question of the form that such 
~xercises might take. In the case of an art or craft such as shoemaking, training 
NiH take the form of repeated practice. In order to master his chosen 
)rofession the apprentice shoemaker will have to try his hand at making shoes, 
mowing full well that despite his grasp of the principles behind the art it will 
)e some time before he is able to produce a decent pair of shoes and claim to 
)ossess the knowledge that constitutes technical expertise. With the art of 
iving, the precise form of the necessary exercises or training is less clear. 
~ortunately a number of examples can be found in the ancient literature. One 
hat we have already encountered is Epicurus' s meditation upon the thought 
hat death is 'nothing to us' . 84 Yet, in general, these spiritual exercises do not 
lppear to have been done in abstracto. Instead they were often associated with 
, written text. 85 
Philosophical texts come in a variety of forms but the most obvious are 
'erhaps those of the treatise, such as those produced by Aristotle or 
I See Epicums Epistula ad 1'vienoeceul1l (apudDiogenes Laertius 10) 12.;1. (= LS 24 A), quoted 
nd discussed above. Further examples drawn from a wide variety of ancient sources are 
iscussed in Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Afind, pp. 211-52. Particular examples of Stoic 
xercises will be discussed further in Chapters Six and Seven. 
i See the discussions in Newman, 'Theory and Practice of the meditatio', pp. 1.;1.78-82; 
oucaul!, 'L'ecriture de soi', in Dit; et ecrU;, vol. 4, pp. 415-30; Essential Work~, vol. 1, pp. 
07-22. Nehamas, The Art of Living, p. 8, suggests that what he calls the art of living is 
rimarily practised in writing. Yet by this he appears to mean that a philosophical life "ill be 
ne devoted to writing and that the texts produced will be the lasting monument to that life. 
°et this is surely the life of an author, and not necessarily that of a philosopher (although these 
lay of course be combined). The significance attached to ,,,ritten te:\.1s for the art of liying as 
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2hrysippus, and the commentary, such as those produced by Alexander of 
l\phrodisias or Simplicius. Yet alongside these works containing philosophical 
:heory (AOYO~) there are also texts comprised of philosophical exercises 
:Clo"Kllo"El~) which serve a very different function. An example of this latter 
:Crm of text would be the Handbook of Epictetus.86 This text is devoted to the 
Jrocess of philosophical habituation and digestion, that is, to spiritual 
~xercises conceived as an essential second stage of philosophical education. 
I\s such, its form and its function are quite different from those of the 
)hilosophical treatise. Yet, in the light of what we have seen, it can 
levertheless be seen to be a thoroughly philosophical text. 
We have, then, two distinct forms of philosophical text corresponding to 
he two components of philosophy conceived as a 'tEXV'll; texts devoted to 
\,oYOt and texts devoted to Clo"Kllo"EtC;. Texts concerned with spiritual exercises 
nay themselves by sub-divided into different types. In particular, two distinct 
iterary forms of exercise may be noted. The first type, exemplified by the 
landbook of Epictetus, is primarily an instructional text directed towards 
raining the student of philosophy who has already completed his preliminary 
ducation in philosophical theory. 87 The second, exemplified by the 
:mceived here is, as we shall see, only insofar as they function as philosophical exercises 
ireeted towards the digestion of AOYot and the transformation of one' s /3tO~. 
, For Hadot, Plato's dialogues would also fall into this latter category, being forms of written 
Ilercise designed to provoke the reader rather than merely to instruct. See Philosophy as a 
l~y o/Life, p. 91. 
Hankinson, The Sceptics, pp. 305-06, suggests that Sextus Empiricus's Pyrrhoniae 
:vpofyposes should also be conceived in this way. namely as "a handbook for other 
>prentice Sceptics". 
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Ueditations of Marcus Aurelius, is a text produced by a student where the 
very act of writing itself can be seen to constitute the exercise. 88 
These two examples of two different types of text concerned with spiritual 
~xercises - the Handbook and the Meditations - are perhaps the most 
mportant surviving texts relating to Stoic uO"Kll<nc;.89 The former is a 
~idebook for philosophical apprentices; the latter is a text produced by an 
lpprentice. These texts are examples of the form of the exercises which 
;omplete the Stoic art of taking care of one's soul. First the theory is studied 
md understood, then texts such as these are studied or written in order to aid 
he digestion of those theories. 
In the remaining two chapters I shall consider these two Stoic texts as 
~xamples of the two types of text devoted to spiritual exercise. Chapter Six, 
levoted to the Handbook of Epictetus, will examine how this second stage of 
)hilosophical education was conceived and will consider the relationship 
letween different types of spiritual exercise and the different parts of 
~ At Dissertationes 2.1.29-33 Epictetus eX1>licitIy recommends this form of philosophical 
mting to his students in contrast to merely rhetorical prose aimed at nothing more than 
ecuring the praise of one's readers. He also implies that Socrates wrote in this way, upsetting 
le assumption that Socrates wrote nothing. In a note on this passage Oldfather (LCL, vol. 1. 
. 222) suggests that it is possible that Socrates engaged in much of this sort of private 
rriting, none of which would have been intended for circulation (like Marcus's Nfeditations). 
'or further discussion of this form of written spiritual exercise see Foucault, 'L' ecriture de 
:>i', in Dits et ecrUs, vol. 4, pp. 415-30; E5sential Work5, vol. 1, pp. 207-22. 
) A third example would be Seneca's Epistulae, described by Nussbaum as '"the greatest body 
f surviving Stoic therapeutic writing" (The Therapy of Desire, p. 337). For general discussion 
~e Newman 'Theorv and Practice of the meditatio', pp. 1483-95. For the way in which 
:>rrespondence may -function as a written spiritual exercise see Foucault, 'L'ecriture de soC, 
1 DUs et ecrUs, vol. 4, esp. pp. 423-30~ Essential Tfork5, vol. 1, esp. pp. 214-21. Newman 
lso proposes Ps. -Seneca De Remediis F ortuitorum (alongside Marcus Aurelius) as one of the 
~w literary examples of the meditatio in action (see ibid., pp. 1477 n. 6. 1495-96). This text 
:>es not appear in tile more recent editions of Seneca but it can be found in Haase (BT) and 
almer, Seneca's De Remediis Fortuitorum and the Elizabethans, pp. 28-65. Palmer argues 
tat this is a genuine work of Seneca, although it only survives in a mutilated form, perhaps 
!ing an epitome of an originally longer work (see ibid., p. 20). 
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hilosophical discourse. Chapter Seven, devoted to the Meditations of ~1arcus 
mrelius, will focus upon one of these types of spiritual exercise concerning 
ne's judgements. Once we have considered the way in which these texts 
lnction we should have a clearer idea of both the form and the function of 
piritual exercises and the role that they play in philosophy conceived as the 
rt of living. 
CHAPTER SIX 
EXERCISES IN THE HANDBOOK OF EPICTETUS 
[n the last chapter I began to develop the idea of a philosophical exercise that, 
:tlongside philosophical discourse or theory, would form an essential 
:;omponent of philosophy conceived as a 't£XVll. In this chapter I shall continue 
:0 develop this concept of a philosophical acrKll(H<; or spiritual exercise by 
:ocusing upon a text devoted to such exercises, the Handbook of Epictetus. 1 
rhe aim of this chapter is twofold. The first is to consider in more detail the 
'elationship between acrKllcrt<; and 'A,6yo<;, the two components of philosophy 
;onceived as a 't£XVll. The second is to present the Handbook as an example of 
For COImnent on the text of both the Enchiridion and Dissertationes of Epictetus see 
~dditional Note 3. For the Enchiridion I have relied upon the texts in Oldfather (LCL) and 
~oter, and have consulted the translations by Oldfather, Boter, and White. The most important 
tudies of Epictetus remain the works of Adolf Bonhoffer and, in particular, Epictet und die 
;toa and Die Ethik des StoikeN; Epictet, the second of which has recently been trans~ated into 
~nglish as The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus. Also wOrtllY of note are Colardeau, Etude sur 
pictete~ Xenakis, Epictetus: Philosopher-Therapist~ Hijmans, 'A(TK1Pl;: lvrotes on Epictetus' 
7ducational System; More, Hellenistic Philosophies, pp. 94-171; Hadot, The Inner Citadel, 
p. 73-100; Dobbin, Epictetus, Discourses Book 1 (a translation with commentary); Gourinat, 
Iremieres le90ns sur Ie Afanuel d 'Epictete; with further references in Hershbell, 'The 
toicism of Epictetus: Twentieth Century Perspectives'. No modem commentary on the 
nchiridion exists but useful notes can be found in Upton (vol. 2, pp. 271-87) and 
chweighauser (Epicteteae Philosophiae }'lonumenta, vol. 3, pp. 139-70, but not in his 1798 
lition of the Enchiridion which contains primarily textual notes). A substantial introduction 
ill be fOlmd inHadot~Arrien, lvfanuel d'Epictete, pp. 11-160. 
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)ne of the two types of philosophical text associated with spiritual exercises 
:hat I outlined at the end of the last chapter? In order to complete these tasks it 
NiH be necessary to explore the internal structure of the Handbook and to see 
)recisely how it functions as a philosophical text devoted to ao"Kllo"t~. But 
1rst, some introductory remarks. 
1. Introduction to the Handbook 
[he Handbook of Epictetus - described by Justus Lipsius as the soul of Stoic 
)hilosophy - is in many ways the archetypal example of a form of writing 
lppropriate to philosophy conceived as an art of living. 3 According to the sixth 
:entury commentary by the Neoplatonist Simplicius,4 the Handbook was 
:ompiled by Arrian from his accounts of Epictetus's lectures now known as 
he Discourses. 5 It takes the form of a collection of passages from the 
)iscourses short enough to be easily reproduced, carried around, or even 
Chapter Seven "'rill attempt to do the same for the other type of philosophical tex1 associated 
rith spiritual exercises by examining the A4editations of Marcus Aurelius. 
See Lipsius Alanuduetio 1.19 (1604 edn, p. 63): Enehiridion sane egregium, & Stoieae 
toralis philosophie velut anima (cited in Oldfather (LCL), yo1. 1, p. xxix). 
For discussion of Simplicius's commentary, including when and where it was written 
~ecently a su~ject of debate), see Ilsetraut Hadot's Le probleme du neoplatonisme alexandrin: 
rjerocles et Simplicius, 'The Life and Work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources', and 
er Introduction in Simplicius, Commentaire sur Ie A1anuel dEpietete. 
See Simplicius In Epieteti Enehiridion Praef. 4-7 Hadot, with further discussion of Arrian 
tld Epictetus in Stadter, Arrian ofNieomedia, pp. 19-31. The Dissertationes probably existed 
I eight books originally so the Enehiridion in theory summarises the four books now lost as 
dl as the four still extant (see Additional Note 3 for further infonnation). Schenkl and Boter 
)th supply references to the parallels between the Enehiridion and passages in the 
'issertationes. As Barnes notes (Logic and the Imperial Stoa, p. 24), nothing in the 
nehiridion suggests that the lost books of the Dissertationes contained anything substantially 
.fferent from the content of the surviving books. 
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nemorised. 6 Its title, 'EYXetpiotov, suggests something that is, in the words of 
\1usonius, always ready at hand (npoxetpoC;),7 a point noted by Simplicius in 
lis commentary: 
It is called Encheiridion CEYXetpiotOv) because all persons who are 
desirous to live as they ought, should be perfect in this book, and have 
it always ready at hand (npoxnpov); a book of as constant and 
necessary use as the sword (which commonly went by this name, and 
from whence the metaphor seems to be taken) is to a soldier. 8 
\s Simplicius indicates, the word eyxetpiowv can also mean sword. It can 
llso refer to a variety of handheld tools, such as those used for cutting stone. 9 
N"hat these different meanings share in common is indicated by the root 
hand' (Xetp); they are all things that one keeps 'ready to hand' (npoxnpoC;). 
~hus Arrian' s choice of eyxetptOtOV as a title suggests a text conceived as a 
;uidebook or manual designed to be used in some form of practical activity. 10 
Boter notes that there are relatively few direct excerpts from the Dissertationes in the 
'nchiridion (see p. xiii). However, one can be found in § 29 which is an almost word for word 
!production of Dissertationes 3.15.1-13 (first noted by Upton, vol. 2, p. 277) and thus 
racketed as an interpolation by Boter (see his discussion, p. 127). 
See Musonius Rufus fro 6 (25.14-26.5 Hense = 54.18-25 Lutz), already quoted in Chapter 
ive § 2 (a), with H~jmans,'A(7K71alq, p. 70. 
Simplicius In Epicteti Enchiridion Praef. 18-20 Hadot (trans. Stanhope modified). 
See the examples listed in LSJ, p. 475. 
, The title byx£tpiolOV is usually translated into English as lvIanual or Handbook. In French 
is usually translated as Manuel, but to translate it as Pensees (e.g. Brun, ed., Les Stotciens, 
114) wo~Ild obscure the primarily practical connotations associated with the title. I prefer 
andbook to Afanual insofar as it reflects the presence of Xdp in £YXnpiOlO\,. Gourinat, 
~emieres le((ons sur Ie Afanuel d'Epictete, p. 40, has suggested tlmt as this would still have 
~en the era of the papyrus roll as opposed to the codex (on which see Kenyon, Books and 
-wders in Ancient Greece and Rome, esp. p. 98), in certain respects a rolled up copy of the 
'lchiridion would have literally resembled a handheld tool or s"\-yord. 
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Each chapter of the Handbook contains what might broadly be 
~haracterised as practical advice rather than substantial philosophical 
:trgument. In his commentary, Simplicius is explicit that what we have here is 
Jrimarily a book of spiritual exercises: 
For as the body (crrojla) gathers strength by exercise (yUJlva~E'tat), 
and frequently repeating such motions as are natural to it; so the soul 
('!fUXl]) too, by exerting its powers, and the practice of such things as 
are agreeable to nature, confirms itself in habits, and strengthens its 
own natural constitution. 11 
[his account of the function of the Handbook as a text clearly shares much in 
~ommon with Socrates' conception of an art ('t£XVll) concerned with taking 
~are of the soul ('lfUx1)). Indeed, Simplicius explicitly proposes that Epictetus 
vas inspired by the example of Socrates as he is presented in Alcibiades /.12 
;implicius's reason for making this connection may have been part of a 
leliberate Neoplatonic educational strategy rather than a desire to shed light 
lpon Epictetus,13 but nevertheless the resonance is clear: the Handbook is a 
I Simplicius In Epieteti Enehiridion Praef. 87-90 Hadot (trans. Stanhope). At Praef. 51-52 
implicius characterises the contents of the Enehiridion as all ex.rpressions of one 'ttXV''l, 
amely that of amending man's life (TtlV OWpeCO'ttKTtV 'tfi~ avapco1tivTJ~ t;rofi~)· 
~ See Simplicius In Epieteti Enehiridion Praef. 82-87 Hadot, a claim repeated in the 
.enaissance by Politi an (Angeli Politiani pro Epieteto Stoleo ad Bartholomeu Seala Epistola, 
1 his Opera Omnia; translated in Kraye, Cambridge Translations, pp. 192-99). For 
pictetus's use of Alcibiades I in the Dissertationes see Jagu, Epieti!fe et Platon, pp. 137-38, 
61. 
, In the Neoplatonic syllabus, philosophical education began \vith Aleibiades I, a teAi 
escribed by Proc1us in Iris commentary on it as "the beginning (aPXll) of all philosophy" 
)roc1us In Platonis Alcibiadem I 11.3 Westerink). Later in the same texi (11.11-15), Proclus 
"edits the priority given to Aleibiades I to Iamblichus, although it actually dates back to the 
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Jook designed to be used to exercise (YUJlva~£lv, <XO'K£tV) the soul (\jIUXll) 
:malogous to the way in which one might exercise the body. 14 
* * * 
But to whom was the Handbook directed? Broadly speaking there are two 
)ossible groups of philosophical readers and, as we shall see, this question will 
)ear upon that concerning the relationship between 'AoyoC; and aO'Kl10'tC;. 
Simplicius suggests that the Handbook should be read by the philosophical 
)eginner in need of preliminary moral instruction before commencing the 
;tudy of philosophy proper, that is, the study of Platonic philosophy. IS One 
night suggest that, beyond the uses to which it may have been put in the 
~eoplatonic educational syllabus, the Handbook should indeed be understood 
lS a text devoted to preliminary moral training (aO'KllO'tC;) designed to prepare 
l beginner for the study of philosophical theory ('AoyoC;). This implies that a 
.1iddle Platonist Albinus (see Mansfeld, Prolegomena, pp. 84-97~ Dillon, The Jvliddle 
)latonists, pp. 304-06). Note also the Prolegomena Philosophiae Platonicae in which it is 
aid that of the Platonic dialogues "the first to be eA']Jlained is the Alcibiades, because it 
~ches us to know ourselves, and the right course is to know oneself before knowing eA1:ernal 
ltings, for we can scarcely understand those other things so long as we are ignorant of 
urselves" (26.18-20 Westerink). By connecting the Enchiridion with Alcibiades I, then, 
:implicius may be seen to be proposing Alcibiades I as the next philosophical text to read 
fier the Enchiridion, in effect dra\ving readers ofEpictetus into a Neoplatonic reading list and 
lUS away from Stoicism. 
~ As such, the Enchiridion resonates not just with Socrates' position (discussed in Chapter 
'wo) but also with the discussion in Book 3 of Cicero's Tusculanae Disputationes (discussed 
1 Chapter Three). This latter resonance was noted by the Renaissance Humanist Niccolo 
erotti in § 7 of the 'Praefatio' to his Latin translation of the Enchiridion (c. 1450), both 
dited and published for the first time in Oliver, Niccolo Perotti's Version of The Enchiridion 
f Epictetus (see esp. pp. 65-69). 
; See Simplicius h1 Epicteti Enchiridion Praef. 61-81 Hadot, with discussion in 1. Hadot Le 
roblerne du neoplatonisme alexandrin, pp. 160-64; 'The Spiritual Guide'. p. 451; Mansfeld. 
'rolegomena, p. 70. Hadot suggests that the commentary itself should also be seen as an 
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philosophical beginner will use this text of spiritual exerCIses on its ow~ 
without recourse to philosophical theory, and that he will do so successfully 
(for otherwise there would be no point). It implies, the~ that these written 
philosophical exercises will, on their own, be sufficient to overcome the 
emotions (nne'll) and transform the soul ('lfUxit). 
Alternatively, one might conceive the Handbook as a text for more 
advanced philosophical students. There are, I propose, two reasons why this 
may be a better approach. 
Firstly, there is the question concerning why Arrian would have produced 
this epitome of the Discourses. Throughout the Discourses Epictetus advises 
his students to keep their philosophical principles 'ready to hand' 
(npoxnpoc;).16 As a student of Epictetus himself, Arrian may have composed 
the Handbook not so much as an introduction to Epictetus for beginners but 
rather as a aide memoire for himself,17 a small digestible summary of 
Epictetus's philosophy that he could carry with him and always keep 'ready to 
hand' (npoX£lpOC;).18 This would certainly explain the choice of title. 
Secondly, there is Epictetus's account of philosophical education which, as 
we have already see~ is comprised of, first, a thorough study of philosophical 
principles and, second, a series of exercises designed to digest those principles 
example of a written series of spiritual exercises (see Le probleme du neopiatonisme 
alexandrin, pp. 164-65). 
16 See e.g. Epictetns Dissertationes 1.1.21, 1.27.6, 2.1.29, 2.9.18, 3.10.1, 3.10.18, 3.11.5, 
3.17.6,3.18.1. 
17 Simplicius, In Epicteti Enchiridion Praef. 7-9 Hadot, reports that Arrian addressed the book 
to his friend Messalinus, already an admirer of Epictetus. Either way, I suggest that it \yould 
have been for someone already familiar with Epictetus's philosophy. 
18 A similar procedure can be seen in the letters of Epicurus. See e.g. Epistula ad Pythoc1em 
(apud Diogenes Laertius 10) 84 and Epistuia ad Herodotum (apud Diogenes Laertius 10) 35 
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and transform one's behaviour. 19 In short, Epictetus proposes first the study of 
AOYOt and then, only once these have been mastered~ a series of U<H.:l10'£1C; 
designed to digest those /"oY01. In the light of this, we might conceive the 
Handbook as a text for relatively advanced students, for those who have 
already mastered philosophical doctrines in the classroom and are now ready 
to attempt to put those doctrines into practice via a series of spiritual exercises. 
For students such as these, the Handbook would serve as a series of exercises 
to study and a distilled summary and reminder of all that they had learned in 
the classroom. The Handbook would thus function as a text for the second 
stage of philosophical education, just as the theoretical treatise would have 
functioned as a text for the first stage?O As such, it would not present any 
philosophical content with which the student would not already be familiar, 
but rather would repeat familiar material in a form specifically directed 
towards its digestion (1tE'lftC;). 
Given that the Handbook is a collection of spiritual exercises, if it were 
used by a beginner who had not yet studied philosophical theory, it would in 
effect be a series of UO'lCTrO'£tC; without )v6yo1. Yet as we have already seen, for 
Epictetus UO'lC1IO'£tC; must come after the study of )'"OY01, for their function is 
the digestion of those AOYOt.21 Arrian would surely have been well aware of 
where he presents these letters as summaries of his larger philosophical works specifically 
designed as aids to memory for more advanced students. 
19 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.26.3, 1.17.4-12, with the discussion in Chapter Five § 1 
above. 
20 I have already noted in Chapter One that Epictetus may well have engaged in close readings 
of treatises su~h those by Chrysippus as part of his classroom teaching. See e.g. Epictetus 
Dissertationes 2.21.11, ~ith More, Hellenistic Philosophies, p. 98: Long, -Epictetus, Marcus 
Aurelius' ,p_ 993. 
21 See Chapter Five § 1. As we have seen in Chapter Three § 5, this point had already been 
made by Seneca in Epistulae 94.25-26. For further general discussion of the theme of 
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this point and thus it seems more likely that he conceived the Handbook as a 
text for more advanced philosophical students. As for Simplicius's claim that 
it is a text for beginners, that has more to do with how he thought the text 
could be appropriated to function within the Neoplatonic educational syllabus 
rather than how it might function within the context of Epictetus's own 
account of philosophical education. 
2. The Structure of the Handbook 
Having considered the way in which the Handbook may be used as a text 
devoted to spiritual exercises, we now need to consider its contents. At first 
glance the 53 chapters or sections of the text do not appear to be in any 
particular order.22 However, it has been argued that it is possible to discern 
some form of structure within the text/3 a structure that is implicitly 
introduced in the opening section. By examining this structure we shall be able 
to see precisely how the Handbook focuses upon a number of different types 
UO'KTJO'tC; in Epictetus see Hijmans, ':4(jK1J(jI~: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System, esp. 
pp. 64-77; Colardeau, Etude sur Epictete, pp. 115-48; Xenakis, Epictetus: Philosopher-
Therapist, pp. 70-84. 
22 The division into 53 sections used by Schenk!, Oldfather, and Boter, derives from 
Schweighauser's 1798 edition. Tins was itself built upon Upton's division of the text into 52 
sections in Ius 1739 edition. Before Upton, the text was often divided into 79 sections, most 
notably by Wolf (1560, 1595, 1655, 1670). This older division of the text corresponds to its 
division in many editions of Simplicius's commentary (e.g. Heinsius 1640, Stanhope's 
translation 1694), although the latest edition by 1. Hadot departs from this. 
23 See e.g. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, vol. 2, p. 162; P. Hadot 'Une cte des Pensees de Marc Aurele: 
les trois topoi plulosophlques selon Epictete', pp. 71-72; Stadter, Arrian ojXicomedia, p. 29; 
1. Hadol, Simplicius, Commentaire, pp. 149-51: Gourinat Premieres ler;ons sur Ie Jfanuel 
d'Epictete, pp. 45-53: P. Hadot, Arrien, Afanuel d'Epictete, pp. 36-140. For a similar attempt 
to discern an implicit structure in Book 1 of the Dissertationes, see De Lacy, 'The Logical 
Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus' . 
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of spiritual exerCIse (acrKl1crt~), and how each of these types of exercise 
relates to philosophical discourse or theory (A,oyo~). 
(a) Section 1: Three 't01tOt 
The key to the structure of the Handbook as a whole can be found in the very 
first section where the three central themes are announced: 
Of things, some are up to us (ecp' 1l}ltv), and some are not up to us (OUK 
Up to us are [1] opinion (u1t6A,l1\lft~), [2] impulse (oP}lll), [3] desire 
[and] aversion (op£;t~, £KKA,tcrt~), and, in a word, all our actions 
(epya). 
Not up to us are our body (crw}lu), posseSSlOns (K'tilcrts), 
reputations (oo;at), offices (apxui), and, in a word, all that are not our 
actions. 24 
Following Socrates' exhortation in the Apology for his fellow citizens to take 
care of their souls rather than their possessions, the Handbook opens with this 
distinction between what is and what is not 'up to us' (ecp' 1l}ltV) or in our 
control,25 and proposes that the only things truly within one's control are four 
24 Epictetus Enchiridion 1.1: 'tOOv ov'tcov 'tCx. Jl.EV EO"uv £q>' ltJl.lv, 'to. Of O'l>K £q>' ltJl.tv. Eq>' ltJl.tV 
JiEv 1)1tOA:11'lflC;, 6pJl. ft, Op£~tC;, EKKAtO"tc;, Kat tvi. AOYO) oO"a ltJl.E-r£pa Epya' OUK £q>' ltJl.l\' Of 'to 
O"OOJl.a, It K'tfjO"tC;, OO~at, a.pxai, Kat tvt AOyO) oO"a OUX ltJl.E't£pa Epya. 
25 This distinction between what is and is not 'up to us' Ciq>' ltJl.tv) draw's upon the earlier Stoic 
theory of internal and e~1ernal causes illustrated in Chrysippus' s cylinder analogy. See 
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activities of the soul, namely Opl1l10n ({>1tOATf"'l~), impulse (oPJlll), desire 
(OP€l;l~), and aversion (£l\:1(Al(n~). The last two of these may be taken together 
insofar as they express opposing forms of the same activity, giving three 
categories of things within one's control: opinion (unoA Tf"'l~), impulse 
(6PJl1]), desire and aversion (OP€l;l~ Ka.t £KKAl(n~)?6 These three areas of 
study (1:0nol) announced in the first section of the text may be seen to 
introduce the three central themes of the rest of the Handbook. 27 
The precise nature of these three areas of study (1:0nol) is discussed at 
greater length in the Discourses, a discussion which this opening section 
would no doubt recall to the mind of the advanced student already familiar 
with Epictetus's philosophy. The following passage gives probably the 
clearest account of this threefold distinction: 
There are three areas of study (1:01tOl), in which a person who is going 
to be noble (KUAOV) and good (aya.90v) must be trained (acrKTf9ftvUl): 
[1.] That concerning desires and aversions ( 6PEl;€l~ Kat 
EKKAicr€l~), so that he may neither fail to get what he desires nor fall 
into what he would avoid. 
Chapter Three § 7 above, with further comment in Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in 
Stoic Philosophy, pp. 330-38. " . 
26 These are the powers of an individual's npoaip£crt<;, an Aristotelian tenn which III Eplctetus 
refers to an individual's faculty of choice. For further discussion see Dobbin. 'rrpoaip~crt<; in 
Epictetus'; Voelke. L'idee di volonte dans Ie stoi"cisme, pp. 142-60; Inwood, Ethics and 
Human Action in Earlv Stoicism, pp. 240-42; Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 228-29. 
27 For further discus~ion of this threefold distinction see BonhoiIeL Die Ethik des Stoikers 
Epictet, pp. 16-126 (= The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus. pp. 30-165); More, Hellenistic 
Philosophies, pp. 107-53; Hadot, The Inner Citadel, pp. 82-98. 
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[2.] That concerning the impu1se to act (6PJla~) and not to act 
(acpoPJla~), and, generally, appropriate behaviour (Ka9ilKov); so that 
he may act in an orderly manner and after due consideration, and not 
carelessly. 
[3.] The third is concerned with freedom from deception 
(av£~a1ta1:11crtav) and hasty judgement (av£tKat0't:111:a), and, 
generally, whatever is connected with assents (cruYKa1:a9tcr£t~).28 
21-l 
The three areas (1:01tOt) of training (acrKl1crt~) outlined here are the same three 
areas introduced in the opening section of the Handbook but presented in 
reverse order. Each of these types of acrKl1crt~ may be seen to correspond to 
one of the three parts of Stoic philosophical discourse (1:0V Ka1:U q>tAocro<ptav 
AOYOV) outlined by Diogenes Laertius; the physical (cpUcrtKOV), the ethical 
(i)9tKOV), and the logical (AOytKOV).29 Following their order in this passage 
from the Discourses, the first type of exercise concerning desires and 
aversions (6pt~£t~ Kat E1\:KAicr£t~) may be seen to correspond to 'physics', the 
second type concerning impulse (6pJ..l1l) may be seen to correspond to 'ethics', 
and the third type concerning opinion (u1t6Al1'1ft~) and assent (cruYKa1:a9tcrt~) 
may be seen to correspond to 'logic'. 30 Although this correlation has been 
28 Epictetus Dissertationes 3.2.1-2. This division into three types of &'01(11O't<; can be found 
throughout the Dissertationes~ see e.g. l.4.11, 2.8.29, 2.17.15-18 & 31-33, 3.12.1-17. -lA.16. 
-l. 10. 1-7 & 13. 
29 See Diogenes Laertius 7.39 (= STiF 2.37), with the discussion in Chapter Thee § 6 above. 
30 For this correlation between the three 't01tOt and the three parts of philosophical discourse 
see Bonhoffer. Epictet und die Stoa, pp. 22-28; Bonhoffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, pp. 
46-49 & 58-60 (= The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus, pp. 78-85): More, Hellenistic 
Philosophies, pp. 107-08; Pohienz, Die Stoa, vol. L pp. 328-29~ Hadot, 'Philosophie. Discours 
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. d 31 questlOne ,- as we shall see, a case can be made to connect the three parts of 
philosophical discourse with these three areas (tOnol) of training or exercise 
(ao"Kllo"l;). What we have with the Handbook, then, is a text devoted to three 
types of spiritual exercise, each of which is concerned with the digestion and 
assimilation of one of the three types of philosophical discourse. 
After the opening section of the Handbook which introduces the three 
'tonOl, the remainder of the text can be seen to divide loosely into groups of 
chapters concerned with the three types of exercise. 32 Whether this was an 
intentional device planned by Arrian is not important here. Nor are arguments 
concerning precisely where one divides the text in order to form these 
different groups. What is important is that by approaching the text with such 
an internal structure in mind one can gain a clearer understanding of the three 
Philosophique, et Divisions de la Philosophie chez les Sto'iciens', esp. p. 218; The Inner 
Citadel, pp. 89-98. 
31 Doubts have been e:\.-pressed by DobbiR Epictetus, Discourses Book 1, pp. 94. 164, and 
Barnes, Logic and the Imperial Stoa, pp. 34-35. Dobbin suggests that "it is vain to look for a 
complete correlation" (p. 94) and that they "do not completely correspond" (p. 164). However, 
his discussion appears, to me at least, to be a little unclear. He claims that the three 't01tOl do 
not correspond completely to the three parts of philosophical discourse and discusses the case 
of logic, apparently to support this claim. Despite tlns he tl1en adnrits that the third 't07tOC; does 
represent the study of logic (p. 164). He suggests that any inconsistency is due to Epictetus's 
use of two distinct conceptions of logic, one expansive (including epistemology), the otl1er 
restrictive (linrited to dialectic ). Yet it is far from clear tl1at Epictetus does use two different 
conceptions of logic. Rather, he simply follows the standard Stoic conception of logic wInch is 
significantly broader than merely dialectic, but sometimes refers to dialectic as logic, of which 
it is obviously a part, without necessarily implying that it is the only part. Barnes, arguing 
against Bonhoffer and Hadot, claims that "the three 't07tOl here are not the three traditional 
parts of philosophy" (p. 34 ). Yet Hadoe s claim is not that these are the same but rather that 
they correspond to one another (see e.g. 'Vne cIe des Pensees de Marc Aun~le: les trois topoi 
philosophiques selon Epictete', p. 69). Moreover, it is important to remember that this 
correspondence is not between three 'areas of study' and three parts of philosophy, but rather 
between three types of philosophical exercise and three types of philosophical discourse. 
32 In what follows I broadly follow the division of the Enchiridion outlined by Gourinat, 
Premieres le90ns sur Ie .A1anuel d'Epictete, pp. 45-48. This differs slightly from the earlier 
accounts such as those in Pohlenz, Die Stoa, vol. 2, p. 162; P. Hadot, The Inner Citadel, 326-
27; 1. Hadot, Simplicius, Commentaire sur Ie Alfanuel d'Epictete, pp. 149-51 (since Gourinat 
note also P. Hadot, Arrien, A1anuel d'Epictete, pp. 36-142). I do not want to suggest that 
Gourinat's analysis is definitive. Ratl1er I simply ",,'ant to draw attention to tlle presence of a 
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types of exerCIse proposed by Epictetus. This, in turn, will help us to 
understand the relationship between these three types of exercise (ao"KllO"l.~) 
and the three types of philosophical discourse (A6yo~). 
(b) Sections 2-29: Physical Exercises 
The first of the three types of exercise dealt with in the Handbook is concerned 
with exercises for one's desires and aversions (6p€~£1.~ Kcd £KKAiO"£l~),33 and 
this type of exercise may be seen to correspond to 'physics,.34 Spiritual 
exercises of this type are directed towards transforming one's desires and 
aversions so that one only wills that which is in accordance with nature (Ka:r<x 
qro(jtv).35 Many of the passages in this first section of the Handbook focus 
upon the order of nature and what is appropriate to desire in light of an 
understanding of that order. For example: 
Do not seek events to happen as you want (9€A£l~), but want (9€A£) 
events as they happen, and your life will flow well (£i>Po110"£l~). 36 
structure '''ithin the Enchiridion based arOlmd the three types of exercise which correspond to 
the three parts of philosophical discourse, a point agreed upon by all those noted above. 
33 For discussion of these terms and the eAient to which Epictetus's use of this terminology 
differs from the early Stoa see Inwood, Ethics and Human J1ction in Ear~y Stoicism, pp. 115-
26. 
34 See Bonhoffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epfctet, pp. 18-49 (= The Ethics of the Stoic 
Epictetus, pp. 32-81) who characterises this 't01tO~ as 'desire according to nature'. 
35 In this conteAi I use cpu(n~ to refer to the order of universal nature, the cosmos. Epictetus 
also uses cpucrt~ to refer to the nature of a particular species and to the nature of an indi,iduaL 
See Hijmans, 'A Note on cpucrt~ in Epictetus', esp. p. 282. 
36 Epictetus Enchiridion 8: Jllt STt't£t 'tu ytvoJl£va yivEcr6at ro~ 6£J..£~, &:AAU 6£AE m 
ytvOJlEVa ro~ yivE'tat, "Kat E'i>pOTtcr£t~. Note the etymological connection between yivEcr6at 
(i.e. yiyvEcr6at) and m Y1VOJlEva. In order to capture this one might translate as 'do not seek 
occurrences to occur as you want:, but want occurrences as they occur, and your life ,,,ill flow 
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The aim of this type of exercise is to train one's desires and aversions, to 
accustom oneself to desire whatever happens, to bring one's will into harmony 
with the will of the cosmos conceived as a living being.37 In Stoic physics, the 
individual is understood as but one component within a cosmos conceived as a 
1 k f · 38 . comp ex networ 0 mterconnected causes. ThIS network of causes was 
called 'fate' (£iJlapJlEvll).39 Within this network of causes, early Stoics such 
as Chrysippus distinguished between two types of fated things, 'simple' 
(simplicia) and 'conjoined' (copulata).4o For Chrysippus, simple-fated things 
are necessary and the product of the essence of a thing, such as the fact that all 
mortal beings will die. Conjoined-fated things involve both internal and 
external causes and it is by way of the role played by internal causes in 
conjoined-fated things that the Stoics introduce the notion of freedom into 
their deterministic system. 41 For example, 'Socrates will die' is a simple-fated 
well'. Regarding the use of £i>P011<J£1<;, note Zeno's £oo<X.1J1ovia &' icr'L1.v cupOla f3io'O (Arius 
Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.6e = 2.77.21 WH = SVF 1.184). Parallels to this passage can be 
found in Dissertationes 1.12.15, 2.14.7, 2.17.17-18, 4.1.89-90, 4.7.20. 
37 For tlns conception of the cosmos see in particular the extended account in Cicero De 
Natura Deorum 2.16-44, esp. 2.22 (= SVF 1.112-114), '\-vith further references in SVF 3.633-
645. 
38 For general surveys of Stoic physics and cosmology see Sanlbursky, Physics o/the StOics: 
Rahill, The Origins o/Stoic Cosmology; Sedley in CHHP, pp. 382-411; Furley in CHHP, pp. 
432-51. 
39 See e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.149 (= 5;vF 2.915), Aetius De Placitis Reliquiae 1.28.4 (DG 
324al-3 = SVF 2.917 = LS 55 J), Aulus Gellius 7.2.3 (= SVF 2.1000 = LS 55 K), Cicero De 
Dvinatione 1.125 (= SVF 2.921 = LS 55 L). For discussion see Gould, 'The Stoic Conception 
of Fate'; Long, 'Stoic Detemnnisl11 and Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato (i-xiv)'; Bobzien, 
Detenninism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, pp. 16-58. 
40 See Cicero De Fato 30 (= SVF 2.956), with further discussion in Bobzien, Determinism and 
Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, pp. 199-233. 
41 TIris formed part of the Stoic response to the 'lazy argument' (a.p"{o<; A6"{~), namely the 
claim that within a deterministic aCCOlmt of the cosmos it would become pointless for an 
individual to act towards any specific goal insofar as the outcome must already be 
predetermined~ see Cicero De Fato 28-29, Origen Contra Cel5um 2.20 (PG 11.837-40 = SJ F 
2.957). For Cbrysippus's distinction between intemal and exiemal causes see Cicero De Fato 
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thing by virtue of the fact that Socrates is a mortal being, but 'Socrates will die 
today' is not simply-fated insofar as various other factors will contribute to the 
outcome, such as whether one chooses to call out a doctor or not. 42 Chrysippus 
uses this distinction between simple-fated and conjoined-fated things to argue 
that even within a determinist conception of the cosmos an individual's 
decision to act can still contribute to the outcome of events. Epictetus, 
however, is keen to stress the role of external causes in conjoined-fated things 
and to remind his students that the outcome of these things is far from being 
within one's control, even though they involve an element that is 'up to us' 
(eq>' 1]jllv). An individual's desire and effort is but one causal factor among 
many in a conjoined-fated thing and consequently one can in no way control 
the final outcome. Thus Epictetus warns his students not to make their 
happiness or well-being (£uoatjlovia) dependent upon the outcome of such 
things. 
The alternative proposed by Epictetus is to bring one's own desires into 
harmony with the desires of the cosmos, to overcome the boundary between 
the individual and the cosmos so that one's own desire is in harmony with 
cosmic fate. 43 According to Stoic physics, any individual entity will act 
41-42 (= SVF 2.974), Aulus Gellius 7.2.11 (= SVF 2.1000)0 Plutarch De Stoiconl1ll 
Repugnantiis 1055f-1057c (part in ST-F 2.994), lvith discussion in Chapter Three § 7 above. 
42 Tins example derives from Cicero De Fato 30 (= SVF 2.956). modified in the light of 
Diogenianus apud Eusebius 6.8.35 (267a-b). Another example of a conjoined-fated thing is 
'Laius will have a son Oedipus' wl1ich will of course depend upon 'Laius will have 
intercourse with a woman' (see Origen Contra Celsum 2.20 (PG 11.837-40) = STF 2.957). In 
tlns example the two events are not only conjoined (copulata) but also co-fated (conjaralis) , 
one being a necessary condition of the other. See also Diogenianus apud Eusebius 6.8.25-29 
(265d-266b = SVF2.998). 
43 Sorabji e:\.'}Jresses tIns point perfectly: "it is not a matter of gritting your teetll. It is about 
seeing things differently, so that you do not need to grit your teeth" (Emotion and Peace oj 
lvfind. p. 1). 
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according to its own nature unless hindered by some external cause. From the 
perspective of the individual there are a whole series of external causes which 
hinder one's desires and actions. These external causes are other individual 
entities acting in accordance with their own internal natures. But cosmic 
nature includes everything that exists and thus has nothing external to it. In his 
account of Stoic cosmology Cicero writes, 
the vanous limited modes of being may encounter many external 
obstacles to hinder their perfect realisation, but there can be nothing 
that can frustrate nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains 
within herself all modes of being. 44 
Only the cosmos as a whole has complete freedom. It always acts according to 
its own nature and can never be hindered insofar as there are no external 
causes to interrupt its actions. From a cosmic perspective, then, the distinction 
between internal and external causes falls away. The distinction between such 
causes is thus always only relative to the perspective of a particular 
individual. 45 Epictetus appears to have overcome this always only relative 
distinction between internal and external causes, and to experience himself in 
agreement with the network of causes that constitutes fate. By 'willing' 
whatever happens, Epictetus identifies his own will with the will of the 
44 Cicero De Natura Deorum 2.35 (not in Sr.F but see 1.529; trans. Rackham): Etenim ceteris 
naturis multa extema quo minus perficiantur possunt obsistere, universam autem naluram 
nulla res potest impedire, propterea quod omnis naturas ipsa cohibit et continet. See also 
Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis I050c-d (= SVF 2.937), Marcus Aurelius 8.7. 10.33. 
45 See Botros, "Freedom, Causality, Fatalism, and Early Stoic Philosophy', p. 287. 
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cosmos. In effect, he expands his conception of his own will to include and 
encompass all causes, both internal and external to himself. 46 What Epictetus 
proposes, then, is a transformation of one's way of life based upon a detailed 
understanding of the nature of causes. 
We are now in a position to understand how Epictetus's exerCIses 
concerning desire and aversion (OP€~lC; Kat EKKAl<HC;) can be seen to relate to 
Stoic physical theory. Such theory postulates that the cosmos as a whole is a 
unified system of causes and that the individual is but one part of that system. 
Epictetus's exercises concerning desire and aversion attempt to assimilate and 
digest that theory so that it will transform one's behaviour. What we might call 
the practical implication of Stoic physical theory is the thought that, as a part 
of the system of nature, the individual should not conceive himself as an 
isolated entity surrounded by external causes, but rather as a single element 
within a larger unified physical system. Epictetus's 'physical exercises' are 
directed towards the transformation of one's desires in the light of this. They 
attempt to put into practice Stoic physics. 
46 Compare this with the way in which the distinction between what is and is not 'up to us' 
(£q>' TtJ1tv) is often cited as an example of the way in which Epictetus limits his conception of 
the individual and isolates it from both its mVll body and the rest of the ex1emal world (see e.g. 
Kalm, 'Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine', p. 253). Although there is a sense 
in which such a characterisation is correct, the physical exercise in Enchiridion 8 appears to 
suggest this other tendency in which the individual ex-pands his conception of himself to 
include all the actions of the cosmos. 
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(c) Sections 30-41: Ethical Exercises 
The second of the three types of exercise in the Handbook is concerned with 
one's impulse (OPJllt).47 Insofar as these impulses are impulses towards action, 
this type of exercise may be seen to correspond to 'ethics,.48 Spiritual 
exercises of this type are directed towards transforming one's impulses so that 
one only engages in 'appropriate actions' (K<x611KOV't<X), namely actions that 
are appropriate to one's own nature, to one's place in society, or the particular 
situation in which one may find oneself. 49 
According to Stoic ethical theory, of the impulses towards action, the 
primary impulse (1tpu)''Cll OPJllt) is towards self-preservation. 50 This leads one 
to select things that are in accordance with one's own nature (K<X'ta cpucrtv), 
such as food or anything else conducive to one's health. Any action that is in 
accordance with one's nature (K<X'ta cpucrtv) may be said to be an 'appropriate 
action' (K<x6fiKOV).51 Many actions inspired by this primary impulse are 
47 The introduction of the second 't6no~ at Enchiridion 30 is one point upon which 
commentators generally agree as this section opens with the words 't<X Ku61lK\'o'tu. 
48 See Bonhoffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, pp. 58-109 (= The Ethics of the Stoic 
Epictetus, pp. 82-158), who characterises this 't61to~ as ·action according to nature'. The 
connection is made explicit in Diogenes Laertius 7.84 (= SVF 3.1) where OPJlll is presented as 
part of ethics. 
49 The term 'appropriate' (lCu6f}lCOV) is glossed by Zeno in Diogenes Laertius 7.108 (= SVF 
1.230, 3.493 = LS 59 C) and translated into Latin by Cicero as officium in De Finibus 3.20 (= 
SVF 3.188 = LS 59 D). It is defined as an action that is in accordance with one's nature (KU't<X 
q),OCH v) and bas been illlderstood as 'function', 'proper function', . task " or 'duty'. It is applied 
to infants, m1in1als, even plants (see Diogenes Laertius 7.107), so it clearly cannot be 
tmderstood as 'duty' in any narrow moral sense. For further discussion see Bonhoffer, Die 
Ethik des Stolkers Epictet, pp. 193-233 (= The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus, pp. 244-289); 
Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 97-111; Tsekomakis, Studies in the Terminology of Ear~y Stoic 
Ethics, pp. 1-60; Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Ear~v Stoicism, pp. 200-01. That 
'appropriate actions' (lCu61llCOV'tU) fall under the heading of 'ethics' along with impulse 
(oPJlll) is made explicit in Diogenes Laertius 7.84 (= SVF 3.1). 
50 See Diogenes Laertius 7.85 (= SVF 3.178); also Aulus Gellius 12.5.7 (= STF 3.181). 
51 See Diogenes Laertius 7.108 (= ST'F 3.493). 
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common to animals, infants, and adults. However, for a rational adult the only 
properly appropriate actions will be those which are the product of rational 
impulses, namely an impulse with a rational justification. 52 Thus they will be 
actions that are appropriate to one's nature not merely as a biological entity 
but also as a rational being. 53 Some of these appropriate actions will be 
unconditional; others will vary according to circumstance. 54 
In the Handbook Epictetus deals with three different types of appropriate 
action (tca.9fitcov) - social, religious, and personal - examples of which would 
be what is appropriate behaviour towards, say, one's brother, towards the 
gods, and towards oneself 55 In particular, Epictetus discusses these in relation 
to what would constitute appropriate behaviour for a philosopher. For 
example: 
When you are about to meet someone, especially one of the people 
enjoying high esteem, ask yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have 
52 See Diogenes Laertius 7.86 (= SVF 3.178),7.108 (= SVF 3.495). Compare with Aristotle 
Ethica Nicomachea 1097b33-1098a18 where the function of man is characterised as an 
activity of the soul according to reason (lCo.'tCt AOyOV). 
53 For the rational adult, to act according to one's nature (Ko.'tCt q)'omv) is to act according to 
reason (1('o.'tCt AOyOV). See Diogenes Laertius 7.86 (= Sf/F 3.178). 
54 The fatnous example of a Stoic appropriate action dependent upon circumstance is suicide~ 
see e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.130 (= SVF 3.757), Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1042d 
(= SVF 3.759), Cicero De Finibus 3.60 (= SVF 3.763), with Rist, Stoic Philosoph)'. pp. 233-
55. 
55 These three types can be seen in Enchiridiol1 §§ 30 (social), 31-32 (religious), and 33-35 
(personal). Epictetus appears to have emphasised the role of social 1('o.8111('0\''to. perhaps more 
than was done so in the early Stoa. This reflects his use of the analogy between one's social 
position and the role given to an actor in a play (see e.g. Enchiridion 17). 
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done in such circumstances, and you will not be at a loss to deal with 
the situation properly. 56 
Here Epictetus presents the behaviour of these two philosophers as examples 
of the sort of behaviour to which the apprentice philosopher should aspire. Just 
as one might say that what is appropriate behaviour for an infant will differ 
from what is appropriate for an adult, so Epictetus suggests that what is 
appropriate for a typical person will not necessarily be appropriate for a 
philosopher. If one attempts to follow a philosophical way of life - to adopt 
the role of the philosopher - then one must acknowledge that this will affect 
what will and will not be appropriate for one to do. In order to discover what 
sort of behaviour is appropriate to the philosopher, Epictetus suggests that one 
should examine the lives of role models such as Zeno or Socrates. A study of 
their lives will soon reveal that the philosopher must be indifferent to external 
circumstances, unconcerned with material possessions, and undisturbed when 
faced with death. These attitudes will determine the actions that are 
appropriate to the philosopher who aspires to a completely rational way of life. 
We can now see that exercises concerned with one's impulse (6PIll}) and 
with what sort of behaviour is appropriate (Ka.9fjKOV) will vary depending 
upon the individual concerned. In the Handbook, a text for philosophical 
apprentices, the focus is clearly on actions appropriate for an aspiring student 
of philosophy. These 'ethical exercises' can be seen to attempt to put into 
56 Epictetus Enchiridion 33.12 (trans. Boter): o'tav 't1V1. JltAA:)1~ o"\)Jl~}.AEt\", JlCtA~?"'t~ 'tOOl' 
tv i>nEpoXn BOK01>V'tOOV, npOj3aAAE <JEau't<$ 't1. <Xv tn01.11<JEv tv W1>'tQ> Ioo1<pa'tll~ 11 Zl1\'(O\" 
Kat. OUK anopl)<JEt~ wi> xpl)<Ja<J6a1 npo<JllKoV'tOO~ 't<$ EJlnE<JoV't1. 
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practice Stoic ethical theory concerned with how one should act. Although, 
unlike physical theory, the practical implications of such theory may seem 
obvious, nevertheless the student of philosophy will still need to engage in 
series of exercises designed to aid its digestion so that he can not merely s£ry 
how the sage should act but also act as the sage should act. Thus, 'ethical 
exercises' are essential. 
(d) Sections 42-45: Logical Exercises 
The third of the three types of exercise dealt with in the Handbook is exercises 
concerned with one's judgement (u1t6A.TJ\j1t~) and one's assents 
(n)'YKa'taetcrEt~).57 As has been suggested, this type of exercise may be seen 
to correspond to 'logic'. 58 Epictetus is himself the first to note the apparent 
irrelevance of the study of the form of logical arguments to daily life. 59 
Nevertheless he repeatedly affirms the need for this type of spiritual 
exercise.60 Such exercises are directed towards transforming the way in which 
one judges impressions ( cpav'tacrtat), training oneself to give assent 
(a1)'YKa'taetcrt~) only to those that are 'adequate impressions' (cpav'taatat 
57 These terms "rill be discussed further in Chapter Seven § 2 (b) below. 
58 See Bonhoffer, Die Ethik des Stoik.ers Epictet, pp. 122-126 (= The Ethics of the Stoic 
Epictetus, pp. 158-165) who characterises this W1tO~ as 'judgement according to nature'. This 
clearly presupposes a conception of 'logic' much broader than that com~on toda~; see LS, 
vol. L pp. 188-89; Barnes in C71HP, pp. 65-67. It also involves a conceptlon of lOgIC broader 
than that presupposed by Xenakis, 'Logical Topics in Epictetus', p. 94. 
59 See e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 1.7.1, with discussion in Barnes. Logic and the Imperial 
Stoa, pp. 38-42, 62-70. 
60 He also affirms the need to study logical theory; see e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 2.25.1-3. 
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Ka 'ta),:ll1t'tt Ka i). 61 Central to this 1 S the role played by judgements 
(U1tOA:i1",E1<;, 8oYJ.la'ta). For example: 
Someone bathes quickly: do not say, 'he bathes badly', but 'he bathes 
quickly'. Someone drinks much wine: do not say, 'he drinks badly', 
but 'he drinks much'. For before knowing his judgement (8oYJla), how 
do you know that it is bad? In that way it will not happen to you that 
you receive adequate impressions (<puv'tacrtw; Ka'taA:ll1t'tn:a<;) of 
some things but give your assent (O'uYKu'ta'ti8Ecr8a1) to others.62 
Here Epictetus illustrates an important distinction between what is given in an 
impression ( <puv'tucria) and what is added to that impression by the 
individual. In this case, the addition is the value-judgement concerning 
someone else's behaviour. The third type of exercise concerned with 
judgement (U1tOA 11"'1<;) and assent (cruYKa'ta8ecrt<;) is designed to train the 
individual to assent only to those impressions which have not been 
supplemented by an unwarranted value-judgement. In other words, they 
involve using logical analysis concerning what is true, what is false, and what 
is doubtful, in relation to one's judgements and the beliefs based upon those 
judgements. This, Epictetus suggests, is the only real reason to study logic.63 
61 For more on 'adequate impressions' see Chapter Four § 2 (c) and Chapter Seven § 2 (c). 
62 Epictetus Enchiridion 45 (trans. Boter modified): Aou£'tai 't~ 't<X.xtro~· ~:it £lnn~ on 
KaK&~, ft.A/,,' o'tt 'taxtro~. niv£t 'tt~ 1tOAUV ohov' J!TJ dnn~ o'tt KaK&~, ft.A/,,' on n.?AU\,. np~\' 
11 rap otarv&vat 'to oorJ!a, no8£v oicr8a £i KaK~; 01)'t~ 0-0 O1>J$i1cr£'tai crot aA/"rov J.l£V 
q>av'tacria~ Ka'taAl1n'ttKa~ J.aJ.ll3av£tv, (iAAot~ of; cr'U'YKa'ta'ti8£cr8at. 
63 Epictetus mocks one of his students by saying, "It is as if, when in the sphere of assent 
(crUYKa'ta8£'ttKO-U 't01to'U) sUITOlmded with impressions (q>av'taO't&\,), some of them adequate 
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There is a sense in which this third type of exercise is the most important 
of the three, insofar as it underwrites the other twO.64 One's judgements will 
always, to a certain extent, determine one's desires and impulses. It may seem 
odd, then, that according to the analysis of the structure of the Handbook that 
has been outlined it is relegated to relatively few sections towards the end of 
the text. However, this theme - the analysis of one's judgements - can be seen 
to run throughout the text of the Handbook and, for example, it appears at the 
very beginning of the text in the discussion of desires and aversions. 65 Yet in 
these later sections the idea of a 'logical exercise' takes centre stage, exercises 
designed to digest logical and epistemological theory so that these seemingly 
abstract subjects can contribute to the task of transforming one's way oflife.66 
(e) Sections 46-52: The Philosophical 131.0<; 
After these three groups of chapters dealing with the three types of spiritual 
exercise corresponding to the three types of philosophical discourse, the 
structure implicit in the Handbook appears to break down. However, the 
chapters that constitute the final part of the text can be seen to have a theme of 
(ICCX:t<lA:Tl1t'ttK"roV), and others not adequate (<lK"<l't<lA:'11t'troV), we should not wish to distinguish 
between them, but to read a treatise On Comprehension (IIEpt K"<l't<lj"Tt'lfEro<;)" (Dissertationes 
4.4.13; trans. Oldfather modified). 
64 I shall return to the third 't61to~ and discuss it in more detail in Chapter Seven § 2. 
65 See e.g. Epictetus Enchiridion 3 & 5. ." 
66 As I have already touched upon earlier, the Stoic conception of 10g.IC O"~YIKTI) was 
significantly broader than the modem conception, including not ?n1y ~lalectIc. but also 
rhetoric, and what today would be called epistemology. For further discuSSIOn see LS. vol. 1, 
pp. 188-89: Barnes in CHHP, pp. 65-67. 
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their own; the philosophical life (~iO~).67 In particular, these chapters focus 
upon how a philosopher should act, the difference between a non-philosopher 
or layman (iot(.i)'t:ll~) and someone who is making progress (npoKonil), and 
how to train oneself to become a philosopher. 68 To this part of the Handbook 
belongs the analogy between the digestion of philosophical principles and the 
digestion of food by sheep.69 This is followed by a reminder concerning the 
function of philosophical discourse, for example, the function of a 
commentary on the philosophical works of Chrysippus: 
If I am impressed by the explaining (£~lly£'iO"eat) itself, what have I 
done but ended up a grammarian (ypaJlJla'ttKoc;) instead of a 
philosopher (qnAoao<pou), except that I am explaining Chrysippus 
instead of Homer. Instead when someone says to me 'read me some 
Chrysippus' I tum red when I am unable to exhibit actions (ta epya) 
that match and harmonise (auJl<prova) with his words (tote; AoYOtC;).70 
67 Although tins is clearly a departure from the tlrree 'tonOl outlined by Epictetus, note the 
fragmentary texi in POxy 3657 (= CPF I 1, 100.5), esp. 2.13-15, which appears to propose 
l3io~ as a Stoic 't01tO~ (see the commentary by Sedley in The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, yol. 52, p. 
54; also CPF I 1 ***, p. 802). 
68 See Epictetus Enchiridion §§ 46-47, 48. and 51-52 respectively. Note that the tlrree 'tonol 
outlined in § 52 do not appear to correlate to the main set of 'tonol 'with which Re ,lmve been 
concerned here. However see 1. Hadot, Simplicius, Commentaire sur Ie J\1a11Uel d'Epictete. p. 
150 n. 22. 
69 See Epictetus Enchiridion 46, quoted and discussed in Chapter Five § 3 (b) above. 
70 Epictetus Enchiridion 49: <Xv OE. aino wino 'to £~llYEicr6at 6a'OJ,uloO), 'tt &).),,JJ ~ 
ypaJ.lJ.la'tl1co~ anE'tEAEo611V ant <plAooo<po'O, nAilv yE 0'1) on avd ·OJ.l~PO'O Xp~ot1tno~' 
£~llYOUJ.lEVO~; J.l&,AAoV ouv ll'tav 'tl~ £1n11 J.lOl £navayv0)6i J.lOl 'to, Xp'OOt1tn~lO\', Ep'06ptO) 
o'tav !i'l) OUVIDJ.lat oJ.lota 'tu epya Kat OUJ.l<pO)va £ntoE1KvUEtV Wl~ AOYot~. 
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Passages such as this in the final part of the Handbook serve to emphasise the 
practical nature of the text by focusing on the idea that the product of 
philosophy is constituted by actions (Epya) rather than words (AOYOt). The 
three -r01tOt do not form yet another mode of theoretical analysis of Stoic 
doctrine; rather they are the means by which such doctrine is put into practice. 
This series of chapters at the end of the Handbook remind the philosophical 
apprentice of this, the apprentice who - when faced with a series of complex 
physical, ethical, and logical theories - may occasionally lose sight of the 
reason why he began to study philosophy in the first place. 
(f) Section 53: Maxims 
The final chapter of the Handbook is comprised of four short quotations. 
These texts, capturing the central themes of the Handbook, may be seen as 
maxims to be learned by the student, and Epictetus (or, more likely, Arrian) 
suggests that these should be kept at hand (npoX£lpa). The first pair - from 
Cleanthes and Euripides - focus upon the Stoic goal of living in harmony with 
nature: 
[1] 'Lead me on, Zeus, both you and Destiny, 
wherever you assign me to go, 
for I will follow without hesitation; but if I do not want, 
being bad, I will follow all the same'. 
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[2] 'Whoever has complied wel1 with necessity, 
is wise according to us and knows the things of the gods,.71 
The second pair - both quotations attributed to Socrates - highlight his status 
as the ultimate philosophical role model and the figure behind the idealised 
image of the Stoic sage:72 
[3] 'But, erito, if it pleases the gods like this, it must happen like this' . 
[4] 'Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot harm me'. 73 
Simplicius notes in his commentary that the second of these quotations from 
Socrates - the final line of the Handbook - brings us back to the very 
beginning of the text insofar as it emphasises again the claim that individual 
should not place value upon those things that are not 'up to us' (eq>' llJltv).74 
The behaviour of Socrates at his trial forms a powerful example of an attitude 
of indifference towards those things that are not within one's control. It also 
illustrates the sort of transformation in attitude and behaviour towards which 
the spiritual exercises in the Handbook are directed. From beginning to end, 
then, the Handbook is a text designed to instruct the philosophical apprentice 
71 Epictetus Enchiridion 53.1-2. These are by Cleanthes (= SVF 1.527) and Euripides (= fro 
956 Nauck: not fro 965 listed by Schenld, Oldfather, and Boter). 
72 Note in particular Epictetus Enchiridion 51.3: "Even if you are not yet a Socrates" you must 
live as if you wish to become a Socrates" (trans. Boter), with comment in Jagu, Epictete et 
Platon, pp. 29-33, 47-62; Hijmans, 'AlTKllCYU;, pp. 72-77; Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic 
Philosophy', pp. 150-51. A list of references to Socrates as a Stoic role model in Epictetus can 
be found in SSR I C 530 but, in particular, note also Dissertationes 4.1.159-169 (= SSR I C 
524). 
73 Epictetus Enchiridion 53.3-4. These are from Plato CrUo 43d and Plato Apologia 30c. They 
both differ slightly from the teA1s preserved in the Platonic MS tradition. 
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how to put into practice the doctrines that he has learned with the ambitious 
goal of developing an attitude of calm (unu8£Hx) and tranquillity (utapa~ia) 
inspired by Socrates. 
3. Summary 
In this chapter I have developed our discussion concerning the relationship 
between ).,oyor; and aO'1Cll.<nr; by examining Epictetus's account of three tOnol 
in which he suggests one should be trained. These three areas of philosophical 
training or exercise correspond to the three parts of philosophical discourse. 
Each type of training is designed to digest and to assimilate the ideas 
expressed in the corresponding part of discourse and, together, these exercises 
form the second stage required in the study of philosophy conceived as a 
The introduction of this account of the three tOnOl has be described as 
Epictetus's single important innovation and contribution to Stoic philosophy. 75 
It is also often presented as a division within ethics. 76 However, as we have 
seen, this is not the case. Epictetus does not neglect physics and logic in 
favour of ethics. If he neglects anything it is philosophical theory, which, in 
the texts that survive, he downplays in favour of philosophical exercise. As I 
have already noted, this may simply reflect the literary genres of the surviving 
74 See Simplicius In Epicteti Enchiridion 71.44-47 Hadot. 
75 See e.g. More, Hellenistic Philosophies, p. 107. 
76 Ibid. 
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texts,77 and there is evidence to suggest that the study of complex 
philosophical theories formed an important part of Epictetus's classroom 
teaching. The occasionally excessive emphasis upon philosophical training 
should not be taken to be a rejection or devaluation of philosophical theory or 
discourse, but rather as a reminder that such theory does not on its own 
constitute philosophy conceived as an art or craft ('tEXV''l). As with the 
apprentice shoemaker, an education in theory (A6yo~) forms only the first 
stage towards mastery of one's chosen art, an education that must be 
supplemented with a second stage comprised of training or exercise (ao"Kllo"t~) 
designed to transform one's character and habitual behaviour in the light of 
that theoretical understanding. Epictetus's innovation, in the form of his 
introduction of the three 'tonot, may be seen as an attempt to emphasise the 
importance of such exercises by subjecting them to a detailed analysis similar 
to that already performed on philosophical discourse by members of the Early 
Stoa. Yet, as we have already seen in the case of discourse, such a division 
was probably designed as an educational device rather than a substantial claim 
concerning the nature of philosophy as such, which was conceived as a unified 
entity and activity. Consequently it should not be assumed that this threefold 
analysis breaks down if, occasionally, the boundaries between the three types 
78 
of exercise appear bluned. 
77 See in particular the discussion of the Dissertationes within the context of the ancient 
literary genre of the diatribe (<>t<X'tptl)it) in Souilhe (CUF), vol. t pp. xxii-x~\:. . . 
78 It is inevitable that analyses of our judgements,. desires, and impulses, wIll to a certam 
eAient overlap with one another, and that some accounts of philosophical exercises "ill 
involve more than one of these and consequently be difficult to categorise according to this 
threefold schema However, tIllS does not diminish the benefit gained from such an analysis. 
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I have followed a number of commentators in suggesting that Epictetus's 
threefold division of philosophical exercises can be seen to structure the text 
of the Handbook. There are clearly limits to the extent to which such a claim 
can be pushed. Nevertheless, I have found it helpful to follow this suggestion 
insofar as it enables us to examine the three types of spiritual exercise present 
in the Handbook and to emphasise the way in which this text is devoted to 
such exercises. The Handbook may be read as a text devoted to the second 
stage of philosophical education, a guide for students who have finished their 
study of philosophical theory in the classroom and are now ready to embark 
on the significantly harder task of putting that theory into practice. Although it 
may not take the traditional form of philosophical writing embodied by the 
complex theoretical treatise or commentary, I suggest that, insofar as it is 
devoted to these essential philosophical exercises, the Handbook is 
nevertheless an important philosophical text. 
In the final chapter I shall move on to examine another Stoic text devoted 
to philosophical exercise, the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Although all 
three of Epictetus's 't01tOt may be seen in the Meditations, I shall argue that 
the third 't01t0<; concerned with judgement (U1tOA.ll\jft<;) and assent 
(cruYKu'tu9tcrt<;) takes centre stage. By examining Marcus's extended 
reflection upon this third 't01t0<;, we shall develop further our understanding of 
the relationship between ')"oyo<; and acrKllcrt<; and complete our analysis of the 
Stoic conception of philosophy as an art concerned with one's life. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
EXERCISES IN THE MEDITATIONS 
OF MARCUS AURELIUS 
In the last chapter I outlined Epictetus's division of philosophical exercises 
into three types corresponding to the three parts of philosophical discourse. In 
this chapter I shall consider the relationship between 'Aoyor; and acrKllcrtr; 
further by focusing upon one of the three types of exercise. In order to do this 
I shall examine the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. 1 As we have already seen 
in Chapter Five, it is possible to discern two types of text concerned with 
spiritual exercises, and, as we have seen in Chapter Six, the Handbook may be 
seen as an example of the first type of text, that is, as a guide to be used by 
philosophical apprentices. In this Chapter we shall focus upon the Meditations 
1 For comment on the teA1 of the 11.1editations see Additional Note 4. I have relied primarily 
upon Farquharson's 1944 edition and, in general, translations are from his edition. 
occasionally modified. Book length studies of the lvleditations include Rutherford. The 
Aleditatiol1s of Ala reus Aurelius, and Hadot, The Inner Citadel. Shorter studies worthy of note 
include Bnmt, 'Marcus Aurelius in his Aleditations'; Asmis, 'The Stoicism of Marcus 
Aurelius'; Hadot 'Vne cM des Pensees de "Marc Aurele: les trois topai philosophiques selon 
Epictete':' Rist, 'Are you a Stoic? The Case of Marcus Aurelius'. A detailed te>..1ual 
commentary can be found in vol. 2 of Farquharson's edition. Detailed textua1notes can also 
be found in Crossley's edition of book 4 of the Aleditatiol1s. 
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as an example of the second type of text, that is, a text written by a 
philosophical apprentice whilst engaged in spiritual exercises. 
In particular, I shall focus upon the ways in which seemingly abstract and 
technical parts of Stoic epistemological theory might be understood within the 
context of the conception of philosophy as a 'tEXVll outlined in Part One. In 
order to do this I shall focus upon a central theme in the Meditations - namely 
reflections upon the idea of a 'point of view of the cosmos' - and examine the 
way in which this is underpinned by Stoic epistemological theory borrowed 
from Epictetus. 
1. The Literary Form of the Meditations 
The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius are the Philosopher-Emperor's personal 
reflections compiled during his apprenticeship in the Stoic art of living. 2 If the 
Handbook may be characterised as a guide to spiritual exercises to be used by 
students, then the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius may be described as an 
example of a text produced by a student engaged in such exercises. Indeed, it 
is tempting to speculate that Marcus may have had a copy of the Handbook 
with him when he wTote the Meditations. 3 The traditional Greek title of the 
Meditations - 'to; £1<; E<XU'tOV, literally 'to himself - indicates the personal 
:2 There are a number of oblique references to philosophy being a 't£XVll analogous to other 
't£;{vcn in tlleAfeditations; see e.g. 4.2, 5.1, 6.16, 6.35, 7.6K 1l.5. 
3 The influence of Epictetus on Marcus is well documented~ see e.g. Long, 'Epictetus, Marcus 
Aurelius', pp. 986-89~ Hadot, The Inner Citadel, pp. 54-72. Although it is unclear whether 
Marcus had a copy of the Enchiridiol1, he does refer to the Dissertatiol1es in the A1editations: 
at 1.7 Marcus says that he borrowed a copy of the 'memoirs' of Epictetus ('tOl~ 'E7ttK'tll'tEiot~ 
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nature of this text.4 The Mediations were written as a private notebook by 
Marcus, probably never intended for public circulation, in which he meditates 
upon specific philosophical ideas in order to transform his own attitudes and 
habitual responses. In doing this he, in effect, follows the advice given by 
Seneca in his On Anger: 
This [the soul] should be summoned to give an account of itself every 
day. Sextius had this habit, and when the day was over and he had 
retired to his nightly rest, he would put these questions to his soul: 
'What bad habit have you cured today? What fault have you resisted? 
In what respect are you better?' Anger will cease and become more 
controllable if it finds that it must appear before a judge every day. [ ... 
In the evening] I scan the whole of my day and retrace all my deeds 
and words. I conceal nothing from myself, I omit nothing. 5 
This practice, Marcus says in Book 1, was something he learned from his 
Stoic mentor Rusticus.6 
imOJiV1Ul<X,crtv) from his teacher Rusticus (Arrian also uses unoJivltJia'ta at Dissertationes 
Praef. 2), and he often quotes them (see e.g. 4.41, 11.33-38). 
4 The title was probably added later and the earliest recorded mention is c. AD 900 by 
Arethas, Scholia in Lucianum 50 (207.6-7 Rabe): M<ipKoe; 0 Kaicrap £V wie; de; tamov 
1181KOic;. Earlier, the teA'l was referred to by Themistius in AD 364 (Orationes 6.81c) as tl~e 
Precepts or Admonitions of Marcus ('trov MapKo'O napayy£AJi<l'troV). See Farquharson s 
commentary, pp. xiii-xix, 433-34; Hadot, The Inner Citadel, pp. 23-25; Birley. Afarcus 
Aurelius, p. 212. 
5 Seneca De Ira 3.36.1-3 (trans. Basore). 
6 See Marcus Aurelius 1.7: "From Rusticus: to get an impression of need for refonn and 
treatment of character (8£pcmd~ 'to-u it8oi><;)", with Farquharson. p. -I-. ./J. For R~sticus:s 
status as a Stoic (who, as I have already noted, lejnt Marcus a copy of Eplctetus s 
Dissertationes) see Dio Cassius 72.35.1. 
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With the exception of Book 1, the Meditations do not seem to have any 
implicit structure in the way that the Handbook can be seen to have. 7 As we 
have seen, it is possible to discern within the Handbook a division into distinct 
sections each focusing upon a different type of spiritual exercise. Although the 
Meditations do not display any similar structure, Marcus can nevertheless be 
seen to follow Epictetus's account of the three types of spiritual exerCIse 
corresponding to the three parts of philosophical discourse: 8 
Wipe out impression (<paV'tao-lav): check impulse (6pJll]V): quench 
desire (op£l;tv): keep the governing self in its own contro1. 9 
Continually and, if possible, on the occasion of every impression, test 
it by physics, by ethics, by logic. 10 
'Impressions', 'impulses', and 'desires', are clearly references to Epictetus' s 
three 't01Wt which, as we have seen, correspond to the three parts of 
philosophical discourse; logic, ethics, and physics. The Meditations can also 
be seen to share with the Handbook the idea that philosophical doctrines 
7 The order of the teA'! may simply follow the order of composition but one cannot be certain. 
With regards to Book 1, Rutherford notes that § 6.48 appears to outline a plan for it and that it 
may have been composed as a separate work but preserved "vith the rest of the AJeditations in 
the manuscript tradition. See his Introduction to the new edition of Farquharson's translation, 
p. xvi; also Bnmt, 'Marcus Aurelius in his l\leditations', p. 18; Birley, .A1arcus Aurelius. p. 
212. 
8 See Hadot 'Une cM des Pensees de Marc Aurele: les trois topoi philosophiques selon 
Epictete', 65-83; The Inner Citadel, esp. pp. 69-70. 
9 Marcus Aurelius 9.7. 
10 Marcus Aurelius 8.13. Farquharson translates q)1)(HoAoy£tV, n(90)"oy£t\,. and 
OlUA£K'tU(£'\:)£a9ul as 'natural science', 'psychology', and 'logic', but in his commentary (p. 
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should always be ready to hand (npOXEtpo~). In one passage Marcus 
emphasises this with particular reference to Epictetus's three 'tonol: 
These three thoughts keep always ready to hand (npOXEtpu): 
First, in what you do that your act be not without purpose and not 
otherwise than Right (LltKll) itself would have done [ ... ]. 
The second, to remember the nature of each individual from his 
conception to his first breath until he gives back the breath of life [ ... ]. 
The third, to realise that if you could be suddenly caught up into 
the air and could look down upon human life and all its variety you 
would disdain it [ ... ] .11 
The first of these is concerned with actions and impulses, and corresponds to 
'ethics'. The second is concerned with the true nature of individuals and 
corresponds to 'physics'. The third is concerned with the analysis of 
impressions (cpuv'tuO'tUt) and value-judgements (unOAltVEtC;) and thus 
corresponds to 'logic'. Although to a certain extent these three thoughts are 
inevitably interconnected, the one that tends to dominate the Meditations is the 
third, concerned with the analysis of impressions and judgements. In the 
passage here, Marcus imagines a perspective 'above' the everyday world of 
human affairs and this imagery recurs throughout the Meditations, often 
closely connected to comments relating to Epictetus's third 'tonoc;. In the 
759) acknowledges that this is an attempt to e:x-press the Stoic tripartite division of 
philosophical discourse. Indeed, Haines (LCL) translates these as "physics, ethics, logic". 
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remainder of this chapter I shall focus upon this theme in Marcus's written 
spiritual exercises and, in particular, its relation with Stoic logical theory in 
order to develop further our understanding of the relationship between 'AoyoC; 
and aO'Kl1O'tC;. This, in turn, will contribute to our understanding of philosophy 
conceived as a 1:EXVl1. 
2. The Point of View of the Cosmos 
(a) Spiritual Exercises in the Meditations 
Central to the written spiritual exercises that constitute the Meditations is the 
distinction between the opinions of the foolish majority and the adequate 
impressions of the sage. This is the distinction between the way things appear 
according to human opinion (()o~u) and the way they are according to nature 
(KU1:<l <puO'tv). Marcus writes that one should not hold on to the opinions of all 
men, but only to those of men who live in accordance with nature. 12 Only the 
Stoic sage experiences things as they are according to nature, that is, as they 
are in themselves.13 Throughout the Meditations there are numerous passage 
11 Marcus Aurelius 12.24. For further examples of npoX£1po<; see 3.13, -1-.3, 5.1, 6.48, 7.1, 
7.64, 9.42, 11.4, 11.18. 
12 See Marcus Aurelius 3.4.4. TIus is the only place where Marcus uses this Stoic formula 
('trov OJlOAoyoUJ.ll:V(J)<; 'tn <pUO'£1). Elsewhere (e.g. 1.9,3.9,3.12,4.1, 5.3, 5.4, 7.11, 7.56, 7.7-1-. 
8.29, 10.33, 12.1), he prefers the shorthand 'according to nature' (Ka't<x <pUcrtv). 
13 See Kerferd, 'What Does the Wise Man Know?', esp. p. 132. 
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that illustrate what Marcus takes this perspective to reveal. Here are five such 
examples: 14 
Of man's life, his time is a point, his sub stance flowing, his perception 
faint, the constitution of his whole body decaying, his soul a spinning 
wheel, his fortune hard to predict, and his fame doubtful~ that is to say, 
all the things of the body are a river, the things of the soul dream and 
delusion, life is a war and a journey in a foreign land, and afterwards 
oblivion. 15 
Often consider the speed of the movement and carrying away and 
coming to be of existing things. F or substance is like a river in 
perpetual flow, its activities are in continuous change, its causes are in 
countless turns, it is never near a standstill, and close at hand is the 
infinite void of past and future in which all things disappear. 16 
14 The following translations are my own. I have consulted a number of editions for these 
passages including Dalfen (BT), Farquharson, Haines (LCL), Leopold (OCT), and Theiler. I 
supply the texts upon which my translations are based and the different readings adopted by 
the various editors. I have already discussed these passages in a slightly different contex1 in 
my 'The Point of View of the Cosmos'. 
15 Marcus Aurelius 2.17: Tou «v6pconivou /3iou 6 J.Ltv Xpov~ O"'tlYJ.LTt, it ot ouO"ia pEoooa, it 
ot al0"81}0"~ «J.LUOp<l, it ot O}"()1) WU O"cOJ.La'toe; O"uy~ptO"te; EUO"1}nWe;, it ot 'lfUXTt poJ1/3oe;, it ot 
'tUx1} (1)0"'t£lCJ.Lap'tov, it ot Q>TtJ.L1} <X.lCpt'tOV· o"1)VEAOV'tt ot £inElv, n<lv'ta 'to. ).LEv WU O"cOJ.La'toe; 
no'tcxJ.LO<;, 'to. ot 'tile; 'lf1)xile; OVEtpOe; lCat. 'tuQ>oe;, 6 ot /3ioe; nOAE).LOe; lCal ~EV01) E.nt01}J.Lia, it ot 
uO"'tEpoQ>1}J.Lia ATt81}. (line 2: P6J.L/3oe; Farquharson, Haines, Leopold; pEJ.L/36e; Dalfen, Theiler). 
16 Marcus Aurelius 5.23: I10}"/v<llC~ Ev81)J.LoU 'to 't<lXOC; TIle; napcx<popae; lCat. i>nE~aycoYile; 'tID\, 
OV'tCOV lCat. ytv0J.L£vcov. 11 'tE ya.p oooia oiov nO'taJ.LOc; tv Ot1}VElCEl pUo"H lCal. ai tvEpYHat tv 
o"1)VEXEO"t J.LE'ta/3oAalc; lCal. 'to. cxhta £V J.L1)pia~ 'tponcxlc; lCat O"XEMv ouotv Eo"1ri>c; lCal 'to 
n<lpEYY1)C; 'tOOE a.nHpov 'tOU napQ>X1}lCOWe; lCCXl. J.L£AAoV'tOC; «xavE;, 4> n<l\-"ta tvaQ>avi~E'tat. 
(line 2: ov'tcov Haines, Leopold; ov'tcov 'tE Dalfen, Farquharson, Theiler: line 3: after Eo"'tcOc; 
Dalfen adds <000£ 'to £1)EO"'too; 'tOU XPOV01»; line 4: WOE Haines, Theiler; 'to o£ Dalfen, 
Farquharson, Leopold; line 4: wu Haines, Leopold; 'tou 'tE Dalfen, Farquharson, Theiler). 
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Observe the courses of the stars as if revolving with them and reflect 
upon the continuous changes of the elements into one another for 
, 
. . 
Impresslons such as these are for cleansing the filth of earth-bound 
life. 17 
You have the power to strip away many superfluous troubles located 
wholly in your judgement, and to possess a large room for yourself 
embracing in thought the whole cosmos, to consider everlasting time, 
to think of the rapid change in the parts of each thing, of how short it is 
from birth until dissolution, and how the void before birth and that 
after dissolution are equally infinite. 18 
How little a fraction of infinite and empty time has been di stributed to 
each individual, for quickly it is lost in the eternal; and how little of 
the whole substance, how little of the whole soul, and on how little a 
clump of the whole earth do you creep. Considering all these things, 
imagine nothing greater than this: to act as your nature guides, and to 
undergo what common nature brings. 19 
17 Marcus Aurelius 7.47: I1£PlcrlW1t£lV acr'tprov 15pol1o'O~ cOcr1t£p cr'Ol11t£PlSEOV'to. K':o.! 'tae; 'tOOv 
cr'tolx£irov de; aAA11Ao. l1£'to.(30Aa~ cr'Ov£x&c; EVVO£lY U1tOK':o.So.iPO'UO"1 yap o.i wi>'tcov 
<pa.V'to.cria.t 'tov pfutov 'tou xa.l1a.!j3io'O. 
18 Marcus Aurelius 9.32: I10AAa 1t£ptcrcra 1t£pt£A£lv 'tOOv EvoXAoi>V'tCOV crot 15uvo.cra.t OAa. E1tt 
'tTI imOATt'lf£t crO'O K£il1£va., Ka.! 1tOAATtV £up'Oxcopio.v 1t£pt1t01.Ttcr£te; 111511 cr£o.mQ), <'tQ» 'tO~ 
OAOV K':ocr110V n£pl£tA11<PEVa.t 'tTI YVIDl1TI K':a.! 'tOv ui15wv a.iOOva. 1t£ptVO£lV K':a.! 'tTtv 'tOOv K':a.'to. 
l1EpOe; EK':acrw'O npaYl1a.'toe; 'ta.X£la.V l1£'ta.(30ATtV E1ttVO£lV, ~ !)pa.X'\> 11£V 'to U1tO y£v£cr£roc; 
l1EXpt 15ta.A ucr£ro~, uxa.vte; 15t 'to 1tpO 'tile; Y£VEcr£coe;, roe; K':a.t 'to l1£'ta 'titv 15tal. '00"\. v Ol1oicoe; 
a1t£tpov. (line 2: <'tQ» Farquharson, Haines, Leopold Theiler: omitted in Dalfen; line 3: 
ui15l.OV Dalfen, Haines. Leopold Theiler; <u>i15wv Farquharson; line 4: Dalfen brackets 
EK':acr'to'O 1tpaYl1a.lOe;). 
19 Marcus Aurelius 12.32: I1ocr'tov l1EpOe; 'tou u1t£ipo'O K':a.! uxa.voue; a.iOOvoc; U1tOl1£~PtO"'ta.t 
h:acr'tQ)' 'taxtcr'ta. yap Eva.<pa.vi~£'to.t 'tQ) utoiW 1tocrwv 15t 'tile; OA11c; oucriac;' 1tocrwv 15£ 'til~ 
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In these passages and many others like them Marcus proposes what might be 
called a 'point of view of the cosmos', a perspective that takes as its point of 
departure the large scale processes and movements of the cosmos itself a , 
perspective far removed from the first person perspective of ordinary human 
affairs. In a number of passages Marcus reminds himself continually to "look 
from above" (iivro9EV t1u9EroPEtV),20 From this birds-eye view or 'point of 
view of the cosmos' the apparently stable and secure individual appears as 
merely a momentary pause in the vast flows of matter and energy that 
constitute the physical system of the cosmos. Marcus writes: 
You came into the world as a part. You will vanish in that which gave 
you birth, or rather you will be taken up into its generative principle by 
the process of change. 21 
For Marcus and his Stoic predecessors the cosmos is organised by an 
immanent generative principle (o"1tEPJla:tU(O~ lJ:Jyo~), also known variously as 
OAll~ 'IIt)x~' tv noO"'tcp oe (3roA<xpicp 'tfl~ OA~ Yfl~ epm:t~. n(l"na 't<X.u'ta £Vet)JlOUP.EVO~ 
P.lloEV p.ey<x q><xv'tasot) 11 'to, ax; p.ev it O"Tt q>OOt~ CiYEt OOtEtV, naO"XHv oe ro~ it KOtVTt q>ucn~ 
q>epH. 
20 Marcus Aurelius 9.30; see also 7.48, 12.24. This was a common theme in Stoicism before 
Marcus (see for example Seneca Epistulae 49.2-3, 99.10, Naturales Quaestiones 1. Praef. 7) 
and not the product of drug abuse, pace Mrica, 'The OpilUTI Addiction of Marcus Aurelius' 
(note also Witke, 'Marcus Aurelius and Mandragora'). It is reported that Galen administered 
theriac to Marcus (see Galen De Praecognitione 11.1-2 = 14.657-58 Killlll = 126.16-28 
Nutton) and Africa takes this evidence of 'drug addiction' as an e:\1>lanation for Marcus's 
"bizarre visions" and "extraordinary insulation from domestic reality". For further discussion 
see Hadot, Philosophy as a Way 'of Life, pp. 180-82, and my 'The Point of View of the 
Cosmos'. pp. 19-22. 
21 Marcus Aurelius 4.14; see also 4.21, 6.24. 
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God, the world-soul, fire, and breath (rrv£uJlu)?2 Some ancient accounts of 
Stoic physics present this as an active principle in some form of mixture with 
the passive principle of matter (UAll)?3 However, the generative principle is 
itself material and this distinction between two material principles is merely 
formal. 24 The generative principle (crn£PJla'tt1(o~ A6yo~) or breath (nv£uJlu) is 
not in mixture with matter (uA 11), but rather may be conceived as a certain 
quality of matter itself Stoic physics is thus monistic, conceiving material 
nature as a force moving itself 25 Within this monistic materialism, the 
generative principle produces all stability and form, with processes of 
condensation, rarefaction, solidification, and stratification generating states of 
pneumatic tension ('t6vo~ 'tou nv£uJla'to~).26 In this, the Stoics follow 
Heraclitus and his physics of continual flux organised by a single rational 
22 See Aetius De Placitis Reliquiae 1.7.33 (DG 305.15-306.11 = 5'VF 2.1027 = LS 46 A), 
Diogenes Laertius 7.135 (= SVF 1.102 = LS 46 B). It has been suggested that the concept of 
1tv£uJla as active principle of the cosmos was introduced by Cluysippus, while Cleanthes 
posited heat, and Zeno fire. See Lapidge, 'apxai and <n;01Xeta: A Problem in Stoic 
Cosmology', pp. 274-75; Solmsen, 'Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics', pp. 
456-57. 
23 See Diogenes Laertius 7.134 (= Sf'F 1.85,2.300 = LS 44 B). 
24 See e.g. Calcidius In Platonis Timaeum 294 (297.1-2 Waszink = SVF 1.87). Central to 
discussions of this point has been a variant reading in Diogenes Laertius 7.134 (= SVF 2.299 = 
Posidonius fro 5 EK =: LS 44 B); according to the MSS the two principles are 'corporeal' 
(crcOJla'ta) but an alternative reading in the Suda (s.v. 'APXlt (A 4092» suggests 'incorporeal' 
(acrroJl(i'to1)~). A number of editors have adopted the Suda reading (e.g. Lipsius Physiologia 
Stoicorum 2.5, von Amlin (SVF), Hicks (LCL), H. S. Long (OCT» but more recently the MS 
reading have gained support (e.g. LS, Sora1::~ji, Alatter, Space, and ;\iotion, pp. 93-94). I 
lUlderstand the relationship between the principles similar to Todd (,Monism and IImnanence' . 
p. 139), who characterises the principles as primarily a logical or conceptual distinction within 
a physically unified system. The claim would not be that the principles are incorporeal but 
rather that the distinction between these two inseparable aspects of a single substance is an 
incorporeal 1.£K:'ta. or proposition. In other words, the principles constitute merely a formal 
distinction, not an ontological one (they are never fOlUld dissociated from one another). The 
principles, as aspects of a single material unity, remain corporeal; only the linguistic 
distinction betw'een them is incorporeal. 
25 See Diogenes Laertius 7.148 (= Sf'F 2.1132 = LS 43 A). 
26 See Diogenes Laertius 7.142 (= SVF 1.102 = LS 46 C), Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 
1053f (= SVF 2.449 = LS 47 M), De Communibus Notitiis 1085d (= SVF 2A~-l = LS ~7 G). 
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principle (J..,oYOt;) generating stability through processes of dynamic 
equilibrium.27 What Stoic physics adds to this is a distinctively biological 
orientation. Their generative principle functions as a principle of nonorganic 
life and as such Marcus proposes that we should never cease to think of the 
cosmos as one living being (ev stf>ov 'tOY KOO'jlOV).28 For the Stoics, this living 
material nature is God/9 defined as the intelligence in matter (vouv tv '\)An),30 
and, as both Cicero and Plotinus note, this is often used as a way of disposing 
of the concept of God altogether.31 Thus the Stoic conception of the cosmos is 
more biological than theological and Stoic cosmology IS always 
"cosmobiology".32 
It is this physical or scientific approach that constitutes 'the point of view 
of the cosmos'. From this perspective, nature is experienced as a cosmic 
process of continual flux punctuated with occasional points of dynamic 
equilibrium. It is already clear that Marcus uses this perspective in order to 
Nemesius De Natura Hominis 2 (18.2-10 Morani = LS 47 J), and, for pneumatic tension, 
Alexander of Apbrodisias De A1ixtione 223.34-36 (= SVF 2.441 = LS 47 L). 
27 Much of Stoic physics can already be found within the fragments of Heraclitus, in particular 
a model of dynamic equilibrium based upon a theory of pneumatic tension. See e.g. fro 8 DK 
apud Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1155b4-6, fro 31 DK apud Clement of Alexandria Stromata 
5.14 (PG 9. 160a), ff. 51 DK apudHippolytus Rejutatio 9.9 (241.19-21 Wendland). It is often 
claimed that this resonance may be due to a Stoicised portrait of Heraclitus used by later 
doxogfaphefs; however, tins c~uld not have affected Aristotle's testimony. For further 
discussion see Long, 'Heraclitus and Stoicism', pp. 133-56; Brehier, Chrysippe, pp. 142-4 .... 
Of all the Stoics, Marcus appears to have had a particularly strong interest in Heraclitus, 
naming lrim often and preserving five of tile fragments (4.46 & 6.42 are the sources for fro 71-
75 DK). 
28 Marcus Aurelius 4.40. For a contemporary explication of the concept of 'nonorganic life' 
see De Landa, 'Nonorganic life'. 
29 See Cicero De Natura Deorum 1.39 (= SVF 2.1077 = LS 54 B). 
30 Plutarch De Communibus Notitiis 1085b (= ST/F 2.313). 
31 See Cicero De Natura Deorum 1.32 (with reference to Antisthenes and so fro 39b DC = S:,)R 
V A 180) & Plotinus Enneades 6.1.27 (= SVF 2.314), who says tlmt the Stoics bring in God 
only for the sake of appearances (dntp£nEiac;), defining Him as matter in a certain state (UA 11 
nOx; ExoOO'a). 
32 I borrow tins term from Hahm, The Origins o.fStoic Cosm%gv, pp. 136-84; see also Annas, 
Hellenistic Philosophy ojlvfind, p. 43; Lapidge, 'Stoic Cosmology', p. 163. 
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devalue human anxieties and concerns. The suggestion is that by placing what 
appears to be stable within the broader context of a cosmos defined by 
constant flux, one can become aware of, and open to, the inevitable change of 
all things - change in circumstance, change in fortune, change in health, and, 
above all, the change from life to death. Indeed, Marcus makes numerous 
references to death,33 and in general he characterises it as but one aspect of a 
more general cosmic process: 
All things are in change (nav'ta tv jl£'ta~oA:ft), and you yourself are in 
continuous alteration and in a sense destruction. So, too, is the cosmos 
as a whole. 34 
Marcus supplements this kind of very abstract reflection upon death as but one 
expression of continual cosmic transformation with references to the deaths of 
powerful individuals who once occupied positions similar to his own: 
Alexander the Great and his stable boy were levelled in death, for they 
were either taken up into the same life-giving principles of the cosmos 
('tou<; au'tou<; 'tot) KOO'jlOl) O'1C£PJlanKou<; A,oyou<;) or were scattered 
without distinction into atoms. 35 
33 For discussion see Rutherford, The A1editations o/A1arcus Aurelius, pp. 161-67: Hadot, The 
Inner Citadel, pp. 275-77; Newman, 'Theory and Practice of the meditatio', pp. 1509-1 L 
34 Marcus Aurelius 9.19. 
35 Marcus Aurelius 6.24. See also 831 and Newman, 'Theory and Practice of the meditatio'. 
p. 1510. 
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Although in this last passage one can see Marcus's agnostic attitude towards 
both Stoic and Epicurean physics, the one physical doctrine which he 
continually affirms is the Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux. The 
fundamental law of the cosmos is the inevitability of continual transformation 
and it is within this context that Marcus wants to understand death. Death is 
not the end but merely an internal rearrangement in a much larger cosmic 
system. For instance: 
I was composed of a formal and a material substance; and of these 
neither will pass away into nothingness, just as neither came to exist 
out of nothingness. Thus, every part of me will be assigned its place by 
change (KCX-C<l J.l£-ccx(30Jv11V) into some part of the cosmos, and that 
again into another part of the cosmos, and so on to infinity. 36 
Many further passages expressing this theme could also be mentioned. As we 
have already seen, the repetition of these ideas is central to their 'digestion' 
(nE'lftC;). By reflecting over and over again on the same philosophical themes 
Marcus attempts to 'dye' his soul, to make himself so completely accustomed 
to these ideas that they transform his character and thus his habitual 
behaviour?7 The motive behind this is the thought that by overcoming the 
limited perspective of the individual with its assumption of stability, one will 
36 Marcus Aurelius 5.13. 
37 See the discussion in Chapter Five § 3 above. 
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be able to escape the emotional disturbances (nnS'll) that occur when the only 
ever apparently stable is inevitably transformed. 
Freeing oneself of this limited first person perspective will free one from 
the emotional turmoil that goes with it. From the cosmic perspective, 
everything is in a continual state of change and nothing is expected to remain 
stable for long. In this sense, the 'point of view of the cosmos' enables one to 
free oneself from attachment to particular external objects, to free oneself from 
the bad passions that accompany such attachments, and thus to cultivate well-
being (EuoalJ.LOvia). It is this cosmic perspective that the Stoic sage is said to 
expenence. 
(b) Impressions and Judgements 
How does Marcus Aurelius think that one might be able to overcome the 
everyday limited perspective of the individual and approach this cosmic 
perspective? To some extent this question has already been answered insofar 
as we have already encountered examples of Marcus's spiritual exercises 
directed towards that very goal. Yet these were reflections upon the cosmic 
perspective itself rather than philosophical exercises directed towards 
cultivating that perspective. In order to cultivate the 'point of view of the 
cosmos', Marcus proposes another series of spiritual exercises which draw 
upon Stoic epistemological theory and, in particular, the Stoic theory of 
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judgement (unOAll",t<;, 8oYJlu, KpiJlu, Kpicr1<;)?8 Marcus suggests that all of 
the problems that accompany the limited perspective of the individual are the 
product of human judgements: 
Look at the inmost causes of things, stripped of their husks~ note the 
intentions that underlie actions; [ ... ] observe how man's disquiet is all 
of his own making, and how troubles come never from another's hand 
, 
but like all else are creatures of our own judgement (unOA 11",1<;).39 
Here Marcus follows his Stoic mentor Epictetus in suggesting that all 
judgements of good and evil are always a product of the perspective of the 
limited individual. 40 As Epictetus often repeats, what upsets people are not 
things themselves, which are neither good nor evil, but rather their judgements 
(8oYJlu-ru) about things. Compare the following two passages, the first 
Marcus, the second Epictetus: 
38 Marcus and Epictetus use a variety of terms that can all be and have been translated as 
either 'judgement' or 'opinion'. These include {moA11",l<;, OO'YJ.La., "KptJ.La., and "Kpt<HC;. Marcus 
uses unoA11",lC; and OO'YJ.La. most, 25 and 21 times respectively, while Epictetus 
overwhelmingly prefers OO'YJ.la., using it over 100 times (see the indexes in Dalfen (BT) and 
Schenk! (BT) respectively). In the index to his Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet (p. 267) 
Bonhoffer suggests that UnOA 11"'1<; and OO'YJ.La. can be taken to be synonymous and Epictetus 
uses them as such at Dissertationes 1.11.33. In his Latin translation of Epictetus, Wolf renders 
both unoA11",l<; and oO'YJ.La. as opinio (Enchiridion §§ 1 & 5 = §§ 1 & 10 in his edition) and 
elsewhere both OO'YJ.la. and "KptJ.La. as decretum (Dissertationes 1.11.33 & 2.15.8). Crossley 
suggests that when Marcus uses "KptJ.La. it should be understood to be synonymous with oo'YJ.La. 
(see p. 6). I shall assume that all of these tenns are broadly synonymous and render all of them 
as 'jUdgement', understanding them also to involve the notions of 'opinion' or 'assumption'. 
Occasionally I also follow Hadot's suggestion of 'value-judgement' for unoA:'1'1ftc; (see The 
Inner Citadel. p. 83). For further comment of Epictetus's use of oO'YJ.La. see Barnes, 'The 
Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist', pp. 71-72. 
39 Marcus Aurelius 12.8. 
40 A similar position can be found in SeA1us Empiricus Adversus Nlathematicos 11.68-78 who. 
while denying the possibility of saying that anything is in its nature good or evil, will still 
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If you suffer because of something external, it is not due to the thing 
itself (£KEtVO) but your judgement (Kptj.L<X) of it, and this it is in your 
power to wipe out at once [ ... ].41 
It is not the things themselves ('t<X npaYJlu'tu) that disturb men, but 
their judgements (86YJlu'tu) about these things. For example, death is 
nothing dreadful, or else Socrates too would have thought so, but the 
judgement (86YJlu) that death is dreadful, this is the dreadful thing. 
When, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never 
blame anyone but ourselves, that means, our own judgements 
2~8 
Perhaps the best surviving account of Epictetus's analysis of judgement is 
contained in a fragment from the now lost fifth book of the Discourses 
preserved by Aulus Gellius. 43 Aulus tells the story of a journey by sea during a 
storm that he once made in the company of a Stoic philosopher. As the storm 
became more violent Aulus says that he turned to the Stoic to see how this 
wise man kept his composure in the face of such danger. However he was 
somewhat disappointed to see that the philosopher was as pale and frightened 
as everybody else. When the storm passed Aulus turned to the philosopher and 
asked why it was that he seemed scared even though, as a Stoic, he professed 
acknowledge tImt it is possible to talk about good and evil relative to a particular individual. 
See Bett, Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists, p. xiy. 
41 Marcus Aurelius 8A 7. 
42 Epictetus Enchiridion 5 (trans. Oldfather); see also Dissertationes 2.16.24. 
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to be indifferent to all such external circumstances. The philosopher responded 
by taking out of his bag a copy of the fifth book of the Discourses of Epictetus 
and directing Aulus to a passage that he thought would help to explain his 
behaviour. 
According to Aulus' s Latin rendition of that passage (which retains 
Epictetus's Greek terminology), Epictetus argued that the impressions 
(cpuv'tucrial) that present external objects are neither voluntary nor controlled, 
but rather force themselves upon the mind. 44 However, the acts of assent 
(cruYKu'tagecrl<;) by which these impressions are acknowledged are voluntary 
and subject to the will. So, when a terrifying event occurs, such as Aulus's 
storm at sea, even the mind of a sage will become disturbed by a sudden 
impression that cannot be stopped. As Augustine glosses it in his discussion of 
this fragment, it is as if these passions are too quick for the intellect.45 
However, the sage will not give his assent to such an impression; instead he 
will reject the impression and affirm that nothing terrible has actually 
happened. This is where the sage differs from the foolish individual who does 
not question his impressions and assumes that things are in reality as terrible 
as they first seem to be. In other words, the fool unthinkingly assents to 
impressions without examining their true nature. The sage, on the other hand, 
examines his impressions and only assents to those that are 'adequate' 
43 See Aulus Gellius 19.1.1-21. The quotation from Epictetus (in Aulus' s Latin) is at 19.1.15-
20 (= Epictetus fro 9 Schenld). . . 
44 In the doxographical tradition, the Stoics are said to have held that llnpresslOns are 
imprinted upon the mind, although the precise nature of tins was subject to some deb~te. See 
e.g. Aetius De Placitis Reliquiae 4.11.1 (DG 400a4-8 = SVF 2.83 = LS 39 E), DlOgenes 
Laertius 7.50 (= SVF 2.55 = LS 39 A). 
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(K<X:taAll'1ft~).46 It was with this account of impressions that Aulus's Stoic 
travelling companion attempted to justify his expression of fear during the 
storm, namely, that although he was momentarily overcome by the impression 
that something terrible was happening, he did not give his assent to that 
impression once he had examined it. 
In order to understand this account of giving assent to impressions, it may 
be helpful to place it alongside what Epictetus says in those books of the 
Discourses that have survived. In a passage from the second book of the 
Discourses that also considers fear while on a sea voyage Epictetus says the 
following: 
Whenever I go to sea, as soon as I gaze down into the depths or look at 
the waters around me and see no land, I am beside myself, and 
imagine that if I am wrecked I must swallow all that sea. Not once 
does it enter my head that three pints are enough. What is it then that 
alarms me? The sea? No, my own judgement (oOYJ..L<X),47 
What this passage indicates - when it is considered alongside Aulus's account 
- is that for Epictetus the impressions that force themselves upon the mind are 
not simply given. Rather, they are already composite, the product of both the 
external object and the mind of the individual. As with Plato, for Epictetus an 
45 Augustine De Civitate Dei 9.4.2 (PL 41.259): tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus 
mentis et rationis officium. 
46 TIns concept will be examined further in § 2 (c) below. 
47 Epictetus Dissertationes 2.16.22 (trans. Hard modified). 
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impression IS already a blend of perception and judgement.48 As such, 
impressions are not a straightforwardly accurate perception of an external 
object, but rather how such an object or event seems to be from the perspective 
of a particular individual. As such, they reflect that individual's own 
presuppositions and beliefs. 49 These impressions are impressions of things 
appearing in a certain way, not impressions that things are in fact that way. 50 
Affirmation to such an impression is thus not necessarily to an impression 
merely of what is given. Drawing these two accounts by Epictetus together, 
four distinct stages can be outlined in his analysis of impressions: 
1. The perception of an external object. 
2. An almost involuntary and unconSCIOUS judgement concernmg the 
perception. This judgement will be shaped by an individual's 
presuppositions, preconceptions, and mental habits. 
3. The presentation of an impression composed of both perception and 
judgement to the conscious mind (the ruling part of the soul or 
4. The act of granting or denying assent (cruYKa"Cugecrtc;) to this composite 
impression, creating a belief. 
48 Compare with Plato Sophista 264a-b: "what we mean by 'it appears' (q>aivE'tat) is a blend 
of perception and judgement (aiO"EhlO'E~ Kat. 06~'TI<;)". However elsewhere (e.g. Theaetetlls 
I52c) Plato tends to identify 'appearing' (q>av'taO'ia) with 'perceptio~' (ctt0'6'T1O't<;). 
49 See De Lacy, 'The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Eplctetus', p. 1 P: Long. 
'Representation and the Self in Stoicism', pp. 103 & Ill. 
50 See LS, vol. 1, pp. 239-40. 
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According to Aulus' s account, the foolish individual wi11 not even be aware of 
the second stage and will assume that his impressions are an accurate 
reflection of external objects. The sage, on the other hand, will subject his 
impressions to strict examination before giving or denying assent, analysing 
what is given and what is the product of his own involuntary judgement. By so 
doing, he will be able to overcome the emotions that are a product of these 
judgements. 52 In other words, the sage will use his conscious act of assent to 
reject his unconscious act of judgement. To be more precise, the sage will go 
further and actually train himself to stop adding value-judgements to what is 
given in perception. Marcus writes, 
Do not say more to yourself than the first impressions (ai 
npollyoUjlEvat cp<xv't<xcrlcn) report. [ ... ] abide always by the first 
impressions ('trov npro'twv cp<xv't<xcrtrov) and add nothing of your own 
from within. 53 
51 This impression is often said to be presented in propositional form; see Diogenes Laertius 
7.49 (= SVF 2.52 = LS 39 A). 
52 There was some debate in the Early Stoa concerning whether emotions should be described 
as judgements themselves or as the product of judgements. See e.g. Galen De Placitis 
Hippocratis et Platonis 5.1.4 (5.429 Killm = 292.17-20 De Lacy = SVF 1.209, 3.461) who 
reports that while Zeno held that the emotions are contractions and expansions of the soul that 
are the product of judgements, Chrysippus identified the emotions with the judgements 
themselves. According to Cicero (Academica 1.39 = SVF 1.207). Zeno held all emotions to be 
voluntary and the product of a judgement. According to Diogenes Laertius (7.111 = Sf! 
3.456), Chrysippus is reported to have said that greed is simply the judgement that money IS 
intrinsically good. Of these two positions Zeno' s seems to be the more plausible, namely that 
the emotions are the product or consequence of judgements. Thus it would make sense to say 
that someone might no longer be upset that someone close to them has died. but nevertheless 
that they still hold the judgement that their death was a terrible thing. 
53 Marcus Aurelius 8.49; see also 5.26. 
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These first impressions are what is given by perception before any value-
judgement has been made. The task for the aspiring philosopher is to train 
oneself to stop at these first impressions. 
According to Marcus and Epictetus all statements claiming that something 
1S either good or bad are a product of human judgements. As Simplicius 
comments, 
those things (-ca 1tpaYJ.'ux-ca) which we apprehend to be evil [ ... ] are 
really neither evil themselves, nor the true causes of any evil to us [ ... ] 
all our troubles and perplexities (-ca -capa-c-cov-ca) are entirely owing to 
the opinions (86yfla-ca) which we ourselves have entertained and 
cherished concerning them. 54 
Indeed, it is this addition of a value-judgement that forms the unconscious 
contribution that the mind makes to impressions. Thus the task of the Stoic 
analysis of impressions and judgements is to examine impressions and to 
reject any value-judgements they might contain. Its aim is to develop an 
experience of the world as it is in itself, that is, an experience that presents 
things as neither good nor bad in themselves. This, Epictetus suggests, is the 
key to living well: 
54 Simplicius In Epicteti Enchiridion 10.11-15 Hadot (trans. Stanhope). 
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If you have right judgements (opSa 86YJlata), you will fare well 
(KaA&~), and if wrong (<pauAa), ill (KaK&~); since in every case the 
way a man fares is determined by his judgement (86YJla). 55 
254 
For Epictetus, well-being (Eu8atJlovia) is directly dependent upon a correct 
analysis of impressions (<pavtacriat) and judgements (86YJlata, unOA 11\jlEl~). 
This, he says, is the only thing that can properly be called good. Likewise, the 
only thing that can properly be called bad is an incorrect use of impressions. 
Thus, Epictetus proposes a thoroughly Socratic analysis of behaviour based 
upon two premises; the first that everyone acts according to what they believe 
to be good, and the second that all actions are a direct consequence of one's 
judgements. 56 In the case of theft, for example, Epictetus suggests that the 
thief genuinely believes that what he does will bring him good.57 Just like 
everyone else, he desires what he thinks is in his best interest. This means that 
his motive cannot be criticised. If one thinks that the thief has made a mistake 
or done something wrong then one must show that this is due to the thief s 
incorrect use of his impressions. To be more precise, one must show that the 
error lies in his implicit assent to a value-judgement that has led to his impulse 
to act, combined with his failure to use his faculty of assent (crt)YKataeE(n~) 
55 Epictetus Dissertationes 3.9.2 (traIlS. Oldfather modified). See also Musonius Rufus fr. 38 
(125.1-5 Hense = 134.24-136.3 Lutz) apud Stobaeus 2.8.30 (2.159.25-160.11 WH) where the 
correct use of impressions is presented as the key to serenity, cheerfulness, constancy, and 
excellence. This text is also Epictetus fro 4 Schenkl and it appears to derive from one of the 
lost books of the Dissertationes where Epictetus was presumably quoting his teacher 
Musonius. 
56 See De Lacy. 'The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus', esp. pp. 120-21. A g~d 
discussion of these themes within Socrates can be fOlUld in Guthrie, History, Y01. 3, pp. 4)0-
62. 
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that stands in between his impressions and impulses. This failure makes the 
thief no different to an animal whose impulses follow directly from 
impressions. 58 This is where the origin of an individual's actions must be 
sought. 
Epictetus suggests that commg to understand that this act of assent 
(O"\Y(lC<l'tae£O"tc;) is within one's own control (tcp' llJllv) is the very essence of 
philosophy, and the primary task for the philosopher is to test impressions and 
to analyse judgements,59 for the knowledge of what is given in perception and 
what is added by human judgement is the key to living well. Thus, Epictetus 
repeatedly defines the goal ('t£AoC;) of his philosophy as the correct use of 
impressions (opel) XPll<nc; cpav't<lO"tIDV).60 What at first glance seems like a 
technical epistemological question, then, is in fact the foundation of his ethics 
and central to his project of cultivating the art of living well. This tough 
Socratic stance distances Epictetus from the Platonic position which, with its 
tripartite theory of the soul, removes an individual's responsibility for their 
actions by placing their origin within an alien faculty in the soul, one that 
reason cannot necessarily control. 61 In contrast to this, Epictetus affirms that 
57 See Epictetus Dissertationes 2.26.1-2, 1.18.3-6, Simplicius In Epicteti Enchiridion 1.305-
315 Hadot. 
58 See Kahn, 'Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine', p. 247. 
59 See De Lacy, 'The Logical Structure of the Ethics ofEpictetus'. esp. pp. 118-122. 
60 See e.g. Epictetus Dissertationes 2.19.32,1.12.34, and, in particular, 1.20.15 (= SVF 1.182) 
where he cites Zeno as an authority for this formulation of the 'ttA~. For further examples see 
the list in Bonhoffer, Die Ethik d~s Stoikers Epictet, p. 7 (= The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetlls. 
p.19). 
61 See Frede, 'The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul', esp. p. 98. For early Stoic 
monistic PSY~hology see Plutarch De Virtute A10rali 441b-d & ~46f-447a (botll SVF 3A59 = 
LS 61 B & 65 G). Early Stoic polemics against the Platonic tripartite model of the soul and 
their arguments in favour of a monistic psychology can be seen as an attempt to reaffirm 
Socratic psychology in the face of Plato's later criticisms, and thus as an attempt to pre~nt 
themselves as the true heirs to Socrates (see Sedley, 'Chrysippus on PsychophysIcal 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
256 
individuals have total power over their happiness and that the key to that 
happiness is the correct analysis of impressions. 
(c) Adequate Impressions 
The impressions assented to by the sage are impressions free from human 
value-judgements. Thus they are impressions that do not involve the terms 
'good' and 'bad'. To repeat a key passage by Marcus Aurelius: 
Do not say more to yourself than the first impressions (ai 
1tPOllyoUjl£vcn <p<xv't<xcri<Xt) report. [ ... ] abide always by the first 
impressions ('trov 1tpo)'t(J)v <p<xv'tacrtrov) and add nothing of your own 
from within. 62 
This passage can be taken to be Marcus's formulation of the Stoic concept of 
an adequate impression (<p<xv't<xala K<X't<XA ll1t'tt Kll). 63 In Stoic epistemological 
discussions this term is used to refer to the criterion of truth.64 It is defined as 
an impression that is caused by an object and stamped upon the mind in 
accordance with the nature of that object in such a way that it could not have 
Causality', pp. 313-14). For a detailed discussion of Stoic monistic psychology and the precise 
nature of its response to Platonic accOlmts of 'irrational' desires see Gill 'Did Chrysippus 
understand Medea?'. 
62 Marcus Aurelius 8.49. 
63 For a note on the translation of this tenn, along with references to further discussions see 
Chapter l1rree § 4. To the alternatives listed there, note also that Crossley, pp. 20-22, proposes 
'irresistible perception'. 
64 See e.g. Sextus Empiricus Adversus Afathematicos 7.227 (= SVF 2.56), Diogenes Laertius 
7.54 (= STir 2.105 = LS 40 A). 
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been produced by a non-existing object.65 It is an impression that is so clear, 
distinct, vivid, and obvious that it is its own guarantee of its accuracy and 
clarity.66 This guaranteed accuracy may be understood in terms of its causal 
history - that is, in terms of the physical conditions of all of the elements 
involved in its production. If the sense organs, the object in question, and all 
the other variables are not obstructed or in an abnormal state, then the 
resulting impression will be adequate.67 
Although at first glance this concept appears somewhat obscure, a number 
of ancient examples may help to clarify it. 68 Epictetus attempts to do just this 
by proposing that in the middle of the day one should attempt to hold the 
belief that it is in fact the middle of the night.69 He suggests that one just 
cannot do this. He concludes that during the day the impression 'it is daytime' 
is so powerful that it must be an 'adequate impression' (cpav1:aaia 
KU1:UAl11t1:tKll). One might say that impressions of this sort demand assent.70 
If, on the other hand, one found that one could hold the opposing impression 
then this would immediately call into question the validity of the initial 
impression, and this might lead one to withhold one's assent. For example, the 
impression that the number of stars in the night sky is even is no more self-
65 See Cicero Academica 2.18,2.77, Se:xius EmpiricusAdversus "~lathematicos 7.248 (all SVF 
1.59), Diogenes Laertius 7.45-46 (ST-·F 2.53), 7.50 (= SIF 2.60). 
66 See in particular Frede in CHHP, pp. 312-13. 
67 See Frede, 'Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions', pp. 157-58, and Sextus 
EmpiricusAdversus It...1athematicos 7.424 (= SV'F 2.68). 
68 The following paragraph repeats material already presented in Chapter Four § 2 (c). . 
69 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.28.2-3; also Sextus Empiricus Adversus A1athemallcos 
7.242-·+3 (= SVF 2.65 = LS 39 G). 
70 See Sextus Empiricus Adversus A1athematicos 7.257, Cicero Academica 2.38, "ith 
Bumyeat, 'Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?', pp. '+6-47 n. 38. 
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evident or obviously correct than the impression that the number is odd.71 
Thus, in a manner similar to the Pyrrhonist sceptics, Epictetus proposes that in 
such a scenario one is forced to withhold one's assent and suspend 
judgement. 72 
According to the account of Stoic epistemology made by Sextus 
Empiricus, giving assent to an adequate impression is the first step away from 
human opinion (o6~a) and towards scientific knowledge (t1tlO"tlU1 ll) reserved 
for the sage.73 This scientific knowledge has been defined as a systematic 
series of adequate impressions that are so secure that they are impregnable to 
rational persuasion (i.e. no longer open to debate).74 This absolutely secure 
and organised knowledge of the world is, not surprisingly, reserved only for 
the sage. Adequate impressions, however, can be held by anyone and thus do 
not in themselves constitute such scientific knowledge. 75 They are a necessary 
71 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.28.3, Sextus Empiricus Adversus A1athematicos 7.243, 
7.393,8.147.8.317. 
72 See Epictetus Dissertationes 1.28.2-3, with Burnyeat, 'Can the Sceptic Live his 
Scepticism?', p. 44. For other reports of the Stoic attitude towards suspension of judgement 
see SeA1us Empiricus Adversus Alathematicos 7.155 (= LS 41 C), Cicero Academica 2.57 (= 
LS 40 I). For further discussion of the relationship between Pyrrhonian and Stoic suspension 
of judgement see Allen, 'The Skepticism of SeA1us Empiricus', pp. 2596-97. 
73 See Sextus Empiricus Adversus A1athematicos 7.151 (= 5,'VF 2.90 = LS ·n C), also Cicero 
Academica 1.42 (= SVF 1.60 = LS 41 B), with further discussion in Arthur, 'The Stoic 
Analysis of the Mind's Reactions to Presentations' . 
74 See Annas, 'Stoic Epistemology', esp. p. 187. For secure scientific knowledge to arise they 
must be made impregnable to rational argument; see Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus 2.7.51 
(2.73.16-74.3 WH = SVF 3.112 = LS 41 H), Cicero Academica 1.41 (= SVF 1.60), "ith 
Ioppolo, 'Presentation and Assent', p. 436; LS, vol. 1, p. 257. 
75 Adequate impressions CaImot constitute scientific knowledge themselves because they can 
be experienced by both the foolish and the wise, whereas scientific knowledge is restricted to 
the wise (see Sextus EmpiricusAdversus j\1athematicos 7.152). However it should be stressed 
that the sage does not know more than the fool, rather he knows the same things in a more 
secure and systematic manner (see Kerferd, 'What Does the Wise Man Know?'). TI~s 
difference may be seen as the SaIne as that between the apprentice who knows an ar:t or craft. m 
theory and the master who has assimilated that theory and necessarily expresses his expertIse 
in his actions. TIle expert does not know more than the apprentice but what he knows he 
knows 'better'. 
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condition but not a sufficient condition of such knowledge and are thus, as 
Sextus reports, half way between opinion and knowledge. 
The scientific knowledge (bncr'tl}Jlll) held by the sage and grounded upon 
adequate impressions (q>av'tucriul KU'tUAll1t'tlKui) will capture the world as it 
is in itself. As such, it will be an objective understanding of the world, an 
understanding free from value-judgements (U1tOA 11'l'£l<;), and an understanding 
free from anthropocentric concerns. 76 In short, it will be the perspective of 
physics. 
However, Epictetus has only a limited interest in such strictly 
epistemological questions and is less concerned with the role that adequate 
impressions playas the criterion of truth.77 He uses the term 'adequate 
impression' primarily to refer to those impressions that present an external 
object free fi'om any value-judgement, and it is only to impressions that are 
adequate (Ku'taAll'tlKft) and thus not value-laden to which one should give 
one's assent. 78 These are the same as Marcus's first impressions 
(1tpollyoUJl.£Val q>av'tucrial), namely, those initial impressions that have not 
been supplemented with any value-judgement. 
An important aspect of these adequate impressions is the rejection of the 
conception of the individual as an isolated entity detached from his 
76 See Hadot, The Inner Citadel, p. lOS. . 
77 To be more precise, Epictetus expresses little interest in the details of epistemologIcal 
theory in the Dissertationes. That is certainly very different from claiming that he had no 
interest in such matters at all. The image of Epictetus as a popular moralist with little interest 
in logic or physics may simply reflect the fact that our only sources ~ the Dissertationes, 
texts produced within a specific literary geme primarily concerned WIth moral th~mes (see 
Souilhe (CUF), pp. x.."Xii-xxx). One aspect of this quite common image of Eplctetus IS 
challenged in Barnes, Logic and the Imperial Stoa, pp. 24-125. 
78 See Epictetus Dissertationes 3.8.4. 
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surroundings. Epictetus suggests that this division is itself a judgement that 
does not derive from things themselves. In a discussion of what it might mean 
to live in accordance with nature he says the following: 
If you consider yourself as a detached being (unOA'01:0v), it is natural 
(KU1:<X qrU(Hv) for you to live to old age and be rich and healthy; but if 
you consider yourself as a man (av9pc.onov), and as part of the whole 
(jl£po<; OAO'O), it will be fitting, on account of that whole, that you 
should at one time be sick, at another take a voyage and be exposed to 
danger, sometimes be in want, and possibly - it may happen - die 
before your time. 79 
Epictetus suggests that if one considers oneself to be but one part of the 
cosmos as a whole then one will tend to approach any apparently bad things 
that may happen as simply a part of the broader cosmic process. In other 
words, one will come to realise that value-judgements of the form 'this is 
good' or 'this is bad' are actually shorthand for 'this is goodfor me' or 'this is 
bad for me'; that is, they implicitly presuppose a first person perspective. 
Epictetus's suggestion is that once such value-judgements have been rejected 
and replaced by adequate impressions then this first person perspective will 
79 Epictetus Dissertationes 2.5.25 (trans. Hard); see also 2.5.13. 
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I d' 80 I db' a so lsappear, rep ace y a perspectIve embracing the whole of the cosmos 
in which nothing is in itself good or bad. 81 
The sage who regularly experiences adequate impressions will no longer 
experience the subject-centred world of everyday human existence surrounded 
by apparent stability. Instead, he will apprehend the cosmos as it is in itself as 
, 
a dynamic system of flows of matter and energy in a continual process of self-
transformation. It is with this physical or scientific perspective in mind that 
Marcus proposes to re-describe everything usually held of value. From this 
new perspective he describes a human being as merely a mass of water, dust, 
bones, and stench; Europe as but a mound of earth in one comer of a vast 
ocean; death as merely a reorganisation of a collection of material elements; 
and sexual intercourse as nothing more than a convulsive expulsion of 
mucus. 82 
80 This shares something in common with Pyrrhonism. The Pyrrhonist \\ ill also reject 
judgements concerning impressions and this will lead to a certain sort of detachment from any 
first person perspective. See Burnyeat, 'Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?', pp. 36-46. Of 
course, the Pyrrhonist will have no time for adequate impressions. 
81 This is clearly very different from the claim that from the cosmic perspective all things are 
good (see e.g. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 170). Such a position is also often attributed to 
Marcus, yet it is far from evident that he held this. His statement at 2.17 that according to 
nature nothing is bad in itself (oubEv bE "KCl"KOV "KCl't<X q)'oow) does not imply that eveI)thing is 
good. Note also his frequent expressions of agnosticism to the question 'providence or 
atoms?' (6.24, 7.32, 9.28, 9.39, 10.6, 12.14, 12.24), perhaps deriving from Epictetus (see 
Epictetus fr. 1 Schenkl apud Stobaeus 2.1.31 = 2.13.5-14.8 WH). For further discussion see 
my 'The Point of View of the Cosmos', pp. 18-19. 
82 See Marcus Aurelius 9.36, 6.36,2.17, & 6.13 respectively. See also -1..48 where life is 
described as a brief journey from mucus to ashes. As I have already noted above, such 
imagery forms a part of Marcus's spiritual exercises and has nothing to do with drug abuse. 
Nor should it be read as an expression of personal melancholy or conduciye to melancholy, 
pace Arnold, Roman StoiCism, pp. 124-26; Birley, Afarcus Aurelius, p. 222. Rather, it is part 
of a properly philosophical perspective inspired by the Heraclitean doctrine of continual flux. 
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(d) Epistemological Exercises 
It is this theory of the analysis of impressions and judgements made by 
Epictetus that forms the backdrop to the Meditations. For Marcus the 'point of 
view of the cosmos' is just like this, namely a perspective free from the first 
person perspective and its value-judgements (U1tOAll",nc;). It is one that rejects 
human opinion (oo~a) and approaches a purely physical or scientific 
perspective (£1tt<1't1lJ.11l), an experience of things as they are in themselves, as 
they are according to nature. Marcus writes, 
Salvation in life depends on seeing everything in its entirety and its 
reality, in its matter ('to UAtKOV), and in its cause ('to ainroo£c;).83 
The Stoic ideal of living in accordance with nature (0J.10AOYOt)}lEVc.oC; 'ttl cpucrn 
~fjv) involves experiencing the world in precisely this way. As such, the Stoic 
philosophical project - despite its apparently more ethical orientation 
especially in later authors such as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius - shares 
much in common with the Pre socratic natural philosophers and their attempts 
to offer a naturalistic account of the cosmos. As we have already seen, 
Marcus's conception of the cosmos shares much in common with Heraclitus's 
conception of a complex dynamic physical system in which states of conflicts 
generate harmony and apparent stability. For Marcus, just as for Heraclitus, a 
perspective of the cosmos in these terms is one in which value-judgements are 
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transcended. 84 The 'point of view of the cosmos' outlined by !\1arcus and 
constituted by scientific adequate impressions is nothing other than the 
perspective of the Heraclitean AOY0C;, namely, a single rational account of a 
dynamic cosmos beyond value-judgements and limited first person 
perspectives. 
It should thus be clear that the 'point of view of the cosmos' is very 
different from a transcendent perspective. As such, it can be contrasted with 
the theme of a 'view from above' that appears throughout ancient philosophy 
and literature, and is particularly associated with Platonism. 85 Within this 
Platonic tradition, the 'view from above' is the view of a soul that is detached 
from the body, either before birth or after death.86 It thus involves a dualist 
conception of the individual and the possibility of a privileged transcendent 
perspective. In contrast to this, the Stoic 'point of view of cosmos' affirms an 
immanent perspective of nature, a perspective that rejects the limited 
perspective of the human individual and the value-judgements upon which it is 
based. The Stoic cosmic perspective is thus not a 'view from above'. 87 It is not 
83 Marcus Aurelius 12.29 (trans. Haines modified): see also 12.10, 12.18. 
84 See e.g. Heraclitus ft. 61 DK apud Hippolytus Refutatio 9.10 (243.l4-16 Wendland) :\'~ere 
Heraclitus can be seen to draw attention to the dependence of value judgements upon limited 
perspectives (seawater is both good and bad depending upon whether one is a fish or a man). 
See also Aristotle Topica 159b30, Physica 185bI9-25. . 
85 Pace Rutherford, The A1editations of A1arcus Aurelius, pp. 155-6l. For more on tillS tile me 
in ancient philosophy see Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, pp. 238-50; Qu 'est-ce que fa 
philosophie antique?, pp. 309-22. 
86 See e.g. Plato Phaedrus 246b-c. 
87 As Rutherford notes, The A1editations of Jlarcus Aurelius, pp. 155-57, Marcus quotes 
Respuhlica 486a in 7.35 and alludes to Theaetetus 174d in 10.23. However, for Marcus. 
Heraclitus is by far tile more important influence. 
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a transcendent perspective but rather an immanent perspective, or, to be more 
precise, an immanent non-individualistic perspective. 88 
The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius might best be understood as a 
collection of spiritual exercises directed towards the cultivation of this 
immanent non-individualistic perspective. As we have seen, the first step 
towards this perspective is the correct analysis of one's impressions. These 
spiritual exercises are thus primarily epistemological exercises. For both 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, the analysis of impressions and the study of 
epistemology which fall under the heading of 'logic' are vital parts of their 
practical philosophical project. Although both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius 
are often said to neglect physics and logic in favour of a diluted and popular 
ethics, we can in fact see that the exercises of Marcus Aurelius, building upon 
his reading of Epictetus, involve all three aspects of philosophy. 89 Rather than 
neglecting physics or logic it might be more accurate to say that these later 
Stoics value these aspects of philosophy to such an extent that they are not 
content merely to discuss these subjects but are determined to put what they 
have learned from them into practice. In order to do this, spiritual exercises 
such as the ones outlined here are essential. 
88 This may seem surprising insofar as the analysis of impressions has also been cited as an 
important moment in the development of the modem concept ~f the se~; see e.g. ~ong. 
'Representation and the Self in Stoicism', p. 103; Kahn, 'Discovermg the WIll: From Aristotle 
to Augustine', p. 253. . 
89 Pace Annas, The Alorality of Happiness, p. 160; Bames, Logic and the 111lfX!.rIal Stoa, p. 34 
n. 47; Newman. 'TIleory and Practice of the meditatio', p. 147~ n. 1, In partlcular,.Newmall 
refer~ to the us~ of the ~edical metaphor in later Stoic autllors as an indication of this change. 
apparently unaware of its earlier use by Chrysippus and its origins with Socrates. 
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3. Summary 
In this chapter I have attempted to do two things. The first task was to consider 
the nature of the Meditations as a philosophical text and to show some 
examples of the written spiritual exercises contained within it. As we have 
seen, the Meditations are a personal notebook containing written exercises that 
reflect upon a number of philosophical themes. The very act of writing these 
reflections can be seen to be a vital part of the process of digesting 
philosophical principles and habituating one's character to philosophical 
doctrines. 
The second task was to develop our understanding of the relationship 
between 'Aoyoe; and aO'KllCHe; further by examining the relationship between 
Marcus's clearly non-technical literary reflections and the details of Stoic 
epistemological theory. As we have seen, Marcus's exercises concerning 
impressions and judgements are an attempt to put into practice that theory. 
The Meditations may thus be seen as an extended reflection on Epictetus' s 
third -r01tOe; and as an example of the way in which the study of Chrysippus' s 
logical theory could in fact contribute the transformation of one's way of 
life. 90 
90 Pace Williams, 'Do Not Disturb', p. 26, who, as we have seen in the Introduction, rejected 
outright the idea that the logical works of Chrysippus could mak~ any ~erence to an 
individual's behaviour. Here, however, I assume the broader conceptIon of lOgiC held by ~e 
Stoics which, as I noted in the previous chapter, includes not only dialectic but also rhetOrIC 
and epistemology (see Barnes in ClIHP, pp. 65-67). 
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In the light of this it may be possible to re-assess the status of the 
Meditations as a philosophical text. It has become commonplace to deny the 
Meditations the status of being a serious philosophical text, especially when 
placed alongside the works of Aristotle or the sober commentaries of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. 91 Yet for philosophy conceived as a 'tEXVll, both 
philosophical theory (Jvoyo<;) and exercise (iio"K110"1.<;) will be essential. As 
such, texts relevant to each of these components of philosophy will also be 
essential. For example, the philosophical apprentice attending the class of 
Epictetus will first have to complete his preliminary education in philosophy 
by studying theories and arguments (/,,0 yo 1. ), for which he will need to study 
theoretical treatises such as those of Chrysippus. Once he has mastered these, 
he will then move on to the more difficult task of translating his newly 
acquired understanding into his actions (epya.) by habituating his character 
(1190<;). In order to complete this second stage of his philosophical education, 
he will require a very different type of text. He may use a guide to this process 
of habituation in the form of a text like Epictetus's Handbook (if it existed at 
the time). He may also write himself insofar as the act of writing may itself 
help him to digest the theories already studied in the classroom. If he does, 
these written reflection may well take a form similar to that of the Meditations. 
91 This image of the Afeditalians has now been challenged b?' Hadot in The Inner Citadel. 
However, at present tlus work remains very much the exceptIon to the rule. In general. the 
kfeditations are rarely discussed as a serious philosophical text. 
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It is possible, then, to distinguish between two types of philosophical text 
corresponding to the two components of philosophy conceived as a tEXVT). 
First come theoretical treatises, then texts concerned with exercises. Yet it 
would be a mistake to conceive of the latter as simply a series of maxims, 
rules, or moral catch-phrases. Rather they form a compact distillation of Stoic 
philosophy designed to remind the student in a short digestible form of the 
complex theory that he has already studied in detail. 92 Although a text like the 
Meditations may not stand up to a close comparison with one of Aristotle's 
philosophical treatises, within the context of the Stoic conception of 
philosophy as a tEXVll requiring both philosophical "Aoyoc; and acrKT)crlC;, it can 
nevertheless be seen to be a serious philosophical work performing an 
essential function. 
By examining the Meditations we have been able to see some specific 
examples of written spiritual exercises and have seen how these primarily non-
technical passages relate to the more complex details of Stoic epistemological 
theory. Writing passages such as these in order to assimilate and digest 
complex philosophical theories is one form that the second stage of 
philosophical education may take. The existence of such forms of 
philosophical writing highlights the fact that for Stoics such as Epictetus and 
Marcus Aurelius mastery of philosophical arguments was not on its own 
enough. Mastery of philosophy in "AOYOl must be supplemented with mastery 
of philosophy in epya. 
92 See e.g. the reference to short and elemental axioms in Marcus Aurelius 4.3.1. 
CONCLUSION 
In the Introduction I raised the question concerning how one might conceive 
the relationship between an individual's philosophy and his way of life. For 
modern philosophers such as Hegel and Williams the suggestion that there is 
such a relationship merely indicates a weakness in the philosophical position 
in question. For them, philosophy should be understood as an abstract system 
or as a process of intellectual analysis. Although such philosophers might 
acknowledge that one's philosophy may have some impact upon one's way of 
life, for them this is not essential to philosophy but rather merely a 
consequence. 
In contrast to this I suggested that in order to engage in a more 
constructive understanding of this relationship one would need a conception of 
philosophy in which philosophical ideas would be primarily expressed in 
one's way of life. In particular, I noted a number of other modern 
philosophers, including Nietzsche and Foucault, who can be seen to gesture 
towards the idea of philosophy as an activity primarily expressed in one's 
actions and concerned with turning one's life into a work of art. It was in order 
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to develop this idea that I returned to ancient discussions concerning the idea 
that philosophy should be conceived as an art concerned with one's life. 
1. Towards a Technical Conception of Philosophy 
In the light of my discussion of Socratic and Stoic ideas of an art concerned 
with one's way of life (rElV'll 1rept 'tOY ~iov), it is now possible to offer a 
summary sketch of a conception of philosophy in which philosophical ideas 
are primarily expressed in actions and which consequently might form the 
basis for a more productive understanding of the relationship between 
philosophy and biography. I shall call this 'the technical conception of 
philosophy', understanding 'technical' in its etymological sense. However, it 
is important at the outset to draw attention to a subtle but important distinction 
between the Socratic and Stoic positions. 
We have seen that, for Socrates, philosophy is an art ('tEl V'll) that is 
directed towards the cultivation of excellence ( ap£'tll) and should not be 
identified with excellence (ap£'tl1) itself For him, philosophy conceived as an 
art aspires to excellence (ap£'tll) and wisdom (O"o<pia), and thus Socrates 
understands 'philosophy' (cplAoO"ocpia) in its etymological sense. With the 
Stoics, the matter is not so clear. According to Zeno' s definition, any art 
('tElV'll) will be a form of secure knowledge (£1tlO"'tllJl11). Consequently the art 
of living will be a form of secure knowledge (£1tlO"'tllJlll) identifiable with 
wisdom ( O'ocpia) and thus reserved for the sage. F or the Stoics, then, 
philosophy understood in its etymological sense cannot be an art or expertise 
CONCLUSION 270 
('tEXV'1) but rather that which desires or cultivates such expertise. Yet as we 
have seen, a number of Stoics including Epictetus appear to have understood 
the idea of an art of living as Socrates did, namely as something synonymous 
with philosophy in its etymological sense. 
These two accounts may be reconciled by turning to an example from 
some other art or craft. In the case of shoemaking, for instance, the beginning 
apprentice clearly does not possess expert knowledge yet one would still say 
that he is engaged in the art of shoemaking during his apprenticeship. The 
lowest trainee and the master craftsman are both engaged in the same activity 
even if only the latter can claim expertise in that activity. In this sense, both 
the philosophical apprentice and the Stoic sage may be said to be engaged in 
the art of living. In what follows I shall focus upon the art of living understood 
from the perspective of the apprentice. 
By way of summary, then, in the technical conception of philosophy, 
philosophy is conceived as an art ('tEXV'1) directed towards the cultivation of 
an ideal disposition of the soul (Ol(XeEcrv; 'tfi~ \If\)Xfi~), a disposition that may 
be called excellence (apE'tll) or wisdom (croCj>i<x). Thus one might say that the 
subject matter (u/..:'1) of this art is one's soul (",uxi}) and its goal ('tEAO~) is to 
transform or to take care of one's soul (\jfUX11). The product (epyov) will be the 
transformed disposition of the soul (Ol(XeEcrt~ 'tfi~ \jfuXfi~), namely excellence 
(apE'tll) or wisdom (croCj>i<x). This transformed disposition will, insofar as it 
constitutes an internal cause, necessarily impact upon an individual's 
behaviour, expressing itself in their actions. Alternatively, one might say that 
this art ('tEXV'1) is concerned with one's life (131o~), that this is its subject 
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matter (-oA:11), and that its goal ('tEJ.vO~) is to transform one's life (~io~). Thus 
one might say that the product (i:pyov) of this art will be the actions (i:pya) 
that constitute one's life, highlighting its status as a performative art 
(n:paK'ttKlt 'tEXV'll) in which the performance itself is the product. This product 
conceived as an activity may be characterised variously as a good flow of life 
(£upota ~iou), as living well (£u <;flv), and as well-being or happiness 
(£uoat/lovia).l Ultimately not much hinges on this restatement for, as we 
have seen, both Socrates and the Stoics often use 'l'UX11 and ~io~ 
interchangeably in their accounts, highlighting the close connection between 
these terms. 2 
A further characteristic worth underlining is the personal nature of 
philosophy conceived in this way. For Socrates, the task of taking care of 
oneself is fundamentally a private project. Although he may exhort others to 
do so, nevertheless it is something that they must do for themselves. 3 This is 
becomes even clearer in Chrysippus's cylinder analogy which suggests that 
the only proper object of one's concern is the internal cause that is one's 
character. 4 Cicero also makes clear that, according to Chrysippus, the 
philosopher conceived as a doctor for the soul can only treat himself. 5 As 
1 For the formulations cUpOla, /3io'O (attributed to Zeno) and £-\) ~ilv see Arius Did~lnus apud 
Stobaeus 2.7.6e (2.77.16-78.6 WH = SVF 1.184, 3.16). Aristotle famously characterised 
£UOa,lJ-l0Vta, as an activity (see e.g. Ethica Nicomachea 1176a30-1176b9), 'with which the 
Stoics would agree. For further discussion see Long, 'Stoic Eudaimonism', esp. p. 82: .. 
2 This close connection may be emphasised by noting hvo points. The first that the ~Ispos~tIOn 
of one's soul (ola6£cne; tile; 'If'Oxile;) - one's character (1160<;) - is the source of one's habItual 
way of behaving (Eeo<;) and tlms one's actions (epya,). The second is. that 'If'OX1l. should be 
understood not in tlle limited sense of 'mind' but rather as 'that by Ylrtue of wInch we are 
alive' (see Urmson, The Greek Philosophical T/ocabuiary, pp. 144-45). 
3 See Chapter Two §§ 1-3 above. 
4 See Chapter Three § 7 above. 
5 See Chapter Three § 3 (a) above. 
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Epictetus will put it later, the only proper objects of one's concern are those 
things that are in our power or 'up to us' (tcp' 1tJltv), namely desire, impulse, 
and judgement.6 The perfection of these mental activities constitutes human 
excellence (ap£'tll), the only object to which the Stoics assign a positive 
value. 7 In the light of this one may rightly say that the Socratic-Stoic art of 
living is ethical in the sense that it is concerned with one's character (ijeo~) 
which, in turn, determines one's habits (EeO~).8 However, it is not moral in the 
modern sense of offering a series of regulations concerning how one should 
act or what one should do, and it is certainly not concerned with specifying 
how others should act.9 The art of living may form the basis for an ethics but 
not for a morality. 10 
6 See Chapter Six § 2 (a) above and, in particular, Epictetus Dissertationes 1.15.1-5, partially 
quoted in the Introduction and in Chapter Three § 1. 
7 On this see Kidd, 'Stoic Intennediates and the End for Man'. 
8 Here I use ethics in the sense of 11en:6~, that which is concerned ,"ith one's character (see 
Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, p. 62). Of course, moralis derives from 
Cicero's translation of lleo~ (see De F ato I) and thus shares the same origin. 
9 Stoic 'eudaimonism' does not involve an 'ought' (pace e.g. Annas, The },.{orality of 
Happiness; Becker, A New Stoicism). It takes as its point of departure the assumption that 
everyone's ultimate desire is for EUO<xtJ.l0Vt<x - quite different from the claim that everyone 
ought to desire such EOO<XtJ.lOVt<x - and then says 'if you want tins, do x'. However, it cannot 
claim that one ought to do that x. RatIler, it suggests that if one desires EUO<XlJ.lOVt<x then 
Stoicism offers the best method for its cultivation. Whether it does or not will be a question 
that can be settled by experimentation. Other 'eudaimonist' schools will make sinrilar claims 
and tile task of the philosophical student who does desire EOO<XlJ.lOVt<x will be to assess tile 
relative merits of the competing methods on offer. However, none of the ancient schools 
appear to have tried to convince people that they should desire EUO<XlJ.lOVt<x. Two authors who 
have drawn attention to the non-moral nature of Stoicism are Schopenbauer (The rVorld as 
rVill and Representation, vol. 1, p. 86) and Foucault ('On the Genealogy of Ethics: An 
Overview of Work in Progress'; Essential Works, vol. 1, p. 254). Note also the excellent 
discussion in Vander Waerdt, 'Zeno's Republic and tile Origins of Natural Law', pp. 281-89. 
10 This distinction between ethics and moralitv can be found in a number of plnlosophers 
(although often under different terms) but perhaps the two clearest expositions can be found in 
Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 25-32 (L 'usage des plaisirs, pp. 36-45), and Deleuze, 
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 17-29 (Spinoza: Philosophie pratique, pp. 27-43). This 
distinction maps perfectly onto Chrysippus's distinction between internal and exiernal causes: 
ethics is concerned with tile trallsfonnation of one's internal cause; morality as a system of 
rules or codes is a series of exiernal causes. Of course, many etllical or moral systems can be 
seen to involve a mixture of these two elements and Foucault draws attention to the legislative 
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* * * 
As we have seen, central to the conception of philosophy as an art are the roles 
played by the two components of 'Aoyo<; and a:O'KllO't<;. In the technical 
conception of philosophy, the study of philosophical arguments, theories, and 
doctrines (AoYOt, 9£coP11JlCt'tCt, 8oYJlCt'tCt) is merely the first part of a 
philosophical education. Once these have been mastered there will then be a 
period a practical training (a:aKllat<;) in which the apprentice will attempt to 
digest this material in order to produce the actions or product (epyov) 
appropriate to his art. II 
Although the practitioner of the art of living will, like other artists and 
craftsmen, be able to give a rational account (AOyO<;) of what it is that he is 
doing, it must be stressed that, as with other arts, this always remams 
secondary. Although the expert shoemaker can, if cross-examined, gIve an 
account (wyo<;) of the principles underpinning what he is doing, his primary 
job is to make shoes. The same applies to the philosopher whose primary job -
according to the technical conception of philosophy - is to produce 
philosophical actions (epyCt), to follow a philosophical way of life (~lo<;). Like 
aspect in ancient ethics in the form of self-imposed niles and regulations; see The [~<;e of 
Pleasure, pp. 29-31 (L 'usage des plaisirs, pp. 41-43). 
II As Sorabji notes, it would be a mistake to present this as first the creation of a theory ~n 
abstract followed by the application of that theory in a somewhat automatic ,vay (see 'Is StOle 
Philosophy Helpful as Psychotherapy?', p. 209). Instead, these two elements ~e both 
constitutive of philosophy conceived as a 't£XVll which is at once both theoretIcal ~d 
practical. The division into these two stages, as with the threefold divisio~ of philos?phical 
discourse, is primarily an educational device rather than a substantive clalIll eoneenung the 
nature of philosophy. 
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the shoemaker, the philosopher can, if cross-examined, gIve an account 
(Aoyo<;) of the principles underpinning that way of life. However, that account 
will always remain secondary. 
It has been suggested that m the Hellenistic schools of philosophy 
following a philosophical way of life (l3io<;) often involved simply living 
according to principles (AoYOt) already developed within the philosophical 
school to which one was drawn and thus, in general, did not involve any 
independent thought of one's own. 12 I do not want to enter into a discussion of 
the question of whether this is a fair portrait of Hellenistic philosophical 
practice here. Rather, I simply note that the technical conception of philosophy 
in no way precludes independent or original thought. It is perfectly possible to 
conceive a philosophical student who studies philosophical arguments and 
doctrines with a view not simply to repeat the opinions of others but rather to 
develop his own system of philosophical doctrines based upon his own 
arguments. 13 What the technical conception of philosophy proposes is that any 
set of philosophical doctrines is not itself the final product (epyov) of 
philosophy. Those doctrines must next be digested so that they transform the 
soul ("''OX'll) and are expressed in one's actions (epya). It is these actions 
(epya) made according to philosophical principles (Ka-cu AOYov) that form the 
final product (epyov) of philosophy conceived as a performative art 
(1tpaK'CtK'll -c£XVll). 
12 See the discussion in Sedley, 'Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World'. 
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2. Two Conceptions of Philosophical Knowledge 
This technical conception of philosophy conceives philosophical knowledge 
(£1ttG'tlU.1ll) as technical knowledge, its paradigm being the kind of knowledge 
found in an art or craft ('tEXVll). This is clearly very different from an account 
of philosophy in which knowledge (£1tHnllJlll) is conceived as rational 
explanation or intellectual analysis (A6yo~). It is particularly important to be 
precise here. In attempts to draw a distinction between philosophy primarily 
concerned with theoretical knowledge and philosophy primarily concerned 
with practical wisdom, an implicitly Aristotelian distinction is sometimes 
drawn between £1ttG'tl1Jlll and <pp6Vll(H~.14 While the former is said to focus 
upon a rational understanding of the world, the latter is said to focus upon how 
one should act. 
For the Stoics, there is no conceptual distinction between knowledge 
(bncr'tl1Jl11) and wisdom (<pp6Vl1crt~, cro<pta). Presenting philosophy as 
something concerned with one's life does not involve a rejection or 
devaluation of theoretical or scientific knowledge (£1ttcr'tllJlll) but rather a 
different conception of such knowledge. The distinction, then, is not between 
knowledge (bnG'tllJlll) and wisdom (<pp6vllGt~, cro<pta) but rather between 
two distinct conceptions of knowledge (t1ncr'tl1Jlll)· The first conceives 
knowledge as rational understanding primarily expressed in words; as ~v6yo~. 
13 This is of course precisely what 'heterodox' Stoics such as Antipater and Posidonius did 
with respect to those parts of Stoic philosophy that they felt were untenable. 
14 See e.g. Critchley, Continental Philosophy, pp. 1-11: 'The Gap between Knmvledge and 
Wisdom'. 
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The second conceives knowledge as technical knowledge analogous to the 
expert knowledge of a craftsman; as 'tt:XVTJ. As we have already seen, the 
second of these conceptions does not reject the first but rather incorporates it 
as one of its essential components, supplementing it with training or exercise 
(acrKll(Jl~) that will translate it into actions (epyex). 
3. Philosophy and Biography 
In the light of this summary, we are now in a position to return to the question 
concerning the relationship between philosophy and biography. With the 
technical conception of philosophy, philosophical ideas or doctrines are 
primarily expressed in one's behaviour. Consequently it forms an ideal 
foundation from which one might explore the idea that a philosopher's 
doctrines will be expressed in his life. Moreover, it also gIves a new 
philosophical significance to a biographical account of a philosopher's life, for 
if, according to this conception, philosophy is primarily expressed in actions 
rather than words, then the best way in which to uncover an individual's 
philosophical position will be by an examination of their life. It will, in the 
words of Nietzsche, enable one to examine a philosopher through what he did 
rather than what he said, let alone what he wrote. 15 
The significance assigned to biographical information by the technical 
conception of philosophy is reflected, as we have seen, in the importance often 
15 See Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as Educator § 3 (KGWIII L 346: Complete Work<>, Yol. 2, pp. 
183-84), quoted in the Introduction. 
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attached to such material in antiquity. A number of ancient philosophical 
schools attached considerable significance to biographical and anecdotal 
literature, and it was often thought essential to study the life of a philosopher 
before commencing the study of his ideas. The technical conception of 
philosophy offers a framework within which one might comprehend the 
importance attached to such literature. If philosophy conceived as an art is 
primarily concerned with transforming one's life (~io~) then it should not be 
surprising that the clearest written expression of an individual's philosophy 
may well be a written account of his life. 
4. Three Different Types of Philosophical Text 
One can see, then, that with the technical conception of philosophy a new 
philosophical significance may be attached to a written biography. In general, 
modern philosophical texts tend to conform to a single model which may be 
seen as a variation upon the ancient philosophical treatise exemplified by the 
surviving works of Aristotle. For some, this type of text may be supplemented 
with philosophical commentaries dealing with existing texts and this may be 
seen as a variation upon another model already present in antiquity in the 
works of commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
With the technical conception of philosophy, the matter is complicated 
somewhat. Alongside such treatises and commentaries, not only do 
biographies gain a new philosophical significance but also texts such as 
Epictetus's Handbook and Marcus Aurelius's Meditations. As we have seen, 
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these latter texts may be characterised as texts concerned with spiritual 
exercises.
16 
With the technical conception of philosophy, then, there are a 
three main types of philosophical text: 
1. Literature concerned with actions (Epya): 
biographical literature, anecdotal material 
2. Literature concerned with arguments and doctrines (/",0YOt): 
( a) theoretical treatises such as those by Aristotle 
(b) commentaries such as those by Alexander of Aphrodisias 
3. Literature concerned with spiritual exercises (ao"Kito"€t~): 
(a) texts for guiding exercises such as Epictetus's Handbook 
(b) texts written as exercises such as Marcus Aurelius's Meditations 
As we have seen in Chapter One, in later antiquity it was often suggested that 
philosophical education should begin with the study of a philosopher's life 
(~io~). Then, following Epictetus's account of philosophical education 
outlined in Chapter Five, the student should next study arguments and 
doctrines (AOYOt) before finally moving on to engage in exercises (ao"KitO"£t~) 
16 A munber of other works have been proposed as further examples of teA1s devoted to 
spiritual exercises. These include Seneca's Epistulae (by Nussbaum, The Therapy o/Desire, p. 
337), Ps.-Seneca's De Remediis Fortuitorum (by Newman. 'Theory and Practice of the 
meditatio', p. 1477), Simplicius's In Epicteti Enchiridiol1 (by 1. Hadot, Le probleme du 
lU?oplatonisme alexandrin, pp. 164-65), Plato's dialogues (by P. Hadot, Philosophy as a TVay 
of Life, p. 91), and Sextus Empiricus's Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (by Hankinson, The Sceptics. 
pp. 305-06). Another example would be Epicurus's Epistulae. 
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designed to digest those arguments and doctrines. The final goal is of course to 
transform one's life into one similar to those studied at the very outset. We 
have, then, three main types of philosophical literature corresponding to three 
distinct stages in a plan for a philosophical education. 
Thus the technical conception of philosophy enables one to reassess what 
texts may and may not be described as philosophical. As well as enabling one 
to reassess the philosophical significance of biographical literature, it also 
enables one to reassess the status of texts such as the Handbook of Epictetus or 
the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. As we have seen, these texts form a 
compact distillation of Stoic philosophy designed to aid the student in the 
digestion of complex philosophical doctrines that he has already studied in 
detail. They function as an aide nlenloire for the student who, for instance, 
understands fully the principles involved in the Stoic analysis of impressions 
and judgements, but has not yet managed to train himself fully to assent only 
to adequate impressions. When approached within the context of the technical 
conception of philosophy, texts such as these gain a greater philosophical 
significance. 
5. The Persistence of the Technical Conception of Philosophy 
Despite the way in which the technical conception of philosophy may enable 
one to understand better the relationship between philosophy and biography 
and the way in which it may enable one to reconsider one's assumptions 
concerning what constitutes a philosophical text, it has been objected that it 
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would be pointless to attempt to revive this conception of philosophy. In 
particular, it has been suggested that such a conception of philosophy remains 
tied to the historical and cultural context in which it was produced and that the 
d· b h . 17 Istance etween t at context and our own IS too great. Moreover, it has also 
been suggested that it would be idle to engage in a debate concerning the 
nature and function of philosophy, that philosophy as it is conceived today is 
neither better nor worse than it was in antiquity, just different. 18 Consequently 
it would be foolish to suggest that an ancient conception of philosophy could 
directly inform contemporary philosophical practice. 
What judgements such as these fail to acknowledge is that throughout the 
history of Western philosophy thinkers have repeatedly returned to antiquity 
for inspiration and have drawn upon ancient philosophical resources to help 
them deal with contemporary philosophical problems and to rethink the nature 
of what it is that they are doing. 19 Throughout the Middle Ages, for instance, 
philosophers such as Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury drew upon the 
readily available Latin works of Cicero and Seneca not only for philosophical 
ideas but also for an understanding of the nature and function of philosophy as 
such.20 In the Renaissance the same happened, as can be seen in a work such 
17 See e.g. Williams, 'Do Not Disturb', p. 26. 
18 See e.g. Nehamas, The Art of Living., pp. 1-4. 
19 See the survey in DomaIiski, La philosophie. theorie ou maniere de ,ivre? Les controverses 
de I' Antiguite a la Renaissance. 
20 For the influence of Cicero and Seneca in the Middle Ages see Spanneut, Permanence du 
StoiCisme, pp. 190-202~ Reynolds, The Afedieval Tradition 0.( Seneca's Letters, ~p. ~1-12~; 
also Verbeke, The Presence of Stoicism in Aledieval Thought. For ~lard s~~ his D.l~logliS 
inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum (PL 178.1611-1684, WIth the cnhcal ~dihon by 
Thomas; translation by Spade), esp. 4 (PL 178.1613a = 11. 18-22 ~homa~) .. bl-~2 (PL 
178. 1637a-b = 11. 1283-1305 Thomas). For Jolm of Salisbury - Abelards pupIl m Pans - see 
Iris Policraticus (PL 199.379-822; translation by Nederman), esp. 7.8 (PL 199.651-53). 7.11 
(PL 199.661). 
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as Petrarch's On the Remedies of Both Kinds qf Fortune. 21 In the sixteenth 
century the same occurred as part of the explicit attempt to create a 
'Neostoicism' by Justus Lipsius.22 More recently, as I have already noted in 
the Introduction, Nietzsche developed his own version of this conception of 
philosophy, drawing upon his philological education in ancient philosophy. 23 
Under the influence of Nietzsche, Foucault can also be seen to tum to this 
technical conception of philosophy. 24 Although one might argue that it would 
be a mistake to take Foucault's comments on ancient philosophy in his A 
History of Sexuality out of their genealogical context, nevertheless in a number 
of shorter pieces and interviews Foucault makes it clear that he had a strong 
personal interest in what he calls ancient technologies of the self (technologies 
de soi) and thought that they could have a contemporary relevance.25 Although 
he is careful - and surely correct - to emphasise that it would be a mistake to 
21 See Petrarch De remedUs uiriusque fortunae (Opera, vol. 1, pp. 1-254; no modem critical 
edition exists, extracts in Prose, pp. 606-645; translation by Rawski), esp. the 'Praefatio' 
(Opera, vol. 1, p. 2; Rawski, vol. 1, p. 4). In this teA'"! Petrarch draws upon Cicero's account of 
Stoic theories concerning the emotions and borrows his title from Ps.-Seneca's De Remediis 
Fortuitorum. For further discussion see Panizza, 'Stoic Psychotherapy in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance: Petrarch' s De remedii s' . 
22 See Lipsius De Constantia Libri Duo (1584, 3rd edition 1586: translation by Stradling, 
edited by Kirk), esp. the 'Ad Lectorem' (Kirk, p. 206), 1.10 (Kirk, p. 92). Lipsius was 
principally influenced by Seneca whose works he edited in 1605 and from whom he borrowed 
tlle title De Constantia (from Seneca's De Constantia Sapientis). For further discussion see 
Lagree, Juste Lipse et la restauration du stoidsme; Morford, Stoics and Neostoics, esp. pp. 
160-68; Zanm, La renaissance du stoiCisme au .iTVIe siecle, pp. 151-331; Spanneut, 
Permanence du Stofcisme, pp. 238-55; Copenhaver & Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, pp. 
260-69. Note also Moreau, ed., Le stoicisme au ~lYle et au )(VlIe siecle. 
23 I have argued at greater length elsewhere that Nietzsche's conception of philosophy outlined 
in Schopenhauer as Educator - a conception that Nietzsche later suggests underpinned both 
his subsequent work and Iris own way of life - may be seen to be a technical conception of 
pirilosophy, perhaps implicitly inspired by Socrates. See my fOrtllCOming 'A con~ao 
socnitica de filosofia de Nietzsche em Schopenhauer como Educador'. 
24 See Chapter Five § 2 (b) above. 
25 See e.g. Foucault, 'On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress', in I?its 
et ecrits, vol. 4, pp. 392, 617; Essential Tf'orks, vol. 1, p. 26L and quoted in the IntroductIOn. 
Note also the discussion in 'L'etlrique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberte'. in Dils el 
ecrUs, vol. 4, pp. 708-29: Essential Hlork.s~ vol. 1, pp. 281-301. 
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present this ancient conception of philosophy as some form of originary yet 
tragically forgotten conception of what philosophy truly is, Foucault is equally 
clear that he considers that a contemporary engagement with ancient ideas 
concerning the nature and function of philosophy may well be productive, so 
long as one remembers that the product of this encounter will itself be 
something contemporary. 26 
With so many reappropriations of the technical conception of philosophy 
m so many different historical periods, it becomes al most meaningless to 
characterise this conception of philosophy as 'ancient'. Like so many other 
things with their origins in antiquity, this conception of philosophy has 
become an ever present - if recently neglected - part of the Western 
philosophical tradition.27 As I stressed in the Introduction, it would be a 
mistake to conceive the question concerning the different conceptions of 
philosophy outlined there as an ancient-modern dichotomy. As we have seen, 
in antiquity the distinction between philosophy as '),,6yo~ and philosophy as 
'tEXVl) can be seen in the respective conceptions held by Aristotle and 
26 See e.g. 'L'ethique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberte' (Dits et ecrits, vol. 4, p. 
723; Essential Work~, vol. 1, pp. 294-95), where to the question whether the classical idea of 
care of the self should be updated Foucault replies, "Absolutely, but I would certainly not do 
so just to say, 'We have unfortunately forgotten about the care of the self~ so here, here it is, 
the key to everything.' Nothing is more foreign to me than the idea that, at a certain moment, 
philosophy went astray and forgot something, that somewhere in its history there is a 
principle, a foundation that must be rediscovered. I feel that all such forms of analysis, 
whether they take a radical form and claim that philosophy has from the outset been a 
forgetting, ~r whether they take a much more historical viewpoint and say, 'Such and such a 
philosopher forgot something' - neither of these approaches is particularly interesting or 
useful. Which does not mean that contact with such and such a philosopher may not produce 
something, but it must be emphasised that it would be something new". 
27 As Nussbuam notes (The Therapy of Desire, p. 4), this conception of philosophy, al~ough 
influential throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance, suffered considerable neglect m the 
twentieth century. 
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Socrates, while more recently it can be seen with Hegel and Nietzsche.28 \Vhat 
we have, then, are two alternative conceptions of philosophy, both present in 
antiquity and both present today. To be sure, neither can claim superiority over 
the other on either originary or evolutionary grounds. Yet both exist and the 
aim of this study has been to affirm a pluralism concerning how one might 
conceive the nature and function of philosophy by attempting to offer a 
detailed account of the precise nature of philosophy conceived as a texvTJ 1tEpt 
tOY ~iov. 
b" ted in the 
28 Or more recently still, in the debate beh,"'een Williams and Sora ~1, no 
Introduction. 
ADDITIONAL NOTES 
Additional Note 1 (on Socrates) 
The problem of determining to what ex1ent Plato's literary character 'Socrates' represents the 
\I""~ historical Socrates is of course HtetC ibf,. complex and may well be insoluble. Putting to one 
side Plato's portrait of Socrates' personal characteristics, the problem may be simplified to 
that of determining to what ex1ent Plato's literary character presents the philosophical views 
of the historical Socrates and to what extent he presents the views of Plato himself. Numerous 
approaches to this problem exist and it may be helpful to outline the more prominent ones 
very briefly (and thus inevitably somewhat crudely): 
a) Everything said by Plato's character may be attributed to the historical Socrates (e.g. 
Burnet, Greek Philosophy; Taylor, Socrates), with the result tImt everyihing that lms 
traditionally been called 'Platonic philosophy' is held to be 'Socratic', including the theory of 
Forms. 
b) Plato's dialogues may be arranged on stylistic grounds into a chronological order of 
composition and in tlle earlier dialogues a distinct set of philosophical opinions can be found 
which reflects the ideas of the historical Socrates (e.g. Vlastos, 'Socrates'; Socrates: Ironist 
and Aforal Philosopher). 
c) Wherever an idea presented by Plato's character is corroborated by both Xenophon and 
Aristotle then tImt idea may be attributed to the historical Socrates (e.g. Zeller, Socrates and 
the Socratic Schools; Guthrie, History, vol. 3: Gulley, The Philosophy o.fSocrates). 
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d) The account of Socrates in Plato's Apology has a unique status insofar as it reports ajt. 
Jy~/w. steric~ event and ideas presented by Plato's characters in the dialogues may only be taken 
to be 'Socratic' if they can also be found in the Apology (e.g. Kalm, Plato and the Socratic 
Dialogue). 
It is clearly not possible to assess each of these approaches here or to offer a full 
justification for my own approach. Broadly speaking I follow the last of the approaches 
outlined above, taking Plato's Apology as my point of departure for the historical Socrates. A 
number of conunentators have noted that, of all Plato's works, the only one that claims to 
report a public event is the Apology (see Burnet, Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and 
CrUo, pp. 63-64; Ross, 'TIle Problem of Socrates', p. 36; Vlastos, 'The Paradox of Socrates', 
pp. 3-4; Kalm, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, esp. pp. 88-95). It has been suggested that, 
although still a literary recreation, this text - and this teAt alone - would have been produced 
under certain external constraints if it were to appear convincing to Plato's contemporaries, 
many of whom would have been at the trial themselves or have heard first hand accounts of it. 
Unlike the Apology, all of Plato's early dialogues present private conversations and thus 
would not have been subject to any comparable external constraints. Moreover, it is the only 
Platonic account of a conversation by Socrates at which Plato claims to have been present (see 
Apologia 34a, 38b) and, as Ross notes, this may be seen as a "gentle hint at the historicity of 
this work" ('The Problem of Socrates', p. 36). On the basis of this, a 'minimal' approach to 
the Platonic characterisation of Socrates has been proposed (by Kalm), that is, one that accepts 
the testimony only of the Apology with any measure of trust, and draws upon the early 
dialogues onl;y when they present or elaborate ideas corroborated by the Apology (Hackforth 
expresses some doubts concerning tlns approach but nevertlleless comes to a similar 
conclusion; see The Composition of Plato's Apology, esp. p. 146). Of course, it goes without 
saying tlmt the text of the Apology is Plato's literary creation rather than a word for word 
report of what was said at Socrates' trial. Its unique status is thus not as an impeachable 
historical record but rather simply as the best point of departure for an understanding of the 
historical Socrates (recently Morrison, 'On tlle Alleged Historical Reliability of Plato's 
Apology', has raised some doubts concerning tlns approach; however his arguments against 
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treating the Apology as a straightforward report of the trial do not appear to invalidate the 
claim that it nevertheless remains our best point of departure). 
In theory, at least, the arguments put fonvard by Ross, Vlastos, and Kahn concerning 
Plato's Apology should also apply to Xenophon's Apology (other 'apologies' now lost 
included one by Lysias~ see Arethas SchoUa in Platonis Apologiam 18b = SSR I B 51). 
However, whereas Plato is generally agreed to have been present at the trial, Xenophon's 
Apology is based upon a second-hand account from Hermogenes (see XenophonApoiogia 2), 
although Hackforth suggests that Xenophon's may well have been written first (see The 
Composition of Plato 'sApology, pp. 8-46). 
Montuori has shown that a prioritisation of Plato's Apology has repeatedly marked 
attempts to lUlcover the historical Socrates (see his Socrates: Physiology of a .A1yth, pp. -1-2-
53). However he argues against placing too much faith in this texi, suggesting that tlle 
Apology is a mythical and poetical creation that should be treated as a quasi-historical 
document. In particular he suggests that traditionally the reliability of the Apology has been 
assumed on the basis of the account it contains of the pronouncement of the Delphic oracle 
concerning Socrates' wisdom (see ibid., esp. pp. 47-50). Montuori argues against the historical 
truth of the oracle and thus refuses to grant tlle Apology a privileged position. Without wanting 
to COlllinent on Montuori's complex argument concerning the oracle I simply note that this 
does not affect the point made by Ross, Vlastos, and Kahn concerning the public nature of the 
event reported in the Apology. In this study, then, I shall continue the tradition of prioritising 
the Apology as a key source for the historical Socrates, but I do so only provisionally and hope 
to investigate the matter further at a later date. 
For further discussion of what has come to be known as 'the problem of Socrates' see the 
works by Gulley, Guthrie, Kahn, Montuori, Ross, Taylor. and Vlastos mentioned above plus 
Lacey, 'Our Knowledge of Socrates', and the papers collected in vol. 1 of Prior, Socrates: 
Critical Assessments. For an historical appraisal of the development of tIus problem since the 
18th century see Montuori's De Socrate Iuste Damnato and The Socratic Problem: The 
History - T71e Sources. For further comment on tile status of the Apology as a source for the 
historical Socrates see Brickhouse & SllUth, Socrates on Trial, pp. 2-10. 
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Additional Note 2 (on Stoicism) 
The term 'Stoic' refers to the philosophical school founded by Zeno of Citimn in c. 300 Be 
which continued to exert an influence at least until the time of Marcus Aurelius (d. AD 180) 
but probably right up lmtil the end of the classical period (note the references in Porphyry Vita 
Plotini 17 and Damascills Historia Philosophica 46d apud PhOtillS Bibliotheca cod. 242 
(339aI7-20) = Epictetus test. 42 Schenld). In contrast to Epicureanism, Stoicism was a 
philosophical school named after a place rather than a master, suggesting a less dogmatic 
outlook (see Brunschwig, 'La philosophie it l'epoque heUenistique', p. 512). Indeed, in 
antiquity the Stoics appear to have been renowned for internal bickering and dispute (see e.g. 
Numenius apud Eusebius 14.5.4 (728a = SVF 2.20); Seneca Epistulae 33.4; however note 
Sedley's reservations concerning the traditional iInage of Stoic liberalism in his 'Philosophical 
Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World', esp. pp. 97-103). Some of these differences 
occasionally make generalisations concerning 'the Stoics' difficult. I shall try to avoid such 
problems by naming the Stoics connected with the sources that I shall use and by drawing 
attention to matters of internal dispute where they become relevant. 
For ancient histories of the early Stoics see Book 7 of Diogenes Laertius and 
Philodemus's Stoicorum Historia (PHerc 1018). For modem accounts of the history of the 
school see Dorandi in (71HP. pp. 37-43; Brun, Le stolCisme, pp. 7-26. 
Additional Note 3 (on the texts of Epictetus) 
The Dissertationes (Ata.'tPl(3a.i) of Epictetus were probably written by his pupil Arrian, as 
Arrian hinlself states in his prefatory letter, perh.:'lps sometime around the year 108 (see Millar, 
'Epictetus and the Imperial Court', p. 142; Stadter, Arrian of Nicomedia, p. 28: Souilhe, pp. 
xix-x,\:). However a few scholars have suggested that they may have been written by Epictetus 
himself (see e.g. Dobbin, pp. xxi-xxii, following Stellwag: also Souiihe, pp. ~,y-:\\·ii) and some 
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support for this suggestion might be seen in the (sometimes unreliable) Suidae Lexicon S.li. 
'EniK'tTJWC; (E 2424 = test. 21 Schenkl) which claims that Epictetus "Tote much (E'Ypa 'l1E 
noAAa). These texts appear to record Epictetus's lectures at Nicopolis and are \uitten in 
Koine Greek, the popular Greek of the New Testament, in contrast to Arrian's other works 
which are in a more literary Attic Greek. Four books survive out of a possible total of eight 
(see Photius Bibliotheca cod. 58 (l7b1l-20 = test. 6 Schenkl) who mentions eight books of 
~ta'tptl3ai) and the fact that more than four books once existed is confirmed by Aulus 
Gellius's reference to a fifth book (See Aulus Gellius 19.1.14 = fro 9 Schenkl, although he uses 
the title 8taAe~£tC;; see Souilhe, pp. xiii). Photius also mentions another work - the 
Conversations or Lessons (,OlltAiat) - in twelve volumes, but this is generally thought to be 
mistaken (see Photius Bibliotheca cod. 58 (17b1l-20 = test. 6 Schenkl) & Souilhe, p. ~·viii). 
The issue is confused further by the number of different names used by ancient authors (for 
further discussion see Souilhe, pp. xi-xix.). The Enchiridion ('EYXHpiolOV) was, according to 
Simplicius, also compiled by Arrian as a summary of the Dissertationes, presumably 
summarising the content of the now lost books as well as those still extant (see Simplicius In 
Epicteti Enchiridion Praef. 4-7 Hadot = test. 3 Schenkl). 
The tex1 of the surviving books of the Dissertationes derives from a single MS now held 
in the Bodleian Library. Oxford (Auct. T.4.13 = Graec. Misc. 251), from which all the other 
surviving MSS have been shown to derive. All of the other surviving MSS of the 
Dissertationes contain a laclUla in 1.18 where in the Bodleian MS there is a smeared ink blot 
(MS fo1. 25r), indicating that they all ultimately derive from this single copy (see Mowat 'A 
Lacuna in Arrian', pp. 60-63; Schenkl, p. Iv: Souilhe, pp. lxxi-lxxii; Dobbin, p. 171). In 
contrast, the Enchiridion has been transmitted in so many MSS, including those of 
Simplicius's commentary and a number of Christian adaptations, that Oldfather was led to 
proclaim that the task of producing a new critical edition was too great compared to any likely 
benefit (see Oldfather (LCL), vol. 2, p. 480). This immense task has now been completed by 
Boter whose new edition also includes the Christian adaptations. 
In general I have relied upon the LCL edition by Oldfather which is based upon Schenkl' s 
1916 BT edition which, in tum, is based upon the Bodleian MS. For the Enchiridion I ha\c 
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regularly consulted Boter as well. Schenkl' s edition includes an invaluable Index Verborum. I 
have also consulted the older editions by Wolf (1595-96), Upton (1 TH). and Schweighauser 
(1798, 1799-1800). The editions by Oldfather and Boter contain English translations. The 
Handbook is translated along with Simplicius's commentary by George Stanhope (1694). 
Note also the translations with commentaries by Dobbin (Discourses Book 1) and Pierre 
Hadot (Afanuel d'Epictete). Fuller lists can be found in Oldfather, Contributions Tmvard a 
Bibliography of Epictetus, updated by Contributions To-ward a Bibliograp/~y of Epicfetus: A 
Supplement. A survey of recent scholarship can be found in Hershbell, 'The Stoicism of 
Epictetus: Twentieth Century Perspectives' . 
Additional Note 4 (on the text of Marcus Aurelius) 
The ftifeditations - or To Himse?('tCx. Ell; £a'lnov) - were probably written ,vhile Marcus was 
on campaign in Europe~ Books 2 and 3 are headed 'among the Quadi' ('tCx. tv Ko'\)aoO\~) and 
'at Carnuntum' ('tCx. tv KapvouV'tcp) respectively (alternatively, these phrases may belong at 
the ends of Books 1 & 2). Their composition has been dated to c. 171-75 (see Brunt, 'Marcus 
Aurelius in his AIeditations', pp. 18-19~ Birley, Afarcus Aurelius, p. 227; Farquharson, p. 
lxxiii). It is generally agreed that Book 1 was written last and is to a certain extent independent 
of the rest of the text (see Rutherford's Introduction to Farquharson's translation, p. x'Vi: 
Birley, ll4arcus Aurelius, p. 227). 
The text oftheAfeditations derives primarily from two sources, a MS in the Vatican (Vat. 
Gr. 1950) and the relatively late editio princeps of 1558 by Xylander which was based upon 
the now lost Palatine MS (for the early editions and reception see Kraye, 'Ethnicorum 
omnium sanctissimus: Marcus Aurelius and his Jvleditations from Xylander to Diderot'). Other 
MSS supply only extracts (see Farquharson, pp. xxxii-xlii). 
In general I have relied upon the edition of Farqullarson but I have also always had the 
LCL edition by Haines at hand. Other editions worthy of note include Dalfen (Bn, Leopold 
(OCn, and Theiler. Dalfen's edition includes a helpful Index Verborum. Illaye also consulted 
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the earlier edition by Gataker (1652) and the edition of Book 4 v\ith commentary by Crossley_ 
The editions by Haines and Farquharson contain English translations. For further 
bibliographical information see Wickham Legg, 'A Bibliography of the Thoughts of Marcus 
Aurelius Antoninus', and DaIfen, pp. xxxii-xxxviii. 
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GLOSSARY OF GREEK WORDS AND PHRASES 
The following list includes only the more important Greek terms that appear in 
this study and focuses only upon the meanings relevant here. The obvious 
place for further information is of course Liddell and Scott's Greek-English 
Lexicon, revised by Jones (LSJ). I have also benefited from consulting 
Urmson's The Greek Philosophical VocabulalY. Where I have referred to 
Latin terms I have generally specified the Greek terms to which they 
correspond and therefore I have not thought it necessary to list them separately 
here. An index of Latin to Greek correspondences can be found in volume 4 of 
SVF. 
&v8pco1to<; (anthropos), pI. &V8pC01t01 (anthropoi): human being, often used in Stoicism to 
refer to an ideal human being and as a synonym for the sage. 
apE'tTt (arete), pI. apE'ta.i (aretai): human excellence, goodness. virtue. 
&OlCllO'l<; (askesis), pI. aO'1cTtO'Et<; (askeseis): exercise, training. practice. 
&OlCllO'1.<; 't~ 'II'Oxfi<; (ask.esis tes psuches): exercises of the soul, 'spiritual exercises'. 
a'ta.pa.~ia. (ataraxia): tranquillity, literally 'untroubled' or 'undisturbed'. 
f3fA't10''tO<; (beltistos): the best, most excellent, that which an art aims at. 
f3io<; (bios), pI. f3i01 (bioi): way of life, manner of living, title of a "ritten biography. 
GLOSSARY 
Y'UJ1vacn:n:'ll (gumnastike): gymnastics, athletic training, the art that takes care of the body. 
ota.8£(n~ 'tf1~ '/f'Oxf1~ (diathesis tes psuches): a state or disposition of the soul. 
OtKatoOUVTJ (dikaiosune): justice, righteousness. 
oOYJ1a (dogma), pI. oOYJ1(X,'ta (dogmata): philosophical doctrine, opinion. 
oo~a (doxa): belief, opinion. 
£.aisro (ethizo): to accustom. 
t8tcrJ10~ (ethismos): habituation, accustoming. 
EeOC; (ethos): habit, custom. 
E"K"K/,tCJt~ (ekklisis), pI. tKKAiO£t~ (ekkliseis): aversion. 
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EJ1£'tO~ (emetos): vomit~ Epictetus's characterisation of undigested philosophical doctrines. 
EJ11t£tpia "Kat 'tptj3'll (empeiria kat tribe): empirical knack or routine gained by practice rather 
than theoretical understanding. 
E1tt}.I.EA£ta (epimeleia): care, attention. 
E1ttJ1£A£1cr8at 'tfj~ 'I''Uxfj~ (epimeleisthai tes psuches): to take care of one's soul. 
E1tto't'llJ1TJ (episteme): knowledge, understanding, especially scientific knowledge. 
E1tOX'll (epoche): suspension of judgement. 
EpyOV (ergon), pI. Epya (erga): product, action, deed, work, function. 
e.pya "Kat ')..oYOt (erga kat logoi): 'deeds and words', that is, harmony between behaviour and 
speech. 
epya ou ')..oyot (erga ou logoi): 'deeds not words', actions rather than theoretical explanations. 
£uoatJ1ovia (eudaimonia): well-being, prosperity, happiness. 
£u£~ia (euexia): a good state or condition. 
EC/>' 1)J11V (eph' hemin): that which is 'up to us', in our control, in our power. 
1)Y£J10VtKOV (hegemonikon): the governing principle or most authoritative part of the soul. 
1l80~ (ethos): character, disposition. 
8£pa1t£ia (therapeia): therapy, medical treatment, cure. 
8£roPTJJ1a (theorema), pI. 8£rop'llJ1a'ta (theoremata): theory, speculation, scheme, plan. 
8£roPTJ'ttK'll 'tEXVTJ: see under'tExvTJ· 
8£ropia (theoria): theory, speculation, contemplation. 
Pi .til 
GLOSSARY 
ta'tplKl} (iatrike): medicine, the art that restores the good state of the body. 
to'00'6EV£ta (isostheneia): equipollence. a state of balance. 
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Ka6fjKov (kathekon), pI. Kael}Kov'ta (kathekonta): that which is appropriate, an appropriate 
action. 
Ka'ta VOJ.LOV (kata nomol1): in accordance with custom or convention. 
Ka'ta qruO'tV (kata phusin): in accordance with nature. 
K'tTJ'ttKl} 'tEXVTJ: see under 'tEXVll. 
AOYOc;, (logos). pI. AOYOt (logoi): account, principle, rational e~'PlanatioR theory, argument, 
word, literally 'something said'. 
J.L£AE'tll (melete): care, attention, treatment, exercise. practice. 
VOJ.L06£'ttKl} (nomothetike): legislative, relating to legislation. 
vOJ.Loc;, (nomos): custom, convention, law. 
v60'0c;, (nosos): disease, sickness. 
OJ.LOAoYO'UJ.LEvroc;, 'tTI q)'oO'£t ~ 11V (homologoumeos tei phusei zen): living in accordance with 
nature; the goal of Stoic philosophy. 
op£~tc;, (orexis), pI. OPE~£tc;, (orexeis): desire. 
optO'J.Loc;, (horismos), pI. optO'J.LOt (horismoi): definition. 
opJ.Ll} (horme), pI. opJ.Lat (hormai): impulse. 
1ta60c;, (pathos). pI. 1ta61l (pathe): emotions, passions, diseases of the souL 
1tEO'O'ro (pesso): to digest; the process by which philosophical doctrines are absorbed into the 
souL 
1tE'I'tc;, (pepsis): digestion. 
1tV£uJ.LO: (pneuma): breath, spirit, vital breath or spirit; one of the two principles in Stoic 
physics. 
1tOtll'ttKl} 'tEXVll: see under'tExvll· 
1tOAt'ttKl} (politike): relating to citizens, political. 
1tpaK'ttKl} 'tEXVTJ: see under'tExvTJ· 
1tpoo:ip£O'tc;, (proairesis): an individual's faculty of choice or judgement or will. 
= 
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1tpOKOnl1 (prok£Jpe): one who is 'making progress', especially philosophical progress towards 
the ideal of the sage. 
1tpOXEtPOs (procheiros): at hand, ready to hand, readily accessible. 
oocpia (sophia): wisdom. 
oOCPOs (sophos): one who is wise, a sage. 
01tEPJ.la'ttKOs ,)..1),'(os (spermatikos logos): generative principle of the cosmos. 
o1to'Uoaios (spoudaios): one who is good, excellent (opposed to cpauAos), used in Stoicism as 
a synonym for sage. 
o'toxao'ttKl1 (stochastikel: 'stochastic', skilful in aiming at, describes an art ill which 
successful practice does not guarantee the goal. 
o'toxao'ttKl1 'tEXVTJ: see under 'tEXVTJ. 
o'UYKa'ta6Eots (sunkatathesis), pI. o'UYKa'ta6EoEt.<; (sunkatatheseis): assent. 
'tEAO<; (telos): end, goal, purpose. 
'tEXVt'tTJs (technites): an expert, a skilled craftsman. 
'tEXVTJ (techne), pI. 'tEXVat (technai): art, craft, skill, expertise. A number of distinct types of 
'tEXVll can be distinguished: 
- 6EroPTJ'ttKl1 'tEXVTJ (theoretike techne): theoretical art, such as mathematics. 
- K'tTJ'ttKl1 'tEXVTJ (ktetike techne): acquisitive art, such as fishing or hunting. 
- 1tOtTJ'ttKl1 'tEXV11 (poietike techne): productive art, such as building or shoemaking. 
_ 1tpaK'ttKl1 'tEXVTJ (praktike techne): performative or active art, such as music or dancing. 
_ o'tOxao'ttKi1 'tEXV11 ~stochastike techne): stochastic art, such as medicine or navigation. 
'tEXVTJ 1tEpt 'tOY j3iov (tecJ1l1e peri ton bion): the art concerned 'with one's way of life, the art of 
living. 
'tovos (tonos): tension, esp. the tension or state of the soul. 
't01to<; (topos), pI. W1tot (topoi): place, area; in Epictetus it is used to refer to an area or topic 
of study. 
uyiEta (hugieta): health, soundness. 
1>ATJ (hule): matter. 
U1tOA TJ'lIts (hupolepsis), pI. U1tOA l1'llEt<; (hupolepseis): opinion, judgement, value judgement. 
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<pCt.V'tCt.O"tCt. (phantasia), pI. <pCt.V'tCt.O"tCt.t (phantasiai): impression, presentation, appearance. 
<pCt.v'tCt.O"ta KCt.'tCt.A lln'ttK1l (phantasia kataleptike), pI. <pCt.v'tCt.O"tCt.t KCt.'tCt.A lln'ttKCt.t (phantasiai 
kataleptikai): an adequate impression~ alternatively an objective, cognitive. recognisable. 
or convincing impression (or presentation). 
q>Ct.1>AO~ (phaulos) , pI. q>Ct.1>Aot (phauloi): one who is simple, inferior, foolish (opposed to 
O"nouoCt.to~), the opposite of a sage. 
q>tAOO"Oq>tCt. (philosophia): philosophy, the love of wisdom. 
q>tA60"0q>0~ (philosophos): a philosopher, a lover of wisdom. 
q>p6VllO"~ (phronesis): practical wisdom, prudence~ in Stoicism synonymous with O'oq>tCt.. 
q>uO"t~ (Phusis): nature, either nature as a whole or the individual nature or constitution of a 
thing. 
Xp£lCt. (chreia), pI. Xp£tCt.t (chreiai): a maxim involving an anecdote used in order to make a 
philosophical point (literally something of advantage or service). 
'l'UXTJ (psuche): soul, mind, animating force, that by virtue of which something is alive. 
-
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AND AUTHORS 
The following list does not pretend to include every ancient name that appears 
in this study. Dates are of course often far from certain. Further general 
biographical information can be found in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. 
Also useful is Goulet-Caze's 'Catalogue of Known Cynic Philosophers'. 
However, once completed, the definitive guide to ancient philosophers will be 
the Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, pub lie sous la direction de Richard 
Goulet (Paris: CNRS Editions), of which volumes 1 ('A', 1989), 2 ('B-D', 
1994), and 3 ('E-J', 2000) are already available. 
AESCHINES OF SPHETTUS (c. 5th - 4th Cent. BC): associate of Socrates mentioned in the 
Apology and Phaedo; author of Socratic dialogues acknowledged in antiquity for their 
faithfi.I1ness to their subject. Fragments in SSR. 
AETIUS (c. 1st - 2nd Cent. AD): Hypothetical doxographica1 author proposed by Diels whose 
anthology was constructed from the Placita Philosophorum attributed to Plutarch and 
passages in Stobaeus. Text in DG. 
AGRIPPA (c. 1st Cent. AD ?): Othenvise unknmvn Pyrrhonist Sceptic to "hom the FiYe 
Modes of Scepticism are credited. 
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ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS (c. 2nd - 3rd Cent. AD): Holder of the Chair of 
Peripatetic philosophy in Athens created by Marcus Aurelius, and author of scholarly 
commentaries on Aristotle (in CAG). 
ANTIPATER (c. 2nd Cent. BC): Stoic philosopher, successor to Diogenes of Babylon as head 
of tlle school, teacher of Panaetius. Fragments in SVF. 
ANTISTHENES (c. 450 - 360 BC): Companion of Socrates and participant in Xenophon's 
Symposium. Traditionally presented as a genealogical bridge between Socrates and the 
Cynics. Fragments in Decleva Caizzi, Antisthenis Fragmenta, and SSR. 
APOLLONIUS OF TY ANA (c. 1st Cent. AD): Neopythagorean ascetic sage whose life is 
recounted in an extended biography by Philostratus. 
ARISTO (c. 3rd Cent. BC): Stoic philosopher with strong Cynic tendencies. pupil of Zeno. 
Said to have been the most famous philosopher in Athens in his day. Fragments in SVF. 
ARISTOTLE (384 - 322 BC): Pupil of Plato, tutor to Alexander the Great, founder of the 
Lyceum and the Peripatetic tradition. 
ARIUS DIDYMUS (c. 1st Cent. BC): Doxographer whose account of Stoic ethics ,vas 
included in the anthology of Stobaeus. Has been identified with the Alexandrian 
philosopher Arius. 
ARRIAN (c. 2nd Cent. AD): Pupil of Epictetus, compiler of the latter's Dissertationes and 
Enchiridion, and author of various historical works. Said to have modelled llinlself upon 
Xenophon. 
AUGUSTINE (AD 354 - 430): Latin Church Father and Christian Saint who reports a number 
of pagan philosophical doctrines during the course of his polemics against them. 
AULUS GELLIUS (c. AD 130 - 180): Author of an anthology covering a wide range of 
material including much relating to philosophy. Preserves a number of fragments from 
Epictetus and the Early Stoa. 
BION OF BORYSTHENES (c. 325 - 255 BC): Eclectic philosopher with strong Cynic 
tendencies, a pupil of Crates who also studied in the Academy and Peripatos. 
CARNEADES (214 - 129 BC): Platonic philosopher, founder and head of the New Academy. 
member of the embassy of philosophers to Rome in 155 Be. 
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CATO THE YOUNGER (95 - 46 BC): Roman statesman influenced by Stoicism and often 
cited as an example of a Stoic sage. A biography by Plutarch survives. 
CHRYSIPPUS (c. 280 - 207 BC): Stoic philosopher, third head of the school after Zeno and 
Cleanthes. Probably the most important and systematic of the early Stoics who 'Hote 
ex1ensively, almost all of which has been lost. Fragments in STIr. 
CICERO (106 - 43 BC): Roman orator and statesman who presented Greek philosophy in a 
series of philosophical works in a form accessible to a Latin audience. 
CLEANTHES (331 - 232 BC): Stoic philosopher, pupil of Zeno and his successor as head of 
the school. Fragments in SVF. 
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (c. AD 150 - 215): Greek Church Father who reports many 
pagan philosophical doctrines during the course of his polemics against them. 
CRATES (c. 365 - 285 BC): Cynic philosopher, pupil of Diogenes, teacher of Zeno who is 
said to have been drawn to him due to his resemblance to Socrates. Fragments in SSR. 
CRITOLAUS (c. 2nd Cent. BC): Head of the Peripatetic school, member of the embassy of 
philosophers to Rome in 155 BC. 
DAMASCIUS (c. 5th - 6th Cent. AD): Neoplatonist philosopher. teacher of Simplicius, last 
head of the Academy when it was closed by Justinian in AD 529. 
DEMOCRITUS (b. c. 460 BC): Atomist philosopher from Abdera contemporary with 
Socrates. 
DEMONAX (c. AD 70 - 170): Cynic philosopher from Cyprus who lived in Athens, a pupil of 
Epictetus, knmvn primarily via the biography written by his pupil Lucian. 
DIO CHRYSOSTOM (c. AD 40 - 112): Popular philosopher who travelled throughout the 
ancient world teaching a mh.we of Cynicism and Stoicism. He was at one point a pupil 
of Musonius Rufus. 
DIOGENES LAERTIUS (c. early 3rd Cent. AD): Biographer and doxographer whose work is 
an invaluable source for ancient philosophy. 
DIOGENES OF BABYLON (c. 240 - 152 BC): Stoic philosopher, pupil of Chrysppus, head 
of the school after Zeno of Tarsus, teacher of Panaetius. member of the embassy of 
philosophers to Rome in 155 BC. Fragments in SVF. 
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DIOGENES OF SINOPE (c. 400 - 325 BC): Founder of the Cynic moyement famous for his 
scandalous behaviour, teacher of Crates. Fragments in .\j.,)R. 
EPICTETUS (c. AD 55 - 135): Stoic philosopher, pupil of Musonius Rufus, banished from 
Rome by Domitian after which he set up school in Nicopolis. The Discourses of Epictetus 
preserved by Arrian are the single largest surviving Stoic text. 
EPICURUS (341 - 270 BC): Atomist and Hedonist philosopher who founded the school 
named after him. Te)..is preserved in Diogenes Laertius and also in the papyri from 
HerculanemTI. 
FRONTO (c. AD 100 - 166): M.arcus Aurelius's rhetoric teacher whose correspondence \vith 
Marcus was discovered in a palimpsest in the early nineteenth century. 
GALEN (c. AD 129 - 210): Medical author and philosopher, personal physician to Marcus 
Aurelius. 
HERACLITUS (c. 6th - 5th Cent. BC): Presocratic natural philosopher from Ephesus whose 
philosophy formed an important influence upon the development of Stoic physics. 
JULIAN (AD 332 - 363): Roman Emperor influenced by Neoplatonism who attempted to 
revive pagan culture in the face of rising Christianity. Also sympathetic towards certain 
Cynic doctrines. 
LUCIAN (c. AD 120 - 180): Satirist and onetime pupil of the Cynic Demonax who often deals 
with philosophical themes. 
MARCUS AURELIUS (AD 121 - 180): Roman Emperor 161-180, deeply influenced by Stoic 
philosophy and author of the lv/edttalions. 
METROCLES (c. 3rd Cent. BC): Cynic philosopher, brother of Hipparchia and brother-in-law 
of Crates. 
MUSONIUS RUFUS (c. AD 30 - 100): Judged variously as important Stoic philosopher or 
merely a popular moraliser. Occasionally appears in the works of Tacitus. Banished from 
Rome a number of time by different Emperors. Teacher of Epictetus. His Diatribes are 
preserved in Stobaeus. 
OL YMPIODORUS (c. 6th Cent. AD): Neoplatonist philosopher and commentator. 
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PANAETIUS (c. 185 - 109 BC): Stoic philosopher, pupil of Diogenes of Babylon and 
Antipater, teacher of Po sidon ius, succeeded Antipater as head of the school. Fragments in 
van Straaten., Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta. 
PHILODEMUS (c. 110 - 40 BC): Epicurean philosopher and polemecist against the Stoics 
whose library was preserved in the Villa of Papyri at Herculaneum. 
PHOTIUS (c. AD 810 - 893): Byzantine scholar, author of an important compendium 
concerning pagan literature. 
PLATO (c. 430 - 347 BC): Follower of Socrates, teacher of Aristotle, founder of the 
Academy. 
PLOTINUS (AD 205 - 270): Founder of Neoplatonislll, teacher of Porphyry \vho wTote Iris 
biography. 
PLUTARCH (c. AD 50 - 120): Phllosopher and biographer primarily influenced by Platonism, 
author of a number of important polenrical works against the Stoics. 
PORPHYRY (c. AD 230 - 305): Neoplatonist philosopher, pupil and biographer of Plotinus. 
author of logical commentaries on Aristotle. 
POSIDONIUS (c. 135 - 50 BC): Stoic philosopher, pupil of Panaetius, associate of Cicero. 
Fragments in EK. 
PYRRHO (c. 360 - 270 BC): The first Greek sceptical plrilosopher after whom Pyrrhonism is 
named. 
SENECA (c. 4 BC - AD 65): Stoic philosophical author, tutor to Nero, eventually forced to 
commit suicide. 
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS (c. 2nd Cent AD): Sceptical phllosopher and medical doctor, 
polenricist against all dogmatic schools of philosophy including the Stoics. 
SIMON THE SHOEMAKER (c. 5th Cent BC): Associate of Socrates reported to have 
invented the Socratic dialogue. 
SIMPL1CIUS (c. 6th Cent AD): Neoplatonist and important Aristotelian commentator who 
also produced a commentary on Epictetus's Enchiridion. 
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SOCRATES (469 - 399 BC): Probably the most important philosopher in the Western 
tradition, put to death by the Athenian State for corrupting the youth, the first to conceiyc 
philosophy as the art of living, the inspiration for a number of diverse ancient 
philosophical schools. Fragments (beyond the reports of Plato and Xenophon) in SSR. 
STOBAEUS (c. 5th Cent AD): Jolm Stobaeus (Ioannes of Stobi, Skopje in Macedonia), 
compiler of an anthology of philosophical texts designed to aid the education of his son in 
Classical pagan culture. A number of ancient authors survive only thanks to their 
inclusion in this collection, including Arius Didymus and Musonius Rufus. 
STRABO (c. 64 BC - AD 21): Geographer and historian, associate of Posidonius and convert 
to Stoicism. 
TIMON (c. 320 - 230 BC): Sceptical philosopher, follower of Pyrrho. Fragments in PPF. 
XENOPHON (c. 430 - 350 BC): Historian and 'biographer' of Socrates. 
ZENO OF CITIUM (335 - 263 BC): Founder of Stoicism, pupil of Crates, teacher of 
Cleanthes. Inspired to study philosophy after reading Xenophon's portrayal of Socrates in 
the A1emorabilia. Fragments in Sl/F. 
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Fragmenta, ed. Diels & Kranz (DK 22) 
A 15 198 
B 1 128 
B 8 243 
B 12 198 
B 31 243 
B 51 243 
B 61 263 
B 71-75 243 
HIEROCLES 
Elementa Ethica (PBeroI9780), ed. 
Bastianini & Long (CPFI 1,60.1) 
1.12-28 198 
HIPPOCRATES 
DeArte, ed. Jones (LCL) 
8 69 
HIPPOLYTUS 
Refutatio Omnium Haeresfum, ed. 
Wendland 
9.9 (241.19-21 W) 243 
9.10 (243.14-16 W) 263 
ISOCRATES 
Ad Demonicum, ed. Norlin (LCL) 
6 56 
Antidosis, ed. Norlin (LCL) 
304 56 
In Sophistas, ed. Norlin (LCL) 
8 56 
JULIAN 
Orationes, ed. Wright (LCL) 
6.200b 34 
mVENAL 
Saturae, ed. Owen (OCT) 
2.15 27 
13.122 92 
LACTANTIUS 
Divinae lnstitutiones, ed. Migne (PL 6) 
3.15 & 3.16 (PL 6.390-397) 46 
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3.15.1 (PL 6.390-391) 
LUCIAN 
9,88 
Opera, ed. Macleod (OCT) 
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1 
Demonax 
2. 
13 
De Parasito 
4 
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3 
8 
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18 
vltarium Auctio 
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107 
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4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.14 
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4.40 
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5.4 
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6.13 
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238 
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234 
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241 
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234,238 
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241. 244,261 
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6.36 
6.42 
6.48 
7.1 
7.11 
7.32 
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7.47 
7.48 
7.56 
7.64 
7.68 
7.74 
8.3 
8.7 
8.13 
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8.31 
8.47 
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9.7 
9.19 
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9.30 
9.32 
9.36 
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9.42 
10.6 
10.23 
10.33 
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11.4 
11.5 
11.18 
11.33-38 
12.1 
12.8 
12.10 
12.14 
12.18 
12.24 
12.29 
12.32 
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47.236,238 
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240 
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238 
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Reliquiae, ed. Hense (BT); Lutz (1947) 
fr.3 (10.6-7 H, 40.13-14 L) 89 
fr.3 (12.15-19H, 42.19-22L) 171 
fro 6 (22.6-27.15 H, 52.7-56.11 L) 
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fr.6 (24.9-14 H, 54.2-7 L) 177 
fro 6 (25.4-5 H, 54.10 L) 177 
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3·B 
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NEMESIUS 
De Natura Hominis, ed. Morani (BT) 
2 (18.2-10 M) 197.243 
OL YMPIODORUS 
In Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria, ed. 
Westerink (BT) 
3.2 
12.1 
12.1-2 
13.1-2 
13.2 
63 
107. 150 
63 
61. 63 
61 
ORIGEN 
Contra Celsum. ed. Migne (PG 11) 
2.20 (PG 11.837-40) 217,218 
6.2 (PG 11.1289) 16, 136 
PANAETIUS 
Fragmenta, ed. van Straaten 
fro 55 159 
PAPYRI 
POxy 3657; CPFI 1, 100.5. 
2.13-15 89.227 
PHILO 
Quod Deus sit lmmutabilis, ed. Colson 
& Whitaker (LCL) 
35-36 197 
Legum Allegoria, ed. Colson & 
Whitaker (LCL) 
1.57 9,88 
2.22-23 197 
PHILODEMUS 
De Stoicis (pHere 155 & 339), ed. 
Dorandi 
11.~<f,'3 
13.~-lf 
PIDLOSTRATUS 
159 
92,97 
Vita Apollonii. ed. Conybeare (LCL) 
7.34 26 
Vitae Sophistarum, ed. Wright (LCL) 
2.2 (566) 20 
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PHOTIUS 460b-c 79 Bibliotheca, ed. Henry (CUF) 463a-466a 61 
cod. 58 (17bI1-20) 288 463b 62 
cod. 181 (126a5) 32 463d 62 
cod. 212 (l69b26-29) 143 464a 61 
cod. 242 (335b14) 32 464b-465a 108 
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Alcibiades 1, ed. Burnet (OCT) 500c 54 
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127e 56 512a 60 
128a-129a 56 514e 76 
128d 58 527d 77 
129a 58 
130a-c 56 Laches, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
BIb 65 184e-185a 59 
185e 65 
Apologia Socratis, ed. Burnet (1924 188c-d 29 
edn) 193d-e 29,37,78 
21b 146 194e 68 
21c-d 98 
21c-22e 54,83 Meno, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
22c-d 70 70a 77 
25a-b 59 71b 146 
28e 51 71d-72e 148 
29d-e 55 87e 80 
30a-b 56 90d-e 68 
30e 229 
31b 56.72 Phaedo, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
32d 37 60e 60 
34a 285 61a 60 
38a 52 67e 189 
38b 285 
3ge 52 Phaedrus, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
41e 56, 72 246b-e 263 
269d 77 
Charmides, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
165c-d 69 Protagoras, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
165d 66 313a-e 60 
165e 69 319d 57 
165e-166a 68 323d-e 77 
34ge-350a 80 
Crito, ed. Burnet (1924 edn) 352e 79 
43d 229 357b 82 
47a-d 59 360d 80 
47e-48a 60 
Respublica, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
Euthydemus, ed. Burnet (OCT) 333a 57 
275a 72 376e 60 
289b-e 68 397e 57 
290b-c 67,68 443e 57 
486a 263 
Gorgias, ed. Dodds 
Sophista, ed. Burnet (OCT) 447d 57 
450d 68 21ge 68 
450d-e 69 223e 67 
INDEX LOCORUM 
264a-b 251 
Symposium, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
219c 97 
57 221e 
Theaetetus, ed. Burnet (OCT) 
146d 57 
146 
251 
263 
150c-d 
152e 
174d 
PLINY 
Naturalis Historia, ed. Rackham et al. 
(LCL) 
7.211 22 
35.79-97 163 
PLOTlNUS 
Enneades, ed. Henry & Schwyzer 
(OCT) 
l.2 
l.3.2 
1.4 
1.6.9 
2.9 
2.9.15 
6.1.27 
PLUTARCH 
A;foralia 
44 
189 
44 
189 
16, 136 
194 
243 
Adversus Colotem, ed. Einarson & De 
Lacy (LCL) 
1118c 58 
Compendium Argumenti Stoico$' 
Absurdiora Poetis Dicere, ed. Cherniss 
(LCL) 
1057d-e 93 
1058b-c 93 
De Communibus Notitiis, ed. Cherniss 
(LCL) 
1062e 98 
1063a 98 
1063d 93 
1070~1071b 115 
1071b-c 113 
1073e 131 
1085b 243 
1085d 242 
De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, ed. 
Cherniss (LCL) 
1033a b 46 
1034e 14 
345 
1035a 124 
1035a-f 129 
1042d 222 
1042e-f 157 
1044b 159 
1048e 94.95 
1050c-d 219 
1052f 198 
1053f 242 
1055f-1057c 218 
1056b 132 
De Virtute l\;forali, ed. Helmbold (LCL) 
441b-c 131 
441b-d 255 
446~447a 255 
Quaestiones Convivales, ed. Clement et 
al. (LCL) 
613b 9,88 
Vitae Decem Oratorum, ed. Fowler 
(LCL) 
838e 149 
v'itae 
Alexander, ed. Perrin (LCL) 
1.1-3 33 
1.2 33 
Fragrnenta, ed. Sandbach (BT) 
fr.1O 34 
PL UT ARCH (Pseudo-) 
De Exercitatione, trans. Gildemeister & 
Biicheler 
pp. 524-25 180 
PORPHYRY 
Vita Plotini, ed. Henry & Schwyzer 
(OCT) 
1 44 
17 287 
POSIDONIUS 
Fragmenta, ed. Edelstien & Kidd 
test. 75 9, 90 
fr.5 242 
fr.87 124 
fr.88 126 
ff. 139 196 
~1~ 1m 
~1~ 1M 
~1~ 1m 
fro 178 170 
fro 186 99 
INDEX LOCORUM 
fro 187 115 
PROCLUS 
In PlatonisAlcibiadem I, ed.Westerink 
11.3 207 
11.11-15 207 
PROT AGORAS 
Fragmenta, ed. Diels & Kranz (DK 80) 
B 3 75 
B 10 75 
QUINTILIAN 
institutio Oratoria, ed. Butler (LCL) 
1.9.3-5 39 
RUFINUS 
Historia A1onachorum, ed. Migne (PL 
21) 
7 (PL 21.41Od) 176 
29 (PL 21.453d) 176 
SENECA 
De Beneficiis, ed. Basore (LCL) 
5.4.3-4 158 
Dialogi, ed. Reynolds (OCT) 
2. De Constantia Sapientis 
7.1 94,96 
3-5. De ira 
3.36.1-3 235 
9. De Tranquillitate Animi 
8.4-5 158 
Epistulae }..{orales, ed. Reynolds (OCT) 
2.2-4 
6.6 
15.5 
16.1 
16.3 
20.2 
33.4 
38.1 
42.1 
49.2-3 
58.13-15 
70.18 
71.7 
71.31 
75.4 
75.8-18 
82.8 
84.5-8 
89.4 
90.46 
94.1-3 
94.11 
194 
47 
170 
170 
46, 199 
46 
287 
47 
94 
241 
131 
170 
51 
191 
46 
98 
170 
194 
99,130 
170 
120 
120 
346 
94.13 121 
94.17 121 
94.25 121 
94.25-26 210 
94.32 122 
94.38 l70 
94.40-42 122 
94.50 122 
95.4 122 
95.7 9,88 
95.8 9.88 
95.9 9,88 
95.10 122 
95.38 122 
95.59 123 
95.64 123 
99.10 241 
108.36 46 
Naturales Quaestiones, ed. Corcoran 
(LCL) 
l. Praef. 7 241 
Fragmenta, ed. Haase (BT) 
fro 17 
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS 
9.88 
Adversus j\4athematicos, ed. Bury 
(LCL) 
2. Adversus Rhetores 
2.5 
2.10 
7. Adversus Logicos 1 
7.2-23 
7.19 
7.20-23 
7.38 
7.151 
7.152 
7.155 
7.158 
7.227 
7.242-43 
7.243 
7.248 
7.257 
7.393 
7.401-35 
7.424 
7.427-29 
8. Adversus Logicos 2 
8.147 
8.291 
8.317 
10. Adversus Physicos 2 
10.218 
68 
107 
124 
126 
129 
131 
258 
258 
152,258 
143 
150,256 
151. 257 
151,258 
150.257 
151,257 
151. 258 
152 
151 
152 
l5l. 258 
68 
151. 258 
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INDEX LOCORUM 
11. Adversus Ethicos 
11.23 
11.42-140 
11.68-78 
11.110-67 
11.110-18 
1l.118 
11.140 
11.141 
11.147 
11.168-215 
11.168 
11.169 
11.170 
11.173-77 
11.176-77 
11.180 
11.181 
11.182 
11.188-96 
11.197-209 
11.200 
11.203 
11.206-07 
11.209 
90. 131 
138 
247 
164 
162 
143 
143 
143 
143 
137, 139 
139 
139 
88, 109, 139 
140 
142 
9 
94, 145 
150, 153 
157 
154 
155 
155 
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9, 156 
Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, ed. Bury 
(LCL); Mutsclunatm & Mau (BT) 
1.3 161 
1.12 142, 162 
1.13-15 161 
1.13 144, 153 
1.25-30 142 
1.25 162 
1.26 162, 163 
1.28 163 
1.29-30 144 
1.160 159 
1.165 141 
1.169 152 
3.168-238 138 
3.179 138 
3.180-82 138 
3.188 150 
3.190 138 
3.199-201 157 
3.205-207 157 
3.235 138 
3.235-36 144 
3.239-249 137. 139 
3.239 139, 140 
3.240 145 
3.241 150 
3.242 150, 152 
3.243 154 
3.244 155 
3.245-248 157 
3.249 
3.272 
3.273 
3.280 
347 
157 
9 
9 
164 
SIMPLICIUS 
In Aristotelis Physica. ed. Diels (C4G 
9-10) 
303.10-11 66 
In Epicteti Enchiridion. ed. I. Hadot 
Praef. 1-..j. 
Praef. 4-7 
Praef. 7-9 
Praef. 18-20 
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Praef. 61-81 
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Praef. 87-90 
1.305-315 
10.11-15 
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49.4-6 
64.27-30 
71.34-35 
71.44-47 
205 
209 
206 
207 
208 
207 
207 
255 
253 
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47 
194 
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STOBAEUS 
Anthologium, ed. Wachsmuth & Hense 
2.1.31 (2. 13.5-1..j..8 WH) 261 
2.7.5-12 (2.57.13-116.18 WH) 
see Arius Didymus 
2.8.30 (2.159.25-160.11 WH) 254 
2.15.36 (2.191.9 WH) 29 
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2.31.79 (2.215.8-10 WH) 56 
3.29.78 (3.648.1-651.21 WH) 
170, 177 
3.29.80 (3.652.22-23 WH) 75 
4.32.21 (5.786.1-10 WH) 39 
STRABO 
Geographica, ed. Leonard Jones (LCL) 
1.1.1 9.90 
1.2.34 90 
SUDA 
Suidae Lexicon, ed. Adler (BT) 
S.v. 'APXTt (A 4092) 242 
s. v. 'En:ilC'tll'tO<; (E 2..j. 24) 288 
s. v. <Daio(J)v (<D 154) 5 7 
TACITUS 
Annales, ed. Fisher (OCT) 
13.42 46 
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THEMISTIUS 
De Anima, ed. Spengel in Themistii 
Paraphrases Aristotelis (BT) 
1.5 (2.64.25-28 S) 197 
Orationes, ed. Downey & Norman (BT) 
6.81c 235 
TIMON 
Fragmenta, ed. Diels (PPF) 
test. 2 143 
fr.74 144 
VARRO 
De Re Rustica, ed. Hooper & Ash 
(LCL) 
2.11.10 22 
XENOPHON 
Apologia Socratis, ed. Marchant (OCT) 
2 286 
3 29,37,85 
20 59 
3~8 
A1emorabilia, ed. Marchant (OCT) 
1.2.3 U7 
1.2.4 56 
1.2.19 77. 174 
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59 
38 
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